Gonzalez Lodge, Commentary on Plato: Gorgias

ἀγαθὸν . . . τελέως: ‘the perfection of goodness.’ Cope. All the virtues combined make the ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα. Wisdom is omitted, probably because Socrates has in mind only the earlier discussion, and besides he is taking for the moment the popular point of view; hence the collocation of ὅσιον with δίκαιον, as in Protagoras. Besides, as Socrates' view was that all evil-acting springs from ignorance, the fact that a man wàs δίκαιος, ἀνδρεῖος, and ὅσιος would presuppose the possession of wisdom.

τὸν δ᾽ εὖ πράττοντα κτἑ.: not in the sense “he who is fortunate,” so often found, but in the sense of the clause εὖ καὶ καλῶς πράττειν ἃ ἂν πράττῃ preceding; otherwise it would be equivalent to μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα, and the syllogism would gain nothing. Plato therefore conceives εὖ πράττειν ἃ ἂν πράττῃ the necessary basis for μακάριον εἶναι, and the latter as the natural result of the former. Hence there is no case of a fallacia secundum dictionem (by the use of homonyms or ἀμφιβολία), but the conclusion ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἄθλιος is correctly and legitimately obtained by a combination of the second statement with the first and without any fallacious or sophistical reasoning.

1 f.

καί φημι ταῦτα: the repetition of ταῦτα causes these principles to appear especially weighty.

2 f.

τὸν βουλόμενον . . . διωκτέον: the verbal is equivalent here to δεῖ with the inf. The regular case for the agent is the dat.; the acc. is rare. See H. 991 a, and cf. 480 e. The position of ὡς ἔοικεν, which belongs to the whole clause, is noteworthy.