I.

pole/mou kai\ ma/xhs: Socrates and Chaerephon come just after Gorgias has finished his lecture. Callicles receives them with a jest, the point of which lies in the ou(/tw. In the double expression, the more general precedes, as is natural, the more definite.

metalagxa/nein: occurs also in 429 a with e)pisth/mhs, and 873 c with ai)sxu/nhs. It is rare.

to\ lego/menon: in appos. with the sentence. See G. 137, 3; H. 626 b.

kato/pin e(orth=s: proverbial, like post festum. This would call up to the Greek mind their public exhibitions, and the banquets with which they closed. Here is probably also an allusion to the extravagant enthusiasm which led the Athenians to designate as festivals those days on which Gorgias lectured. See Introd. § 4 end

kai\ ma/la g' a)stei/as: Hirschig remarks the frequency of such answers as these, which avoid the repetition of the last word of the preceding question. 168 e a)ll' ou)/ toi sou= ge, w)= *qeo/dwre, a)/meinon, 391 b.

a)ttei/as: properly belonging to a city. It became an adj. of quality inasmuch as city festivals and celebrations are naturally superior to those of the country. It is used here in a good sense, though it may also mean “citified.”

e)pedei/cato: the aor. is necessitated by the time-limit (o)li/gon pro/teron).

o)li/gon pro/teron: the first word is an acc. of extent; the second is adverbial.

tou/twn: the pl. refers to the fact and its consequences.

o(/de: is deictic.

e)n a)gora=|: the omission of the art. shows that this was a phrase like ‘in town,’ ‘on change.’ By this time, a)gora/ had come in Athens to mean simply the exchange, or marketplace, where people assembled not for public debate (that was in the Pnyx), but for business. It was a favorite resort of Socrates, since there the concourse of people offered him the best opportunity for prosecuting his god-given vocation (cf. Introd. to § 25, and 33 a ff.). Cf. Xen. i. I. 10 a)lla\ mh\n e)kei=no/s ge a)ei\ me\n h)=n e)n tw=| fanerw=|: prwi/ te ga\r ei)s tou\s peripa/tous kai\ ta\ gumna/sia h)/|ei kai\ plhqou/shs a)gora=s e)kei= fanero\s h)=n, kte(.

a)nagka/sas: the literal meaning is not to be pressed. Chaerephon as the constant companion of Socrates took the liveliest interest in all his actions.

ou)de\n pra=gma: shows the asyndeton of ordinary conversation.—

e)gw\ ga\r kai\ i)a/somai: prob. contains some allusion to the story of Telephus, who when wounded by Achilles received from the oracle the assurance o( trw/sas (kai\) i)a/setai. The myth was made the subject of a noted tragedy by Euripides.

w(/ste e)pidei/cetai : w(/ste, when combined with the ind., can for all practical purposes be treated as if it were compounded of ou(/tws and te/. Cf. Lat. itaque. See on 458 d.

e)pidei/cetai: here used absolutely in the same sense as above. The fut. has two sides, one corresponding to each condition; thus it is equiv. to (1) e)qe/lei e)pidei/knusqai ei) dokei=, and (2) e)pidei/cetai e)a\n bou/lh|. Cf. a different case in 502 b, with note.

ti/ de/: the question shows that Chaerephon had not anticipated any great eagerness on Socrates' part.

e)p' au)to/: the pronoun is emphatic. See on 458 a. The emphasis is heightened by ge/.

o(/tan bou/lhsqe kte(.: contains an invitation, the basis of which is given by the clause with ga/r. The original conclusion of the condition was to be e)pidei/cetai, but in the course of the ga/r clause the speaker lost sight of this and continued with the co-ordinate construction.

par' e)me\ h(/kein oi)/kade: this shows that the speakers are neither in nor before the house of Callicles. On the place of meeting, see Introd. § 17.

e)qelh/seien a)/n: Socrates uses the opt. with a)/n a great deal, esp. when he first meets a person. It is the mood of courtesy, but not of argument. In this dialogue the opt. preponderates at the beginning, but the subjv. overtakes it in the argumentative passage 471, 472; while in the whole dialogue the proportion of subjs. to opt. is 3 to 2.

dialexqh=nai: emphasized in order to contrast Socrates' method with the e)pi/deicis of Gorgias.

du/namis (vis): i.e. the power and inner meaning of the art, with which the e)pa/ggelma should correspond,—the scope or compass.

e)pagge/lletai kte(.: cf. 33 b w(=n mh/te u(pesxo/mhn ma/qhma mh/te e)di/daca. e)pagge/llesqai is the regular word in Greek for ‘advertise,’ ‘profess.’

th\n de\ a)/llhn e)pi/deicin: it does not follow from this that Socrates considered the dialexqh=nai as a kind of e)pi/deicis. It is only an example of the idiomatic Greek usage of a)/llos, which does not include but excludes the word with which it is connected. Cf. 473 c politw=n kai\ a)/llwn ce/nwn, 36 b. See G. 142, 2, N. 3; H. 705. We must use a circumlocution, or another word, in English. In Cal licles' answer, however, the attributive force is regained.

w(/sper su\ le/geis: const. closely with ei)sau=qis, as referring to the invitation of Callicles to come to his home.

ou)de\n oi(=on to\ au)to\n e)rwta=n: there is nothing like asking the man himself. The articular infinitive is a favorite with Plato. He uses it most commonly in the acc. The nom. comes next in frequency, with the gen. a close third. The dat. is much less frequent. The pr. tense occurs nine times oftener than the aor., showing a great advance on Pindar. See III. 193-201.

au)tw=|: on account of its meaning (“the master,” Kr. 51. 5, 4; H. 681 c) is placed in this emphatic position. On the matter itself see Introd. § 7, and the passage from quoted Introd. N. 12. Auditors are present also at the following dialogue (cf. Introd. § 17 end).

e)ke/leue: imperf., because the same bidding or invitation was given to the different members of the group.

kalw=s le/geis: expresses more satisfaction than eu)= le/geis just before.

ti/ e)/rwmai: deliberative subjunctive.

o(/stis e)sti/n: o(/stis is regularly used to ask the question ‘who’ after a neg. (cf. 524 e, 526 b); but in all cases it may be used to express the idea of quality. See on 453 b.

w(/sper a)\n . . . a)pekri/nato a)/n: w(/sper a)\n ei) is phraseological, and the second a)/n comes in unconsciously with the conditional apodosis. The use of the aor. with a)/n in the apodosis, following an imperf. with ei) in the protasis, where both refer to the same sphere of time, is not uncommon. In Plato, according to GMT. 414, it appears to be confined to such phrases as ei)=pon a)/n, a)pekrina/mhn a)/n. But similar constructions with other verbs are found in Dem., Aristoph., Soph., Eur., Xen., etc. Cf. Dem. xix. 162, Ar. 507.

dhmiourgo/s: see on 452 a.

manqa/nw: one example suffices to make the idea of Socrates clear to Chaerephon; two are not enough for Polus. This is, however, due to the fact that Chaerephon is familiar with Socrates' methods, while they are new and strange to Polus.

a)pokri/nesqai kte(.: this is the ti/ of Socrates' question above in c. The tense shows that it is a general standing announcement.

h)= pou a)/ra kte(.: spoken in a wondering, admiring tone which expects an answer. “Surely, then, you must have but little difficulty in re-plying, Gorgias.” The irony lies in (the inferential) a)/ra as well as in r(a|di/ws. On the pushing nature and insolence of Polus, see Introd. § 14. What is said generally in 70 b (see Introd. N. 12) of the pupils of Gorgias applies excellently to him.

e)mou=: by a very natural shift, after tou/tou.—‘Gor. You may try the experiment if you please, Chaerephon. Pol. , 'egad, and upon me too, if you like, Chaerephon.’ Cope.

kai\ a)peirhke/nai: gives the ground of Polus' offer. Possibly he may also wish to intimate that Gorgias may now fairly retire, and yield the field to another.

ti/ de\ toi=to: sc. diafe/rei. “What difference does this make?” Cf. 497 e. Polus does not wish to slight his master, but only to win admiration for himself.

(*hro/dikos: this brother of Gor gias (see Introd. § 4) must not be confounded with another physician of the same name who came from Selymbria ( iii. 406 a, 227 d, 316 d), and was famed as the first to insist upon the value of gymnastics for health.

o(/per: after ti/na by an easy transfer to the actual idea,—‘name.’ Aristophon's brother was thecelebrated painter Polygnotus of Thasus. Polus speaks as from a book— perhaps from his own book (462 b). He overdoes the use of those figures, with which Gorgias also was accustomed to amuse himself, i.e. ‘paronomasia’ (kata\ te/xnhn . . . kata\ tu/xhn) and other phonetic figures in regard to the names of which theorists themselves were not at one. He uses the poetic ai)w=na instead of bi/on. His statements are indefinite and cloudy, and finally he brings forward a wholly general attribute—as Socrates proves in e by the distinction between poi/a and ti/s—of the matter in question, instead of its name. To speak of rhetoric as kalli/sth tw=n texnw=n is furthermore dialectically inappropriate, although it well agrees with the artistic design by drawing attention thus early to this idea. For other examples of similar mannerisms, see the speeches which go under the name of Gorgias (i.e. in the appendix to Blass' edition of Antiphon), and which, whether genuine or not, show admirably the peculiarities of the Gorgianic school.

pareskeua/sqai ei)s: equipped for. The phrase is a military one; hence lo/gous is almost equiv. to the later logomaxi/an, ‘disputation.’ The reference is to the readiness with which Polus begins his harangue.

ti/ ma/lista: how so, pray? To Gorgias' view the question has been well answered.

8 f.

ou)k . . . a)lla/: the construction is colloquial. ou)k is to be translated no! The following clause with ge/ serves to give the reason for ou)k, “that is, if.” The negative color of the whole complex causes the speaker to ground his position by a)lla/ where one would more naturally find ga/r. It is not necessary to fill out the ellipsis with a)\n h(/dion se/ either in Greek or English.

dh=los ga/r moi: on the personal construction, see on 449 b.

diale/gesqai: the most unassuming name by which Socrates can characterize his practice, so completely the reverse of the commonly used rhetoric. The inf. is an acc. verbal noun.

w(/sper tino\s ye/gontos: equiv. to w(/sper a)\n ei)/ tis e)/yege.

u(petei/nato: cf. the Eng. use of ‘lay down a proposition or principle’ to serve as analogy for future guidance. Note the asyndeton which appears somewhat harsh, but is not uncommon in clauses with w(/sper. 108 d ti/ ou)=n to\ kata\ tau/thn o)rqw=s gigno/meno/n e)stin; w(/sper e)kei= e)gw/ soi to\ kata\ th\n te/xnhn e)/legon o)rqw=s, th\n gumnastikh/n, kai\ su\ dh\ ou)=n ou(/tws e)ntau=qa ti/ fh/|s;

Socrates accepts tentatively the statement which has been so continually advanced, that r(htorikh/ is a species of art, in order to proceed with the discussion. The correctness of this statement is brought under question later.

a)gaqo/n ge: the self-satisfaction of Gorgias is so great that he speaks like a Homeric hero. Note the condescension (perhaps unconscious) in the following ka/lei dh/ (you may call me so, then), of which, however, Socrates takes no notice.

ei) dh/: if . . . really.

a)/lloqi: on these travels, see Introd. § 5. The vagueness of the adverb stamps the whole statement as somewhat boastful.

to\ de\ mh=kos tw=n lo/gwn: Socrates does not mean that the answers should be restricted to a certain length; but he wishes to exclude those answers which, instead of keeping strictly to the question under discussion, branch off and lose themselves in different trains of thought. By using kai/ before *pw=los, Socrates gives us to understand that he fears something similar from Gorgias.

ei)sau=qis a)poqe/sqai: put off till another time.

o(/per u(pisxnei=: with reference to 447 e.

ei)si\n kte(.: though Gorgias speaks like a master, with the air of authority, he would still like to leave a way of escape open for himself, —which unfortunately his boastful e)pa/ggelma has rendered impossible, although he had not yet distinctly promised to speak with brevity.

a)nagkai=ai . . . polei=sqai: the personal construction proceeds from the ‘prolepsis’ of the subject of the inf.,—a common occurrence with di/kaios and dh=los. The real subject of the infinitive is then e)ni/as tw=n a)pokri/sewn. Of this construction Plato affords other examples. 79 d a)po/krisin th\n dia\ tw=n e)/ti zhtoume/nwn . . . e)pixeirou=san a)pokri/nesqai, 92 d toi=s dia\ tw=n ei)ko/twn ta\s a)podei/ceis poioume/nois lo/gois. In translation the adj. must be made neuter, or a circumlocution must be used. “There are certain answers in which it is necessary for one to deliver himself more at length.” See H. 944 a; Rid. § 230.

dia\ braxuta/twn: simply a circumlocution for the superlative adv., and accordingly const. with w(s acc. to the usual rule. Kr. 49, 10, 1; H. 651 a. In the next sent., e)n seems to have much the same force as dia/ here.

mhde/na a)\n . . . ei)pei=n: the use of mh/ here is not to be considered as due to indir. disc. which would require ou), but as being in an inf. clause which is in apposition with e(/n.

r(htorikh=s ga\r kte(.: ga/r introduces the reason for the question which is announced in the challenging phrase, fe/re dh/. Hence the position of the causal clause.

peri\ ti/: ‘peri/ with acc., ordinarily of action; peri/ with gen., ordinarily of thought or speech; but thought or speech may be considered as action, and shifts are not uncommon.’ B.L.G. Cf. peri\ th=s r(htorikh=s below (12).

nh\ th\n (/*hran: Socrates rarely uses the same oath twice in the same dialogue. Cf. nh\ to\n ku/na 466 c, ma\ to\n—;466 e, *di/) 470 e, 516 d, to\n ku/na to\n *ai)gupti/wn qeo/n 482 b, to\n *zh=qon 489 e. See on 463 d.

o(/ti a)pokri/nh|: the explanatory clause freq. borders on the causal, as here.

pa/nu e)pieikw=s: fairly well. In this self-laudation, Gorgias has in view only the form of his answers without reference to their connexion with the subject-matter. He only wants to show that he is a master of brachylogy, and therefore answers in the shortest formulae of affirmation and negation.

e)pisth/mh: not really different from te/xnh, inasmuch as the orator is e)pisth/mwn r(htorikh=s te/xnhs.

poi/ous tou/tous: the acc. instead of the nom. on account of the proximity of lo/gous. The const. of the previous clause is continued.

tou\s ka/mnontas: an example of one of the most common kinds of anticipation, where the subj. of the dependent sent. is drawn forward under the government of the leading verb.

ou)k a)/ra peri\ pa/ntas kte(.: accordingly the definition of Gorgias is too wide. 312 d i)/sws a)/n, h)=n d' e)gw/, a)lhqh= le/goimen, ou) me/ntoi i(kanw=s ge: e)rwth/sews ga\r e)/ti h( a)po/krisis h(mi=n dei=tai peri\ o(/tou o( sofisth\s deino\n poiei= le/gein.

ou)kou=n peri\ w(=nper le/gein, kai\ fronei=n: sc. poiei= dunatou\s with each clause. Apparently Socrates makes no immediate use of this point, so that it might appear unnecessary. But by contrasting thought with speech he thus at the beginning of the discussion emphasizes the importance of the contents as opposed to the form, a distinction on which he subsequently bases his refutation of Gorgias.

dunatou\s ei)=nai (sc. poiei= from 449 e): on the difference between a)=ra and a)=ra ou), where an affirmative answer is expected, see on 479 c.

eu)eci/an te . . . kai\ kaxeci/an: opposites are regularly connected by te . . . kai/.

e(ka/sth: when the second clause explains the first, the asyndeton is but little felt.

h( te/xnh: const., in spite of the article, not with e(ka/sth, but with ou(=. This is the pred. while e(ka/sth is sub-ject. “Of which each (art) is the art.”

h(\ a)\n h)=: the indef. rel. sentence is necessary, owing to the very general character of Gorgias' statements hitherto.

tau/thn: as referring to h(\ a)\n h)=| is also indefinite. “If this you call rhetoric—any art which has to do with discourses.”

w(s e)/pos ei)pei=n: this phrase occurs in Plato 77 times (GMT. 777, 1). The w(s is not to be considered as final, as in the Eng. ‘so to speak,’ but is rather comparative, in the meaning ‘in a word,’ though it is often convenient to translate by ‘so to speak.’ It is closely connected with the following pa=sa, as in 456 a with a(pa/sas, 450 d with ou)deno/s, 78 e with ou)damw=s. Cf. Kr. 55, 1, 2. Its force is shown by its opposition to a)kribei= lo/gw| in i. 341 b pote/rws le/geis to\n a)/rxonta, to\n w(s e)/pos ei)pei=n h)\ to\n a)kribei= lo/gw|, and its employment here shows the inability of Gorgias to give a clear and sharp definition of his art.

ku/rwsis: accomplishment, consequently effect, power. This unusual word, which Thucydides vi. 103 uses in the meaning decision, resolution, determination, is replaced below in e by the equally unusual ku=ros. More common is the verb kurou=n confirm and kurou=sqai bring to pass, 451 b, c. Cf. also a)/kuros void, inoperative, Crito 50 b, 356 d.

o)rqw=s le/gwn w(s e)gw/ fhmi: this addition is also characteristic of his self-confidence.

a)=r' ou)=n manqa/nw kte(.: this question is put without any expecta tion of an answer. oi(/an is used, and not ti/na, because there is no inquiry after the name of the art (which for the moment is considered satisfactory), but after its nature or kind, which must now be more clearly defined. In the following methodical discussion Socrates makes clear what was present, but in a confused form, in Gorgias' mind. The question now is as to the means of the ku/rwsis. The ground of distinction is formed by the contrast so familiar to the Greeks between lo/gos and e)/rgon (le/gein and pra/ttein). 32 a.

tw=n me/n: in part. apposition with pasw=n. See H. 624 d. The correlative is e(/terai de/ (12), while e)/niai de/ is to be connected with de/ontai as one division of the tw=n me/n, and as correlative with the implied subject (ai( me/n) of de/ontai. Below we find h)\ . . . h)/ instead.

to\ th=s texnh/s: the business, function of the art. See H. 730 b.

ou) fh/s: on the adhaerescent ou) see GMT. 384; H. 1028.

h( a)riqmhtikh\ kai\ logistikh/: arithmetic is the theoretical science of numbers; logistic, the practical art of reckoning. See the following chapter. On the omission of the article, see Kr. 58, 2, 1; H. 660 a; and note on 469 d.

petteutikh/: seems to be a general name for various games which were played on a board with pieces, whether dice or checkers. The addition of ge/ indicates that the member of the series is not usually classed with the others; cf. 47 b tau/th| a)/ra au)tw=| prakte/on kai\ lumnaste/on kai\ e)deste/on ge kai\ pote/on kte(.

au)tai=s . . . e)sti/n: cf. below in e h( dia\ lo/gou to\ ku=ros e)/xousa.

ou)x o(/ti: not but that, although.

tw=| r(h/mati: as far as actual words are concerned; “but you could not have earnestly meant it.”

u(pola/boi a)/n tis: regular formula for introducing an objection; cf. 20 c. The opt. is potential.—

dusxerai/nein: in the proper sense of dusxerh/s, treat harshly, i.e. to make difficulties. Cf. 483 a kakourgei=s e)n toi=s lo/gois. Remark the delicate irony of the words a)ll' ou)k kte(., which consists in this, that Socrates apparently passes very gently over the contradiction which exists between the words and the actual meaning of the teacher of oratory.

o)rqw=s ga\r oi)/ei: acknowledges and accepts the suggestion made by Socrates. Note the oratorical swing in the addition of dikai/ws u(polamba/- neis, which serves also to preserve the dignity of the master who is ever ready to encourage good work in the pupil.

i)/qi: is simply an encouraging interjection like fe/re dh/ 449 c.—

kai\ su/: acknowledges the courtesy of Gorgias' preceding words.

th\n a)po/krisin h(\n h)ro/mhn: is brachylogic for th\n a)po/krisin tou= e)rwth/matos o(\ h)ro/mhn.

diaperai/nein: denotes the suitable conclusion which Gorgias ought to make to his answer, by establishing some distinction characteristic of rhetoric. Socrates assumes then a little ironically that this object has already been almost attained. Since, however, he wishes in what follows to make clear that two or more arts can belong to the same species and yet be entirely distinct from one an other, it is necessary for him to give and compare several examples.

w(=n nu=n dh\ e)/legon: logically follows texnw=n.

tw=n peri\ ti/: the sentence would be correctly filled out thus: tw=n peri\ ti/ dia\ lo/gou to\ ku=ros e)xousw=n. The use of tw=n, both here and in the following answer, shows that the inquiry is directed to the function of a class. On the other hand h( peri\ ti/; just below inquires after the function of the individual art. As an example of Plato's poikili/a, notice the variety in the expressions e)n lo/gois to\ ku=ros e)/xousa, dia\ lo/gwn to\ ku=ros e)/xousa and lo/gw| kuroume/nwn.

10 f.

o(/sa a)\n tugxa/nh|: however great each happen to be, i.e. to any magnitude you please.

w(/sper oi( e)n dh/mw| suggrafo/menoi. Socrates refers to those who bring forward motions in the assembly of the people or have them recorded by the grammateu/s to be then communicated to the assembly, at the command of the president, by the herald. If there was a previous motion either of the senate or an orator on the same subject before the body, instead of recording and reading the common preamble of both motions, the words ta\ me\n a)/lla kaqa/per h( boulh/ (or whatever the name of the proposer was) were employed, followed by the modification or amendment. This corresponds in a general way to our ‘amend after the words,’ etc.

pro\s au(ta\ kai\ pro\s a)/llhla kte(.: ‘the relative as well as the absolute properties.’ Cope. The reckoning can only be made with odd and even numbers; hence pro\s au(ta/ means even to even, etc.; pro\s a)/llhla, even to odd, etc. The definition of logistikh/ runs thus in 166 a h( logistikh/ e)sti/ pou tou= a)rti/ou kai\ perittou= e)pisth/mh, plh/qous o(/pws e)/xei pro\s au(ta\ kai\ pro\s a)/llhla. The pl. must be construed according to the sense, not the form.

a)ne/roito: sc. ti/s e)stin, the subject of which is given in the proleptic accusative. 351 e th\n h(donh\n au)th\n e)rwtw=n ei) ou)k a)gaqo/n e)stin.

i)/qi su/: the rest of the sentence is to be supplied from the preceding words of Gorgias. The clause with ga/r gives the basis of the following question. Cf. 449 c, d.

peri\ ou(=: according to analogy we should expect peri\ o(/. But cf. a similar shift in 453 b and e with peiqw/. See also 491 a and note on 449 d.

ta\ me/gista. Gorgias, like Polus, finds it extremely hard to come out of the rut into which he has fallen, and give a scientific definition of his art.

VII. The scolion was a peculiar kind of drinking-songs, paroi/nia, sung at banquets. The one here alluded to is mentioned by Plato in 279 a, 48 d, 631 c, 661 a. It probably was composed by Simonides, although according to some it was by Epicharmus. After Bergk's (Poet. Lyr. Gr. iii.^{4} 645) rhythmical changes the words acc. to the Scholiast read as follows: *(ugiai/nein me\n a)/riston a)ndri\ qnatw=|, deu/teron de\ fua\n kalo\n gene/sqai, to\ tri/ton de\ ploutei=n a)do/lws, kai\ to\ te/tarton h(ba=n meta\ tw=n fi/lwn. The last line of the scolion is omitted by Socrates, because, for his argument, only those advantages can be cited which involve the practice of some art.

katariqmou=ntai: the advantages are arranged according to their value in the enumeration. Instead of an object the clause with o(/ti follows, introducing the dir. discourse.

dhmiourgoi/: the word is found as early as Homer and denotes all who carry on a business which is public and useful to the people; as, physicians, soothsayers, singers, goldsmiths. Later, the expression was extended to free manual laborers, without, however, losing any of its respectability. Hence it corresponds to our use of the word ‘master’ (master-workman, master-mason). Cf. 455 b. It is noteworthy that only such things are enumerated as, like the assumed result of rhetoric, were reckoned among external advantages; for rhetoric, according to the view of Gorgias, should procure in the state either high office or honors. Hence the scolion is very applicable. Socrates brings forward the physician, the bodytrainer, and the banker, in order to contrast with the subjective judgment of Gorgias the subjective opinions of others, and thus to show the subjectivity of the answer.

paidotri/bhs: the body-trainer for boys taught in the gymnastic schools (palai=strai). He is often confounded with the gumnasth/s, whose proper office was the scientific treatment of the whole subject of bodily exercises, and whose field was the public gumna/sia, where he instructed grown men in general and also those who were training for the games (a)qlhtai/). Both the paidotri/bhs and the lumnasth/s are often mentioned alongside of the physician, since the nurture and care of the body was their common aim. 47 b.

ei)/poi prw=ton: the a)/n before parastai=en is felt as extending over the whole sentence.

u(gi/eia: if the word is sound, it must be taken as an absolute addition to the proper question which ends with w)= *sw/krates. The diffuse ness of the whole passage favors the view that the construction must not be rigidly pressed here.

ta)/n: for toi a)/n, as we frequently find menta)/n for me/ntoi a)/n. 29 a deino\n ta)\n ei)/h.

18 f.

kai\ au)to/s: like et ipse, “likewise,” while recognizing the claims of the physician, shows also a consciousness of his own importance as compared with Gorgias. This calls forth in the reply the address w)= a)/nqrwpe, which indicates some degree of contempt and surprise.

The very mode of speaking declares the pride of wealth.

dh=ta: with the imv. makes the claim for recognition more urgent than the sim ple dh/. Kr. 69, 20; H. 1037, 6.—

e)a/n: whether, introducing the indir. question. But Goodwin (GMT. 493, 680) denies that e)a/n can ever mean ‘whether,’ insisting that every expression like the present is conditional. The side-thrust at Gorgias is very appropriate, as he himself received much money from his teaching and lived magnificently upon it.

a)mfisbhtei=: affirms (in contradiction of his opponent), “disputes this and says.”

to\ meta\ tou=to: adverbial acc. H. 600 a; 719 b.

au)tou=: shift from the rel. to the leading clause. G. 156; H. 1005.

39 f.

au)toi=s toi=s a)nqrw/pois: the pronoun emphasizes personal freedom as opposed to power over others. In thus stating the aim and purpose of all the sophists' efforts, Gorgias (acc. to Plato) fails completely to notice the mutual contradiction of the two members.

tou= a)/llwn a)/rxein: Heindorf desires tw=n a)/llwn, which would better accord with the ordinary usage. Still the indefiniteness of the expression may not be without object in showing the inexactness of thought which naturally prevailed at a time when the art of speaking was just being brought within the reach of all.

Construe e)/gwge (le/gw) to\ oi(=o/n te ei)=nai pei/qein kte(.

oi(=o/n te: expresses ‘position,’ oi(=os ‘disposition.’ Gildersleeve, vii. 165.

kai\ e)n a)/llw| cullo/gw| (sc. tw=n politw=n): is paraphrased with a limitation in the following clause. In this division of the various kinds of bodies in which the orator would have occasion to display his powers we see the basis of the three chief varieties of oratory (ge/nh, genera) which are generally recognized by later critics. The first, to\ dhmhgoriko/n (sumbouleutiko/n, deliberativum), was employed e)/n te toi=s bouleuthri/ois kai\ tai=s e)kklhsi/ais. The second, to\ dikaniko/n (iudiciale), was employed e)n toi=s dikasthri/ois. The germ of the third, to\ e)pideiktiko/n, which was not distinguished by Anaximenes, can be discerned in the words kai\ e)n a)/llw| cullo/lw| kte(. This last was first defined by Aristotle, who used as the basis of his division the oratorical characteristics of the several varieties, not the place of their delivery, as Gorgias does here.

e)n duna/mei kte(.: “the possession of this power will involve the servitude of the physician,” etc.

dou=lon. This expression seems to be Gorgias' own, as is to be gathered from the passage in 58 a, cited by Heindorf. Protarchus says there: h)/kouon me\n e)/gwge, w)= *sw/krates, e(ka/stote *gorgi/ou polla/kis, w(s h( tou= pei/qein (du/namis) polu\ diafe/roi pasw=n texnw=n: pa/nta ga\r u(f' au(th=| dou=la di) e(ko/ntwn a)ll' ou) dia\ bi/as poioi=to, kai\ makrw=| a)ri/sth pasw=n ei)/h tw=n texnw=n.—The Gorgianic balancing dou=lon me\n . . . dou=lon de/ gives a certain dignity to the words.

ou(=tos: is scornful, as in 45 a.—The thought is expressed first positively, then negatively, then again (by a kind of apostrophe—since soi/ cannot be considered as addressed to Socrates) positively. Gorgias cannot refrain from again declaring more distinctly what he has already indicated by a)/llw|. Cf. 464 c h( kolakeutikh\ ai)sqome/nh, ou) lnou=sa le/gw a)lla\ stoxasame/nh, where, however, the same device is of value in giving more clearness to the statement.

ta\ plh/qh: sc. in the different assemblies.

e)llu/tata: more definitely. The answer given comes nearer to being an answer indeed.

peiqou=s dhmiourgo\s h( r(htorikh/: this definition which Socrates has gathered from Gorgias' verbiage, was not invented by Plato, but was apparently well known in Athens at the time.

peiqou=s: to be understood in a passive sense, as peiqw\ poiei=n below shows.

4 f.

ei)s tou=to teleuta=|: instead of the regular ei)s, occasionally e)n and pro/s are used with but little difference of meaning.

ti\: is not the object of le/gein, but is probably to be construed with e)/xein somewhat as follows, have you any reason to say. The object of le/gein is contained in the following e)pi\ ple/on . . . du/nasqai (“its power extends further than”), with which indeed Hirschig construes ti\.

eu)= i)/sq' o(/ti: is occasionally found construed with the inf. like an ordinary verb of perception, even in cases where there is no intervening clause as here to attract a following inf. Cf. Xen. ii. 2. 2 *au/sandros tou\s frourou\s . . . a)pe/pempen ei)s ta\s )*aqh/nas . . . ei)dw\s o(/ti o(/sw| a)\n plei/ous sullelw=sin ei)s to\ a)/stu, qa=tton tw=n e)pithdei/wn e)/ndeian e)/sesqai. Owing to the shift in the construction, e)lw/ is left absolute at the beginning of the sentence.

ei)/per kte(.: the leading idea of the pred. lies in the participle.

ti/ ou)=n dh/: inquires what is to follow from the admission of the statement.

th\n peiqw/: proleptic.

h(/tis pot' e)stin: but h(\n oi)=mai is used below, according to the rule that o(/stis is required after a negative, while it may occur—though o(/s is regular—with a positive. Cf. 447 d, and see Morris on Thuc. i. 136. 4.—

h(\n su\ le/geis: indispensable addition to h(/tis. On peri\ w(=ntinwn, see on 451 d.

tou= e(/neka dh/: an example of the ‘rhetorical question’ which Demosthenes uses to great advantage. Rid. § 325 cites also from 457 e, 458 a, 487 b.

20 f.

ou) sou= e(/neka: in this answer we have merely an indefinite contrast between person and thing; which is much more clearly defined below in 457 d kata\ fqo/non oi)/ontai to\n e(autw=n le/gein and e ou) pro\s to\ pra=gma filonikou=nta le/gein . . . a)lla\ pro\s se/. Socrates guards himself against any suspicion that he may be influenced by personal feelings in his criticism of Gorgias. Cf. 454 c.

w(s: not to be joined with ma/lista as a superlative phrase, but correlative with ou(/tw.

w(/sper a)\n ei): introduces frequently, as an illustration of a general principle, a supposed case similar to it. It is easy to add a second hypothetical clause, not coördinated with the first, but which, combined with the apod., has the first as a common protasis. Cf. below, 468 d, and 27 d. Zeuxis, the celebrated painter and contemporary of Socrates, was a native of Heraclea in Lower Italy. He was the pupil of Apollodorus, who, by a more delicate appreciation and application of the principles of light and shade in painting, greatly furthered the development of the art, and obtained for himself the surname of ‘Sciagraph.’ The paintings of Zeuxis, who belonged to the Ionic school, were noted for their delicacy and fine coloring. Besides the Helena which he painted for the Crotoniates (Cic. de Inv. ii. 1. 1), his most celebrated picture was the Penelope, wherein he depicted with great success pure matronly modesty. The story of his contest with his rival Parrhasius is well known.

zw=|a: a general expression for every kind of pictures.

kai\ pou=: Socrates wishes here to make clear that if we wish to define an object exactly, i.e. so as to make it easily recognizable, it is not sufficient to give the characteristic which it has in common with other objects, but rather it is necessary to mention that characteristic which belongs to it alone and distinguishes it from all other objects. So, for example, it is not sufficient to say that Zeuxis is a painter, i.e. one who either paints or has painted pictures; but in order to distinguish him from other painters, who also paint or have painted pictures, we must state more nearly the kind of pictures which he has painted (poi=a), as ‘he who painted the Helena or the Penelope.’ But even this is not entirely sufficient, for there are still other painters who have painted these same objects; but when we say, ‘he who painted the Helena in Croton (pou=),’ we have definitely defined Zeuxis. pou= could also, and more naturally, refer to the scene of his labors,—where he had his studio. We must note (1) that o( ta\ zw=|a gra/fwn is only the common designation of all painters, by which they are distinguished from the lo/gous or no/mous or suggra/mmata gra/fontes, (2) that o( gra/fwn can and must be understood in the same way in which we so often understand o( a)dikw=n, o( kratw=n, etc., i.e. as a generic word, not limited in time (H. 827), (3) that poi=os is often scarcely to be distinguished from ti/s (cf. Xen. iii. 1. 14 e)gw\ ou)=n to\n e)k poi/as po/lews strathgo\n prosdokw= tau=ta pra/cein; poi/an d' h(liki/an e)mautw=| e)lqei=n a)name/nw;). With these points understood, we see that the present example suffices to show that to define rhetoric as peiqou=s dhmiourgo/s, i.e. h( th\n peiqw\ a)pergazome/nh te/xnh is insufficient, so long as the peiqw/ wrought by it is not more exactly specified in order to distinguish it from that wrought by other arts which come under the same general definition. Cf. moreover the answer of Gorgias, below, 454 b, which corresponds to the example before us exactly, even as far as the pou= is concerned.

e)/grafe: were a painter.

ou) dh=ta (sc. ou) pei/qei)

a)lla\ kte(.: chiastic with the question preceding. The affirmative of the first member of the question is made much more emphatic by the previous express denial of the second member, which must therefore itself be emphatically uttered. Usually the answer does not follow so closely the words of the question; cf. below, 501 c, and 128 a ou(/tw le/geis h)\ e)gw\ ou)k o)rqw=s katamanqa/nw; *ou)/k, a)lla\ kalw=s sunh=kas o(/lon to\ gramma o(\ bou/letai. Different, however, are 454 a, b, and 496 d, below. Cf. Rid. § 305.

w(=nper: on the omission of the prep. see Kr. 51, 11, 1; H. 1007. Cf. below, 517 c e)n panti\ tw=| xro/nw| o(\n dielego/meqa, 27 d. So in Lat., i.e. Nep. 3.

41 f.

ta\ tou= a)riqmou=: the properties of number. Cf. ta\ th=s yu/xhs, ta\ tou= bi/ou. See on 450 c.

to\ peritto/n: in such combinations the article is usually omitted with the second member, and only inserted when the two members are to be looked upon as more distinct. Cf. above, 451 b with c, and 454 e, 455 a; see Kr. 58, 2, 1.

o(/son: sing. because each antecedent is of equal value. Neither o(/son e)sti/n, nor o(/sa e)sti/n, above, conflict with the passage 451 b, c.

3 f.

poi/as peiqou=s kai\ th=s peri\ ti/: cf. above, poi/as peiqou=s kai\ peri\ ti/.

te/xnh: no one need be disturbed by the substitution of te/xnh for dhmiourgo/s, as the two words have kindred ideas. There is also no appreciable difference between poi/as here and h(=stinos a few lines above. Cf. 453 e, and see on 453 c.

e)/moige: the form of the question shows that an affirmative answer is expected.

tau/ths: draws attention to the earlier explanation in 452 e, from which is drawn (toi/nun) the following definition, which in form follows as an epexegesis to tau/ths th=s peiqou=s. The definition answers the poi=on as far as the external matters of persons (speakers) and place are concerned, and is used by Socrates (c) in order to obtain a definition that characterizes the nature of the peiqw/. Gorgias does not use o)/xlois with the disparaging feeling which it sometimes has, but as a general word for assemblies.

peri\ tou/twn kte(.: answers the question peri\ ti/ 4, above. On the change of case, cf. 449 d.

a)ll' i(/na kte(.: this sentence is a good example of those curious anacolutha which occur so often in the conversation of ordinary life, where a slight emphasis on a single word may perhaps change the whole construction, and cause the speaker to lose himself in a network of clauses, of which, while the idea is clear enough, the grammatical construction is hopeless. The idea here is this: “I thought you meant that, but still I asked; and you must not be surprised if I again ask something which seems to be evident enough; for it is absolutely essential for our argument that we proceed upon definitely expressed statements, and not upon mere suspicions, which may prove to be misunderstandings.” In the construction the speaker proceeds well enough until he is thrown off the track by e)gw\ d' e)panerwtw=. The use of this seemingly independent clause (it is really, together with dokei= me/n, in dependence on o(/) causes him to branch off, in the clause o(/per ga\r le/gw, in order to explain the reason for his repeated questioning, and at the same time to reiterate one of the fundamental principles of dialectic.

o(/per ga\r le/gw: refers to 453 b.

u(ponoei=n: “to form a pre-opin

ion of what another is likely to think on a subject without his having expressed himself,” to impute to him certain views, and thereby to forestall his explaining himself.

u(po/qesin: is a plan or principle which Gorgias has laid down for himself, and which conditions the direction in which (kata/) the thesis is to be developed until the end is reached (perai/nhs).

i)/qi dh\ kte(.: see on tau/ths, in b, above.

kalw=s ga\r oi)/ei: see on 451 a. Note the difference in tone of Gorgias' answer, as compared with 450 c.

fai/hs a)/n: has the force of an affirmative. ‘yes’; so ou)/ fhmi often means ‘no’, See Kr. 64, 5, 4.

e)pisth/mh: from e)pi/stasqai to understand, i.e. properly, correct understanding, knowledge. This takes the place of ma/qhsis, which strictly denotes the process of learning, whose result is e)pisth/mh, because this idea better suits the above opposition between memaqhke/nai and pepisteuke/nai.

dh=lon ga\r au)=: confirms the distinctness of the two ideas which Socrates had already affirmed much more positively than Gorgias.

pepeisme/noi: so far as the inward conviction is concerned, ma/qhsis and pi/stis agree; objectively, how ever, they are very different, for ma/qhsis involves the acquisition of knowl-edge, while ignorance is the necessary concomitant of pi/stis.

bou/lei ou)=n kte(.: Socrates now proceeds to analyze (diai/resis, divisio) the general definition in order to obtain that special definition (o(rismo/s, definitio) which, according to the requirements of logic, must include, together with the statement of genus (to\ ge/nos, genus proximum) also the addition of the characteristic (diafora\ ei)dopoio/s, differentia specifica) which separates it from other species of the same genus.

h( r(htorikh\ kte(.: the first definition which had its origin in the technic of the rhetorical schools (see on 453 a) has now acquired a more exact and complete expression by the help of this dialectical investigation. Note the change from peri\ tw=n dikai/wn to peri\ to\ di/kaion. Cf. 454 b, e.

peistiko/s: able to persuade. Equiv. to i(kano\s pei/qein, as didaskaliko/s to didaskali/an pare/xwn or i(kano\s dida/skein. Neither this nor pisteutiko/s used above can properly be construed with the genitive. With didaskaliko/s, however, we find examples, as 3 c *)aqhnai/ois ou) sfo/dra me/lei, a)/n tina deino\n oi)/wntai ei)=nai mh\ me/ntoi didaskaliko\n th=s au(tou= sofi/as. See Kr. 47, 26, 9; H. 754, b. In the addition of mo/non lies a gentle intimation of some defect, the result of which for the estimation of rhetoric appears more plainly later.

e)n o)li/gw| xro/nw|: draws attention to a great defect of the Athenian judicial system. It was often impossible to present before the court a clear exposition of the points at issue, as the speeches were limited to a certain length, which was carefully measured by the kle/yudra,—a practice which Socrates also complains of in 19 a e)pixeirhte/on u(mw=n e)cele/sqai th\n diabolh\n h(\n u(mei=s e)n pollw=| xro/nw| e)/sxete, tau/thn e)n ou(/tws o)li/gw| xro/nw|, and 37 a u(ma=s tou=to ou) pei/qw: o)li/gon ga\r xro/non dieile/gmeqa.

fe/re dh\ kte(.: introduces a new discussion designed to test the definition just obtained, which, although from the point of view of form it satisfies excellently the double requirement made above in 454 a, still leaves some uncertainty as to the exact meaning of Gorgias. Hence the question, ‘What do we really mean thereby?’ Socrates professes to be not yet quite certain himself (ou)d' au)to/s), notwithstanding that he has contributed the most to the more close definition of the poi=on. His doubts are directed especially to the peri\ ti/ as it has been just defined according to the specifications made by Gorgias. This discussion forms the transition to the examination of the true value and ethical tendency of rhetoric. On the use of kai/ in questions, cf. Xen. iii. 3. 11 te/los au)to\n (to\n *kina/dwna) h)/ronto (oi( e)/foroi) ti/ kai\ boulo/menos tau=ta pra/ttoi, what purpose he actually had in so doing.

o(/tan peri\ kte(.: on the whole passage, cf. 319 b.

i)atrw=n ai(re/sews: during the rise of philosophy in Greece, a science of medicine also gradually developed, which became hereditary among the priests of Aesculapius. Among these various schools arose; as in Cos, Cnidus, Rhodes, and in several cities of Magna Graecia. After a while it became customary for a state to take a noted physician into the public service; as Democedes, who was hired one year by the Aeginetans, the second by the Athenians, and the third by Polycrates of Samos (Hdt. iii. 131).

e)/qnous (from the same root as e)/qos, ei)/wqa): denotes a class of people drawn into association either for the purposes of habitation or from force of custom (calling, trade). For dhmiourgoi/ see on 452 a. In such formulae as a)/llo ti h)/ and ou)de\n a)/llo h)/ the copula is frequently omitted. See H. 1015 b.

ou)d' o(/tan: is in close connexion with a)/llo ti h)\ to/te o( r(htoriko\s ou) sumbouleu/sei.

h)\ pw=s le/geis kte(.: intimates that possibly Gorgias will not accept this limitation of rhetoric.

eu)= e)/xei: it is proper, it is in order. Cf. 107 a ei) dh/ ti *simmi/as . . . e)/xei le/gein, eu)= e)/xei mh\ katasigh=sai.—

ta\ (not to\)

th=s te/xnhs: because the question is no longer as to the nature of the art, but as to its claims and effects, one by one.

to\ so\n speu/dein: consult your interest.

tina\s sxedo\n kai\ suxnou/s: Cron would take this in its entirety as almost equivalent to “quite a number”; but it seems better to give each word its rights, some, I had almost said many. In 58 d parh=sa/n tines kai\ polloi/ ge, we have almost the reverse of the present case; that is, the higher estimate is asserted, while in the present passage it is denied. The hope of obtaining pupils is the greatest spur to the Sophist to continue a discussion which cannot but be unpleasant to him. It serves also to draw out his true sentiments.

a)ll' e)gw\ kte(.: Gorgias allows himself to be led on by the examples which Socrates has brought forward, and which seem to him excellently adapted (hence kalw=s u(fhgh/sw) to make clear the efficacy of his art. He therefore tries to prove for it as great as possible a scope, and thereby entirely loses sight of his former definition of the peri\ ti/.

ta\ de/: without a preceding ta\ me/n, to complete and correct the statement. See Kr. 50, 1, 12.

e)k tw=n dhmiourgw=n: “in accordance with the architects,” instead of the advice of the architects. Other striking examples of such compression are 358 c ou)d' e)/sti tou=to e)n a)nqrw/pou fu/sei, e)pi\ a(\ oi)/etai kaka\ ei)=nai e)qe/lein i)e/nai a)nti\ tw=n a)gaqw=n, Xen. iii. 3. 41 xw/ran e)/xete ou)de\n h(=tton e)/ntimon tw=n prwtostatw=n for th=s tw=n prwtostatw=n.

le/getai tau=ta kte(.: this admission of Socrates seems to Gorgias to confirm his assumption, and to imply that Socrates was not in earnest in his opposition. At the death of Themistocles, Socrates was about four years old.

w(=n . . . e)/leges: sc. at 455 b. So

crates makes for the moment no ob jection to Gorgias' course, thus stimulating him to the detailed statements which follow.

nikw=ntes ta\s gnw/mas: the verb nika=n is construed with various accusatives which belong to the ‘cognate’ class, as *)olumpia/da, pagkra/tion, yh/fisma, etc. G. 159 R.; H. 716 a.

pa/lai e)rwtw=: for the pres. with pa/lai, see H. 826; G. 200, n. 4, and cf. the similar Lat. use of jam diu with the present (Gildersleeve, § 221).

daimoni/a: has become by this time so weakened as to mean simply wonderful, extraordinary. Cf. the similar weakening of strong words in English; i.e. ‘awful.’

ti\s: by adding to the vagueness, enhances the vastness of the power, like the Lat. quidam. Cf. Cic. x. 12. 1 idque contigit meritorum tuorum in rem publicam eximia quadam magnitudine, owing to the rather exceptional greatness, etc.

ei) pa/nta ge ei)dei/hs: Socrates' object is finally attained, and Gorgias, lulled completely by this ironical expression of admiration, bursts forth into an eloquent laudation of his art, and a defence of it against all censure. The omission of the apodosis gives to the sentence the effect of an exclamation. Such a usage is also common in English.

a(pa/sas ta\s duna/meis: may be a compression of a(pasw=n tw=n texnw=n ta\s duna/meis. Of course sullabou=sa is only a figure of speech, though Gorgias claims his rhetoric to be the art of all arts. In his exposition he contents himself with a pair of examples only. That this view is really due to Gorgias is shown by the passage in , quoted on 452 e.

tw=n a)/llwn: with whom he was on like terms of intimacy. The following passage gives the two leading departments of the physician's profession—pharmacy, fa/rmakon piei=n, and surgery, temei=n h)\ kau=sai parasxei=n —which in ancient times, as is also the case to a large degree at present, were frequently united by the same practitioner. The knife and the cautery, as the two leading instruments of the surgeon's profession, are often mentioned together. Cf. 480 c, 521 e; 354 a; Aeschy. 848 o(/tw| de\ kai\ dei= farma/kwn paiwni/wn,|h)/toi ke/antes h)\ te/montes eu)fro/nws|peiraso/mesqa ph=m' a)postre/yai no/sou.

parasxei=n: cf. 33 b kai\ plousi/w| kai\ pe/nhti pare/xw e)mauto\n e)rwta=n. As here 475 d, 348 a. See Kr. 55, 3, 21.

o(/ph| bou/lei: more exactly we should expect o(/poi, and some of the inferior Mss. have it here. But the ideas of ‘where’ and ‘whither’ are often confounded in Greek, while in Eng. ‘where’ has become the rule for ‘whither’ in ordinary conversation. The remark here is very fitting in the mouth of Gorgias, in view of his extensive travels. Cf. Introd. §§ 4, 5.

ou)damou= a)\n fanh=nai: cf. Xen. i. 2. 52 a)napei/qonta ou)=n tou\s ne/ous w(s au)to\s ei)/h sofw/tatos, kai\ a)/llous i(kanw/tatos poih=sai sofou/s, ou(/tw diatiqe/nai tou\s e(autw=| suno/ntas, w(/ste mhdamou= par' au)toi=s a)/llous ei)=nai pro\s e(auto/n. Also 72 c. Similarly in Latin. Cf. Cic. de Fin. v. 30. 90 tantam vim esse virtutis ut omnia, si ex altera parte ponantur, ne appareant quidem and ii. 28. 90 Socrates voluptatem nullo loco numerat. Compare also the exactly similar Eng. colloquialisms, ‘to be nowhere,’ and ‘to be left quite out of sight.’

11 f.

ton ei)pei=n dunato/n: le/gein is more usual; but the same difference which exists between e)/lege and e)/lece or ei)=pe exists also between their infinitives. So here ei)pei=n means to make or deliver a speech. Cf. Prot. 329 a ta/x' a)\n kai\ toiou/tous lo/gous a)kou/seien h)\ *perikle/ous h)\ a)/llou tino\s tw=n i(kanw=n ei)pei=n.

e)n plh/qei: though properly much more general in its meaning than e)kklhsi/a| or sullo/gw| used above, is probably employed only for the sake of variety. The distinct and definite statement with which Gorgias closes his characterization (h( me\n ou)=n kte(.) brings up to his mind the thought that perhaps some might object to the indiscriminate employment of such an art. He is thus led to a defence of it which is so injudicious that it affords the adversary the very best weapons for attack.

th=| a)/llh| a)gwni/a|: carried away by the excitement of his own thoughts, Gorgias forgets the caution which he had hitherto exercised in his conversation with Socrates, as well as the definition of rhetoric which the two had agreed upon above, and is led to set forth his art quite in the manner of the Sophists (the Eristics), as a means of defence and offence; a weapon which, though it required the use of the mind instead of the body, the lips instead of the arms, was no less a department of the science of fighting than boxing or the other exercises of the soldier. Some Sophists —i.e. Euthydemus and Dionysodorus —were at the same time teachers of fencing. Boxing, pukteu/ein, which, in connexion with palai/ein, or wrestling, formed the pagkratia/zein, went beyond the range of ordinary gymnastics, and belonged to the peculiar art of the athletes. Fighting in full armor (o(plomaxi/a) was not followed as a profession until after the Peloponnesian War. As in all these exercises, so in rhetoric the great object was not public, but private, not advantage to the community, but advancement for the individual.

e)/maqe: the unexpressed subject, as of xrh=sqai, is the indefinite ‘one.’

a)pokteinu/nai: if one gets as far as the kentei=n, it is but a short step to the a)pokteinu/nai.

foith/sas: foita=n is the regular word for attendance at a school; hence foithth/s, a ‘scholar.’

eu)= e)/xwn to\ sw=ma: not merely by the gift of nature, but also, as puktiko\s geno/menos, by education.

pare/dosan: used like tradere in the sense ‘impart, or transmit by teaching.’ The object (afterwards taken up in tou/tois) is to be supplied from the sense of what precedes.

mh\ u(pa/rxontas: an integral part of the subst. inf. clause; hence the mh/. u(pa/rxein has here its primitive meaning, to be the first cause, to be there to begin with, as opposed to a)mu/nesqai. ix. 879 d mh/te ga\r u(pa/rxwn mh/te a)muno/menos to\ para/pan tolma/tw plhgai=s to\n toiou=ton nouqetei=n. a)/rxein is also similarly used in ix. 869 c a)muno/menos a)/rxonta xeirw=n pro/teron, but with a different feeling. The asyndeton of two opposites is not unfrequent.—

metastre/yantes: which is regularly transitive (e.g. Rep. ii. 367 a metastre/fontes au)toi=n th\n du/namin, utriusque vim pervertentes) is used here absolutely in the sense reversing the matter. Cf. Hom. b 67 qew=n d' u(podei/sate mh=nin,|mh/ ti metastre/ywsin (cause a reverse) a)gassa/menoi kaka\ e)/rga.

th=| i)sxu/i: corresponds to eu)= e)/xwn to\ sw=ma, as te/xnh| to puktiko\s geno/menos, so that both are considered dependent upon training.

ou)k o)rqw=s: a case of litotes.

oi( mh\ xrw/menoi: equiv. to oi(\ a)\n mh\ xrw=ntai o)/rqw=s. Hence the mh/.

35 f.

pro\s apantas: as above, 456 d.

e)/mbraxu: denotes what is otherwise expressed by w(s e)n braxei= (sunelo/nti) ei)pei=n, and shows that the following peri\ o(/tou a)\n bou/lhtai is absolutely without limitation.

ou)de\n kte(.: the dangerousness of the art is to be offset by the natural feeling of equity which will compel each of the two aspirants to leave uninjured the public position which both desire, as well as the do/ca, which is the orator's continual and chief aim.

ou)de/n ti: strengthens the negation. Cf. the Eng. ‘none the more.’ The acc. of this neg. is used, but never the dat. with the comparative.

o(/ti: is correlative with tou/tou e(/neka. For the following double kai/, see on 457 e.

e)a\n de\ kte(.: shows again the opposition of practice to theory. Gorgias continually recurs to the same thoughts, as if the rolling swell (o)/gkos) of words could conceal the poverty of ideas. This belongs to the mimetic element of the dialogue.

ka)=|ta: as well as ka)/peita, is often used after a partic. as if it were following a finite verb.

XII.

oi)=mai: the asyndeton shows that Socrates himself is not overpleased.

e)/mpeiron: sc. by having taken part in them either as speaker or listener.

lo/gwn: employed here as the general word including both the public speech as well as the private conversation, which is more properly dia/logos. 335 d e)a\n su\ e)ce/lqh|s, ou)x o(moi/ws e)/sontai h(mi=n oi( dia/logoi with 337 a xrh\ tou\s e)n toioi=sde lo/gois paragignome/nous koinou\s me\n ei)=nai a)mfoi=n toi=n dialegome/noin a)kroata/s. The word sunousi/a is similarly used in 461 b.

kaqewpake/nai: the compound verb, as compared with the simple, shows that the opinion has been gained by a consideration of a number of cases. Cf. 465 d.

du/nantai: sc. oi( le/gontes or oi( dialego/menoi, from the preceding lo/gwn.

diale/gesqai: belongs to e)pixeirh/swsin. The ou(/tw sums up and re-emphasizes the preceding participles, on which lies the chief weight.

diorisa/menoi pro\s a)llh/lous: “after having, by mutually giving and receiving information, defined to each other's satisfaction the nature of the question under discussion.”—

maqo/ntes and

dida/cantes: stand to each other as active and passive; they denote the means by which the disputants have been enabled to define the question at issue (diorisa/menoi), and are hence subordinate to the preceding participle. Plato rather likes such collocations of active and passive ideas. Cf. d below, ei)po/ntes kai\ a)kou/santes, and 462 a.

h)\ mh\ safw=s: an afterthought. Had it been present originally in Socrates' mind, he would have said mh\ o)rqw=s h)\ kte(.; but not being present, the negative was attracted to the verb of saying, by the regular Greek rule. Looking at it in this light, it is not necessary (with Cron) to supply a second fh=| from the preceding mh\ fh=|, which would hardly come under the head of the simple following the compound.

xalepai/nousi: the pl. occurs here as it did with a)mfisbhth/swsin above, because from o( e(/teros to\n e(/teron we naturally draw the idea “both.” Cf. in Latin, Cic. de Fin. iii. 2. 8 quod cum accidisset, ut alter alterum necopinato videremus, etc., and the expression for ‘both’ in the Romance languages.— The use of the pronouns throughout this long sentence is both interesting and instructive; a)llh/lous, e(autou/s, e(/teros, e(/teron, e(autw=n, sfw=n au)tw=n (bis). The distinction between reciprocal and reflexive is sometimes very narrow.

filonikou=ntas kte(.: when both reproach each other thus, they place themselves on the same level as participants in a disputatious contest, where each seeks his own honor, not the truth, as Socrates shows in 91 a, where he contrasts the filoso/fws and filoni/kws e)/xontes, and says of the latter, o(/tan peri/ tou a)mfisbhtw=sin, o(/ph| me\n e)/xei peri\ w(=n a)\n o( lo/gos h)=|, ou) fronti/zousin, o(/pws de\ a(\ au)toi\ e)/qento tau=ta do/cei toi=s parou=sin tou=to proqumou=ntai. Cf. e, below, on pro\s to\ pra=gma. They bear it hardly, and think that out of envy, envy of themselves, the opponent said it, actuated by a factious spirit, and not by a desire to search into the matter before them in the discussion.

loidorhqe/ntes kte(.: the two following participles, though logically co-ordinate with loidorhqe/ntes, really give its two sides.

11 f.

oi(=a . . . a)/xqesqai u(pe/r: the use of the acc. with the infin. after forms of oi(=os is very rare, and seems to be an extension of the personal use of the infin. with oi(=os. See GMT. 759; Madv. 166 c, and note on 452 e. 23 e *me/lhtos me\n u(pe\r tw=n poihtw=n a)xqo/menos, *)/anutos de\ u(pe\r tw=n dhmiourgw=n kte(. We soon feel anger and indignation for one whom we consider abused.

ou) pa/nu a)ko/louqa: ‘not quite consistent.’ Cope.

a)ko/louqa: denotes the naturally following result; su/mfwna, the inner agreement of two statements standing in juxtaposition. Cf. Xen. ii. 4. 19 nea/niskos de/ tis . . . ei)=pen, w(s ou)k a)ko/louqa ei)/h to\ e)piqh/sesqai kai\ lu/sein th\n ge/furan, 193 e ta\ e)/rga ou) sumfwnei= toi=s lo/gois. Plato delights in applying musical terms to logical conditions; hence the frequency of sumfwnei=n and diafwnei=n, as also of suna/|dein, sunw|do/s. Cf. 461 a, 482 b.

fobou=mai: has here a double reference, (1) to an action to be performed (inf.); (2) to an effect to be avoided (mh\ with subjv.). Cf. Xen. i. 3. 17 e)gw\ ga\r o)knoi/hn me\n a)\n ei)s ta\ ploi=a e)mbai/nein a(\ h(mi=n doi/h, mh\ h(ma=s tai=s trih/resi katadu/sh|, foboi/mhn d' a)\n tw=| h(gemo/ni w(=| doi/h e(/pesqai, mh\ h(ma=s a)ga/gh| o(/qen ou)k e)/stai e)celqei=n. In the first we have the will-side of the fear; in the second, the apprehension.

ou) pro\s to\ pra=gma: the neg. ou) is regular with the inf. of the indir. discourse.

pro/s: denotes the end which the subject has in view. In the present case this is paralleled by tou= with the infin.,—one of the many Greek modes of expressing finality (H. 960; GMT. 798). With pro\s se/ also the main idea of the pro/s is that of hostile purpose; the hostility, however, does not lie in the pro\s, but in the general tone. In a certain sense filonikei=n might also be applied to Socrates, as his search for truth was a continual struggle throughout his whole life.

18 f.

kai\ su\ . . . kai\ e)gw/: when the second member of a comparison is contained in a relative clause with o(/sper or w(/sper, the Greek idiom re quires kai\ in both members.

h(de/ws a)\n e)legca/ntwn . . . le/goi: of these two conditional clauses the first is logical, the second ideal. The present conversation is a practical example of Socrates' view; hence the logical conditional form is used for the practical present case. The rest of the sentence follows naturally in the opt. as being rather theoretical, and applicable to some other time than the present. The participles represent the same tenses of the optatives.

ou)k a)hde/steron kte(.: cf. 506 c kai/ me e)a\n e)cele/gxh|s, ou)k a)xqesqh/somai/ soi, w(/sper su\ e)moi/, a)lla\ me/gistos eu)erge/ths par' e)moi\ a)nagegra/yei.

mei=zon ga\r au)to/: the correlative to o(/sw|per is wanting, as is often the case. au)to\ is always emphatic; the unemphatic pronoun is tou=to.

ou)de\n kte(.: Socrates was convinced that correct views determine the will and actions, and that sin and error are due to lack of knowledge. Hence instruction, if it carry conviction with regard to what is good and true, must also bring about moral improvement. Cf. what he says in 26 a dh=lon ga\r o(/ti, e)a\n ma/qw, pau/- somai o(/ ge a)/kwn poiw=, and the celebrated phrase ascribed to him, ou)dei\s e(/kwn a(marta/nei.

do/ca yeudh/s: the force of oi)=mai extends over the whole sentence, and we should therefore logically expect do/can yeudh=. But by the use of the nom. Socrates holds the object up to view like an image.

ei) de\ kai/: the contrast would rather be given by the harsh ei) de\ mh/, but Socrates modifies it with his usual courtesy.

to\n lo/gon: in the same sense as in 457 d, above.

u(fhgei=: indicate, sc. by your words and example. Gorgias reconsiders his assent by the expression xrh=n e)nnoei=n. With xrh=n and e)/dei the opposition is to the inf., not to the obligation. By giving his reason, Gorgias stimulates himself to change from ‘we ought to have’ to ‘we must’ (skopei=n ou)=n xrh/).

kai\ u(ma=s: as contrasted with the others, who had come earlier.

a)potenou=men: to be completed according to 465 e suxno\n lo/gon a)pote/taka and 466 a. So frequently, e.g. Prot. 335 c, 336 c, 361 a.

mh/ tinas: is connected, in a loose kind of epexegesis, with to\ tou/twn, and hence also depends on skopei=n. For the ind., cf. 196 c, o(rw=men mh\ *niki/as oi)/etai/ ti le/gein, 216 c e)/ti de\ kai\ to/de skefw/meqa mh\ h(ma=s lanqa/nei to\ fi/lon w(s a)lhqw=s ou)de\n tou/twn u)/n.

tou= me\n qoru/bou: here we recognize the importance of the silent listeners, whose presence we infer from such remarks as this, and who serve at this juncture to keep the discussion going. Next to them is Chaerephon, who here acts as their spokesman, and answers the boulome/nous ti kai\ a)/llo pra/ttein. The qo/rubos simply denotes a rather loud expression of protest against the apparent purpose of Gorgias, and of pleasure in the continuation of the dialogue.

mh\ ge/noito kte(.: a most emphatic denial in the form of a wish. The sentiment is similar to that of Pindar ( i. 1 f.), alluded to in 227 b ou)k a)\n oi)/ei me kata\ *pi/ndaron kai\ a)sxoli/as u(pe/rteron pra=gma poih/sasqai to\ sh/n te kai\ *lusi/ou diatribh\n a)kou=sai.

Callicles is very eager to get the conversation directed to his own more especial field—politics. Hence his support of Chaerephon's protest, which he emphasizes by the addition of the expression kai\ me\n dh\ kai\ au)to/s, where the kai\ me/n approximates closely in force to kai\ mh/n.

ou)k oi)=d' ei): commonly equiv. to haud scio an, sometimes, as here, to haud scio an non. On ei) in this double meaning, see Kr. 65, 1, 8.

9 f.

w(/ste . . . xariei=sqe: compare with w(/ste . . . pra/ttein, a few lines above.

to/ g' e)mo/n: has almost the same force as e)gw/, only less personal. Like the phrases with peri/ and a)mfi/, it became very common in later Greek. vii. 533 a e)pei\ to/ g) e)mo\n ou)de\n a)\n proqumi/as a)poli/poi with 210 a e)rw= me\n ou)=n e)gw\, kai\ proqumi/as ou)de\n a)polei/yw. Kr. 43, 4, 26.

ai)sxro/n: note that Gorgias is impelled to a continuation of the dialogue only by regard for his own honor. This motive was especially strong with the Sophists; cf. 352 d ai)sxro/n e)stin e)moi\ sofi/an mh\ ou)xi\ pa/ntwn kra/tiston fa/nai. With ai)sxro/n and similar words which im ply a negation, it is more usual to find mh\ ou). GMT. 817. It is also more common to employ the dat. of reference, instead of the acc. with the infinitive. Rid. § 183.

to\ loipo/n: not ‘furthermore,’ with Kr. 46, 3, 2, but “finally,” “in conclusion,” after those present have expressed their desires.

e)paggeila/menon: for the meaning, see on 447 c. Here it acquires almost the force of “challenge,” since the subject of the inf. must be supplied out of the following o(/ti tis bou/letai.

ou) dida/skonta: the regular neg. with w(/ste is mh/. The ou) here may be due to the fh/|s above, which throws an indir. disc. coloring over the whole. See Gildersleeve, vii. 174.

e)/n ge o)/xlw|: Gorgias wishes to protect himself by a restriction which, while it defers, for a brief interval, his defeat, shows plainly the weakness of his professions. See the criticism of Socrates which follows.

e)n toi=s mh\ ei)do/si: the reason for a change of neg. such as occurs in this and the following clauses is often hard to perceive. Here it seems to be the oscillation from generic to particular, which is going on continually in Socrates' mind. Having made his general point with mh/, he recurs to the case under discussion with ou). So o( de\ mh\ i)atro/s . . . a)nepisth/mwn (cf. before, e)n toi=s mh\ ei)do/si), but o( ou)k ei)dw\s, e)n ou)k ei)do/si. It would be possible, but not so good, to take the latter cases as examples of adhaerescent ou).

tou=to sumbai/nei h)\ a)/llo ti: according to the position of a)/llo ti before or after the h)/ is the latter to be translated “than” or “or.”

e)ntau=qa/ ge: Gorgias notices the danger of such a concession, but still thinks he can limit the force of the argument to the single case. Perceiving this, Socrates immediately extends his statement to make it apply kai\ peri\ ta\s a)/llas a(pa/sas te/xnas.

45 f.

pra/gmata . . . mhxanh\ peiqou=s: Socrates never lets slip an occasion to emphasize the essential opposition of the aim of rhetoric to the truth of facts, an opposition admitted, indeed, by the Sophists themselves. Cf. the statement of Tisias in 272 d o(/ti ou)de\n a)lhqei/as mete/xein de/oi . . . to\n me/llonta i(kanw=s r(htoriko\n ei)=nai.

pollh\ r(a|stw/nh: Gor

gias is continually wandering away from the discussion of the nature of rhetoric to the praise of it, and being set right again by Socrates, who, while he brings back the discussion to the subjects which Gorgias had declared to be the proper province of rhetoric, is at the same time paving the way for an examination of its moral value.

dia\ to\ ou(/tws e)/xein: sc. mh\ maqo/nta kte(.—au)ti/ka e)piskeyo/meqa: a formula for getting rid of a side issue like ei)sau=qis skeyo/meqa 357 b.—

ti\: is adverbial.

pro\s lo/gou: to the advantage of our discourse. But little different from pro\s lo/gon. 351 e e)a\n pro\s lo/gon dokh=| ei)=nai to\ ske/mma.— to/de: draws the attention in advance to the series of closely interconnected questions, introduced by a)=ra, which, by their very intimate relation one to another, oppose, with a certain importunity, Gorgias' continual wandering and vagueness, and also, by their delicate allusion to the somewhat extravagant expression used above (455 d), have a decidedly ironical tinge, which is rendered more appar ent by the doubtful oi)=mai of Gorgias' answer.

a)=ra: see on 476 a.

proepista/menon: the partic. is again the most important part of the statement, as in 457 c, 453 b.

th=s r(htorikh=s: this passage differs from 455 d only in arrangement.

e)/xe dh/: a request to pause, whereby the point reached is declared to be an important one, which merits further consideration. 349 d e)/xe dh\ . . . a)/cion ga/r toi e)piske/yasqai o(\ le/geis. When thus used, e)/xein is of course intransitive. H. 810.

h)/toi . . . h)/: or at least. In English we should naturally use ge\ with the second member. 27 d tou\s dai/monas h)/toi qeou/s ge h(gou/meqa h)\ qew=n pai=das.—

para\ sou=: const. with u(/steron maqo/nta alone; pro/teron with ei)de/nai.

ta\ tektonika/: “the principles of building.”

34 f.

kata\ to\n au)to\n lo/gon: according to the same principle (analogy). ‘The argument which follows is to our notions sophistical enough. Not so, however, from the Socratic point of view, according to which every virtue is a form of knowledge, and every vice the result of ignorance.’ Thompson. See on 458 a.

ou)kou=n a)na/gkh kte(.: a few lines below is found a repetition of the first clause of this sentence, in almost the same language, where, too, the statement is natural, and is used as a basis for a further deduction; here, on the contrary, it is out of place, and besides, is not followed up at all in the next sentence. These reasons have led to the omission of the bracketed words, by which we get a clearly logical argument, as follows: “The just man performs just actions.” “Yes.” “Must he not therefore wish always to perform just actions?” “Apparently.” “The just man will never, then, wish to perform unjust actions,” etc.

XV.

le/gwn: equiv. to o(/ti e)/leges, that you were saying.

ou)d' e)kba/llein: when two verbs which govern different cases are construed with but one object, it is customary to construe this object with the nearer verb. Cf. below (5).

xrh=tai/ te kai\ a)dikh=|: the co-ordination of the two ideas by te . . . kai/ brings into greater prominence the impropriety of thus misapplying otherwise useful skill, than the more usual a)di/kws xrh=tai of the following clause.

a)lla\ tw=| a)dikou=nti: the mhde\ e)celau/nein is a result which may or may not follow the e)gkalei=n, according to circumstances. The real opposition is between tw=| dida/canti and tw=| a)dikou=nti, hence the second is put in the same case as the first, although the acc. would be required by e)celau/nein. 327 a pa=s pa/nta e)di/daske kai\ e)pe/plhtte to\n mh\ kalw=s au)lou=nta.

a)/n pote a)dikh/sas: represents the same tense of the optative.

o(/ ge: gives the basis of the statement. The neuter may be due to the pra=gma immediately preceding (H. 631 a), or it may simply be used ad sensum. Cf. 465 d.

ou(/tw: under these circumstances. See on 503 d.

suna/|dein: a musical term. See on 457 e.

o(ra=|s dh\ kai\ au)to/s: properly the following clause should be independent, stating the conclusions reached in the investigation; but by bringing it under the government of the inserted o(ra=|s kte(. an appeal is again made to the fairness of the opponent. 24 d o(ra=|s, w)= *me/lhte, o(/ti siga=|s, ib. 31 b nu=n de\ o(ra=te dh\ kai\ au)toi/, o(/ti oi( kath/goroi kte(.

ma\ to\n ku/na: cf. 466 c, 482 b, 22 a. Socrates is rather fond of this formula of asseveration, possibly out of aversion to any light handling, even of the Greek divini ties. See on 463 d.

ou)k o)li/ghs sunousi/as: a delicate allusion to 458 c, which shows Socrates' fine feeling in not insisting on a discussion which must be unpleasant and also humiliating to Gorgias. The word sunousi/a is elsewhere employed so as to include the discourses (dia/logoi), e.g. Prot. 310 a ti/ ou)=n ou) dihgh/sw h(mi=n th\n cunousi/an; i.e. in the sense of the Eng. “meeting.”

On Polus, who here again thrusts himself into the discussion, see note to 448 a, and Introd. § 14.

kai/: belongs, according to the sense, with doca/zeis. Is what you say also really your opinion? We should expect a second kai/ with w(/sper, according to usage. See on 457 e. Others construe kai/ with su/.

h)\ oi)/ei: or do you think. The second question repeats the first in a varied form. Both questions are ‘rhetorical,’ expecting no answer, and express a protest against the idea that the art of rhetoric has anything to do with a knowledge of what is right.

mh\ ou)xi\... lang=greek>ei)de/nai kte(.: two negs. after h)sxu/nqh mh\ prosomologh=sai, on account of the negative force of the expression. 352 c, d. See H. 1034 b, and on 458 d. The construction is the same as that after a)parnh/sesqai below, which is followed by a double neg. because the question ti/na oi)/ei veils the assertion ou)dei/s. ou)xi\ is merely more emphatic than ou).

e)a\n mh\ e)/lqh| tau=ta ei)dw/s: more logically, e)a\n e)/lqh| tai=ta mh\ ei)dw/s.—

dida/cein: depends upon some verb of saying to be supplied from prosomologh=sai. The asyndeton with e)/peita instead of ka)/peita (cf. 23 c) is not uncommon, and the clause is to be construed in dependence on o(/ti (because). By this time, however, Polus' flow of words has run away with him; he has only energy enough left to hurl at Socrates the words tou=q' o(\ dh\ a)gapa=|s, before he abandons his struggling sentence altogether and starts afresh. Such passages as this show Plato to have been no mean dramatist.

i)/sws: gives expression in passing to the hint that perhaps the contradiction was not so clearly deduced from Gorgias' words as Socrates supposed. The whole sentence, however, shows Polus' complete inability to grasp the real point at issue.

a)groiki/a: is the reverse of paidei/a. By this very criticism, Polus betrays that he is himself just as lacking in the polish of a gentleman, which he denies to Socrates, as in scientific knowledge.

w)= ka/lliste: the epithet suits the pompous rhetor excellently.

u(ei=s: the addition of the word “sons,” though not strictly necessary, is quite natural, especially among people where the support of the parent by the son was so strictly enjoined as among the Greeks.

e)gw\ kai\ *gorgi/as: besides being the Greek idiom, the initial position of e)gw/ softens the supposition for Gorgias. The Latin has the same position.

di/kaios d' ei)=: the sense is to be supplied from what precedes. 180 d ei)/ ti e)/xeis tw=|de tw=| sautou= dhmo/th| a)gaqo\n sumbouleu=sai, xrh\ sumbouleu/ein: di/kaios d' ei)=. The regular neg. of the inf. after dokei= would be ou). mh\ is here due to the conditional color. For the personal const. see on 449 c.

a)naqe/sqai: the figure is drawn from the draughts-board; it is the regular word for ‘taking back’ a move. Similarly, 354 e a)ll' e)/ti kai\ nu=n a)naqe/sqai e)/cestin, ei)/ ph| e)/xete a)/llo ti fa/nai.

ti/ tou=to le/geis: equiv. to ti/ e)sti tou=to o(\ le/geis. Kr. 57, 3, 6; H. 1012 a.

e)a\n kaqe/rch|s: as it were, by a dam or a fence.

xrh=sqai: because in makrolo- gi/a the orator has at his disposal all the devices of his art.

*)aqh/naze: Athens was noted as a po/lis filo/logos ( I. 641 e), and freedom of speech (parrhsi/a) was held to be the fundamental principle of a democratically governed state. Cf. Dem. iii. 3 u(mei=s th\n parrhsi/an e)pi\ me\n tw=n a)/llwn ou(/tw koinh\n oi)/esqe dei=n ei)=nai pa=si toi=s e)n th=| po/lei w(/ste kai\ toi=s ce/nois kai\ toi=s dou/lois au)th=s metadedw/kate.

th=s *(ella/dos: is the part. gen. dependent upon ou(=. The Eng. would find e)n with the dat. more natural.—

e)/peita: after all. GMT. 856.

a)nti/qes: equiv. to but consider on the other hand; lit. put in opposition.

sou= makra\ le/gontos kte(.: Socrates makes a similar remark in 335 c, when he really prepares to leave the gathering rather than waste his time in words.

kh/desqai: implies personal interest in the matter.

w(/sper nu=n dh\ e)/legon: is to be taken with the following clause, a)naqe/menos.

fh\|s ga\r dh/pou: by quoting his own vaunting words against him, Socrates compels Polus also to adopt the dialectic form.

dh/pou: throws a tinge of irony into the question.

XVII.

tau=ta: is simply the proposition which Socrates makes, and the words a)lla\ poih/sw tau=ta is a formula of acceptance.

a)lla/: well then, is often thus used in answers. After an imv., as here in Soph. 376 ff., *h*l. *fe/r' ei)pe\ dh\ to\ deino/n . . . XP. a)ll' e)cerw= toi pa=n o(/son ka/toid) e)gw/.

ti/na fh\|s ei)=nai: though assuming it as self-evident that rhetoric is a te/xnh, Polus is compelled, in commencing, to put his question quite generally. Socrates, in his answer, confines himself simply to deducing the consequences of Gorgias' admissions. The substitution of h(/ntina for ti/na is according to the strict rule, which, however, is not rigorously adhered to.

6 f.

w(s . . . ei)rh=sqai: cf. x. 595 b w(s pro\s u(ma=s ei)rh=sqai. The active ei)pei=n is more common. See Madv. 151; H. 956; GMT. 777. 2.

o(\ fh\|s su\ poih=sai te/xnhn: is to be explained according to 448 c pollai\ te/xnai e)n a)nqrw/pois ei)si\n e)k tw=n e)mpeiriw=n e)mpei/rws hu(rhme/nai, according to which an art arises from experience. Polus, however, has by this time forgotten his own words.

e)n tw=| suggra/mmati: see on 448 c and Introd. § 14.

e)mpeiri/a: here not an empirical science, but merely a dexterity acquired by much practice. Cf. 463 b. The following question is no advance on his first one, and seems to show that Polus has no definite plan.

xa/ris: is the grace which causes pleasure, and depends principally on the person of the orator; h(donh/, the pleasure with which the hearer is inspired by his speech. Quintilian ( ii. 15. 24) translates the expression by the words peritia gratiae ac voluptatis. Polus has not yet heard the specific difference which distinguishes rhetoric from other e)mpeiri/ai of the same class. Hence he again falls into the same error in his question as he did in his answer above, 448 c. In this way, however, the conversation is again turned to the consideration of the value of rhetoric.

to\ meta\ tou=to: see on 452 c.

ei) ou) kte(.: ou) because Polus expects an affirmative answer.

ei): whether.

tima=|s: equiv. to kalo\n fh\|s ei)=nai or peri\ pollou= poiei=, as in 47 a.

to\ xari/zesqai: pres. for the habit.

xari/sasqai: aor. for the single example.

tau)to\n d' e)sti/n: with surprise and disgust. Polus overlooks the fact that there can be two orders belonging to the same species.

ti/nos . . . tau/ths: in close connexion with what precedes. See on 461 d and 449 e.

mh\ a)groiko/teron h)=|: it is not necessary to supply a verb of apprehension, though that is the idea suggested by mh/ with the subjv. GMT. 309; H. 867. The employment of the form here is an attempt to concili ate. In 486 c, 509 a kai\ ei) a)groiko/tero/n ti ei)pei=n e)sti, Socrates has laid aside all idea of conciliation, and speaks the truth with boldness. a)/groikos is opposed to a)stei=os, and means rude (see on 447 a). It is to be taken in connexion with the reproof administered by Polus in 461 c. Truth often incurs the reproach of a)groiki/a. Note that Socrates still preserves towards Gorgias his courtesy and respect.

ou)deno/s: explanatory of tino/s.

mhde\n e)me\ ai)sxunqei/s: cf. Hom. g 96 mhde/ ti/ m' ai)do/menos meili/sseo.

yuxh=s de\ stoxastikh=s kte(.: in this characterization, Socrates includes all the good that can be said of the art of rhetoric. It requires cleverness in perceiving and distinguishing between various relations, hardihood to work before the eyes of the world, and skill in dealing with men.

stoxastikh=s: is originally connected with shooting and throwing, but is often metaphorically used. With this definition, cf. Isoc. c. Soph. 294 d tau=ta de\ pollh=s e)pimelei/as dei=sqai kai\ fuxh=s a)ndrikh=s kai\ docastikh=s e)/rgon ei)=nai. In regard to courage in speaking, cf. Cic. de Or. i. 26. 121.

kolakei/an: the Greek word means more than the English “flattery.” Under it is included everything whose aim is the agreeable rather than the good.

e)pithdeu/sews: notice the variety in the use of the words e)pith/deusis and e)pith/deuma, which are to be distinguished as pra=cis and pra=gma, the one being a concrete manifestation of the other.

e)mpeiri/a kai\ tribh/: these words are but little distinguished. The first denotes, as has already been said (on 462 c), the result obtained by practice; the latter is more especially that which is derived from work without any definite object or clear consciousness. So rhetoric is called in 260 e a)/texnos tribh/, and in 270 b tribh\ kai\ e)mpeiri/a. See on 462 c.

kommwtikh/: is not only finery in dress, but also hair-curling, ointments, cosmetics, etc. Cf. Quint. ii. 15. 25 mangonum artificium, qui colorem fuco et verumrobur inani sagina mentiuntur. The addition of ge\ emphasizes the examples newly thought of.

ei) ou): see on 462 d.

14 ff.

a)pokrinou=mai . . . pri\n a)\n a)pokri/nwmai: after the model of the anticipatory conditional. pri/n, “before,” takes the inf.; “until,” the indic. subjv. or opt., according to the sphere of time. See Gildersleeve, ii. 465 ff.

a)=r' ou)=n kte(.: the question implies doubt, and is intended to stimulate Polus' attention; but for some cause, probably dulness, he merely renews his previous question.—The meaning of ei)/dwlon is made clear by 150 e feudh= kai\ ei)/dwla peri\ plei/onos poihsa/menoi tou= a)lhqou=s.

ta\ ga\r kaka\ kte(.: that which according to its nature can be characterized as a)gaqo/n, must be esteemed kalo/n. If, however, it is kako/n, then it must be esteemed ai)sxro/n.

w(s h)/dh ei)do/ti: is a stinging rebuke to Polus.

ma\ to\n *di/a, a)ll' e)gw\ kte(.: Socrates' words implied that Polus was either too dull or too careless to understand him. Gorgias, while tacitly admitting Polus' incompetency, tries to smooth over his defeat by confessing to his own inability to catch Socrates' meaning as it is at present stated. If the master, au)to/s, cannot understand, the pupil may be pardoned for the same fault. Polus, though defeated in his attempt to rout Socrates (461 b ff.), only retires to recover breath before making a final effort (466 a).

ma\ to\n *di/a: is a real asseveration, used designedly by Gorgias, who is too much of a gentleman to indulge in oaths,—this being the only instance in this dialogue. It is significant that Polus, in spite of his heat, is likewise only once (473 a) betrayed into the common nai\ ma\ *di/a. Callicles uses oaths roundly enough, but restricts himself to nh\ tou\s qeou/s, nai\ ma\ *di/a, and ma\ *di/a. On Socrates' habit, see on 449 d, 461 b.

*pw=los de\ . . . o)cu/s: in this re

mark Socrates both apologizes for and explains the reason of the obscurity of his statements; but it is, at the same time, an excellent char acterization of the impetuosity and heat of Polus, whether he be the questioner or the respondent. It also contains an allusion to the name itself (pw=los a colt, filly).

The division of kolakei/a given above was made without specifying the standard of division, and only enumerates the different varieties. Socrates now, at Gorgias' instance, reduces the whole subject to a regular system, by referring kolakei/a back to a higher species, qerapei/a, on the basis of a distinction according to reality and appearance. Now, since qerapei/a has for its object the eu)eci/a tou= a)nqrw/pou, we get two more points of view: (1) that of the object (a)nqrw/pou), as composed of body and soul; and (2) that of the treatment, as being either positive or negative.

oi(=on toio/nde le/gw: is a formula for introducing an example or a special case in illustration of a general statement.

eu)= e)/xein ta\ sw/mata: ta\ sw/mata here, as well as to\ sw=ma kai\ th\n yuxh/n below, is acc. of specification. H. 718 a.

to\ toiou=ton: the article is used on account of its reference to what has just been described. This is more definitely given in the o(/ti (relative) clause which follows.

e)/xei de\ kte(.: in this change of subject lies no ambiguity either to the Greek mind or to us. It was, besides, a regular way in Greek of expressing “although.” The subject is the same indefinite one which must be supplied as the object of the preceding poiei=. See on 456 d.

XIX.

duoi=n kte(.: the dual in Plato's time is fast fading out, and he uses it as an artistic feature. It disappears entirely before the close of the fourth century B.C. Notice the asyndeton.

mi/an o)noma/sai: like e(ni\ o)no/mati kalei=n, prosagoreu/ein.—ou(/tws: is idiomatically used, “thus briefly” or “thus at the moment.” See on 503 d.

ou)k e)/xw: , regularly takes the aor. infinitive.

6 f.

a)nti/strofon me\n . . . a)nti/strofon de/: an example of ‘anaphora.’

a)nti/strofon: denotes a part corresponding to a similar part on the opposite side of the symmetrical whole. The function of gymnastic and nomothetic is to lay down, each in its own department, certain positive directions whereby the constitution of the subject under treatment is preserved and improved. The arts of healing and the administration of justice seek in practice to put a stop to the disregard of these directions, and to restore the normal condition. Ac cording to their object, therefore, medicine and gymnastic, as well as the making and administration of law, all belong to the same class, e)pikoinwnou=si me\n dh\ a)llh/lais.

dikaiosu/nh: is used here in the same sense as dikastikh/ 520 b below; why, it is hard to understand. It may have been chosen in view of the earlier definition of the object of rhetoric in 454 b, 455 a. The i)atrikh/ is beyond cavil good; on the contrary, dikastikh/ is susceptible of a bad construction, whereas here there was need of no doubtful word. Though not customary, there is no reason why dikaiosu/nh should not be understood as the practical exercise of that character of the di/kaios, which for an Athenian was naturally to be found in the dikastikh/. The word, then, means here “administration of justice.” That the word is genuine is shown by Quintilian's translation iustitia in ii. 15. 28.

13 f.

ai)sqome/nh and

gnou=sa: are distinguished both as regards the object and the manner of their activity. gnw=sis is directed to the nature, which is only comprehended by thought; ai)/sqhsis is merely the visual perception of the outward form or effects, the cause of which, lying in the nature of the object, is not comprehended. By a)lla\ stoxasame/nh the idea of ai)sqome/nh is not merely repeated, but also more exactly defined. Similarly, 452 e, and in a different order 521 d, e. On the heaping up of participles and their subordination, see Kr. 56, 15 with notes.

u(podu=sa: as it were under a cloak or mask by which its real nature is concealed. The usage is borrowed from the stage; cf. Luc. 33. The simple acc. with this verb is not uncommon.

qhreu/etai th\n a)/noian: the application of the figure of the hunt to those arts which seek only the appearance, is frequent in Plato, and most developed in the With the same employment of abstract for concrete Demosthenes expresses himself, ii. 7 th\n ga\r e(ka/stwn a)/noian a)ei\ tw=n a)gnoou/ntwn au)to\n e)capatw=n kai\ proslamba/nwn ou(/tw hu)ch/qh.

w(/sper oi( pai=des (sc. ei)sin): in such comparisons the nom. is as common as the attracted case. Madv. 20, 3.

e)pai+/ei peri\ kte(.: this otherwise poetic verb is used several times by Plato. Cf. 518 c; 19 c; 47 b, 48 a; 186 e. It also takes the acc. Kr. 68, 31, 2.

25 f.

tou=to ga\r pro\s se\ le/gw: brings up again Polus' persistent efforts to make Socrates say that rhetoric was kalo/n (462 c, 463 d, e).

stoxa/zetai: here equiv. to aim at; above 464 c in the derived mean ing guess at.

a)/neu tou= belti/stou: is brachylogic.

w(=n prosfe/rei: denotes the means which each employs, and whereby it works upon others.

w(/ste . . . mh\ e)/xein: the mh/ could very well be omitted, but Greek usage sanctions the redundancy.

u(posxei=n logo/n: to render account. Cf. Prot. 338 d pa/lin ou(=tos e)moi\ lo/gon u(posxe/tw.

XX.

o)yopoiikh/: is not attributive to kolakei/a, but the latter is predicate with u(po/keitai, as flattery. Hence the point of the following kata\ lo/gon.

u(po/keitai (equiv. to u(pote/qeitai): is not used in the sense which we elsewhere find, lie at the foundation of, as in 349 b e(ka/stw| tw=n o)noma/twn u(po/keitai/ tis i)/dios ou)si/a, but like u(pode/duken above, 464 d.

kakou=rgos kte(.: these four adjectives go in pairs. The two first describing the nature of kolakei/a per se, contain the kako/n of it; the first is more general, the second adds the special (Kr. 69, 32, 2), at the same time emphasizing the result for the world at large. The second pair contains the ai)sxro/n, the verdict on the value of such skill. The following participle, with its datives, defines more narrowly a)pathlh/.

oi( gewme/trai: the word denotes “mathematicians” in general. So i.e. Theodorus of Cyrene is continually called gewme/trhs in the Higher arithmetic also is included under geometry, because the Greeks employed geometrical methods to represent the higher relations of numbers. In the following proportion, we are reminded at once of an arithmetical formula; while the Greeks were reminded of the due proportion of lines and figures, in accordance with the development of mathematical science among them. The relations of the ideas can, by means of this threefold division into pairs, be brought into a simple but complete scheme. See on 464 a above.

h)/dh ga\r kte(.: mathematics was looked upon by Plato as a preparation for ‘dialectic.’

o(\ kommwtikh\ pro\s gumnastikh/n: in this formula e)sti/ is always wanting.

ma=llon de/: introduces a comparison equally true, but more to the point of the argument (cf. 449 a), by the completion of the proportions already worked out, and by their extension to the whole system of ideas thus far developed.—It might seem strange that sophistic is paired with nomothetic, and not with philosophy. Philosophy, however, is the science of principles in general, while in this dialogue only ethical and political principles are discussed. These latter, however, the law-giver must make use of, —i.e. must be a philosopher, as is proved in the much more comprehensive and thorough discussion in the

o(/per le/gw: refers, as it always does, to a previous statement; here to 464 c, where the close relationship of the te/xnai, which have to do with the same object (body and soul) was spoken of. This idea is here expressed by the words a(/te d' e)/ggus o)/ntwn, which recall at once the expression above, a(/te peri\ to\ au)to\ ou)=sai. The subject of die/sthken is not expressed, but is a general one, to be taken out of the preceding proportions, which embrace all te/xnai and e)mpeiri/ai, and the same subject must be thought of with o)/ntwn. On account of the position of a(/te e)/ggus o)/ntwn the de/ is drawn away from the second member of the contrast, fu/rontai.—

fu/sei: means the essential peculiarity, actual nature, of the ideas. Instead of these, however, with fu/rontai we have the persons introduced who employ and practise the te/xnai and e)mpeiri/ai, and who from ignorance of their true nature bring them into activity at the same time, and thus mix together matters which, properly considered, are quite distinct.

e)n tw=| au)tw=|: probably denotes the soul as the place of action, and peri\ tau)ta/ the moral questions treated, both of which are reckoned together above (464 c) in the expression peri\ to\ au)to/. Socrates restricts himself to the two e)mpeiri/ai to which r(htorikh/ belongs, inasmuch as the object of the whole investigation is only an exact understanding of the nature of rhetoric. This passage is referred to below, in 520 a.—Plato can explain more accurately the relation of sophistic and rhetoric to each other, because he was the first to explain the difference scientifically, whereas Gorgias, though he was unwilling to be reckoned among the sophists, could give no reason therefor.

e)pesta/tei: we have to imagine such e)pista/tai as, like the kubernh/ths, paidotri/bhs, poi/mhn, are at the same time e)pisth/mones. 312 d, where the sophist is defined as e)pista/ths tou= poih=sai deino\n le/gein, i.e. e)pista/menos poih=sai kte(., a definition which furnishes, at the same time, an example for the fu/rontai e)n tw=| au)tw=| kai\ peri\ tau)ta\ sofisth\s kai\ r(h/twr above.

kateqewrei=to: cf. 457 c. Here is meant a thorough critical examination from a higher point of view.

to\ tou= *)anacago/rou: see on 450 c, 453 e, and Kr. 47, 5, 10. Anaxagoras, the friend of Pericles, agreed with the Atomic school and Empedocles, in holding that, in their original condition, the elements or atoms (according to him, unlimited in number, but of a certain definite quality) were mixed all together, without any definite arrangement. Into this confusion order was introduced by nou=s, or the thinking spirit; or at least, this spirit gave the impulse towards it. His thesis describing the primitive condition of matter was this: o(mou= pa/nta xrh/mata h)=n. Cf. Dyer-Cron, Introd. to § 10.

tou/twn: perhaps with an intentional ambiguity.—Gorgias himself was not entirely without philosophical culture. See Introd. § 6. But as to Polus, we have no information.

tw=n te i)atrikw=n kai\ u(gieinw=n: both expressions are frequently connected to denote the same idea, both subjectively and objectively. Now, since u(gieino/n is that which u(gi/eian e)mpoiei= ( iv. 444 c) and i)atrikh/ is e)pisth/mh tou= u(gieinou=, the latter must perforce be the art whose object is to restore the body to a healthy condition.

23 f.

o(\ me\n ou)=n kte(.: with this the discussion returns to the point which had given occasion to the above digressions (o(/per me/ntoi).

e)kei=no: refers to o)fopoii/a. The employment of a neuter demonstrative or relative referring to an antecedent in the masculine or feminine adds to the generalness of the conception. Cf. 463 b, 460 e. But e)n sw/mati may have had some influence.

me\n ou)=n: here, as also in i)/sws me\n ou)=n and o(\ me\n ou)=n just preceding, ou)=n does not denote sequence, but adds force to the statement about to be made in view of what has already been said.

e)moi/: hints a contrast.

XXI.

ti/ ou)=n fh/|s: Polus braces himself, and assumes again the office of questioner; but shows, by the vagueness (cf. above, 462 c with note) and inappropriateness of his question, that he is either singularly inattentive or stupid. Hence he receives a sharp rap over the knuckles with the admonition that his question had been some time settled (465 d).

ti/ ta/xa dra/seis: is taken by Cron to mean “what can you possibly (ta/xa) bring forward?” i.e. in the course of the discussion. The scholiast understood it as meaning “what will you do presently,” when you get old, as we see by the addition presbu/ths geno/menos. Probably it is but an exclamation of wonder and surprise; our colloquial “What'll you do next?”

e)n tai=s po/lesi: is to be connected with fau=loi nomi/zesqai. In spite of his qualification, Polus proceeds to put as bad a color on his assumed view of Socrates as possible, by adding a)gaqoi/ (cf. 449 a) to r(h/tores. Cf. 469 a. He does not aim at a refutation of Socrates; with him the question is still not the true nature of Rhetoric, but its value and power in the state.

e)rw/thma kte(.: probably Socrates only wishes to show that, from the point of view of dialectic, the preceding question is so inappropriate that he is obliged to look upon it as a merely rhetorical one, by which Polus only states his own sentiments. Cf. below c.

ou)de\ nomi/zesqai: much more crushing than fau=loi nomi/zesqai. “They are not considered at all,” “they have no value whatever.” On nomi/zesqai, cf. Ar. 962 o(/t' e)gw\ (o( di/kaios lo/gos) ta\ di/kaia le/gwn h)/nqoun kai\ swfrosu/nh )neno/misto (“was in high repute”).

me/n: almost equiv. to mh/n, indeed.

dh/: equiv. to just. “But that is indeed just what I do (ge) say.”

w(/sper oi( tu/rannoi: by this comparison Polus endeavors to emphasize the importance of his art, careless of the fact that he thereby detracts from its moral value. He employs his strongest expression of power actually used (a)pokteinu/asin), not even using the circumlocution oi(=oi/ t' ei)si/n. In spite of his following reassertion, however, the question is really only a rhetorical one, in which he voices his own statements. See on a above.

nh\ to\n ku/na: see on 461 b.—

a)mfignow= . . . le/geis: ‘’ Cope.

ei)=en: “very well,” accepts the issue.

XXII.

du/nasqai me/n: the correlative has me/ntoi, which is much stronger than de/.

w(=n bou/lontai: is a circumlocution for the part. gen.; hence the indicative.

w(s e)/pos ei)pei=n: see on 450 b.

ou)kou=n kte(.: Polus is surprised that Socrates should see any difference in the two phrases.

ou)/ fhmi (nego): repeats ou)/x, w(/s fhsi. Polus does not understand Socrates, who has in mind the results of the admission that the possession of power is a good. The question is merely rhetorical, with an accent of astonishment.

ma\ to/n: the omission of the divinity occurs not infrequently. Cf. Ar. 1374 ma\ to/n, e)gw\ me\n ou)d' a)/n, ei)/ tis e)/lege/ moi tw=n e)pituxo/ntwn, e)piqo/mhn kte(. H., 723 a, says that the deity is omitted with humorous effect; but it is much more likely here that Socrates is a little vexed, but stops at once any exhibition of it. The Scholiast's note, eu)labei/as xa/rin, may be interpreted as indicating this motive, or the motive assigned to Socrates on 461 b.

fh/|s: with a clear reference to Polus' previous statements in b, which he is thus led to reiterate.

ga\r ou)=n: is frequently found thus in phrases of acquiescence.

ou)kou=n a)podei/ceis kte(.: the fut. in neg. questions forms a lively expression for urgent demand. Kr. 53, 7, 4; H. 844 a.—The pred. noun with the supplementary partic. follows the same rule of agreement, as with the supplementary infinitive.

e)cele/gcas: the refutation consists in the proof, and the proof is at the same time a refutation. We must not insist on the priority of the aorist participle (H. 856 b); but the complex is to be considered, and from that point of view it would make no difference whether we had a)podei/ceis e)cele/gcas or a)podei/cas e)cele/gceis.

h( de\ du/namis kte(.: contains one of the propositions on which Socrates bases the statement made above (466 e) and afterwards repeated, pw=s a)\n . . . me/ga du/nainto. The other proposition is that the possession by the orators of the power of doing what they please is not a good possession.

e)celegxqh=|: in the pregnant sense. “If by a refutation of the position taken he be not convinced.” Cf. 482 b.

ou(=tos a)nh/r —: ‘aposiopesis.’ Polus is so astonished that he does not know what to say. The complete exclamation (always without the article) occurs 489 b. Cf. 505 c. Polus' astonishment, as well as stupidity, are still more evident in the words which follow, sxe/tlia le/geis kai\ u(perfua=. sxe/tlios is taken from Homer, where, however, it is only used of persons (except rarely in the Odyssey); u(perfuh/s is not unknown in Attic, but occurs in Plato (except here and 477 d) only in the adverbial form.

tou/tou pro/sqen: can, of course, be considered as a gloss on a)/rti, but it heightens the effect, from a mimetic point of view, as well by its meaning, “a moment ago,” as by its position at the end of the sentence.

de/: almost equiv. to “although.” It is often used in the second of clauses thus connected to emphasize the opposition.

w)= lw=|ste *pw=le: ‘paronomasia’ in Polus' style. See on 448 c.

i(/na kai\ ei)dw=: expresses curiosity, rather than a desire for information. Socrates, as leader of the discussion, makes at once an advance, by fixing a very important distinction.

2 f.

o(\ a)\n pra/ttwsin, o(\ pra/ttousin: the former is generic, the latter is a circumlocution. A few lines below o(/per poiou=sin is the special case, explanatory of tou=to.

pi/nontes para\ kte(.: the preposition is personal; “from the hands of.”

oi( ple/ontes: the merchants (e)/mporoi) who engage in transmarine trade. Notice the confusion of the order, in which we can see the natural freedom of conversation. The subject of e)sti/n is ou) tou=to o(\ poiou=sin, the predicate o(\ bou/lontai. The subject oi( ple/ontes floats until the plural verb appears. The neg. in ou)kou=n is not felt here. H. 1048 a (b).

pra/gmat' e)/xein: is passive to pra/gmata pare/xein.

a)/llo ti: ‘a)/llo ti h)/ challenges an affirmation with respect to some special portion of the sentence; a)/llo ti challenges an affirmation with respect to the whole sentence which follows it.’ Riddell, § 22.

a)=r' ou)=n e)/stin kte(.: see a more detailed investigation of this theory in Cf. 216 d dokei= moi w(sperei\ tri/) a)/tta ei)=nai ge/nh, to\ me\n a)gaqo/n, to\ de\ kako/n, to\ d' ou)/t) a)gaqo\n ou)/te kako/n.

pollh\ a)na/gkh: the answer is not according to the form of the preceding question, but according to the sense, as if ou)de\n e)/sti tw=n o)/ntwn had preceded.

21 f.

sofi/an, u(gi/eian, plou=ton: types of the three great classes of property, —mental, physical, and material.

a)=ra: for position, see on 472 d.

au)=: on the other hand. To actions are opposed things, which, however, belong to a similar category.

be/ltion: sc. than its opposite. When the comparison is self-evident, the Greek, like the English, frequently omits the second member.

XXIV.

e)kei=na, e)kei=no: the immediate repetition of the same pronoun with different reference is remarkable.

tau=ta: refers back to a(/.

sfa/ttein: is purposely substituted as a harsher word for a)pokteinu/nai. It implies that the person killed is defenseless: “to slaughter like an ox.”

a(plw=s ou(/tws. thus sim- ply, “without limitation,” as one would have to assume if the view of Polus is to stand. 351 c ou)k oi)=da a(plw=s ou(/tw, w(s su\ e)rwta=|s, ei) e)moi\ a)pokrite/on e)sti/n, w(s ta\ h(de/a te a)gaqa/ e)stin kte(. Cf. 464 b.

ti/ ou)k a)pokri/nei: a challenge in the form of a question, because Polus hesitates to answer. He is beginning to feel concerned for his fondly cherished view and bold state ments. The same form recurs a few lines below, where Polus is just clearly recognizing his defeat. These artifices belong to the dramatic side of the dialogue, and take the place of the tedious repetitions which weary us in the narrative form; i.e., in 360 c, d sune/fh—e)pe/neusen— kai\ e)ntau=qa e)/ti e)pe/neusen—pa/nu mo/gis e)ntau=qa e)pe/neusen—ou)ke/ti e)ntau=qa ou)/t' e)pineu=sai h)qe/lhsen e)si/ga te.

ei)/per tau=ta o(mologou=men: is the general premiss, while what follows up to ou)ka/kion is the special application of this to tyrants and orators. For the structure, see on the similar case in 453 c.

au)tw=|: is said from the standpoint of the critic, although referring to the subject of oi)o/menos. The Greek does not cling to the reflexive. Kr. 51, 2, 5; H. 684 a.

15 f.

tugxa/nei de\ kte(.: is connected with the participle as an independent clause,—a usage common after relatives. Kr. 59, 2, 6. 9; H. 1005. The Eng. idiom requires ‘although’ or ‘whereas.’

21 f.

e)n th=| po/lei tau/th|: in this undefined city of which they were speaking, the abode of the tyrant or orator under criticism (o( toiou=tos).

o(/ti e)/stin: that it is possible. There need not be in all cases a conflict between what one wishes and what seems best, but the possibility of a single case is enough for Socrates' argument.

w(s dh\ su\ kte(.: is quite ironic; as if you would not! It is really a com parison, “it is just as true as the fact that,” etc. By this fling Polus seeks to evade confession of his defeat.

dh/santa: equiv. to ei)s to\ desmwth/rion a)gago/nta.

zhlwto/n: enviable. By an easy shift, the personal idea is transferred to the action itself.

eu)fh/mei (fave lingua): says Socrates, because the denial of all moral principles implied in the words of Polus seems to him like a sin against divinity. 330 d.

tw=n: the art. with incorporated antec. is Platonic. Kr. 51, 12, N.

dikai/ws: is slipped in unfairly by Polus. Cf. 466 a.

pro/s: is the only preposition that occurs at all frequently in Attic prose as an adverb.

ou(/tws kte(.: ‘Life is not the highest good, but guilt is certainly the greatest evil.’ This was one of the life principles of Socrates. Cf. the beautiful exposition in 28 b ff., especially 29 b and 30 d, 48 b.

bouloi/mhn a)\n ou)de/tera: WISH neither; because also to suffer wrong is not a good thing. With Polus wish and preference coincide. —This quibble of Socrates is interesting, as showing the difficulties by which early thinkers were beset. For an accurate statement of principles, an accurate use of synonyms was indispensable; and this was not yet possible, even with the cultured.

su\ a)/ra kte(.: Polus cannot tear himself away from his fast-rooted ideas. Hence all teaching is vain.

w)= maka/rie: has somewhat of an ironical coloring. The nearest English equivalent is the half serious “Oh, you awful fellow!”—

e)mou= dh\ le/gontos: as an offset to Polus' words a)ll' e)/gwge tou=to le/gw. “Let us have, then, argument for argument.” The gen. may depend on e)pilabou=, as in 506 b, but it is more likely gen. abs. See on a)ntilamba/nesqai, 506 a, and 214 e e)a/n ti mh\ a)lhqe\s le/gw, metacu\ e)pilabou=, a)\n bou/lh|, kai\ ei)pe\ o(/ti tou=to yeu/domai. The original meaning is made clear by 329 a ta\ xalkei=a plhge/nta makro\n h)xei= kai\ a)potei/nei, e)a\n mh\ e)pila/bhtai/ tis (unless one takes hold of it).

tw| lo/gw|: instrumental dat., “with your argument.”

e)n a)gora=| plhqou/sh|: is not tem

poral, as in Xen. i. 8. 1 h)/dh de\ h)=n a)mfi\ a)gora\n plh/qousan, i.e. towards noon. It simply indicates the presence of a multitude.

e)gxeiri/dion: is not a “dagger,” but a short sword for striking and thrusting; the former is shown by kateage/nai th=s kefalh=s. Cf. Xen. ii. 3. 23 paraggei/lantes neani/skois . . . cifi/dia u(po\ ma/lhs e)/xontas paragene/sqai.

teqnh/cei: one of the two Greek verbs with fut. perf. active. See H. 467. The fut. perfect expresses the certainty as well as the immediateness of the result; cf. kateagw\s e)/stai au)ti/ka ma/la, and see GMT. 79.

th=s kefalh=s: is a gen. of the part affected. H. 738 b. Cf. Ar. 1180 th=s kefalh=s kate/age peri\ li/qon pesw/n. The acc. could have been used; cf. 515 e ta\ w)=ta.—

au)tw=n: follows tina/, —a case of ‘hyperbaton.’

The art. is omitted before trih/reis, although it has a different gender from that of the preceding substan tive. 111 c kai\ to/n ge h(/lion kai\ selh/nhn kai\ a)/stra o(ra=sqai u(p' au)tw=n oi(=a tugxa/nei o)/nta. Omission of the art. where both substantives are of the same gender is not uncommon. The two kindred ideas are thereby brought together into one conception. In the present passage, by this means we have the objects enumerated divided into classes: (1) the navy-yard, with the war-vessels therein contained; (2) the remaining vessels, whether they be public or private property. Similarly, Dem. ii. 9 tw=| _ta\ xwri/a kai\ lime/nas kai\ ta\ toiau=ta proeilhfe/nai.

ou(/tw ge: limits the answer, as if Polus still wished to save something from his earlier statement.

ou)kou=n kte(.: the sentence is merely a statement in the form of an interrogation, and assumes an assent by the opponent, provided no express demurrer is raised. Socrates gives opportunity for this after du/nasqai (29), but as none is made, he proceeds again with skeyw/meqa kte(.—

pa/lin au)=: because in this new conception is contained a correction of the former view held by Polus.

fai/netai: has its subject in to\ me/ga du/nasqai, and its predicate in a)gaqo/n te ei)=nai. “Does not then this great power of yours (pa/lin au)=) appear to you (only provided the one who does what seems good to him proves to be doing what is profitable) to be both a good thing,—and that, as it seems, is the real (to/) great power; otherwise it is an evil thing and small power.” The sentence begins with a question which is lost in an affirmation.

ei) de\ mh/: is phraseological, “otherwise.” The contrast is with tou=to, and through this with e)a\n me\n kte(. The subject of kako/n (e)sti) kai\ smikro\n du/nasqai is, of course, the phrase to\ pra/ttein a(\ dokei=, to be supplied from the context. H. 904, 906 a, b.

a)/llo ti: see on 467 d.

XXVI.

xalepo/n: is ironic; but in a)ll' ou)xi/ the irony turns to sober earnest. Not so with the irony of Socrates.

mh\ ka/mh|s, a)ll' e)/legxe: note the difference between positive and neg. imperative.

eu)ergetw=n: is to be explained according to 458 a. On the supplementary partic., see G. 279, 1; H. 983.

ta\ ga\r e)xqe\s kai\ prw/|hn: means “recent events.” Homer also uses the phrase xqiza/ te kai\ prw/iza, B 303. The Greek idiom requires kai/ where the Eng. uses “or.”

8 f.

polloi\ a)dikou=ntes a)/nqrwpoi: in most cases when the participle is used as an attribute, we can still feel the participial plus as compared with the adjective. Here, however, that has almost completely disappeared, and the participle is as much an adj. as prosh/kwn, pre/pwn, etc.

ta\ poi=a: it is a matter of individual preference whether the art. be used or not; cf. 449 e. When used, the article limits the attention to what has been already alluded to; here, ta\ e)xqe\s . . . tau=ta. In Eng. one also occasionally hears the art. with the interrogative.

*)arxe/laon: Archelaus, an ille gitimate son of Perdiccas, seized the throne in B.C. 414, after his father's death, and reigned until 399, when he was murdered by Craterus or Crateuas (name and motive are alike uncertain). The facts brought forward by Polus in their darkest colors are probably correct; but Archelaus laid the foundation for the later importance of Macedonia by introducing Greek culture. He invited famous artists, among others Euripides, to his court. There is also a tradition that he invited Socrates, but that is hardly credible.

o(ra=|s: well expresses the lively interest which Polus, as well as many other Greeks, took in that admired ruler, whose apparent success was doubtless envied by many an aspiring and ambitious man. The answer of Socrates sounds somewhat pedantic, but it is probably jesting, and designed to cool the extravagant ardor of Polus, while at the same time it prepares the way for ou)/pw sugge/gona tw=| a)ndri/ below.

a)lla\ . . . ge: nevertheless, at least. H. 1046, 2, a.

15-This passage is translated by Cicero, v. 12.

au)to/qen: “instinctively,” “of yourself.” This is not translated by Cicero, but it forms a good contrast to suggeno/menos. Polus thinks the very fact of Archelaus being a ruler implies that he is fortunate. That the Persian king was generally esteemed the personification of happiness is shown by 40 e.

21 f.

paidei/a and

dikaiosu/nh: together denote moral cultivation.—

o(/pws e)/xei: construed with the part. gen. See G. 168, N. 3; H. 757 a.

a)/ndra kai\ gunai=ka: virtue, and hence also the foundation of eu)daimoni/a, is, according to Socrates, one and the same for all, while the pupils of Gorgias recognized different varie ties for different classes. 71 e prw=ton me\n ei) bou/lei a)ndro\s a)reth/n, ei) de\ bou/lei gunaiko\s a)reth/n kte(. On the omission of the art. with gunai=ka, see on 469 e.

ou(=tos . . . o( *)arxe/laos: the position emphasizes the name; ‘this man—Archelaus!’

pw=s ou)k a)/dikos: sc. e)sti/n. This admission, coupled with the opinion that Archelaus is an enviable and happy man, which is very evident from the ironical narrative which follows, shows most plainly the utter opposition between Polus' view and the moral principle which Socrates champions.

w(=| ge: introduces the authority of indisputable facts. See on 460 e.

32 ff.

kai\, kai\, kai/: is in sense almost equiv. to “and therefore.” The construction begun in the clause w(=| ge . . . a)delfou= is naturally varied in kai\ . . . *)alke/tou by being made personal.

ei) e)bou/leto, h)=n eu)dai/mwn: is an unreal conditional sentence, with opposition to the present. The close proximity of the two clauses in the apodosis explains the omission of the second a)/n.

despo/thn kai\ qei=on: denotes two kinds of moral obligation to which Archelaus paid no attention; ceni/sas adds a third, the violation of which was considered among Greeks the worst of crimes, a sin against *zeu\s ce/nios. Cf. Hom. N 624, Xen. iii. 2. 4. The heaping up of the words katamequ/sas, e)mbalw/n (like a thing), e)cagagw/n, a)pe/sfacen, h)fa/nisen makes the impression of the repeated acts of violence very vivid.

to\n a)delfo/n: is emphasized by its position in advance of its governing verb (partic.).

*perdi/kkou: Perdiccas II. reigned from B.C. 454 (?) until 414 or 413, after having dispossessed his brother Alcetas. During the Peloponnesian war he pursued a very prudent but faithless policy.—The extraordinary number of participles employed by Polus has an artistic value in showing the tumultuousness of his feelings.

ou)k e)boulh/qh (he did not choose)

eu)dai/mwn gene/sqai: is very sarcastic. The conclusion introduced by toiga/rtoi is equally emphatic. Polus admires in Archelaus the strength of will which hesitates at nothing to accomplish its aim; regret with him is weakness.

kai\ i)/sws e)/stin o(/stis kte(.: in these words, in spite of their sarcastic form, lies the only attempt at proof which Polus makes, i.e. an appeal to the opinion of others; he of course thinks that no one will own himself to be such a man.

kai\ kat' a)rxa/s: leads us to expect in the following kai\ nu=n a confirmation and climax of praise, —which, however, is changed instead to blame by tou= . . . h)melhke/nai. Note the zeugma in combining tou= . . . h)melhke/nai with e)ph/|nesa. See on 520 b h)\ tw=| au)tw=|. The praise was bestowed in 448 d.

po/qen: is a question with a negative force, to which the affirmative kai\ mh/n corresponds.

e)pei\ dokei=: in such phrases the e)pei/ has the force of “although,” “whereas.” 335 c sofo\s ga\r ei)=: e)gw\ de\ ta\ makra\ tau=ta a)du/natos e)pei\ e)boulo/mhn a)\n oi(=o/s t' ei)=nai. 19 e. The conj. merely indicates a relation between the two ideas. If these two ideas harmonize, the relation becomes causal; if not, it becomes adversative.

w)= maka/rie (cf. 469 c): implies the reproof which follows.

e)n toi=s dikasthri/ois: the manner of argument practised there frequently incurs Plato's disapproval. 34 b ff. The emphasis is laid on h(gou/menoi and dokou=sin.

e(/na tina/: the indef. pron. emphasizes the number, “a paltry one.”

15 f.

katayeudomarturhqei/h tis: the Greek idiom does not require intr. verbs to be used impersonally in the passive. Cf. Xen. 24 katayeudomarturei=n e)mou= with Dem. in Meid. 136 katayeudomarturou=mai.

dokou/ntwn ei)=nai ti/: equal to eu)doki/mwn. Cf. the English colloquialism ‘he pretends to be something.’

o)li/gou: almost; the remnant of the phrase o)li/gou dei=n. H. 743 b.

marturh/sou s kte(.: Nicias, the celebrated general in the Peloponnesian war, who met his death in the Sicilian expedition (B.C. 413), was leader of the moderate wing of the aristocratic party. Aristocrates, the son of Scellias or Scellius, belonged, as we can judge from Ar. 125 and Thuc. viii. 89, to the extreme or oligarchical order. He was one of the generals condemned to death for negligence at the battle of Arginusae. Xen. i. 7. Socrates here speaks of both as if they were still living. (See Introd. § 18.) Next to them, Socrates mentions the house of Pericles; he could not name the statesman himself because he was already dead when Gorgias visited Athens for the first time; but he, with his house, was a champion of the Athenian democracy. So we have here representatives of the chief political parties as witnesses for Polus. They agreed with each other in that they esteemed power in the state,—even tyranny, —though purchased at the price of wrong-doing, to be the highest good.

20 ff.

e)a\n me\n bou/lh|, e)a\n de/ bou/lh|: are not pleonastic after e)a\n bou/lh|, but are due partly to courtesy (cf. 353 b ei) de\ mh\ bou/lei, ei)/ soi fi/lon), and serve also by specifying to emphasize the possibility of a free choice among all parties.

w(=n oi( tri/podes: in this way these men show that they were dokou=ntes ei)=nai ti/. They also, by the magnificence of their offerings, proved their piety, and their ‘testimony’ would be therefore the more weighty. Nicias was, according to all accounts, an honorable man. Thucydides says (vii. 86) of him, in referring to his mournful death: h(/kista dh\ a)/cios w)\n tw=n ge e)p' e)mou= *(ellh/nwn e)s tou=to dustuxi/as a)fike/sqai dia\ th\n pa=san e)s a)reth\n nenomisme/nhn e)pith/deusin. By Dionysion is to be understood not a temple, but a spot sacred to Dionysius,—a sacred precinct. Nicias built there a kind of shrine, which possessed, among other treasures, some very costly tripods which he had dedicated to Dionysus after he had discharged the office of Choregus—a very costly liturgy in itself. The tripods were arranged apparently e)fech=s with a kind of ostentation.

22 f.

e)n *puqi/ou: sc. i(erw=|. The offering of Aristocrates must have been, according to the words of Socrates, also costly and well-known.

a)nagka/zeis: sc. to agreement by convincing reasons; often followed by o(mologei=n, but without it in 196 b tou/tw| au)tw=| h)nagka/zomen mh\ ei)=nai yeudh= do/can.

27 f.

e)kba/llein e)k th=s ou)si/as kai\ tou= a)lhqou=s: this is ambiguous, for ou)si/a can denote property, material possessions as well as physical existence. Accordingly Polus appears here in the investigation as a tyrant, who drives others from house and home. But it is this same power which the orator wishes to obtain (before a court) by his speech.

28 f.

se\ au)to\n . . . ma/rtura: the dialectical proof is a course of logic, a process of reasoning, which Socrates carries through, with the help of his adversary, by question and answer. Hence by his enforced agreement a man becomes a witness against himself.

e)/stin kte(.: Socrates does not hereby recognize this adducing of ‘testimony’ to be a correct tro/pos e)le/gxou, but rather implies by the words w(s su/ te oi)/ei kte(. (cf. 471 d, 473 b) that it is only a pretended one, which cannot stand against the true one.

sxedo/n ti: does not weaken the idea, but merely softens the expression. The question under discussion is really the cardinal one of life, ‘How can I be happy?’

au)ti/ka: is one of the ways of introducing an example in Greek. 359 e pa=n tou)nanti/on e)sti\n e)pi\ a(\ oi(/ te deiloi\ e)/rxontai kai\ oi( a)ndrei=oi. au)ti/ka ei)s to\n po/lemon oi( me\n e)qe/lousin i)e/nai, oi( de\ ou)k e)qe/lousin. The addition of prw=ton shows that there are still other conflicts between their views; i.e. in reference to the nature and value of punishment.

ei)=nai: is thrown forward for the sake of emphasis, as e)/sti above. After h(gou=mai, nomi/zw, and similar verbs the pred. is often found without a copula. Cf. 473 a.

e(/n: with this are connected other points of difference.

ei)=en: see on 466 c.

a)=ra: the position here is still more remarkable than in 467 e and 476 a.—The whole weight of the question falls on a)\n tugxa/nh| di/khs kai\ timwri/as. The former, di/kh, usually denotes simply the carrying out of the law, the infliction of justice; the latter, timwri/a, the fine or penalty which falls to the injured person or the state. These are both external demands on the criminal, called forth by his crime, and by which an expiation of it is to be effected. On the other hand, ko/lasis is the discipline which the guilty party himself undergoes, designed to prevent further transgression; while zhmi/a (470 a) is only the injury or damage which he sustains in expiating his crime. From the outset Socrates shows that, even according to the view of his opponent, wrongdoing does not give happiness under all conditions. This point is not made superfluous by the discussion of 469 c-470 c; for there the question concerns du/namis, not eu)daimoni/a.

kai\ tugxa/nh| di/khs: seems a strange addition after didw=| di/khn, with which it appears to be almost synonymous. But the two phrases are probably intended to be but the subjective and objective, the active and passive expression of the same idea; as the u(po/ with the gen. would indicate.

fi/lon ga/r se h(gou=mai: there

fore Socrates does not allow himself to be deterred by the trouble it will involve to bring Polus to the same opinion. tau)ta\ le/gein (kai\ fronei=n) is held as a sign of friendship, just as diafe/resqai of enmity. See on 510 c and Sall. 20 nam idem velle atque idem nolle, ea demum firma amicitia est. At the same time the words contain a delicate reply to Polus' discourteous exclamation. Socrates will soon bring him to say what is in his own view a)/topon.

16 f.

e)n toi=s e)/mprosqen: cf. 469 b.

to\ a)dikei=n . . . ei)=nai: is cited as an example of rather uncommon use of the indir. disc. inf. after ei)=pon (GMT. 753, 3), but the clause is to be looked at rather as the object of ei)=pon in the sense of “declare.”

kai\ e)chle/gxqhn u(po\ sou=: of course the addition of Socrates after Polus' reply throws a quite different coloring over this sentence. Polus' self-assurance is apparent in vai\ ma\ *di/a, his positiveness in a)lhqh= ge oi)o/menos. i)/sws shows no uncertainty, but is only the conscious under-statement which is common in English. See on 480 a.

a)ll' e)/ti tou=to kte(.: refers to 470 c and is just as ironical. In sharp contrast with the false assurance which trusts its own cleverness is Socrates' faith in the immutability of truth, to\ ga\r a)lhqe\s ou)de/pote e)le/gxetai.

lhfqh=|: pictures vividly the actual scene. In compound verbs the metaphorical meaning often predominates, and leaves the actual in the background (cf. e)p' au)tofw/rw| katalamba/nesqai). In what follows, notice the rhetorical heaping up of the most frightful punishments; which reminds us of Aesch. 186 ff. karanisth=res o)fqalmwru/xoi | di/kai sfagai/ te spe/rmato/s t' a)pofqorai\ | pai/dwn, kakou= te xlou=nis h)d' a)krwni/a, | leusmo/s te kai\ mu/zousin oi)ktismo\n polu\n | u(po\ r(a/xin page/ntes. ii. 361 e mastigw/setai, streblw/setai, dedh/setai, e)kkauqh/setai tw)fqalmw/, teleutw=n pa/nta kaka\ paqw\n a)nasxinduleuqh/setai.

kai\ a)/llas kte(.: notice the o(moiote/leuta.

e)pidw/n: sc. lwbhqe/ntas.

katapittwqh=|: an especially severe manner of punishment. The criminal was put into a sack smeared with pitch,—the so-called tunica molesta,—which was then set on fire.

diafugw/n: “if he succeed”; opposed to lhfqh=|.

o(/ti a)\n bou/lhtai: Polus has again forgotten the explanation of the difference between dokei=n and bou/lesqai.—

eu)daimonizo/menos: to be thought eu)dai/mwn by the multitude is to be so, in Polus' estimation.

kai\ tw=n a)/llwn ce/nwn: cf. Hom. B 191 a)ll' au)to/s te ka/qhso kai\ a)/llous i(/drue laou/s, 480 d, 110 e li/qois kai\ gh=| kai\ toi=s a)/llois zw/|ois te kai\ futoi=s. The same idiom is found in Latin, as equites et aliud vul gus. See on 447 c.

43 f.

tau=ta le/geis: Polus is trium

phant, as if Socrates' position (tau=ta) were now overthrown.

mormolu/ttei: the expression for terrifying with ghost stories. The ‘mormo’ was the ‘bad man’ with which children were frightened. 46 c.

w)= ge/nnaie: is probably designedly used because the means employed are unfair, being only a pretended, not a real proof. Cf. 471 e.

o(/mws de/: although in reality no point has been made, yet Socrates is ready to assume one and proceed upon that.

e)a\n a)di/kws e)pibouleu/wn: can be completed from c. The change in the expression is due to the collocation of the two words.

o( diafeu/gwn: “whoever remains unpunished.”

turanneu/sas: “he who attains to the tyranny.” The more important idea precedes.

ti/ tou=to: what can this mean? The inappropriate laughter of Polus is probably in accordance with the precept of Gorgias that in serious things one must draw the audience to his own side by laughing. Arist. iii. 18 ( ed. Sp. i. 160): dei=n e)/fh *gorgi/as th\n me\n spoudh\n diafqei/rein tw=n e)nanti/wn ge/lwti, to\n de\ ge/lwta spoudh=|.

katagela=n: to laugh it down. Socrates' opinion of the a)/llo ei)=dos e)le/gxou is shown by the addition, e)le/gxein de\ mh/.

14 f.

e)rou= tina toutwni/: by again having recourse unto the opinion of others, Polus again reverts, though in a different manner, to his ‘witnesses’ (469 e), and shows that the rhetorical method of proof is alone comprehensible to him. By inviting Socrates to put the question to those present, he reminds him of the analogous practice of e)piyhfi/zein (rogare populum), and gives him a chance to plead his own inaptitude as an excuse for not employing rhetorical methods. Socrates in his reply also shows that to accept the opinion of the majority —the method which the state had settled upon as the best way of establishing the truth—was as unsatisfactory, when employed by the individual, as the rhetorical methods. The fact to which Socrates alludes is the well-known trial of the generals who had won the battle of Arginusae and afterwards fell victims to political intrigue. The full proceedings are detailed by Xen. i. 6. 33 ff. and 7. Socrates was senator this year (Ol. 93. 3, 406 B.C.), and in the memorable assembly e)pista/ths tw=n pruta/newn. As such, he opposed the unlawful proceeding with an intrepid courage which he here humorously calls inaptitude in e)piyhfi/zein. Socrates mentions the circumstance also in 32 b, but in a different manner. On the chronological difficulty, see Introd. § 18.

h( fulh/: of course that to which Socrates belonged, h( *)antioxi/s.

ge/lwta parei=xon kai\ kte(.: a ‘hysteron proteron.’ See Rid. § 308.

tou/twn: i.e. the various means with which Polus had hitherto attempted to confute Socrates.

o(/per nundh/: 472 c.

para/dos: viz. to\n e)/legxon. Cf. below, dido/nai e)/legxon “to give a chance for refutation.”

ou)de\ diale/gomai: because scientific investigation by means of conversation is naturally confined to individuals.

e)pei\ . . . a)dikei=n: this is not meant in earnest, but is a reductio ad absurdum of the preceding words of Socrates, which are so opposed to Polus' view. On e)pei/ cf. 471 e, and see GMT. 718, where this clause is cited as interrogative.

kai\ ga\r e)piqumw=: implies a doubt whether Socrates can really advance anything in support of his view. On the following answers of Polus, see Introd. § 14.

w(/sper kte(.: as an actual fact, the discussion has been concerning the question whether a)dikei=n or a)dikei=- sqai were the greater evil, since the middle of ch. XXIV.

ti/ de\ dh/; how so, then?—The predicate is thrown forward in the following clause, because the chief weight of the contrast falls upon it.

ou)kou=n kte(.: the kalo/n is here the species under which the a)gaqo/n and the h(du/ are subordinated.

w(s e)/oikas: logically, in such cases as this, an inf. is to be supplied; but it is doubtful if any such ellipses were felt by the Greeks.—

kalo/n te kai\ a)gaqo/n,—kako\n kai\ ai)sxro/n: ‘chiasmus.’

to/de: is probably an acc. with le/geis understood. 65 d ti/ de\ dh\ ta\ toia/de and Xen. iii. I. 10 ti/ de\ tou\s kinduneu/ein me/llontas. On the other hand, 27 e ti/ de\ o( so\s bi/os and Soph. 101 ti/ ga\r dh\ pai=s o( tou= *laerti/ou make for the nom. The context must be the guide.

ei)s ou)de\n a)poble/pwn: with regard unto nothing, that is, without searching for some characteristic common to all these things, in accordance with which you would be justified in calling them kala/. The word a)poble/pw is used also when reference is made to an idea or principle, which conditions a person's action or the manner of appearance of any phenomenon.

kata/: is used of the scale according to which a thing is to be measured.

pro\s tou=to: points emphatically back to pro\s o(\ kte(., in a way more remarkable here than in 469 c. The relative clause itself is an extension of kata\ th\n xrei/an, laying especial stress on the relativity of the kalo/n.

e)n tw=| qewrei=sqai: notice the use of the passive to denote the point of view from which sw=ma is kalo/n.

e)kto\s tou/twn: i.e. the points of view mentioned in h)/ . . . h)/.

prosagoreu/ein: i.e. to designate by the addition of a characteristic, as if one were addressing a person by name.

kai\ mh/n: introduces us to a new variety of the beautiful, i.e. the results of mental activity. The no/moi, e)pithdeu/mata, and maqh/mata are, with reference to the subject of investigation, fittingly introduced as representatives of this class.

ta/ ge kata\ tou\s no/mous kte(.: it must be confessed that we could do very well without ta\ kala/. If kept, it must be considered as a repetition and restriction of ta/ ge kata\ kte(., and tou/twn must be explained by h)\ w)fe/lima kte(. in appo sition. See H. 950. But Rid. § 271 b seems to have a different view of the sentence, which he holds to be a case of inversion of government, and with this Cope seems to agree in his translation: “And moreover, in all that belongs to laws and habits of life, their beauty, I presume, is to be found nowhere beyond these limits; that is to say, either the utility or the pleasure that is in them, or both.”

kai\ kalw=s kte(.: this lively as

sent of Polus shows that he thinks that Socrates is at last veering round to his position. The manner in which he is gradually undeceived is interesting.

h)/toi kte(.: if the text is sound, Socrates here speaks with less exactness than above, omitting what can be easily supplied.

fe/re dh/: the result obtained is applied to the case under discussion.

lu/ph|: here denotes, as the following a)lgou=si explains, only physical pain. No reference can be meant to the gnawings of conscience.

u(perba/llei: here construed with gen. like u(pere/xei (5). v. 734a.

a)/llo ti: see on 467 d. Polus had several times given as an authority the opinion of the masses, and had even, in 474 b, by the words ou)/t' a)/llos ou)dei/s spoken in their name. He thus appears, like Protagoras in 353 a, as their representative. w(mologei=to properly applies to u(po\ sou=, and the present is to be supplied to u(po\ tw=n pollw=n a)nqrw/pwn.

de/caio a)/n: pays back for Polus' question in 474 b. The construction is varied by the substitution of a)nti\ with gen. instead of h)/ after ma=llon.

a)nti\ tou= h(=tton: sc. kakou= kai\ ai)sxrou=.

gennai/ws: bravely; scorning the pain. The comparison is the same as in 480 c pare/xein . . . w(/sper te/mnein kai\ ka/ein i)atrw=|, and seems to be a Socratic one. Cf. Xen. i. 2. 54. For the construction, see on 456 b.

fa/qi h)\ mh\ (sc. fa/qi): affirm or deny. See on 454 d.

kata/ ge tou=ton to\n lo/gon: a conditional admission, implying that with a different treatment possibly a different result might be obtained.

30 f.

ou)/t' a)\n kte(.: a)/n draws attention to the emphatic words. On the position and repetition, see H. 862, 864; GMT. 223, 226.

o(ra=|s ou)=n, o( e)/legxos kte(.: we might also have had o(ra=|s ou)=n to\n e)/legxon o(/ti para\ kte(. But the form chosen by Plato greatly heightens the contrast. Socrates, moreover, is referring to his own words in 472 c parabalo/ntes ou)=n par' a)llh/lous skeyw/meqa, ei)/ ti dioi/sousin a)llh/lwn. Hence also the addition of the expressions marturw=n and e)piyhfi/zwn to the more general o(mologw=n.

a)=ra me/giston: the more usual particle for “whether” is ei), but cf. 70 d i)/dwmen a)=r' ou(twsi\ gi/gnetai a(/panta. H. 1016. In the sentence following, we have a)=ra introducing a direct question previously announced by th=|de as in 459 d.

kola/zesqai dikai/ws a)dikou=nta: the adverb is necessary, because upon it rests the main point in the proof.

43 f.

a)=ra to\ au)to\ kalei=s: the position makes the question more pointed.

kai\ diaskeya/menos ei)pe/: the ex

hortation to Polus to think well before he speaks is at the same time an intimation to the reader that the principle touched on in the question is of the greatest importance, as indicative of a man's moral views, and hence is not to be accepted without earnest investigation. How necessary this exhortation is, can be perceived from a question of Polus in 477 c.

XXXII.

ka/ei: the examples are chosen from cauterizing and surgery, because the healing art is in general for the body what the puni tive administration of justice is for the soul. See on 456 b. The second example is an advance on the first, in so far as the result of the treatment —corresponding to the general idea pa/qos—can be expressed in the substantival form tmh=ma.

sullh/bdhn: turns from the particular to the generic, and extends to all cases the law which has been noticed in special cases. It belongs, of course, to the last clause oi(=on kte(.

to\ di/khn dido/nai: the article determines the subject. GMT. 790.

o)rqw=s: denotes in general the proper or appropriate exercise of any function, and thus leads up to dikai/ws, which is specially ethical.

ei)/per kala\ kte(.: the argument, made according to the modus tollendo ponens with natural abbreviations, rests on the exposition made in 474 d f.

th\n w)feli/an: cognate accusative. After u(polamba/nw we must supply w)felei=sqai. The asyndeton which follows is of the very common explanatory class.

a)=ra ou)=n: introduces a new section of the argument, regarding the statement advanced by Socrates in 469 b.

kataskeuh=|: is distinguished from paraskeuh/ in that it denotes a preparation designed to endure; paraskeuh/ is for the emergency. Consequently the constitution of the body, so far as it is the result of physical culture, is naturally a kataskeuh/.

ponhri/an: not kaki/an. The latter word, according to the prevailing usage, denotes, as applied to the soul, moral depravity only, as above (a). The former denotes a bad condition in general, which may or may not be due to moral depravity. But as the bad condition usually involves bad constitution, ponhri/a comes to mean much the same as kaki/a. The use of the words depends upon kataskeuh/.

kai\ ta\ toiau=ta: shows that the enumeration is not complete. The omitted member is given below in d (a)ko/laston) and e a)kolasi/a, and thereby the number of ponhri/ai (i.e. varieties of ponhri/a) is made to correspond with the number of cardinal virtues (a)retai/).

pw=s, w)= *sw/krates; Polus shows by the question that he has not yet completely grasped the relationship of the ideas, good and beautiful, bad and ugly (cf. 477 a), although it has been twice expounded by Socrates.

a)niaro/s and

a)ni/a: like a)lgeino/s and a)lghdw/n, characterize the lu/ph from its physical side, i.e. the pain caused by the punishment. Cf. also 355 e and 499 a, where a)nia=sqai is opposed to xai/rein. With bla/bh| sc. u(perba/llon, and also with a)mfo/tera, which is the adverbial acc. like tou)nanti/on and the like. See G. 160,2; H. 719 b. The words a)niaro/tato/n e)sti do not indeed harmonize with the rest of the sentence and may without injury be cut out, but still they are not unnatural in this careless form of conversational speaking and do fit the following question a)=r' a)lgeino/teron.

tou/twn: is of course to be understood in the partitive sense.

a)po\ tou/twn ge: ‘ex his quidem quae disputata sunt.’ Stallbaum. Polus has a suspicion of what is coming and so expresses himself guardedly, as if he wished to leave a door open behind him. On the contrary, Socrates speaks with great decision, and probably has in mind Polus' words in 471 a qaumasi/ws w(s a)/qlios ge/gonen.

u(perfuei= w(s mega/lh| bla/bh|: a case of what was originally attraction, but which by long usage has become phraseological. See H. 1003 b; Rid. § 197.

XXXIV.

xrhmatistikh/: this and the i)atrikh/ appear already in 452 a ff., where they are associated with gumnastikh/.

6 f.

eu)porei=s: is used in a transferred sense, as is more frequently the case with a)porei=n. “If you are not at once (ou(/tws) prepared with an answer.” We must imagine a short pause as occurring before ei). Such halts and explanations by means of examples, analogies, suggestive questions, and the like, are of course in accordance with the artistic design of the dialogue, but also serve to keep the attention of the reader. Note the interrogative form of one of Polus' answers. On ou(/tws see on 503 d.

a)kolastai/nontas: appears again in 555 d, but otherwise seems to be restricted to comedy.

polu\ diafe/rel: this utterance comes from Polus' heart because he still continues to regard the practice of law as the proper field for the exercise of the art which he teaches.

a)palla/ttetai: the subj. is to be supplied from the previous question of Socrates (a)=r' ou)=n . . . i)atreuo/menoi). The trans. use of i)atreu/ein is not common.

u(gih=: on the form, see H. 231 b.

a)=r' ou)=n kte(.: Socrates proceeds now to fulfil the promise made in 473 a.

ou(/tws: is explained by the partic. which follows.

tout' h)=n kte(.: on the gender, see H. 617; G. 138, N. 2 c. The impf. of ‘awakening’ is often employed with a)/ra or its equivalents (w(s e)/oike). See H. 833.

th\n a)rxh\n mhde\ kth=sis: is the substantival, hence the general expression for the previous particular partic. clause. th\n a)rxh/n is construed with kth=sis, which thus far retains its verbal nature.

i)atrikh\ gi/gnetal: carries out the analogy already so far developed. swfroni/zein in the soul corresponds to i)atreu/ein (ka/ein kai\ te/mnein) in the body.

tou=to: i.e. to\ e)/xein kaki/an e)n sw/mati, to be supplied from the preceding clause.

deu/teros: cf. the Eng. colloquial ‘second best.’

o( nouqetou/menos: contains an intimation that the improving punishment need not necessarily be the infliction of physical pain, but may be perceptible only by its effect on the soul. 26 a tw=n a)kousi/wn a(marthma/twn ou) deu=ro no/mos ei)sa/gein e)sti/n, a)ll' i)di/a| labo/nta dida/skein kai\ nouqetei=n. The following expressions can be conceived as denoting progressively severer modes of punishment without going into details.

e)piplhtto/menos: the act. usually governs the dative. See on 472 a.

a)diki/an: in accordance with the general purpose of the discussion this word is used as a general representative of the various varieties of kaki/a of the soul.

ou(=tos: is pred. and is explained by the preceding clause. The subject is the following rel. clause.

diapra/chtai: cf. 473 c.—The three expressions for the idea of punishment correspond to those above used, since kola/zein o)nei/desin ( viii. 847 a) is but little different from e)piplh/ttein.

w(/sper a)\n ei)/ tis: a case of very natural ellipsis. Cf. the analogous Lat. use of tanquam si, ut si. When used by itself this expression becomes a relative phrase, equivalent to the Lat. tanquam sicut. In this sense it is written as one word. GMT. 227, 868. The comparison to a child occurs in Homer, and is found also elsewhere in Plato, e.g. Phaedo 77 d dedie/nai to\ tw=n pai/dwn and e i)/sws e)/ni tis kai\ e)n h(mi=n pai=s o(/stis ta\ toiau=ta fobei=tai. Cf. above, 470 c.

mh\ dido/nai di/khn: cf. 478 e just above, where the same verb is used with w(/ste mh/, and below, b, c, where pa=n poiou=si is used like diapra/caito in this passage without w(/ste.

5 f.

to\ ka/esqai kai\ to\ te/mnesqai: the repetition of the art. is unusual, and serves to keep the two ideas separate.

o(/ti a)lgeino/n: on the causal o(/ti after verbs of fearing, see GMT. 377.

a)gnow=n ge: Plato frequently employs participial clauses as a kind of addendum to sentences which are either interrupted by the answer of the respondent or already complete in themselves.

oi(=on: what sort of a thing.

11 f.

kaqora=n ... a)gnoei=n: is epexegetical to toiou=to/n ti, and corresponds to sunisxo/menos . . . fobou/menos and a)gnow=n in the comparison above.

12 f.

mh\ u(giou=s sw/matos: a harsh use of the comparative gen. equiv. to h)\ mh\ u(giei= sw/mati. See Madv. § 90.

sunoikei=n: divorces the human personality from the soul and body, by a union of which it exists. With kaqora=n kte(., Plato thins especially of the nou=s to which he opposes that part which, in its subserviency to the lusts and appetites, willingly withdraws from the control of reason.

saqra=|: is used of injuries and defects of all kinds, whether of material things, as jars (493 e), or of the body (Dem. ii. 21 ka)\n r(h=gma (fracture) ka)\n stre/mma (dislocation) ka)\n a)/llo ti tw=n u(parxo/ntwn saqro\n h)=|). From this meaning comes its transferred use in application to the soul or the state. Notice that the unhealthy soul is designated as saqra/ from a physical point of view, a)/dikos in its dealings with its neighbors, and a)no/sios in its attitude towards the divine.

15 f.

kai\ xrh/mata paraskeuazo/me-

noi: epexegetic partic. to pa=n poiou=sin.

o(/pws a)\n w)=sin kte(.: is a circumlocution for a third substantive.

ta\ sumbai/nonta: “the results” obtained.

sullogi/sasqai: “to sum up what has been proved.” See on 478 a above, in regard to the answers of Polus.

ei) mh\ kte(.: affirms and admits; but because nothing else can be done.

a)=r' ou)=n: regularly introduces a conjecture, which is expected to be confirmed by the other party; a)=ra alone is also often so used; a)=ra ou) expects distinctly an affirmative answer. Often a)=r' ou)=n approximates to a)=r' ou). Cf. 450 a.

me/giston kako/n: sumbai/nein has (in addition to the inf.) the constr. of tugxa/nw. Hence the omission of the partic. is allowable. GMT. 890.

kai\ mh\n kte(.: in this and in the following utterance of Socrates, the question is denoted merely by the tone.

deu/teron kte(.: cf. the similar usage above in 478 e. If the reading is sound, we must infer from the following clause that to\ a)dikei=n has the same force as to\ a)dikou=nta dido/nai di/khn.

to\n *)arxe/laon... lang=greek>to\n kte(.: the main force of the example lies in the predicate, to\n . . . dido/nta, as the art. shows. Constr. to/n with dido/nta, to which a)dikou=nta is subordinate.

37 f.

diafero/ntws: is construed like the corresponding verb. 29 b e)gw\ tou/tw| i)/sws diafe/rw tw=n pollw=n a)nqrw/pwn.

XXXVI.

h( mega/lh kte(.: the use of the adj. is a slightly sarcastic allusion to Polus' extravagant encomiums on rhetoric. The rhetorical question has the force of a neg. Hence the following causal clause.

au)to\n e(auto\n kte(.: the prefixing of au)to/n emphasizes the reflexive. H. 688. The subj. of fula/ttein is indefinite; cf. 456 d.

i(kano/n: the use of this word is an example of mei/wsis, or understatement, the peculiar characteristic of American humor. A similar case is Ant. A. b 2 e)moi\ de\ zw=n te a(/nqrwpos a)natropeu\s tou= oi)/kou e)ge/neto a)poqanw/n te . . . i(kana\s lu/pas . . . prosbe/blhken.

u(/poulon: is stronger than sa- qro/n. The disease leaves the surface, and fastens on the innermost kernel of the soul. We are reminded of the Ovidian Principiis obsta. sero medicina paratur, | cum mala per longas convaluere moras ( 91 f.).

ti/ ga\r dh\ kte(.: the rhetorical question has the force of an emphatic affirmation, ti/ being almost equiv. to ti/ a)/llo.

16 f.

patri/dos a)dikou/shs: the speeches in the assembly are hereby put in the same category with the judicial.

a)dikou/shs: is a colloquial repetition of a)diki/as.

17 f.

ei) mh\ ei): cf. 196 a ou)/te ga\r ma/ntin ou)/te i)atro\n . . . le/gei to\n a)ndrei=on ei) mh\ ei) qeo/n tina le/gei au)to\n ei)=nai. Cf. Lat. nisi si; i.e. Cic. ad Fam. xiv. 2. 1 noli putare me ad quemquam scribere, nisi si quis ad me scripsit.

ei) u(pola/boi tou)nanti/on: except in case one should assume, on the contrary, that, etc.

19 f.

o(\s a)\n kte(.: follows a pl. on account of its generic signification, and governs tw=n fi/lwn as a part. gen. Examples in Kr. 58, 4, 5.

mu/santa: to go into danger blindly, i.e. with closed eyes,—to be blind to the existence of danger, as such, was apparently thought to be a mark of great courage and determi nation; hence mu/santa is paired here with a)ndrei/ws. Why one should act so, is explained by to\ . . . diw/konta. One of the functions of the participle is to express manner; hence it is quite natural to find it side by side with an adverb.

tw=n a)/llwn oi)kei/wn kte(.: see on 473 c.

o(/pws a)\n kte(.: is correlative with e)pi\ tou=to. Notice that here the o(/pws is a purely final particle, as it was not in a, b above.

i)/sws soi o(mologei=tai: the per

sonal dat. soi\ seems strange, since it can neither be understood as 482 b below, ou)/ soi o(mologh/sei *kalliklh=s, nor as 477 d above, ai)/sxiston a)diki/a . . . w(molo/ghtai h(mi=n, for o(mologei=tai (conveniunt, consentanea sunt) has its dat. in toi=s e)/mprosqen. But it is not superfluous; its force seems to be this: “but perhaps you can make it agree with what precedes.” Thus the dat., as well as i)/sws, would serve the author's purpose in delineating Polus' character, who by such shallow artifices seeks to weaken his admissions, and, as far as possible, relieve himself from any responsibility in the results,—a design which Socrates balks by his following question. See on 477 d, 478 a, and H. 770, 771.

ka)kei=na: kai/ assumes ei) ta/de a)/topa dokei=, thus noticing Polus' observation.

lute/on: a metaphor drawn from such usage as lu/ein ge/furan. 332 e, Xen. ii. 4. 19. A different meaning appears in dialu/ein to\n lo/gon, 458 b, after dialu/ein th\n sunousi/an in 457 c.

tou)nanti/on: the heaping up of such kindred ideas as au)=, au)=qis, pa/lin is not uncommon (see examples in Kr. 69, 12); tou)nanti/on means “on the contrary”; au)=, “on the other hand”; metabalo/nta (intransitive), “vice versa.”

ei) a)/ra: if, assuming the ordinary view to be the correct one (a)/ra).—

tina\: is object, and with it ei\/te . . . o(ntinou=n is in apposition. e)xqro/s is a personal enemy, as distinguished from pole/mios, a national enemy.

e)a\n mo/non mh\ au)to\s kte(.: because experiencing injury might be held as a kind of substitute for the punishment due for inflicting it.

au)to/s: refers to the subject of kakw=s poiei=n, which is indefinite.—

tou=to kte(.: the insertion of this clause, which is due to the preceding e)a\n mo/non kte(., defers the completion of the sentence to panti\ tro/pw| kte(.

pra/ttonta kai\ le/gonta: the two species of activity do not exclude each other, for the effect of pra/ttein may be more thoroughly completed by le/gein, and vice versa.—The acc. case is in agreement with the unexpressed indefinite agent of paraskeuaste/on. On the case of the agent with verbal adjs., see G. 281, 2; H. 991 a.

o(/pws mh\ dw=| kte(.: this sentence is remarkable on account of the variety of the constructions found after o(/pws,—three out of the perhaps eight varieties being found, viz. subjv., a)/n with subjv., fut. indic. We should not attempt to make any sharp distinctions here, for Plato is capable of changing the construction for the sake of variety. We may, however, say this much. o(/pws mh\ dw=| is purely final, the conjunction not differing from i(/na. When the delinquent is brought before the judge, there is some doubt as to his escape, and o(/pws a)/n (equiv. to e)a/n pws) gives expression to this doubt. In the long sentence following the a)/n gradually fades away, and the most common relative construction with the fut. indic. closes the series. On ei) de\ mh/ after e)a/n, see on 502 b.

e)a\n de\ e)/lqh|: in thus stating the opposite alternative, Socrates takes for the moment the standpoint of the orators. That it is only for the moment is seen from 49 c ou)/te a)ntadikei=n dei= ou)/te kakw=s poiei=n ou)de/na a)nqrw/pwn, ou)d' a)\n o(tiou=n pa/sxh| u(p) au)tw=n.

a)nali/skh|: to make the statement of the wrong complete, the way in which the money is wasted is added.

XXXVII. On the role assigned to Callicles here, see Introd. § 15. After Polus has shown himself in capable of maintaining his views of rhetoric against the superior dialectical skill of Socrates, Callicles enters the discussion with a thought quite similar to the one with which Polus had entered it in 461 b. The view of life on which all of Socrates' deductions rest is so abhorrent to his innermost nature and all his hitherto cherished ideas that he cannot be brought to look upon the principles here advocated as the earnest convictions of a reasonable man. He does not, however, rush into the lists so roughly as Polus, but, being a more polished man of the world, turns first to Chaerephon, who is thoroughly acquainted with Socrates' views. He, however, wittily refers him to the master, in the same words with which Callicles himself had in 447 c referred Socrates to Gorgias.

nh\ tou\s qeou\s a)ll' e)piqumw=: a)lla/ is used after an expression of asseveration, as in 463 d. The words of Chaerephon contain the challenge, “Why don't you rather turn to Socrates himself?” to which Callicles replies, “But that is just what I do desire.” In Callicles' manner of expression we discern his excitable nature as well as his strong faith in his own views, which he is the more surprised to find opposed, not only by Socrates, but also by Chaerephon. Artistically also his words form the text for the discussion which follows.

fw=men . . . pai/zonta: this is a very unusual construction for fhmi/. G. 260, 2, N. 1.

a)natetramme/nos: cf. a)natre/pein ta\ pra/gmata, po/lin, oi)ki/an. For if you be both in earnest, and the thing which you say prove to be (tugxa/nei) true, would not the only (a)/llo ti h)\) conclusion be that the manner of life of us men has been entirely upside down?

tw=n a)nqrw/pwn: is emphatically added because Callicles does not intend that under h(mw=n only a limited circle shall be understood. Cf. Ar. 500 w(s me\n ga\r nu=n h(mi=n o( bi/os toi=s a)nqrw/pois dia/keitai.

pa/nta ta\ e)nanti/a: like pa=n tou)nanti/on, quite the contrary.

ei) mh/ ti kte(.: Socrates recognizes indeed the opposition in their views of life, but refers it to the different exercise of a common feeling, —love,—which varies according to the difference in the objects to which it is directed. The comparison of love of wisdom with other varieties of human love is often found in Plato, e.g. Phaedo 68 a.

pa/qos: denotes a state of mind brought about by external influences. According to cause and circumstances it may be love, hate, admiration, or scorn. But no variety is peculiar to any single man; this is made clear by the explanatory clause inserted between pa/qos and to\ au)to/.

i)/dion: contains in itself an idea of comparison, like a)/llo e(/teron, and hence takes h)/.

tau)to/n ti: the pa/qos experienced by each one, is first roughly characterized as “about the same thing,” and later clearly defined by the explanatory e)rw=nte kte(. The variation from the pl. to the dual is interesting. The lack of a first person dual compels the first pl., with its accompanying partic. peponqo/tes, while the following dual emphasizes the exact similarity of the two experiences.

*)alkibia/dou: the mental and moral training of the rising youth was largely directed by prominent older men with whom they associated, usually according to individual preference. One of these prominent teachers, and one who made it the business of his life, was Socrates, and among the young men who clustered around him and followed his conversations was Alcibiades, whom Socrates greatly loved for his mental gifts. Owing to his great beauty he was jestingly called Socrates' sweetheart (ta\ paidika/). *po/qen, w)= *sw/krates, fai/nei; h)\ dh=la dh\ o(/ti a)po\ kunhgesi/ou tou= peri\ th\n *)alkibia/dou w(/ran. This is the point of the allusion here.

dh/mou: has two allusions. The son of Pyrilampes, a rich Athenian and friend of Pericles, was called Demus. Like his father, he is reported to have been especially beau tiful, and is also mentioned by Ar. 97 ff. as a much admired sweetheart. This fact Socrates skilfully uses to characterize Callicles' relation to the Athenian demus. This people needed, like a boy, a leader and guide; but the orators, instead of governing it, regulated their actions according to its whims.

tou= *purila/mpous: is of course to be understood in the usual way, like tou= *kleini/ou. Cf. to\n *purila/mpous below, and 513 b.

18 f.

ai)sqa/nomai . . . ou) duname/nou: on the gen. partic. construction see GMT. 884-6; H. 742, 982.

deinou=: is often joined with le/gein, in order to describe a skilful orator, but can also be used without this addition, in the sense of “skilful,” “clever.”

20 f.

a)/nw kai\ ka/tw: like Lat. sur

sum deorsum, with metastre/fein, stre/fein (511 a), metaba/llein, metapi/ptein (493 a) denotes a changeable and uncertain course of action. Variations of the phrase are a)/nw te kai\ ka/tw, and more often a)/nw ka/tw.

bouleu/masi: i.e. the fanciful plans and designs of boys.

ei) bou/loio: which probably was hardly to be expected.

e(/tera toiau=ta: cf. above (24), toiau=ta e(/tera.

tw=n e(te/rwn paidikw=n: in the above-cited passage from (68 a) we find the word a)nqrwpi/nwn in the same connexion.

e)/mplhktos: unstable. Cf. Soph. 1358 toioi/de me/ntoi fw=tes e)/mplhktoi brotw=n.

a)/llwn . . . tw=n au)tw=n: gen. of characteristic is not common in Greek, and is always predicate. Cf. Thuc. i. 113 o(/soi th=s au)th=s gnw/mhs h)=san. See H. 732 d.

parh=sqa de/: change from the rel. to the independent construction. See on 452 d. Here, however, we must supply the pronoun (au)toi=s) to which legome/nois is a subordinate temporal partic. equiv. to o(/te e)le/geto. We might translate de/ “although.”

e)ce/legcon w(s kte(.: see on 467 a. Here, to “prove by confuting her.”

o(/per a)/rti e)/legon: refers to 480 e ou)kou=n h)\ ka\kei=na lute/on h)\ ta/de a)na/gkh sumbai/nein. The transition from the personal to the material object is made much easier by the meaning of the verb e)ce/legcon.

ma\ to\n ku/na: the addition of to\n *ai)gupti/wn qeo/n is a humorous allusion to the animal worship of the Egyptians. See 21 e. The omission of the art. with *ai)gupti/wn is regular.

*kalliklh=s: the use of the proper name in contrast with the pronoun soi/, and its close connection with the address w)= *kallikleis, is intended to emphasize as sharply as possible the inner conflict which must continue to rage in Callicles' soul, so long as one opinion has not decisively vanquished the other.

a)narmostei=n: applies especially to imperfection in the general harmony, while diafwnei=n is used of the discord between single tones. Two different principles exert their effects upon the soul.

xorhgoi/hn: this liturgy, which has been already mentioned in note on 472 a, was of course not possible for Socrates, and could be only for the rich. But in proportion as a victory in this kind of musical competition was looked upon as a great honor, so a failure was a great humiliation. The opt. is ideal, and to be translated “which I might conduct.”

ma=llon: frequently follows a comp. to reiterate the idea with a slight modification (rather than). Cf. below, 487 b, 79 e, and see for other examples, Rid. § 166.

neanieu/esqai: “to act like a wild young man.” Callicles has in mind especially the insolent, bold, and reckless conduct of the rich and proud Athenian youth. This is usually the meaning of the adjective neaniko/s (so in our dialogue, 508 d, 509 a), which, however, is sometimes used only of the freshness and the vigor of youth, as below, 485 e. The verb applies especially to the training of the youth by the Sophists, which leads them to light and idle speeches and to a defense of the most conflicting principles without having regard unto the higher and earnest problems of life. 235 a kai\ e)fai/neto dh/ moi neanieu/esqai e)pideiknu/menos w(s oi(=o/s te w)\n tau)ta\ e(te/rws te kai\ e(te/rws le/gwn a)mfote/rws ei)pei=n a)/rista.

2 f.

dhmhgo/ros, dhmhgorei=n: indicate dissatisfaction, sometimes with the length of the speeches, as opposed to diale/gesqai, i.e. 519 d, e, 329 a, 336 b; sometimes, as here and in 494 d, with the means employed by those who, unconcerned for the truth, seek only the approbation of the multitude. In the mouth of Callicles, who is the real dhmhgo/ros, this reproach sounds very strange, especially with the addition w(s a)lhqw=s. It is a kind of unconscious self-criticism.

pro\s se/: cf. 485 b below, and 21 c pro\s o(\n e)gw\ toiou=to/n ti e)/paqon, “at whose hands I had some such experience.”

dida/coi: the fut. opt. is only found in indir. disc. as a representative of the fut. indicative. It is postHomeric, the first example occurring in Pindar.

au)to/n: repeats with emphasis the subject *gorgi/an, which is already expressed. Cf. Xen. i. 3. 15 peira/somai tw=| pa/ppw| a)gaqw=n i(ppe/wn kra/tistos w)\n i(ppeu\s summaxei=n au)tw=|. The clause with o(/ti is causal, and is explanatory of dia\ to\ e)/qos tw=n a)nqrw/pwn, which is to be connected with fa/nai, not with dida/cein.

a)gapa=n: cf. 461 c o(\ dh\ a)gapa=|s.

w(/s ge/ moi dokei=n: as it seemed to me. The phrase is found sometimes with w(s as here and Hdt. ii. 124; sometimes without, as 81 a; e)/moige dokei=n Soph. 410.

sumpodisqei\s e)pestomi/sqh: a combination of two metaphors, both of which refer to a horse which has been caught by a noose, and then guided according to a strange will by a bridle which has been forced into its mouth. In the same way Polus, by that unlucky admission, allowed himself to be noosed, and was thus compelled to follow the lead of Socrates, wherever that might take him.

tw=| o)/nti: affirms the justice of the accusation made against Socrates by Polus.

fortika/: a word not uncommon in Plato, is used in 287 a of insidious catch-questions. See on 32 a, where combined with dikanika/ it is used of the tediousness of those detailed discussions from which Socrates, after the manner of an orator before a court, seeks to draw his proofs. Here Callicles probably wants to indicate the vulgarity of such illustrations and talks, as being fit only for the uncultured multitude. The rel. sentence a(\ fu/sei kte(. is connected epexegetically with toiau=ta, and thereby the conclusion from the special case is made of general application. It was indeed from the idea of the kalo/n that Socrates drew the whole argument with which he refuted Polus.

fu/sei me\n, no/mw| de/: the opposition of natural right to conventional right (law) was first definitely maintained by Hippias of Elis. 337

c d, Xen. iv. 4. 14. After him this principle was accepted and made a commonplace by all the Sophists. It is probable that Gorgias himself did not defend it, but his teaching can be traced back to it. This principle Callicles now proceeds to unfold. Of kindred import is also the discussion between Alcibiades and Pericles, related by Xen. i. 2. 40 ff.

21 f.

o(\ dh\ kai\ su\ tou=to to\ sofo\n kte(.: to\ sofo/n (artifice, trick) is used somewhat scornfully in the sense in which the sophistical Eristics employed it, with whom Callicles puts Socrates on a level. Hence he also employs towards him the word kakourgei=n, which was used among the Eristics to denote crafty tripping in discussion. i. 341 a ou)/te ga\r a)/n me la/qois kakourgw=n, by which Thrasymachus declares his ability to defend himself against such unfair treatment; so ib. 338 d. The same feel ing determines the choice of the compound u(perwta=n “to slip artfully into the question,” “ask slily”.

tou=to to\ sofo/n: is epexegetic to o(/.

e)a\n de\ kte(.: supply the same verbs as are found in the first member of the sentence.

w(/sper au)ti/ka: as, for example. See on 472 d.

e)diw/kaqes kata\ fu/sin: ‘you followed up what he meant “conventionally” by arguing upon it in the “natural” sense.’ Cope. Socrates had treated the concession of Polus, and drawn his results from it, as if Polus had therein conceded that to do wrong was by nature, i.e. of itself, more ugly than to suffer wrong. “For —so runs the argument of Callicles —that which is by nature ugly coincides with what is evil, which latter, however, is the suffering of wrong. But we must not conclude from this that what is by law the more ugly is also the greater evil.”

27 f.

to\ a)dikei=sqai: as the passage stands, must be considered as explanatory of the preceding, without close construction.

ou)de\ ga/r: leads over to a criticism of Socrates' view p e r s e, the question thus far having been his manner of procedure in the case of Polus.

w(=| krei=tton kte(.: in the opinion of the masses, the same is true of all who are without the enjoyments of life. 65 a. The regular relative after an indefinite (tino/s) is o(/stis, which frequently has a conditional idea, and then takes the cond. neg. mh/. H. 699 a.

31 f.

au)to\s . . . kh/dhtai: the same ideas were presented in 480 a. Here every man is expressly thrown upon his own resources and the state abolished.

a)ll' , oi)=mai kte(.: this exposition of the origin of conventional right is designed by Callicles to show the superior authority of the natural right which he advocates.

oi( tiqe/menoi: “the law-makers.” The active is used of the law-giver. On the force of the article with the predicate, see H. 669 a; G. 141, N. 8.

kai\ oi( polloi/: it is just this addition which contains the most important point, according to Callicles' real view, though he keeps it in the background, because for him the contrast between stronger and weaker is of more value for his argument. It is this begging of the question to which Socrates first turns his attention in 488 c ff.

pro\s au(tou/s: usually we find ble/pontes, but the preposition itself is sufficient. Kr. 68, 39, 5.

e)pai/nous, yo/gous: the people not only makes laws,—i.e. commands and prohibitions, the transgression of which is punished by penalties,—but also expresses in manifold ways, by offices, honors, etc., its judgment on the value of men and actions. Another case of explanatory asyndeton.

e)rrwmeneste/rous: how completely this word has become an adjective is shown by the fact that it is the only partic. which admits comparison.

pleonektei=n: is an expression for every effort of self-aggrandizement, and was often used as a political watchword in opposition to i)sonomi/a. Cf. to\ i)/son, two lines below.

a)gapw=si: in mockery, because satisfaction is a sign of weakness. Cf. what Adimantus says in ii. 366 c oi)=den o(/ti plh\n ei)/ tis qei/a| fu/sei dusxerai/nwn to\ a)dikei=n h)\ e)pisth/mhn labw\n a)pe/xetai au)tou=, tw=n ge a)/llwn ou)dei\s e(kw\n di/kaios, a)ll) u(po\ a)nandri/as h)\ gh/rws h)/ tinos a)/llhs a)sqenei/as ye/gei to\ a)dikei=n, a)dunatw=n au)to\ dra=n.—

to\ i)/son: Callicles is thinking of the fundamental principle of democratic states, the i)sonomi/a and i)so/ths of all.

XXXIX.

au<*>to/: draws especial attention to the following clause, which it introduces. By its proximity to au)th/ this emphasis is still more increased.

a)mei/nw: is here probably used purposely instead of krei/ttw, as Callicles had in mind also the mental superiority of the rhetorically educated over the great multitude. Hence, too, dunatw/teron.

dhloi=: can be taken in construction with fu/sis, or, which is better, as an impersonal verb equiv. to dh=lo/n (dh=la/) e)stin. The subj. is the following o(/ti clause, whose own subj., tau=ta, has been attracted to the government of the leading verb.

pollaxou=: introduces facts in support of the general statement.—

kai\ e)n toi=s a)/llois zw/|ois: the law of nature is the principle which is at the basis of national law. Here is, moreover, an indication of the moral character of those who hold this view, in that they put the a)/nqrwpos on the plane of the zw=|on.

o(/lais tai=s po/lesi: in international relations this natural law (‘might makes right’) has preserved its force longer than in the intercourse of individual men; hence ge/nos is equiv. to gens. The clause following, o(/to . . . e)/xein, is explanatory of tau=ta o(/ti ou(/tws e)/xei.

ke/kritai: in 520 e neno/mistai is the word.

a)/rxein: is the legal, ple/on e)/xein the natural expression of the same idea.

e)pei\ poi/w| dikai/w| kte(.: is not purely neg., but has somewhat the sense: “What other right had Xerxes than that of nature?” The choice of examples shows that with this selfish, immoral view of life is connected also a lack of national feeling. Callicles himself feels the impropriety of declaring Xerxes to be a)mei/nwn and dunatw/teros tw=n *(ellh/nwn, and therefore hastily seeks another example which will not arouse personal feeling.

a)/lla muri/a: is simply rhetorical exaggeration. The concluding summarizing clause deviates from the regular construction of the sentence, as also in a similar passage in 41 c e)pi\ po/sw| d' a)/n tis de/caito e)ceta/sai h)\ *)odusse/a h)\ *si/sufon, h)\ a)/llous muri/ous a)/n tis ei)/poi kte(.

oi)=mai: as well as i)/sws, a couple of lines below, merely softens the expression, without diminishing its positiveness. Cf. 473 a.

th\n tou= dikai/ou: if these words, which we would rather miss, are genuine, we have a case of word-play, which may be justified on the ground of the proposition above, h( de/ ge . . . a)dunatwte/rou. The same force must be assigned to tou= dikai/ou fu/sei below (484 c), though the form is different.

nai\ ma\ *di/a kata\ kte(.: a clever play upon the word no/mos. “Nature, too, has its law,—right and custom.”

h(mei=s: contains, by the implied contrast, a rebuke. Notice the heaping up of the participles, which, though connected with one verb, are subordinated one to another, quite after the Greek habit. See Kr. 56, 15, with notes.

pla/ttontes: the side-idea of artificiality and amateurishness easily attaches itself to this verb. 17 c meiraki/w| pla/ttonti lo/gous. It is applied to laws, as here, also iv. 712 b peirw/meqa kaqa/per pai=des presbu=tai pla/ttein tw=| lo/gw| tou\s no/mous.

15 f.

e)k ne/wn lamba/nontes: cf. 18 b e)k pai/dwn paralabo/ntes. The usual word for ‘receiving into school’ is the compound. Cf. 516 b. The use of the simple verb here implies a forcible compulsory manner of treatment.

w(/sper le/ontas katepa/|dontes: the comparison describes with bitterness the suppression of the so-called natural freedom, in that it compares education to the taming of wild beasts (katadoulou/meqa). katepa/|dein applies to soothing by certain formulae, or charms; gohteu/ein to the employment of forms of magic and witchcraft. Meno uses the same expression regarding the dialectic proof of Socrates, 80 a kai\ nu=n, w(/s g' e)moi\ dokei=s, gohteu/eis me kai\ farma/tteis kai\ a)texnw=s katepa/|deis. In a jesting way, without feeling, e)pa/|dein is used in 77 e, e)pw|dh/ in 155 e.

18 f.

e)a\n . . . ge/nhtai: Callicles does not doubt that this future absolute ruler will come.

fu/sin i(kanh/n: “a nature which is equal to all difficulties.” There is no understatement, as in 480 a.—All the following expressions are chosen so as to be appropriate to the muchloved comparison with wild beasts. a)posei/esqai can apply both to the shaking off of any bond or yoke and to the throwing of his rider by a horse; diarrh/cas is used more of breaking a hedge or an enclosure than a halter, etc. a)porrh/cas would be more natural for the latter; cf. Hom. Z 507 desmo\n a)porrh/cas, which passage quite suits the view of Callicles.

diafugw/n: calls to mind what has been previously said by Polus (473 c).

katapath/sas: depicts the insolence of the victor to the vanquished. In *d 157 Homer makes Agamemnon say of the perjured Trojans kata\ d' o(/rkia pista\ pa/thsan.

gra/mmata kte(.: the gra/mmata denote, in contradistinction to the unwritten laws implanted in man by nature, the “written laws” which limit and regulate the exercise of the will; magganeu/mata “works of deceit and witchcraft,” which fetter the reason; e)pw|dai/ “incantations” which palsy the feelings. These ideas correspond in the reverse order to the preceding participles, katepa/|dontes, gohteu/ontes, le/gontes, and the participles just in advance a)poseisa/menos . . . diafugw/n are probably chosen with reference to them. All three ideas serve, moreover, to show from the various sides what objections can be made to the laws which are opposed to nature, and are hence crowded together for greater emphasis.

e)panasta/s: is used of one who has lain prostrate for a time and now unexpectedly shows his strength.—

a)nefa/nh: is ‘gnomic aorist.’ The single past example (aor.) serves as a norm for the general statement (pres.). H. 840; GMT. 155.

o( dou=los: as a result of katadoulou/meqa above, 483 e, “the one whom we brought up as a slave.”—

e)ce/lamye: shone forth in splendor, a poetical word also employed in iv. 435 a.

dokei= de/ moi: introduces a new element,—the authority of Pindar. Knowledge of the poets was a requirement of the culture of the period. 338 e. The last words of the fragment are restored by Bergk ( p. 344, ed. 3) from the citation of the Scholiast as follows:— e)/rgoisin *(hrakle/os e)pei\ *ghruo/na bo/as *kuklwpi/wn e)pi\ proqu/rwn *eu)rusqe/os a)naith/tas te kai\ a)pria/tas h)/lasen. Since we do not know the context in which these verses stand, Pindar's views cannot be determined from them with certainty; but they were probably based on the principles of religious belief. In this no/mos o( pa/ntwn basileu/s Pindar may be thinking of the power of that fate which is superior even to the gods themselves. —Geryones, son of Chrysaor (“lightning”) and the Oceanid Callirhoe (“beautiful stream”), was a giant with three bodies and three heads. He lived with his dog Orthros, or Orthos, on the fertile island Erytheia, and possessed great herds of cattle. These were stolen from him by Hercules in the expedition celebrated in the story. Cf. Preller, ^{2} ii. 202-216.

e)ndeiknu/nai: is used of all kinds of practical proof; a)podeiknu/nai, of demonstration.

ou)k e)pi/stamai: says Callicles, because the exact words of the poem are not at his command. The verb has the same meaning in 339 b, 61 b. After a)pria/tas Callicles breaks off, intending to give the sense of what follows, and resumes the idea with ou)/te pria/menos.

h)la/sato: the use of the middle instead of the active is normal, but is well suited to Callicles' conception.

w(s tou/tou o)/ntos: the use of w(s ascribes this view to Hercules, as his basis of action. tou/tou is explained by the clause kai\ bou=s kte(.

ta\ tw=n xeiro/nwn kte(.: notice the rhetorical position.

to\ me\n ou)=n a)lhqe/s: introduces a new topic, that of the value of philosophy. Its connexion with the preceding lies in the fact that Callicles looks upon philosophy as the hindrance which prevents Socrates from recognizing the truth of what he says.

e)pi\ ta\ mei/zw: is indefinite, and is employed only to depreciate philosophy and relegate it to a lower plane, as is evident from Callicles' further exposition.

xari/en: with a pleasing condescension, recognizing its merit,—but what a poor merit! Cf. 485 b.

e)n th=| h(liki/a|: “in the time of life suitable for it.” What period this is can be gathered from the expressions po/rrw th=s h(liki/as and peraite/rw tou= de/ontos. The words metri/ws and a(/yhtai are also designedly chosen.

diafqora/: Callicles assumes almost the tone of an oracle.

a)/peiron gegone/nai: “a man cannot practise philosophy and at the same time fulfil the requirements of his civil position.” The kalo\s ka)gaqo/s, according to the idea of Callicles, is shown by the addition of eu)do/kimos, to be the man who, through practical activity, obtains reputation and honor. With me/llw we find the pres. and fut. almost equally common, the aor. exceptional.

tw=n no/mwn: that Callicles is laying great stress on the knowledge of the laws in this passage, seems at first sight inconsistent with the view which he has already expressed; but in reality he has shifted his point of view but little, since he advocates the study of the laws, not for the purpose of following them, but as being necessary for the work of the practical statesman, whether he be in the senate or assembly, or hold any public position. The force, therefore, of no/moi is much that of our “constitution.” The lo/goi oi(=s dei= xrw/menon kte(. belong to the department of jurisprudence in both its divisions, individual and national. cumbo/laia is characterized in i. 333 a, as the variety of koinwnh/mata (i.e. mutual intercourse, trade, and commerce) in which dikaiosu/nh is of especial value. It denotes, accordingly, treaties and the law-business connected with them.

11 f.

tw=n h(donw=n kte(.: the enjoyment of life consists, according to Callicles, in satisfying the appetites.

tw=n h)qw=n: can be considered as a general comprehensive term, in so far as we understand by it the peculiar traits of mind and character which impart individuality to a man.

w(/sper ge: makes a concession, in order to anticipate the retort which could easily be made here.

diatriba/s: is used especially of philosophical discussions. 37 c ou)x oi(=oi/ te e)ge/nesqe e)negkei=n ta\s e)ma\s diatriba\s kai\ tou\s lo/gous, 153 a h)=|a e)pi\ ta\s cunh/qeis diatriba/s.

sumbai/nei: is in point.

to\ tou= *eu)ripi/dou: inasmuch as his works abounded in gnomes and sententious sayings, and he himself was not far removed from the sophistic way of looking at things, Euripides was frequently quoted by sophists and orators, and also by Socrates (Plato). The present passage is from the lost tragedy See below, 485 e.

e)n tou/tw| kai\ e)pi\ kte(.: the demonstratives are antecedent to the adverbial rel. clause with i(/na, “in which each one is most successful.” The words lampro/s . . . e)pei/getai, by omitting what would not be missed, and reading ka)pi/ for kai\ e)pi/, form a trimeter. Cf. Ar. 1431 e)/rdoi tis h(\n e(/kastos ei)dei/h te/xnhn.

i(/na tugxa/nei: is to be compared with o(/pou a)\n h)=| to show the difference between definite and indefinite antecedent.

au)to\s au(tou= be/ltistos: the gen. with sups. may be an extension of the gen. with comparatives. See H. 644 a.

a)mfote/rwn: i.e. philosophy and politics.

o(/son paidei/as xa/rin: as far as it serves the purpose of education. Cf. Rep. iii. 403 e o(/son tou\s tu/pous, 273 a th\n fu/sin o(/son. See H. 719 b; G. 160, 1. The opposite is e)pi\ te/xnh|, or something similar, as seen from 312 b tou/twn su\ e(ka/sthn ou)k e)pi\ te/xnh| e)/maqes, w(s dhmiourgo\s e)so/menos, a)ll' e)pi\ paidei/a|, w(s to\n i)diw/thn kai\ to\n e)leu/qeron pre/pei. was the watchword of the time.

kai\ ou)k ai)sxro/n: change from the kalo/n to the katage/laston.

pa/sxw pro/s: as 482 c. The comparison, however sensible the thought therein expressed may be, still is not in place here. For it describes only the subjective impression which philosophizing at different periods of life makes on Callicles. It is therefore only a rhetorical reaffirmation of the statement that philosophy is not appropriate for a mature man. In his mind, however, Callicles has still a tertium comparationis which he does not express, viz. the objects of philosophical research afford no real interest, hence resemble paidi/a. Further, so much trouble about single ideas is like yelli/zesqai (stammering). On the contrary, safw=s diale/gesqai (le/gein) is the business of orators.

e)leuqe/rion: Callicles speaks of stammering thus, as contrasted with the restraint which the child must exercise in order to learn to speak clearly, which latter seems to him to be douloprepe/s. Note also the contrast in xari/en and pikro/n.

para\ ne/w| kte(.: the companion of (para/) a youth. The duplication of the idea is also found in 315 d ne/on ti e)/ti meira/kion.

e)leu/qeron: is amplified and illustrated by the following clause, ou)deno\s a)ciw/sonta kte(. Philosophy gives the youth an opportunity for the practice in mental gymnastics, which is as yet denied him in public life, and thus prepares him for his future career as a speaker in the assembly.

dh/: deictic. This is just the case about which Callicles raises the question.

dei=sqai: is still stronger than a)/cion, and declares that it is to the man's own interest to be so dealt with.

ta\ me/sa th=s po/lews: is emphasized together with the a)gora/, in opposition with the following e)n gwni/a|. Cf. Cic. de Or. i. 13. 57 quibus (philosophis) ego ut de his rebus in angulis consumendi otii causa disserant cum concessero, illud tamen oratori tribuam, etc.

o( poihth/s: the poet, of course, is Homer. He says, I 440, nh/pion, ou)/pw ei)do/q' o(moii/oo ptole/moio | ou)d) a)gore/wn, i(/na t) a)/ndres a)riprepe/es tele/qousin.—

katadeduko/ti: “in retirement,” as contrasted with the brilliant life of the public man. The word is used somewhat differently in ix. 579 b, where it is said of a tyrant ou)/t' a)podhmh=sai e)/cestin (au)tw=|) ou)damo/se ou)/te qewrh=sai o(/swn dh\ kai\ oi( a)/lloi e)leu/qeroi e)piqumhtai/ ei)si, katadedukw\s de\ e)n th=| oi)ki/a| ta\ polla\ w(s gunh\ zh=|.

meta\ meiraki/wn: as contrasted with association with men and with the whole people. It is evident that, in spite of Callicles' exaggeration, he is striking continually at Socrates' (and Plato's) occupation. Quite naturally and conversationally yiquri/zonta suggests again its opposite, which is added in e)leu/qeron fqe/gcasqai.

neaniko/n: for the meaning, see on 482 c above. Cf. Dem. iii. 32 e)/sti d' ou)de/pot), oi)=mai, me/ga kai\ neaniko\n fro/nhma labei=n mikra\ kai\ fau=la pra/ttontas.

After this general presentation of his views of philosophy, Callicles now proceeds to make a special application to Socrates' case, with apparent personal good-will, it is true, but still with the condescending mien of the superior man of the world.

2 f.

o(/per o( *zh=qos pro\s to\n *)amfi/ona: the omission of pro\s se/ is hardly felt. Callicles cleverly illustrates his exposition of the opposition between the principles of practical life and this theoretical philosophizing by reference again to the already cited of Euripides. Antiope had borne to Zeus twin sons, Amphion and Zethus, but was afterwards taken by her uncle Lycus to Thebes, where she suffered for a long time the most cruel treatment at the hands of Ly cus' wife, Dirce. Meanwhile, her sons were being brought up by a herdsman in the forest. Amphion devoted himself entirely to music, while the active and restless Zethus spent his time in hunting and the care of his herds. Finally Antiope escapes from her prison, and hurries to her sons. Dirce pursues, overtakes her, and is just in the act of having her bound to a wild steer, when the sons, who had been informed of their parentage by the herdsman, appear on the scene, rescue their mother from the hands of Dirce, and bind her to the steer instead. Dirce was then changed into a fountain. Amphion and Zethus attain the sovereignty in Thebes, and fortify it with walls. In this work Zethus contributed his great bodily strength, while Amphion's lyre drew after him the stones. This difference in character as related in the myth (Apollod. iii. 5. 5 *zh=qos me\n ou)=n e)pemelei=to bouforbi/wn, *)amfi/wn de\ kiqarw|di/an h)/skei) suggested to Euripides a dialogue between the brothers, wherein each praises his own calling to the disparagement of the other's. Callicles applies Euripides' words to the opposition between political and philosophical activity.

5 f. The words of Euripides are given by Nauck. ^{2} 185, as follows:— . . . a)melei=s, w(=n se fronti/zein e)xrh=n: yuxh=s e)/xwn ga\r w(=de gennai/an fu/sin gunaikomi/mw| diapre/peis morfw/mati: . . . kou)/t' a)\n a)spi/dos ku/tei o)rqw=s o(milh/seias ou)/t) a)/llwn u(/per neaniko\n bou/leuma bouleu/saio/ ti. Yet these lines do not contain all that seems poetical in this passage. In place of gunaikomi/mw| Callicles naturally, from his point of view, uses meirakiw/dei, which is quite different from neaniko/s in its meaning (boyish).

7 f.

di/khs boulai=si prosqei=) a)\n

lo/gon: would give an opinion in counsels of justice.

u(pe\r a)/llou: is in the mouth of Callicles a very natural change of the word of the poet. The sing. of a)/llos, e(/teros, and of ti\s is easily used in a generic sense.

kai/toi: would naturally lead us to expect some qualification of his severe criticism; instead of this he glides over to the rhetorical question, which, while reaffirming his opinion, summons Socrates to decide. Cf. b below.

sh=|: equiv. to

sou=. Cf. 485 a eu)noi/a| th=| e(autou=, 20 e e)pi\ diabolh=| th=| e)mh=|, Hom. T 321 sh=| poqh=|, Soph. 332 sh=| promhqi/a|. See H. 694; G. 147, N. 1.

tou\s po/rrw a)ei\ filosofi/as e)lau/nontas: has a poetic coloring, but also occurs in Xen. and in 410 e po/rrw h)/dh fai/nomai sofi/as e)lau/nein. 4 b. The gen. is partitive. See H. 757; G. 168.

a)ei\: when used with the art. and partic. has a distributive sense. In the present case its position between po/rrw and filosofi/as is also to be noted.

a)pa/goi: this was the summary process called a)pagwgh/, in which the guilty person, when caught in the act, was immediately arrested and brought before the Eleven. 32 b. The expression here is simply a rhetorical hyperbola, but it sounds prophetic in view of Socrates' trial later on, and was probably written designedly by the author. See Introd. § 10.

a)dikei=n: the pres. is the customary tense in accusations. 19 b, 24 b.

oi)=sq' o(/ti: parenthetical, with no effect on the construction, much in the same way as the English phraseological ‘you know.’ The Greek expression is, however, not so colorless as the English, but assumes a recognition of the truth of the observation.

16 f.

ei)liggiw/|hs, xasmw=|o: vividly portray the confusion and terror of the prisoner.

o(/ti ei)/pois: this opt. and the preceding xrh/saio both represent deliberative subjvs. GMT. 186.

a)naba/s: the regular expression for appearing before a court. Its origin may have been from the location of the court; cf. Lat. descendere in forum and 17 d, 33 d.

kathgo/rou tuxw/n: “if chance so willed it.” The words pa/nu fau/lou kai\ moxqhrou= are again designedly given to Callicles by Plato. Socrates' accuser would of necessity be such a man.

qanatou= tima=sqai: if the crime had no definite punishment fixed by law (a)gw\n a)ti/mhtos), the accuser proposed some special punishment, for which the accused was at liberty to offer a substitute, and the court had to accept one or the other. 36 b ff. and for the gen. see H. 746 b. According to Nauck, Fr. 186, the following citation from the runs thus:— pw=s ga\r sofo\n tou=t' e)/stin, ei)/ tis eu)fua= labou=sa te/xnh fw=t) e)/qhke xei/rona.

perisula=sqai: implies that the one robbed is vanquished or defenceless, and contains the side-idea of insult added. This inf. as well as zh=n is used freely after e)/qhke to define in what respects the man who follows philosophy becomes xei/rwn.

a)/timon: ‘atimia’ in various degrees of completeness was a punishment attached to transgressions against the state. Complete ‘atimia’ involved deprivation of all civil rights. See Busolt, § 158, and cf. Andoc. i. 73-76. According to Callicles, Socrates will bring himself virtually into this condition by his continual philosophizing.

ei) . . . a)groiko/teron: see on 462 e. Cf. Lys. 24 proseyhfi/sasqe u(mei=s au)to\n (sc. to\n a)/timon） ei)/rgesqai th=s a)gora=s kai\ tw=n i(erw=n w(/ste mh\ a)dikou/menon u(po\ tw=n e)xqrw=n du/nasqai di/khn labei=n.

e)pi\ ko/rrhs tu/ptonta: a blow on the head was considered especially dishonorable.—ko/rrh (old Attic ko/rsh), ko/rh, de/rh, and a)qa/rh are the sole exceptions to the rule which requires a after r in Attic. Callicles closes with a further citation from the , which Nauck, Fr. 188, gives thus:— a)ll' e)moi\ piqou= pau=sai melw|dw=n, polemi/wn d' eu)mousi/an a)/skei: toiau=t) a)/eide kai\ do/ceis fronei=n, ska/ptwn, a)rw=n gh=n, poimni/ois e)pistatw=n, a)/llois ta\ komya\ tau=t) a)fei\s sofi/smata, e)c w(=n kenoi=sin e)gkatoikh/seis do/mois.

e)le/gxwn: is probably, like the corresponding word in the quotation, to be considered as a verb, since the contrast lies not in a single word, but in the whole following clause. Similarly Thrasymachus says, i. 336 c, mhde\ filotimou= e)le/gxwn. The verb, used absolutely, designates the kind of philosophical activity which Socrates has just practised against Polus. Cf. 472 b.

eu)mousi/an: was appropriate in Zethus' speech, as he wished to show his brother wherein the eu)mousi/a, which he sought in kiqarw|di/a, was really to be found; less so in Callicles', who probably is thinking rather of eu)bouli/a. The contrast to fronei=n would be lhrei=n or fluarei=n. Hence Callicles substitutes lhrh/mata and fluari/as (trifling and prattling) for sofi/smata.

komya/: witty, subtle, often used with an unfavorable connotation, both of persons and things; but it is applied especially to the quibbles of the Sophists and Eristics. Cf. komyeu/esqai in 197 d.

ta\ mikra\ tau=ta: i.e. those subtle distinctions of words and ideas which in Callicles' view yield no advantage; while political activity and its results —these are ta\ mei/zw (484 c above).

bi/os: as opposed to kenoi=si do/mois means “means of livelihood,” an abundance of the good things of life.

do/ca: contrasted with a)/timon zh=n.

The delicate irony which characterizes the reply of Socrates is in striking contrast with the rudeness with which Callicles began, in 482 c above, the exposition of his view of life.

xrush=n: is pred. of th\n yuxh/n. “If the soul which I have were of gold.”

ou)k a)\n oi)/ei me a(/smenon: the main idea lies in a(/smenon.

2 f.

tina\ tw=n li/qwn: equiv. to the more common ba/sanos alone.

h(=|: after li/qwn instead of ai(=s. Cf. 521 d.

e)/mellon kte(.: ‘The relative fut. after an unreal conditional is e)/mellon with the infinitive.’ Gildersleeve. Cf. Isae. ii. 25.

o(mologh/seien: the choice of this expression in the comparison is due to the nature of the discussion. The testing which Socrates is undergoing at the hands of Callicles must end in o(mologei=n (cf. e a)/n moi su\ o(mologh/sh|s).

kalw=s teqerapeu=sqai: leads back to the idea of qerapei/a th=s yuxh=s already discussed in 464 b above, and thus immediately prepares the way for making progress in the investigation. Cf. 487 a.—The subject of teqerapeu=sqai must be supplied from moi/.

e(rmai/w|: all unexpected gains (ke/rdos a)prosdo/khton) were supposed to come from Hermes, who had among other surnames that of kerdw=|os.

a)/n moi kte(.: we miss the less an object to o(mologh/sh|s since the idea is made especially prominent by the following tau=ta. Cf. 487 e e)a/n ti su\ e)n toi=s lo/gois o(mologh/sh|s moi.

doca/zei: is a vox media. The same activity of the soul may, according to circumstances, lead to error or to truth. Cf. also do/ca a)lhqh/s and yeudh/s.—

h)/dh: at once (jam), without need of further discussion.

tri/a a)/ra dei= e)/xein: must of necessity possess three qualities. The particle a)/ra shows that this lies in the nature of the matter.

15f.

polloi=s e)ntugxa/nw kte(.: Socrates gives examples in 21 b ff.

tw\ de\ ce/nw kte(.: Socrates says what follows with an irony which applies especially to Polus; but at the same time it is a significant criticism of the parrhsi/a of Callicles.

ma=llon: see on 482 c.

w(/ ge: the ge\ emphasizes the pronoun. The irony from here on is quite distinct, and no longer veiled.

dia\ to\ ai)sxu/nesqai tolma=|: an example of ‘oxymoron.’ Timidity and shame are not usually the basis of boldness. The opposite of tolma=| is implied. The reference to 483 a is unmistakable: e)a\n ou)=n tis ai)sxu/nhtai kai\ mh\ tolma=| le/gein a(/per noei=, a)nagka/zetai e)nanti/a le/gein.

au)tw=n au)to\s au(tw=|: the position makes the contradiction beat heavily upon the ear.

24 f.

peri\ tw=n megi/stwn: in contrast with 486 d ta\ mikra\ tau=ta. Cf. 484 c ta\ mei/zw.

pepai/deusai: see on paidei/as, 485 a. The addition of w(s polloi\ a)\n fh/saien *)aqhnai/wn implies, of course, the usual opposition of the many ignorant to the few capable, and this makes the tone of i(kanw=s almost bitter.

29 f. Of the three companions of Callicles we know but little. Tisander is mentioned only here. Andron appears in 315 c as a defender of Hippias. Nausicydes had, according to Xen. ii. 7. 6, acquired wealth from his business of a)lfitopoii/a. The deme Cholargus belonged to the tribe Acamantis, Aphidnae to Aiantis.

me/xri o(/poi: the only instance in Plato of me/xri with an adverb. Cf. Xen. iv. 7. 5 me/xri poi=.

e)ni/ka: has a somewhat comic effect, inasmuch as it brings before the mind the image of an earnest and thorough deliberation engaged in by some public body (i.e. the senate), followed by the putting of the question. These young men, however, judge philosophy without understanding it.

proqumei=sqai: epexegetic inf. to toia/de tis do/ca.

33 f.

ei)s th\n a)kri/beian: recalls the ta\ mikra\ tau=ta above. This cautious decision contrasts remarkably with the e)leu/qeron and neaniko/n which Callicles defends in 485 c, d.

35 f.

o(/pws mh\ . . . diafqare/ntes: the same state of mind is shown in the accusation brought later against Socrates, the second part of which ran thus: a)dikei= de\ kai\ tou\s ne/ous diafqei/rwn. That this was Callicles' judgment is shown by his words in 484 c ff. above.

e(tairota/tois: is found also in 89 d.

39 f.

o(/ti... lang=greek>au)to/s te fh\|s kte(.: this must not be considered as a valid example of o(/ti after fhmi/, which regularly takes the infinitive. The o(/ti clause precedes, and may have escaped the speaker's mind when he was about to make the collocation of au)to/s and lo/gos. The occurrence of two forms of le/gw in the same clause would likewise have been awkward.

oi(=os parrhsia/zesqai: you are disposed to free speech. See on 452 e. The omission of the first and second persons of the copula is rare. When ei)= is omitted, su/ is generally found. On the inf. see on 457 d.

e)/xei dh\ kte(.: with this Socrates recurs to what was said in 486 e.

44 ff.

a)\n sunexw/rhsas, sugxwrh/sais a)/n: the time is pushed into the fut. pf. by the previous bebasanisme/non e)/stai, and standing on this assumed plane, Socrates uses naturally the unreal past. The second clause is, as the au)= shows, a second thought, and being of general application, is put into the ideal (potential) optative. The whole sentence shows the narrow line that separates between unreality and ideality.

te/los th=s a)lhqei/as e(/cei: the gen., as in the Homeric phrases te/los ga/moio, qana/toio. Every effort must be directed to a terminus or completion. Here the end is perfect truth.

kalli/sth: refers to its value. It yields a rich return.

ti/ xrh\ e)pithdeu/ein: is the question about which the following discussion revolves. Cf. 492 d, 500 c, 512 e, 515 a, 521 a, 527 b, e.

52 f.

kata\ to\n bi/on: refers, not to the period of life, but to the manner of living.

tou=to: Heindorf, followed by Cron, construes this word with the following verb. But it is more natural to look upon it as antecedent to the following sentence, know well this fact, etc.

ou)x e(kw/n: sc. according to the Socratic view as to the cause of wrong doing.

nouqetei=n: according to the rule, when a)/rxesqai is used with the inf. the inf. is emphasized; when with the partic. the ‘beginning’ is emphasized. So 187 a h)rxo/meqa dialego/menoi, “we commenced the discussion on which we are still engaged.”—Here, as in 458 a, Socrates looks upon the correction of any erroneous views as a favor.

bla=ka: ‘implies feebleness both of mind and character, a dolt.’ Thompson.

60 f.

e)pana/labe: we find a)nalabei=n in this sense in 506 c and 19 b.

su\ kai\ *pi/ndaros: see on 484 b.

a)/gein bi/a|: is a freer expression of the sense of Pindar's words.

mh\ le/geis: in spite of the addition of h)\ o)rqw=s me/mnhmai, the tendency of the question is towards a negative answer, as is also to be gathered from the a)lla\ of Callicles' answer.

to/te: refers to what was said in 483 d, e, and e)ndei/knusqai is accordingly imperfect infinitive.

h)=: appears to be the old Attic form.

9 f.

w(s tau)to\n o)/n: on the assumption that, etc. See on 491 a.

h)\ e)/sti: begins the second member of the double question introduced by po/teron.

o( au)to\s o(/ros: cf. 470 b. The question is, whether the range of each idea is the same. A clear distinction (safw=s dio/rison) would obviate any false application.

to\ krei=tton kte(.: the position of the three terms is arbitrary; but Socrates seems to put first the two on which he lays most stress.

17 f.

w(/sper . . . e)/leges: this appeal to the statement of Callicles reveals a contradiction between his statements, inasmuch as he had said above, 483 b, that the polloi/ were the a)sqenei=s.

28 f.

w(s a)/rti au)= su\ e)/leges: the au)= draws attention again to the above w(/sper kai\ su\ a)/rti e)/leges. See 483 a-d.

30 f.

o(/pws mh\ a(lw/sei: an ironical allusion to Callicles' reproaches of Gorgias and Polus in 482 e.

mh\ fqo/nei: a formula for entreaty and urging, still more frequent in the form mh\ fqonh/sh|s. Regularly mh/ with pres. imv. prescribes a neg. course of action, with an aor. subjv. negatives a course of action. Socrates wishes at the outset to obviate any tendency to a refusal to answer, or hesitancy.

*kalli/kleis: the omission of the w)= is unusual.

bebaiou=sqai: to become strengthened in one's opinion. It is used with para/ to designate the quarter from which the influence comes; direct agency would require u(po/.—

i(kanou= diagnw=nai: competent to decide, with reference to 487 e.

40 f.

le/gein, kathgorei=n: indir. disc. for impf. indicative. The kathgori/a proper begins with a(\ dh/. The use of dh/ implies a fact beyond controversy.

ou(tosi\ a)nh/r: Callicles with this turns to the surrounding listeners to give vent to his indignation. Cf. 467 b, 505 c.

ou) pau/setai fluarw=n: Callicles, who looks upon all philosophical activity as fluari/a, objects to having dialectical treatment applied to him.

ei)pe/ moi: the asyndeton renders the question especially incisive, and hence is a measure of excitement. The question ou)k ai)sxu/nei is a rhetorical imperative.

2 f.

o)no/mata qhreu/wn: the same image is employed in 166 c, with the substantive o)noma/twn qh/reusis to denote logomachy, where the matter at issue has been quite forgotten.

r(h/mati: in an expression. See on 450 e. Callicles takes his stand on the identity, which he had maintained, of belti/wn and krei/ttwn, but reverses the relation of these words to each other; for while above he considered belti/wn to be synonymous with krei/ttwn, now he wishes krei/ttwn to be understood in the sense of be/lti/wn.

ou) pa/lai soi le/gw: he adds, in order to cover this change of conception. See on 456 a.

h)\ oi)/ei kte(.: Callicles allows himself to be clearly recognized as a member of that political party which applied to itself by preference the name oi( kaloi\ ka)gaqoi/, and which both during the latter part and after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war obtained for a brief period the ascendency in Athens.

su/rfetos: from su/rw, sweep. Cf. the English colloquial words ‘off-scourings’ and ‘scum.’

a)ci/wn plh/n: without a following gen., instead of which we find tw=| sw/mati i)sxuri/sasqai by means of their bodily strength. Others construe tw=| with sw/mati, making the inf. depend upon some word of ability to be taken from a)ci/wn, but this is harsh.

au)ta\ tau=ta ei)=nai no/mima: construe with le/gein as an indignant disclaimer in the shape of a question. “Or think you I mean that if a rabble be got together, of slaves and all sorts of wretches, good for nothing unless perhaps for feats of physical strength, and these people say this or that, that these their mere dicta are to have the force of law?” Thompson.

ai)to\s pa/lai topa/zw: why So

crates does not express his conjecture, he has already explained in 453 b, c.

su/ ge: you, at least, for your part. Cf. what has just preceded in c.

a)lla\ pa/lin: in what precedes Callicles has really succeeded merely in eluding the expression of any positive view.

prodi/daske: the pro/ in composition indicates the progress or going forward, which ought to attend teaching.

a)pofoith/sw para\ sou=: run away from your school. Cf. 456 d.

ma\ to\n *zh=qon: with ma/ we always infer the negative. The allusion to Zethus, whom Callicles had brought forward as an authority, has a very comic effect.

a)ll' i)/qi: see on 451 a.

o(ra=|s kte(.: alludes to 489 c, where be/ltion and krei=tton were said by Callicles to be identical. Here he characterizes the belti/ous as a)mei/nous, showing, as Socrates declares in dhloi=s ou)de/n, that at this time there was no distinction of consequence between these two words.

ou)k e)rei=s: again asyndetic, as above in b.

fronimwte/rous: excludes the ambiguity which was still possible with i)sxuro/teros.

mh\ fronou/ntwn: the neg.is con

ditional.

r(h/mata: a clear reference to 489 b, c. r(h=ma has rather the force of “phrase.”

e)/xe dh/: see on 460 a.

e)n koinw=|: i.e. so that, as being public property, it must be distributed.

oi( me\n i)sxuroi\ kte(.: added be cause it is just in the distribution of food that one would expect bodily strength to form the standard.

peri\ tau=ta: the acc. implies some mental activity.

e(kte/on: the verbal of e)/xw, which is quite rare, shows two forms, this and the more normal one sxete/os, also used by Plato.

tw=| me\n a)/rxein: this comes to him according to 490 a, because he is fronimw/teros. The dat. is one of cause. ne/mein is an action for which are necessary wisdom, justice, and self-control.

kataxrh=sqai: not misuse, but use up. kata/ frequently has the force of “completely” in composition. Kr. 68, 46, 10.

zhmiou=sqai: used metaphorically, of the natural result which follows the over-engorgement of the stomach with food.

tw=n me\n . . . tw=n de/: with refer ence to b.

tw=| belti/stw|: used instead of the pron. for the sake of the contrast with e)la/xiston.

peri\ siti/a: this is a very unusual construction. The gen. is the rule with peri\ after le/gw. Cron thinks it is calculated to define the region in which the speeches of Socrates move. The word fluari/as serves also to characterize all that precedes. Cf. 519 a lime/nwn kai\ newri/wn kai\ teixw=n kai\ fo/rwn kai\ toiou/twn fluariw=n, the companion passage to this one. Cf. also Dem. iii. 29 ta\s o(dou\s a(\s e)piskeua/zomen, kai\ krh/nas, kai\ lh/rous.

po/teron: the second member is to be supplied from the following question.

h)\ mh/ (sc. fa/qi): to be understood like ou)/ fhmi (nego).

manqa/nw: ironic; as if Socrates could by any means judge what Callicles did mean from a general statement of what he did not mean.

u(fantikw/taton: a sup. coined for the occasion.

periie/nai: sc. in order to show off in them; still stronger is the following (31) peripatei=n (“strut about”).

poi/wn i(mati/wn: expresses indignant contempt. 174 b a)=ra/ ge (oi)=de) to\ petteutiko/n; poi=on petteutiko/n;

fluarei=s e)(xwn: a manner of speech taken from the common life, and hence especially frequent in the comic poets. Cf. ti/ e)/xwn lhrei=s; (497 a), ti/ dh=ta e)/xwn stre/fei; ( 236 e), ti/ dh=ta diatri/beis e)/xwn; (Ar. 1151). e)/xwn seems to imply a kind of continual persistence.

toiau=ta, toia/de: correspond in usage to ou(=tos and o(de. The article divides the examples into classes.

w(s a)ei\ kte(.: an exclamation implying a taunt, which was so often directed against Socrates i.e. (according to Xen. iv. 4. 6) by the sophist Hippias, who receives about the same answer that Callicles does here, with the ironical addition: su\ d' i)/sws dia\ to\ polumaqh\s ei)=nai peri\ tw=n au)tw=n ou)de/pote ta\ au)ta\ le/geis. Cf. 482 a.

a)ei\ skute/as kte(.: Charicles, one of the thirty, irritated by some keen remark of Socrates, expresses himself similarly in Xen. i. 2. 37 ou)kou=n, e)/fh o( *swkra/ths, kai\ tw=n e(pome/nwn tou/tois tou= te dikai/ou kai\ tou= o(si/ou kai\ tw=n a)/llwn tw=n toiou/twn. nai\ ma\ *di/), e)/fh o( *xariklh=s, kai\ tw=n bouko/lwn ge.

41 f.

w(s o)/nta to\n lo/gon: the acc. abs. is rare, except with impers. verbs. GMT. 853; G.278, 2; H.974. The inference here is that the assumption introduced by the w(s is untenable; in which case we more commonly have w(/sper.

peri\ ti/nwn: due to assimilation after peri\ tou/twn, for, acc. to the usage, we should expect peri\ ti/na after pleonektei=. 182 e oi(=s ou)de\n a)/llo me/lei h)\ tou=to zhtei=n, o(/ti a)\n maqo/ntes pleonektoi=en tw=n a)/llwn peri\ to\n po/lemon. The e)rei=s may also have had some effect. See on 449 d. For ou)kou=n e)rei=s, see on 489 e.

a)ll' e)/gwge kai\ pa/lai le/gw: see on 456 a and 489 c. Callicles' irritation shows itself again in the side-thrust, ou) skutoto/mous kte(.

46 f.

tou\s krei/ttous oi(/ ei)sin: equiv. to tou/tous oi(\ krei/ttous ei)si/n. See Kr. 61, 6, 2; H. 878. Such prolepsis usually occurs after verbs which express recognition or make declarations. Here the relative clause is almost pleonastic, but this is the more in harmony with the excited feelings of Callicles.

ei)s . . . pra/gmata: denotes the object, as peri\ tau=ta (above 490 b) denotes the field, to which the fro/nhsis is directed; and from it we must take the subject of oi)koi=to.

i(kanoi\ o)/ntes kte(.: is to be considered as explanatory of a)ndrei=oi and fro/nimoi w)=sin.

e)gw\ de\ sou= tou)nanti/on: this use of sou=, with which we must supply kathgorw=, is somewhat harsh after e)me/, with which it contrasts, and leads Cron to prefer to consider sou= as dependent upon tou)nanti/on, in the sense “the opposite of you,”—i.e. of what you say,—and the clause with o(/ti as epexegetic to tou)nanti/on, —a harsh and doubtful construction.

tou\s i)sxurote/rous: the art. is employed, because i)sxurote/rous is not merely a pred. to tou\s belti/ous kte(., but both ideas are considered as identical.

6 f.

h(/keis e)/xwn: as 518 a. In English also we often say, ‘here you are with,’ etc.

tine/s: ‘ti\s may express indefiniteness of nature: “a sort of.”’ H. 702.

ei)pw\n a)palla/ghqi: relieve your mind by saying, tell and be done with it. Cf. below, e o(\ e)gw/ soi nu=n parrhsiazo/menos le/gw. The use of the aorist tense of the partic. may be simply a case of attraction; it certainly loses its connotation of past time, being practically identical with the time of the leading verb, as in 60 c eu)= g' e)poi/hsas a)namnh/sas me. See GMT. 150, 845; H. 856 b.

tou=t' e)sti/n: does not refer to a)/rxein, but simply, as often, introduces the following clause.

ti/ de\ au(tw=n: the indefiniteness of the question shows that it is only designed to draw Callicles' attention to the necessity of some rule governing the actions of the krei/ttous to one another. According to the connexion we may supply either a)/rxein or ple/on e)/xein to govern the gen., or we may consider it as a free genitive. The idea of a man's governing himself is so entirely new to Callicles that he is unable to catch Socrates' meaning at first.

e(/na e(/kaston: the single concrete case to explain the principle.

ou)de\n poiki/lon: means that the question is about a simple matter, whereas the person addressed imag-ines something else behind the words.

w(/sper oi( polloi/: with this, Socrates calls in the authority of common usage to determine the meaning of e(autou= a)/rxein, which he defines by sw/frwn and e)gkrath\s e(autou=, with tw=n h(donw=n kte(. explanatory.

w(s h(du\s ei)=: is often used ironically.

h(du/s: corresponds best to our naive. Callicles means that Socrates still keeps the point of view of a naive—hence interesting (but cf. 485 b, c)—child, inasmuch as he has not yet laid aside his childish prejudice in favor of swfrosu/nh. Hence the words tou\s h(liqi/ous kte(. are a criticism of Socrates' view: “you mean those simple-minded fellows,— the temperate.” This passage shows that Callicles erases swfrosu/nh, as he did dikaiosu/nh, from the list of the virtues.

ou(/tw: we should naturally expect tou/tous. Of course there is a tinge of irony in the allusion to Cal licles' words.

pa/nu ge sfo/dra: sc. ou(/tw le/geis. Callicles, of course, means tou\s h/liqi/ous, and makes an effort in what follows to defend his words. For this purpose he unfolds his view of life more completely, and shows especially wherein he finds happiness. The beginning of his discourse bears a rhetorical stamp.

douleu/wn: not to be conceived literally of human servitude, but rather equiv. to a)rxo/menos and that too au)to\s u(f' e(autou=, which Callicles considers just as bad as if the slavery were to some one else, o(tw=|oun. The lot of thraldom is considered so unhappy that Callicles conceives douleu/wn, even in the sense which it has here, as the exact opposite to eu)dai/mwn. That selfcontrol is not consistent with the generally held idea of freedom is spoken plainly in 86 d e)peidh\ de\ su\ sautou= me\n ou)d' e)pixeirei=s a)/rxein i(/na dh\ e)leu/qeros h)=|s, and is at the present day a principle of the opponents of the temperance movement.

kola/zein: in the sense of “discipline” is quite in place here. At the same time its use forms a link between this and the earlier discussion between Polus and Socrates. a)kolasi/a is the proper opposite to swfrosu/nh, and as such is praised by Callicles.

u(phretei=n: Callicles says this, without noticing that thereby the servitude (doulei/a) in which man stands to his appetites is recognized.

tou\s toiou/tous: viz. tou\s dunatou\s a)popimpla/nai kte(.

ai)sxro\n dh/: with ironical reference to ai)sxu/nhn.—

o(/per: introduces what follows. The reference is to 483 c ff.

oi(=s u(ph=rcen: whose fortune it was. The original meaning of u(pa/rxein, “to be as a foundation,” “to begin with,” becomes gradually weaker as time goes on. The dat. in the pred. here passes over into the acc. as subj. of the inf. (i(kanou/s and ei)=nai) as is frequently the case, especially in long periods. Kr. 55, 2, 5, 7. The cause here lies in the necessary addition of au)tou/s.

a)rxh/n tina kte(.: the word a)rxh/ can be applied to any position of power, whether in a democracy or not. Thuc. ii. 65. 9 says of Athens e)gi/gneto/ te lo/gw| me\n dhmokrati/a, e)/rgw| de\ u(po\ tou= prw/tou a)ndro\s (i.e. Pericles) a)rxh/. The idea of turanni/s is well known; cf. Nepos, 8. 3. dunastei/a combined with turanni/s is not infrequently (479 a, Thuc. iii. 62. 3) used of oligarchs, but it is also a designation of princes, both smaller and greater (524 e, 525 d).

ai)/sxion kai\ ka/kion: declare as strongly as possible the inappropriateness of the practice of virtue for such men; it becomes for them really a shame and an evil.

tou/tcis toi=s a)nqrw/pois: pur posely placed at the end of the clause (as above dia\ th\n au(tw=n a)nandri/an), and to emphasize the contrast, a)nqrw/pwn, which is usually wanting, is added in the next clause after tw=n pollw=n.—

oi(=s e)co\n kte(.: such connexion of the subordinate to the principal clause is idiomatic in Greek and Latin. 174 e oi(= me\n ga\r eu)qu\s pai=da/ tina tw=n e)/ndon a)panth/santa a)/gein ou(= kate/keinto oi( a)/lloi. Nep. 4. 1 huic . . . corona a populo data est; quam quod . . . non vis expresserat nullam habuit invidiam. Notice the necessary shift in e)co/n and mhdeno\s . . . o)/ntos due to the change from impersonal to personal. The participles are both practically concessive, the neg. mh/ being due to the conditional coloring.

tw=n pollw=n kte(.: notice the assonance (pari/swsis) in no/mon, lo/gon, yo/gon.

tou= kalou=: is said with bitter irony. Callicles shows here, as well as in 486 b above, the code of morals prevalent at that time and which Xen. expresses in the praise awarded to Cyrus, i. 9. 11 fa/neros h)=n ei)/ ti/s ti a)gaqo\n h)\ kako\n poih/seien au)to\n, nika=n peirw/menos.

h(\n fh\|s su\ diw/kein: as above 482 e fa/skwn th\n a)lh/qeian diw/kein.

e)pikouri/an: capacity to help (one's self); i.e. to provide means for pleasure and to ward off hindrances. So also e)pikourei=n and e)pi/kouros. Cf. below, the recapitulation of Socrates.

ta\ de\ a)/lla kte(.: the subject, which at first is only inferred as the opposite of the three qualities specified, is nearer specified first by the characteristic addition ta\ kallwpi/smata (affectations) and then by a definite expression which at the same time shows Callicles' opinion.

fluari/a kte(.: is predicate.

ou)k a)gennw=s: like gennai/ws 475 d, 521 a, transferred from its original application to the free independent conduct proper for a man of noble birth; hence equiv. to “spirited,” “brave.”

e)pece/rxei: an image from war. Cf. e)pixeirw=men 495 c.

tw=| lo/gw|: refers to the view just stated, the position defended. 345 d, where Socrates says of Simonides di) o(/lou tou= a)/|smatos e)pece/rxetai tw=| tou= *pittakou= r(h/mati. We may, however, consider e)pece/rxei as used absolutely and tw=| lo/gw| as dat. of accompaniment.

ei) me/llei tis (sc. toiou=tos ei)=nai)

oi(=on dei= (au)to\n sc. to\n a)/nqrwpon)

ei)=nai: the absence of the inf. after e)w=nta is strange; cf. 491 e above.

7 f.

a(mo/qen ge/ poqen: Socrates wishes to settle beyond all cavil that Callicles sanctions the employment of all means, without limitation and in the broadest sense, to satisfy his desires. As e(toima/zein is in the same construction with kolaste/on, we must conceive an idea of obligation connected with it. 51 c poihte/on . . . h)\ pei/qein.

th\n a)retg/n: the sole true virtue (manliness), which is recognized also by Callicles.

a)/ra: “it appears,” “according to your view.”

oi( mhdeno\s deo/menoi kte(.: the fundamental principle of the Cynic school (of Antisthenes), which also derived its origin from Socrates. Cf. Xen. i. 6. 10, where to the sophist Antiphon, who maintains similar principles to those of Callicles here, Socrates says e)/oikas th\n eu)daimoni/an oi)ome/nw| trufh\n kai\ polute/leian ei)=nai: e)gw\ de\ nomi/zw to\ me\n mhdeno\s dei=sqai qei=on ei)=nai, to\ d' w(s e)la/xiston e)gguta/tw tou= qei/ou.

oi( nekroi\ kte(.: Socrates mentions the prevalence of this view in 65 a kai\ dokei= ge/ pou toi=s polloi=s a)nqrw/pois . . . e)ggu/s ti tei/nein tou= teqna/nai o( mhde\n fronti/zwn tw=n h(donw=n ai(\ dia\ tou= sw/mato/s ei)sin. Sophocles, however, makes the sorely afflicted Ajax say ( 554 f.) e)n tw=| fronei=n ga\r mhde\n h(/distos bi/os, | e(/ws to\ xai/rein kai\ to\ lupei=sqai maqh=|s. Now that Callicles has stated exactly the manner in which he looks at life, Socrates proceeds to contrast that view with his own, not directly indeed, but by a series of comparisons and similes, which serve the double purpose of calming the feelings of the listeners and readers after the impassioned speech of Callicles and, by presenting these pictures to the fancy, of preparing their minds for the following dialectical argument.

*eu)ripi/dhs: the same poet to whom Callicles has several times appealed. Socrates also can quote for his own purpose. The passage is from the , and has the second line completed by the words ka/tw nomi/zetai. Quite similar is a passage which has come down to us from another lost tragedy, the , ti/s oi)=den ei) zh=n tou=q' o(\ ke/klhtai qanei=n, | to\ zh=n de\ qnh/|skein e)sti/. See Nauck, 639, 830.

19 f.

e)/gwge kai\ h)/kousa/ tou: the following comparisons are probably taken from the book of Philolaus, a Pythagorean who, after having been driven from Italy, wandered to Thebes, and there engaged in teaching and writing. Socrates was acquainted with the Pythagorean teaching probably only orally, from association with his Theban friends Simmias and Cebes. For this reason Plato implies by the manner of expression that this knowledge, which Socrates himself in nowise valued, was as general as possible. See Thompson.

20 f.

to\ me\n sw=ma/ e)sti sh=ma: this comparison, though ascribed to the Pythagoreans, is connected also with the Orphic saying that the body is the custodian of the soul. Plato combines both in the same manner in 400 b kai\ ga\r sh=ma/ tine/s fasin au)to\ (sc. to\ sw=ma) ei)=nai th=s yuxh=s. 62 b.

th=s de\ yuxh=s tou=to: in order to continue the discussion, a distinction between the separate parts of the soul is necessary. This could not be given here scientifically; but as much as is needful is stated by the comparison. Elsewhere Plato distinguishes three parts of the soul,—to\ logistiko/n, to\ qumoeide/s (qumo/s), and to\ e)piqumhtiko/n. For his present purpose two are sufficient,—the really spiritual, the reason, and that part which clings greedily to the body; for the question to be decided is: Shall life be directed according to the nature of the soul or of the body?

metapi/ptein: the active is found in 481 d, e. Cf. 517 b metabiba/zein ta\s e)piqumi/as.

muqologw=n: “speaking in mythical (here allegorical) form,” in contradistinction with the dialectical method. 61 e diaskopei=n te kai\ muqologei=n.—

komyo/s: of delicate perceptions. Often with irony, but not here. See on 486 c. *sikelo/s refers to Empedocles, *)italiko/s to Philolaus. Neither was able, in the infancy of the science, to clothe his profound thoughts in philosophical form. Cf. Cron-Dyer Introd. to §§ 3 and 8. *sikelo/s, and not *sikeliko/s, may be due to the old love song of Timocreon Rhodius, which began: *sikelo\s komyo\s a)nh\r | poti\ ta\n mate/r' e)/fa.

para/gwn tw=| o)no/mati: by a slight variation of the word. para/gein is otherwise used of etymologies which are effected by small variations in the sound.

dia\ to\ piqano/n te kai\ peistiko/n: Philolaus was very fond of such tricks of derivation (cf. Boeckh, , p. 188). Both words are obviously, as was shown above by a)napei/qesqai and metapi/ptein, to be considered as passive, and applying to something that can be easily persuaded. In form piqano/n approaches closest to pi/qon, and hence stands first. It is usually active, yet it occurs also as a passive, i.e. Xen. ii. 2. 10 piqanoi\ d) ou(/tws ei)si/ tines, w(/ste, pri\n ei)de/nai to\ prostatto/menon, pro/teron pei/qontai.—

peistiko/n: adapted and inclined to belief, presupposes also some persuasion.

a)noh/tous: is chosen here as the opposite of sw/frones, on account of its assonance with a)muh/tous, and denotes those who are under the control, not of the nou=s, but of the e)piqumi/a. a)mu/htoi, according to the regular usage, denotes those who are not initiated into the mysteries. Hence Plato applies it also, in 69 c and 155 e, to those who have not been initiated into wisdom, or Philosophy, which causes—as the mysteries were also designed to do—an actual inner purification of the soul. But here is also probably, at the same time, an allusion to the actual untransferred meaning of mu/ein, close, —i.e. the “unconfined.” With this agrees the following explanation, ou) stegano/n and tetrhme/nos pi/qos. The a)mu/htoi stand open to all the charms of sense and the outer world.

to\ a)ko/laston: an allusion to the expression of Callicles.

ou) stegano/n: which does not cover and preserve its contents, gives cause and introduction for the image of the jar. It is noteworthy that this greedy part of the soul is designated entirely by neg. expressions.

27 f.

w(s tetrhme/nos ei)/h pi/qos: depends on an e)/lege, which is implied in w)no/mase. It is true, however, that after a verb of naming we find occasionally a relative clause, as Soph. 780 kalei= (me) plasto\s w(s ei)/hn patri/. The comparison reminds one of the myth of the Danaidae. With the image of the pi/qos and ko/skinon Thompson compares Shaks. i. 7 ‘The cloyed will, That satiate yet unsatisfied desire, That tub both filled and running,’ and All's Well i. 3. 193 ‘Yet in this captious and untenable sieve, I still pour in the waters of my love, And lack not to lose still.’

a)peika/sas: the necessary objects in the acc. and dat. are to be supplied from the context.

tou)nanti/on: construe with soi/.

29 f.

e)n *(/aidou: the following etymological explanation is found also elsewhere. It draws attention to a consideration of the beyond and the life after death, which plays an important part in the close of the dialogue. 80 d, 81 c, d.

ou(=toi: points back, but is at the same time fixed by the addition oi( a)mu/htoi.

e(te/rw| toiou/tw|: “likewise.” The objects are different, but their defects are similar.

o( pro\s e)me\ le/gwn: Socrates again refers to his authority, because he is still engaged with the details of the simile.

th\n tw=n a)muh/twn: emphatically added, because what follows applies only to oi( a)mu/htoi. The soul is here, as a whole, compared to a perforated sieve, whereas, just before, only a part of it was compared with the jar, because thereby was meant only the part attached to the body. But the other part, the soul proper, is brought into service to this bodily part, so that it affords material for it, and even assumes its nature. 66 d douleu/ontes th=| tou= sw/matos qerapei/a|.

a)pisti/an: no contradiction to the above peistiko/n, which was said only of the e)piqumhtiko/n of the soul. By yielding to the sensual, the soul loses its power of reception and retention, of belief and knowledge.

e)pieikw=s: reasonably, fairly, and then very likely, indeed.

u(po/ ti: somewhat, like u(po/ in u(poa/mousos viii. 548 e, belongs to a)/topon. Rid. § 131 cites 242 d u(po/ ti a)sebh= (lo/gon). Cf. in Lat. subabsurdus, subrusticus, etc.

mh/n: yet, moreover, like the more usual me/ntoi.

soi/: in Greek, when a pron. has been expressed once with one of the verbs of a series, it is not necessary to express it a second time, even though the second verb would require a different case, as here.

metaqe/sqai: denotes the change of an opinion or statement. i. 334 e a)lla\ metaqw/meqa: kinduneu/omen ga\r ou)k o)rqw=s . . . qe/sqai.

38 f.

a)nti\ . . . e(le/sqai: epexegetic, instead of w(/ste e(le/sqai.

kosmi/ws: chiastically contrasted with a)kola/stws.

po/teron pei/qw: the question shows that Socrates himself attaches no especial cogency to the comparison. Cf. below, muqologw=.

metati/qesai: here equiv. to metaqe/menos h(gei=. Mutasne ita sententiam ut statuas feliciores esse modestos libidinosis. Heindorf.

tou=to: refers to the second part of the double question.

fe/re dh/: the employment of another simile after the preceding one is strange; but possibly the second contains an advance on the first, inasmuch as it extends the consideration from the nature to the life. It may, however, be only another version of the first one, as the scholiast suggests: h)=n de\ e)kei=no me\n tw=n *puqagorei/wn oi)kei=on, tou=to de\ *swkra/tous, w(s safe/stero/n te kai\ plhktikw/teron.

gumnasi/ou: it is not necessary to refer this strictly to the philosophical school already mentioned. It rather has the meaning of “place of general exercise,” the domain of imagination and fancy from which Socrates (Plato) draws his new image. On the ‘brachylogy’ in th=| nu=n (“where we obtained the one just given”), see Kr. 48, 13, 9.

pi/qoi polloi/: by these are to be understood only the separate desires. Pleasures are the materials with which the jars are filled.

u(giei=s: in the physical sense, “undamaged,” but with a pre-understanding of the moral judgment in regard to them; hence the contrast is formed by saqra/, as in 479 b.

pollw=n: viz. toiou/twn xrhma/twn or nama/twn. The common manner of expression would be a)/lloi a)/llwn pollw=n or a)/lloi a)/llwn polloi\ pollw=n.

xalepa/: used absolutely and explained by the addition of kai\ . . . e)kporizo/mena. Cf. below (11), where the supplement is self-evident.

o( me\n e(/teros: i.e. o( sw/frwn.

9 f.

e(/neka tou/twn: “so far as it depends upon the filling of the casks or desires.” 148 d proqumi/as me\n e(/neka fanei=tai.

pori/zesqai: probably middle. Kr. 55, 3, 8; H. 813.

h)/: i.e. ei) de\ mh\ (pimplai/h).

a)=ra toiou/tou kte(.: comprehensive resumption of the protasis beginning with ei) duoi=n.

pei/qw ti: the adverbial acc. of the indef. neut. pron. is frequent. See H. 719 b; G. 160, 2. The repetition of pei/qw shows that Socrates attaches no value to the comparison as a proof, for one simile can be offset by an other, but it helps to clarify the idea.

to\ w(/sper li/qon zh=n: epexegetical to tou=to . . . o(\ kte(., in order to draw attention again to the earlier remark.—We must supply naturally the same subject to plhrw/sh| as to zh=n.

e)pirrei=n: Callicles takes up the simile of Socrates; but at the same time, in this treatment of it there may be some traces of the teaching of Gorgias, if, as is supposed, he accepted Empedocles' ideas of flux and reflux in his views of physics. 76 c bou/lei ou)=n soi kata\ *gorgi/an a)pokri/nwmai;—*ou)kou=n le/gete a)porroa/s tinas tw=n u)/ntwn kat' *)empedokle/a; kai\ po/rous ei)s ou(\s kai\ di) w(=n ai( a)porroai\ poreu/ontai. In this light the word pori/zesqai gains especial importance.

e)kroai=s: this compound with e)k is very unusual, but also here very exact.

xaradriou=: according to Arist. ix. 11, the xaradrio/s was a bird of ugly voice and color, which lived in chasms and clefts of the rock, and came forth only at night. Others describe it as a very greedy bird, o(\s a(/ma tw=| e)sqi/ein e)kkri/nei. It is this peculiarity which explains the reference here. The duck has that reputation with us.

a)ll' ou): we might also have simple ou) (456 e), or kai\ ou) (Kr. 59, 1, 10).

to\ toio/nde le/geis: viz. as the above (a)ll' . . . e)pirrei=n) used expressions. The following answer of Callicles, le/gw kte(., saves Socrates the trouble of enumeration.

to\ toio/nde: see on 490 e.

XLIX.

eu)=ge: the verb is regularly omitted with this exclamation, which is usually ironic. By the words ta\s a)/llas e)piqumi/as a(pa/sas, Callicles gives Socrates an open field for attack. Hence the ironical praise. Callicles need only continue to make such rash statements to be soon silenced.

w(s e)/oike: by this expression Socrates reminds Callicles of the principle he had laid down in 482 e (cf. 489 a), in order, by this ironical praise of his determination which shrinks from no consequence, to make acceptable the diversion of the discussion to less pleasant subjects. At the same time, he shows that he feels himself compelled, by the results of Callicles' moral view, to carry the investigation into this field.

a)fqo/nws e)/xonta tou= knh=sqai: the gen., on account of the meaning of the adverb (cf. fqonei=n tini/ tinos).

knh=sqai: contracted like zh=n, yh=n, etc. Cf. peinh=n in b above.

w(s a)/topos ei)= kte(.: rudeness instead of response.

dhmhgo/ros: see on 482 c.

toiga/rtoi: this strong inferential particle (cf. 471 c) serves to compel Callicles, who would gladly have evaded the answer by the general reproach w(s a)/topos ei)=, to a definite answer, by reference to 487 a, b.

a)ndrei=os: with an allusion to 491 b. It is contrasted with e)kplagh=nai, because, besides fro/nhsis, bravery is the only virtue recognized by Callicles as necessary for a statesman. He must, therefore, display this quality himself.

16 f.

ta\ e)xo/mena: used absolutely would not indeed be unexampled (cf. Isoc. vi. 29 e)k tw=n e)xome/nwn gnw/sesqe), but in connection with tou/tois e)fech=s is pleonastic. Otherwise Plato's usage is either ta\ tou/twn e)xo/mena ( iii. 389 e) or ta\ tou/tois e)fech=s ( 30 c, 34 d).

kefa/laion: without the article is rather uncommon (cf. 453 a, 472 c), but does occasionally occur. Cf. Dem. ii. 31.

ou(=tos: points emphatically back to o( tw=n kinai/dwn bi/os, which has already received especial stress through the preceding word kefa/laion.

ei)s toiau=ta a)/gwn: is the same reproach which was made above, 482 e.

a)ne/dhn: without limitation, from the same root as a)ni/hmi.—

ou(/tw: see on 468 c a(plw=s ou(/tws.

a)ll' e)/ti kai\ nu=n: the last attempt to come to an understanding. 44 b. The answer of Callicles tends to bring into the foreground the question of the identity or opposition of the agreeable and the good.

a)nomologou/menos: is not to be connected with a)nomologei=sqai, “to repeat an admission already made and to come to an agreement,” but is from o(mologou/menos in composition with

a- privative. By this expression Callicles makes plain the recklessness of his thinking and the obstinacy of his disposition. The sentence is condensed by the omission of a selfevident clause: “in order that I may not make my statement inconsistent, (which I will do) if I say,” etc.

diafqei/reis tou\s prw/tous lo/-... lang=greek>gous: cf. 360 a diafqerou=men ta\s e)/mprosqen o(mologi/as. Callicles' words in 491 e and elsewhere gave reason to expect that he would speak his sentiments roundly without any hesitation. Cf. 492 d.

i(kanw=s . . . e)ceta/zois: has reference to 487 e e)a/n ti su\ e)n toi=s lo/gois o(mologh/sh|s moi, bebasanisme/non tou=t) h)/dh e)/stai i(kanw=s.—

ei)/per... lang=greek>e)rei=s: “if you will persist in speaking,” with a decidedly unfavorable color.

sautw=|: rather stronger than soi/.

kai\ ga\r su/: complete the sen

tence from what precedes.

a)/qrei: like skopei=n and similar verbs has the construction of verbs of fear.

ai)nixqe/nta: denotes the consequences previously intimated, though not definitely stated, by Socrates.

w(s su/ ge oi)/ei: evasive, as 473 b. The following question inquires whether Callicles still holds to his previous statement, while accepting the consequences of it.

L.

e)pixeirw=men: see on 492 d e)pece/rxei. Notice the determination and assurance of the answers of Callicles.

dielou=: because it is a question of distinction between ideas.

nundh\ e)/leges: inasmuch as Callicles had in 491 a, b classed together a)ndrei=oi and fro/nimoi.

w(s e(/teron (sc. o)/n): the omission of the partic. in the acc. abs. with an adj. and w(s is very rare; i.e. 323 b w(s a)nagkai=on ou)de/na o(/ntin' ou)xi\ a(mwsge/pws mete/xein au)th=s. But Heindorf supplies o)/n.

w)= sofw/tate su/: a humorously ironical intimation that Socrates was asking something quite self-evident. But Callicles should not recognize an e)pisth/mh and an a)ndrei/a, in addition to “the good,” if this is to find its realization in h(donh/. The argument which begins 497 d is based upon this contradiction.

o(/pws memnhso/meqa: this use of o(/pws with the fut. is distinctively a colloquialism, the majority of exam ples being found in Aristophanes. For statistics, see GMT. 274.

17 f.

*kalliklh=s e)/fh *)axarneu/s: a humorous imitation of the custom which prevailed in the public assembly, according to which any one who introduced a motion or resolution had to add to his own name the name of the deme to which he belonged; cf. the famous line which used to afford Philip of Macedon so much amusement, *dhmosqe/nhs *dhmosqe/nous *paianieu\s ta/d' ei)=pen. Callicles falls in with the humor immediately. *)axarnai/ belonged to the fulh\ *oi)nhi/s, *)alwpekh/ to the fulh\ *)antioxi/s.

tou= a)gaqou=: does not properly belong in this summing up (o(/pws memnhso/meqa) of the foregoing steps, which define expressly the fact that e)pisth/mh and a)ndrei/a on the one hand are quite distinct from h(donh/ (to\ h(du/) on the other. Still, by reason of the identity of h(du/ and a)gaqo/n maintained by Callicles, the a)gaqo/n would be very easily substituted for the h(du/.

au)to\s au(to/n: “himself,” i.e. his own mind.

e)nanti/a: i.e. logically contrary and contradictory ideas, between which a mean is not to be thought of.

a)polabw/n: used absolutely equiv. to “separately.” iii. 392 e w(/sper ou)=n oi( a)du/natoi le/gein, ou) kata\ o(/lon, a)ll' a)polabw\n me/ros ti peira/somai/ soi e)n tou/tw| dhlw=sai. The gen. tou= sw/matos depends on peri\ o(/tou (me/rous) bou/lei.

a(/nqrwpos: the same as o( a)/nqrw- pos above.

ou)d' o(pwstiou=n: by the addition of ou)=n, the relative seems to acquire the force of an indefinite. See Kr. 51, 15, 3; H. 285, 1002 a.

qauma/sion . . . gi/gnetai: “the result (gi/gnetai) so stated is unreasonable.” Note that the Greek uses the ind. of the necessary conclusion, whereas Eng. would prefer the ideal ‘would be.’

58 f.

kai\ eu)= ma/la kte(.: with this formula Socrates warns Callicles of the importance of being careful in his response,—a warning which the latter ignores in the reckless assurance of his answer.

1 f.

to\ peinh=n e)/leges po/teron: the question, by coming late in the sentence, gains in animation. Cf. Rid. §§ 309, 310.

2 f.

au)to\ le/gw to\ peinh=n: added by Socrates that Callicles may not think at the same time of the satisfaction of the hunger. How close that idea lay is shown by Callicles' answer, in which he tries to guard himself by adding this idea.

kai\ e)gw/: manqa/nw: the asyndetic union of two such expressions, one expressing assent, the other comprehension, is quite isolated and contrary to usage. Cf. 474 c, 490 d.

a)ll)... lang=greek>ou)=n: but in any case, frequently associated with ge/. Cf. 506 b and 27 c a)ll' ou)=n daimo/nia/ ge nomi/zw kata\ to\n so\n lo/gon, 34 e, 327 c a)ll' ou)=n au)lhtai/ g) a)\n pa/ntes h)=san i(kanoi/.

sfo/dra ge: see on ma/lista in e below.

a)lla\ mh\ e)rw/ta: further questions are superfluous.

tou/tou ou(= le/geis kte(.: the concrete example diyw=nta pi/nein Socrates uses to distinguish and characterize the two ideas clearly. The generaliz ation that pain and pleasure can both be present in the same act follows later.

ma/lista: like sfo/dra ge in d above, gives emphatic assent. ma/lista has become the general word for “yes” in modern Greek, almost to the exclusion of nai/.

29 f.

ei)/te yuxh=s ei)/te sw/matos: for Socrates' argument it is immaterial whether pleasure and pain are looked upon as something bodily or something psychical; for psychology, not so. But here the question is only of the nature of the ideas them selves, the peculiarity of their association at the same place and time, which distinguishes them from that other class of mutually exclusive ideas.

fh/|s: with reference to 495 e. The answer of Callicles shows that he still maintains his statement.

ou)k oi)=d' a(/tta sofi/zei: Callicles avoids admitting his defeat by complaining of Socrates' methods. Cf. 511 a. sofi/zesqai is much the same as “subtilize,” “quibble.”

a)kki/zesqai: ‘this word and its derivative a)kkismo/s are used to denote any kind of mock modesty or prudery, especially, though not exclusively, on the part of women.’ Thompson. To Socrates' words of encouragement Callicles angrily replies, “What nonsense are you still talking?” whereby, however, Socrates is not deterred from continuing his talk in the courtly manner which is characteristic of him. On the phrase e)/xwn lhrei=s see on 490 e.

ou)k oi)=da o(/ti le/geis: Callicles sees that from this new turn Socrates will draw the same conclusion which he has drawn above (e(/teron gi/gnetai to\ h(du\ tou= a)gaqou=). Hence he repeatedly refuses to answer, and so shows plainly that he wishes to break off the conversation. This leads to the deprecatory remark of Gorgias.

mhdamw=s: don't! To be com pleted by some such general phrase as ou(/tw poih/sh|s. The omission of the verb is common. 175 b mhdamw=s, a)ll' e)a=te au)to/n.—That Gorgias here enters as mediator is quite in keeping with the role assigned him in this dialogue, in accordance with which he is distinguished from his companions by his personal dignity. See Introd. § 13.

timh/: in a judicial sense, “the penalty decreed by the court.” Hence the words ou) sh\ kte(. are equivalent to “this is no fault of yours,” “the blame cannot be laid upon you.”—

u(po/sxes: equiv. to u(p' seauto/n. See on parasxei=n 456 b and 475 d.

Callicles allows himself to be persuaded by Gorgias to continue the conversation, but not without repeated expression of his disinclina tion.

stena/: mean, paltry, is in keeping with the view expressed by Callicles in 485 d of the relative provinces of philosophy and politics.

1 f.

ta\ mega/la memu/hsai kte(.: two kinds of Eleusinian mysteries were distinguished, the greater and the lesser. In the great procession which on the 20th of Boedromion (September) conducted Iacchus to Eleusis, no one could take part who had not received previously at Athens the less and preparatory consecration (mu/hsis, ka/qarsis, prote/leia) in the month Anthesterion (February). By this he became eligible to initiation into the Greater Mysteries; and after initiation, as an initiated member (mu/sths), to the e)poptei/a or view of the mysterious sacred relics and participation in the holy rites which were connected with the arrival of the pro cession at Eleusis and took place in the so-called telesth/rion.—Socrates meets with most cutting irony the disdainful contempt with which Callicles regards dialectical methods. A different simile for the same matter is found in 514 e.

o(/qen a)pe/lipes: the interrupted argument is resumed again by Socrates at the point where it had been broken off by Callicles' refusal to answer.

h(donw=n: corresponding with what precedes we might expect h(do/menos. The noun is used owing to e)piqumiw=n, which stands on the same plane as peinw=n and as a kind of e)/ndeia (496 d) is an a)niaro/n. Hence the employment of lupw=n below.

ti/ ou)=n dh/: well! what then? See on 453 b and 515 e.

w(s e(te/rwn o)/ntwn: this seems otiose after the preceding sentence. If genuine, it must be considered as mere conversational fulness.

th=|de: refers naturally, according to the regular usage, to the argument begun in tou\s a)gaqou\s kte(. The introduction of this argument is, however, delayed by the parenthetical clause oi)=mai . . . a)/qrei de/. In this clause tau/th|, though in sense also applicable to the argument which follows, is in form to be connected with th=|de. The subject of o(mologei=sqai is general, and can be supplied from the clause pw=s ou)=n kte(.

20 f.

tou\s a)gaqou/s, tou\s kakou/s: the art. as in 490 e collects the individuals into a class or species. a)gaqw=n is used on account of its nearness to a)gaqou/s, otherwise we should expect a)retw=n as in 506 d. The way in which we arrive at these ideas of distinction between species is shown by the same expressions which are employed in other places to explain the relation of the ideas to the things themselves. So besides parousi/a (parei=nai) we find koinwni/a and of things also mete/xein employed.

23 f.

a)/fronas kai\ deilou/s: “unreasoning and cowardly creatures.” The absence of the art. does not cause obscurity, because the connexion shows a)gaqou/s to be the predicate. In the words a)ndrei/ous kte(. Socrates is referring to 489 e and 491 b.

ti/ tou=to: see on 448 b above.

ei)=don: the tense is due to the preceding question. English would require ‘I have seen.’ This would be permissible also in Greek. The aor. of verbs of perception states the fact; the pf. retains the image. The negation of the fact involves the negation of the image; hence the neg. is usually followed by the aorist. The pf. with the neg. is, however, also found; cf. 310 e. But the difference in the force is evident. In 38, below, the tense may be due to the desire for consistency, or to h)/dh.

a)rkei= kai\ tou=to: gives us to understand that Socrates was expecting a more definite answer.

a)mfo/teroi ma=llon: Callicles tries to return such answers as will not afford Socrates any chance for argument. Such action borders on rudeness, and is almost equivalent to a refusal to answer. The addition that he makes, however, gives Socrates a hold. The answers which follow show that Callicles is not stating his real sentiments. The artistic design of the author is therefore now to make his defeat seem all the more decisive.

a)=r' ou)=n kte(.: this conclusion comes from the fact that Socrates, on the basis of the view set forth by Callicles in 491 e ff., uses in the predicate a)gaqoi/ in place of xai/rousi, and kakoi/ in place of lupou=ntai, whereas these same words in the subject have an entirely different meaning, which is to be seen from the explanation of Callicles in 491

c d. The two predicates are to be conceived as belonging to two different sentences, thus: oi( a)gaqoi/ te kai\ oi( kakoi\ paraplhsi/ws ei)si\n a)gaqoi/ and oi( a)gaqoi/ te kai\ oi( kakoi\ paraplhsi/ws ei)si\ kakoi/.

LIII.

a)lla\ le/geis: this statement of Callicles may be meant in earnest, inasmuch as the previous words of Socrates are really somewhat confusing, although they are simply a paradoxical conclusion from Callicles' paradoxical propositions. But by confessing his inability to comprehend, Callicles gives Socrates the opportunity of supplying a proof of his previous exposition, and setting forth the principles upon which it rests. The distinction made in 497 e now becomes of value.

kakou\s de\ kakw=n: both the subj. as well as the subst. on which the gen. depends are to be supplied from the context. Note the chiasmus of the arrangement.

ta\ de\ a)gaqa\ kte(.: the preds. are ta\s h(dona/s, ta\s a)ni/as, the art. defining a class. The art. with a)gaqa/ refers back to a)gaqw=n. We should also expect one with kaka/.

oi(\ me/n ge ma=llon kte(.: is to be completed from the context thus: oi(\ me\n (a)\n) ma=llon (xai/rwsi) ma=llon (a)gaqoi\) kte(.

di\s ga\r kai\ tri/s: this proverb is ascribed to Empedocles. Plato employs it also in 59 e, where we read: to\ di\s kai\ tri\s to/ ge kalw=s e)/xon e)panapolei=n tw=| lo/gw|. Cf. Soph. 1238 di\s tau)ta\ bou/lei kai\ tri\s a)napolei=n m' e)/ph. The first kai/ means also, and its force extends over both members, as 63 e e)ni/ote a)nagka/zesqai kai\ di\s kai\ tri\s pi/nein tou/s ti toiou=ton poiou=ntas.

ta\ pro/tera e)kei=na: refer probably to the discussion of 494 a-495 a, where Socrates had urged Callicles to reflect whether he was determined to abide by his statement that h(du/ and a)gaqo/n are the same.

pa/lai toi kte(.: like all who try only to gain their point, not to arrive at the truth, Callicles seeks to evade the now inevitable confession of his error by representing his previous statement as a mere joke. But cf. 495 a-c.

tou/tou: e)/xesqai, to hold fast, takes the gen. See G. 171, 1; H. 738.—

w(/sper ta\ meira/kia: boys easily receive as genuine what one tries to impose upon them. Farther than this, the comparison is not to be pressed.

w(s dh\ su\ oi)/ei: see on 468 e. Callicles tries to heighten the probability that he was only joking, by himself characterizing his first statement as nonsensical.

h(dona/s: the natural position would be ta\s me\n h(dona\s belti/ous kte(. The reason for the post-position is that the word is an afterthought of Callicles, added from the sudden consciousness that ta\s me/n was not sufficiently definite. , etc., do not believe that some are better,—pleasures, I mean,—others worse.

i)ou\ i)ou/: exclamation of surprise and wonder, usually with a sideidea of ill-treatment (sxetliastiko\n e)pi/rrhma), as Ar. 1 i)ou\ i)ou\, w)= *zeu= basileu/, to\ xrh=ma tw=n nuktw=n o(/son a)pe/ranton, but it also expresses pleasure, as e.g. Rep. iv. 432 d kai\ e)gw\ katidw/n, *)iou\ i)ou/, ei)=pon, w)= *glau/kwn: kinduneu/ome/n ti e)/xein i)/xnos (trace) kai/ moi dokei= ou) pa/nu ti e)kfeucei=sqai h(ma=s. *eu)= a)gge/lleis, h)= d) o(/s.—

panou=rgos: sometimes associated with deino/s, denotes a rather excessive adroitness, bordering on rascality, as “artful,” “sly”; also “knavish.”

w(/sper paidi/: by a delicate use of his own comparison, Socrates characterizes Callicles' conduct in acting as if he were dealing with boys, not men, as improper and unworthy.—

to/te me\n au)=: it must be confessed that au)= in this position gives trouble. Cron thinks that it recalls a similar allegation in 491 b; but that is rather far-fetched.

kai/toi kte(.: in 495 a Socrates' faith in Callicles' parrhsi/a is shaken; in 497 a, that in his sofi/a, and now, that in his eu)/noia.

e(ko/ntos ei)=nai: on the use of ei)=nai in phrases, see GMT. 780 and H. 956 a.

10 f.

kata\ to\n pa/laion lo/gon: a common way of introducing a proverb; cf. 195 b.

to\ paro\n eu)= poiei=n kte(.: a mixture of two proverbs. The first one means literally, to “treat well what is at hand,” i.e. ‘to make the best of what one has,’ according to the English saying. In almost the same sense we use the more colloquial ‘grin and bear it.’ The second proverb, de/xesqai to\ dido/menon, applies more exactly to the case in point, the dido/menon being naturally to\ lego/menon. An English proverb which has much the same force is, ‘do not look a gifthorse in the mouth.’ After tou=to, to\ dido/menon serves for a relative clause.

kakai/: we should naturally ex

pect blaberai/, but kako/s is elsewhere also used in this sense.

au(=tai me/n: resumes ai( me\n . . . tou= sw/matos.

37 f.

te/los . . . to\ a)gaqo/n: cf. 468 a ff. The subst. embraces in one idea what has been said, and thus gives it a form of general application.

su/myhfos: reminds again of the formal vote, and hence sounds somewhat solemn. Cf. 501 c and 473 e f.

e)k tri/twn: “of the third part.” Thompson. 213 b u(polu/ete, pai=des, *)alkibia/dhn, i(/na e)k tri/twn (i.e. with Agathon and Socrates) katake/htai. In 54 a e)k tri/tou is used in much the same sense.

panto\s a)ndro/s: possessive gen. in pred. See H. 732 a, c.

45 f.

poi=a . . . tw=n h(de/wn: the position of the gen. shows that it is an example of e)pifora/, based on the conclusion drawn in 499 b. The use of o(poi=a after poi=a may be due to euphonic reasons, or to its distance from the beginning of the question.

texnikou=: i.e. of a man who understands the matter thoroughly, who is a master of his profession (whether art or science). Only this man can decide what is to be done and what not. The same point is made in 47 a.

w(=n au)=: the au)= belongs to the dem. included in the relative. The arguments which Socrates again calls to mind were set forth in 464 b ff.

paraskeuai/: contrivances. This word, which is not found in the passage referred to, is used generally instead of e)pithdeu/seis, qerapei=ai, as drawing more attention to the end in view (mexri\ h(donh=s). The prep. shows that the contrivances are not claimed to reach h(donh/, but must be varied and directed until the object is compassed; hence paraskeua/zousai is conative.

au)to\ tou=to: i.e. the general idea, h(donh/.

6 f.

tw=n me/n, tw=n de/: take up ai( me/n, ai( de/. On the part. gen. with tiqe/nai, see G. 169, 2; H. 732 a.

pro\s fili/ou: so 519 e. 234 e ei)pe\ pro\s *dio\s fili/ou. This adjuration is designed to remind Callicles of his ostentatious profession of eu)/noia, which he had so quickly forgotten.

mh/te au)to/s: finds its correlative in mh/t' au)= ta\ par) e)mou=, while mhde/ serves only to connect the two sections of the first member.

o(/ti a)\n tu/xh|s kte(.: implies perverseness in addition to chance. Cf. 495 a, b, and 499 c.

ou(=: depends upon ma=llon and is explained in h)\ tou=to. 44 c ti/s a)\n ai)sxi/wn ei)/h tau/ths do/ca h)\ dokei=n xrh/mata peri\ plei/onos poiei=sqai h)\ fi/lous. See Kr. 47, 27, 8.

spouda/seie: in reference to an investigation which one should seriously prosecute.

12 f.

smikro\n nou=n e)/xwn: indicates that the question is important for every one, not merely for statesmen and philosophers.

tou= a)ndro\s dh/: ironically added as a matter already decided, because Callicles had so defined the sphere of the “real man.”

e)pi\ to/nde: anacoluthic, as if e)pi\ po/teron xrh\ bi/on parakalei=n had preceded, whereas with po/teron we must supply tou=ton, i.e. to\n tro/pon zh=n xrh/.

diafe/rwn: on the pred. use of the partic., see GMT. 830.

w(s a)/rti e)pexei/rhsa: we think at first of the question raised in 491 d ff. as to the nature of self-control, which leads naturally to a distinction between what is good and what is pleasant, but we are also reminded of the earlier conversation with Polus and Gorgias (464 b) in which a distinction was drawn between true arts and various tricks of dexterity, which are designed only to cajole.

ei) e)/stin kte(.: to be conceived, not as an interr. clause depending upon o(mologh/santas, but as the protasis of a logical conditional sentence, the apodosis of which is formed by be/ltisto/n e)stin . . . ske/yasqai. The further investigation as to ti/ diafe/reton can only take place in case the existence of these two views of life is definitely settled.

o(mologh/santas: as well as dielome/nous and diairei=sqai, whose meaning is defined by its reference to 495 c, are used absolutely.

o(po/teron biwte/on: sc. bi/on. Cf. 485 d and 38 a o( a)nece/tastos bi/os ou) biwto\s a)nqrw/tw|.

th\n me\n kte(.: explains e(kate/ron kte(. by substituting for the somewhat philosophical phrase (mele/thn . . . kth/sews) one less technical (qh/ran). But before Socrates proceeds further he deems it necessary to have these assumptions definitely agreed to, since, although they are indeed the result of the preceding investigations, Callicles has not expressly acceded to them.

LVI.

pro\s tou/sde: the distinctions between various ideas which have been drawn in ch. XVIII.-XX. serve for Polus as well as Gorgias, inasmuch as the latter entered the discussion again in 463 e of his own accord.

diomolo/ghsai: the dia/ implies ‘finally,’ ‘definitely.’ We should be more apt to use the kai/ in the demonstrative instead of the relative clause.

e)/doca: Cron thinks the use of the aor. instead of the pres. implies that Callicles must have already at the time come to a decision, though he had not expressed one. But while such was doubtless the case, it is not easy to draw such a conclusion from the tense, for the Greeks in such an expression looked rather to the idea of the whole complex.

h( d' i)atrikh/: the clause is to be completed from the first member. The following h( me\n . . . h( de\ kte(. are arranged chiastically.

ai)ti/an: cf. 465 a, where the reference was especially to the means employed (w(=n prosfe/rei); here it is more general (w(=n pra/ttei).

h( d' i)atrikh/: the addition of the substantive at the end of the first member was not necessary for clearness, but very conducive to it. Similarly 351 a.

h( d' e(te/ra th=s h(donh=s kte(.: another case of anacoluthon. If the speaker had followed the line of construction begun in the previous clause, we should have had some such phrase as ou)/te th\n fu/sin kte(., on which th=s h(donh=s would depend, as in the case of tou/tou above. In true conversational style, however, he is diverted from his line of thought by the relative clause, and proceeds to a detailed account of the method of the e)mpeiri/a which komidh=| a)te/xnws e)p' au)th\n e)/rxetai. The result is that th=s h(donh=s is left without government, and that too without the speaker or hearers noticing it.

a)lo/gws: as 465 a o)\ a)\n h)=| a)/logon pra=gma, because the distinctive feature of a te/xnh consists in its ability dou=nai lo/gon. This must not be conceived as closely modifying diariqmhsame/nh, but as being a general criticism on ou)de\n diariqmhsame/nh (“quite foolishly”).

w(s e)/pos ei)pei=n: probably belongs to the following negation. 17 a a)lhqe/s ge w(s e)/pos ei)pei=n ou)de\n ei)rh/kasin. See on 450 b.

w(=| dh/: refers to the whole pre

ceding clause, i.e. equiv. to tw=| sw/|zesqai mnh/mhn kte(.

toiau=tai a)/llai: “according to their nature similar, but different in their application.” Supply dokou=sin out of the preceding dokei=.

promhqi/an tou= belti/stou: designed to be in sharp contrast with the mnh/mhn tou= ei)wqo/tos gi/gnesqai above.

16 f.

w(/sper e)kei=: i.e. in the case of the body.

h(/tis de\ h)\ belti/wn kte(.: is a circumlocutory reference to fu/sis, as ou)/te me/lon in the following member is to ai)ti/a. The abs. partic. me/lon is likewise combined with an appos. partic. in 235 a w(s ou) pa/nu eu)porw=n tou= polla\ le/gein peri\ tou= au)tou= h)\ i)/sws ou)de\n au)tw=| me/lon tou= toiou/tou.

kai\ peri\ a)/llo: indefinite and merely preparatory.

a)ske/ptws e)/xwn: like a)melw=n or o)ligwrw=n. Cf. above, b.

sugkatati/qesai: reminds again of voting (as above, 500 a su/myhfos). It is regularly used without an obj. Here we must consider do/can as taking the place of the word yh=fon, to be construed with this verb after the analogy of the regular phrase qe/sqai yh=fon. See Thompson. sugkatati/qesqai has also the meaning “lay aside for future use.”

ou)k e)/gwge kte(.: an emphatic assent (see on 453 d). But Callicles weakens it by the addition of i(/na . . . xari/swmai, referring to 497 b, c.

28 f.

peri\ de\ du/o kte(.: this extension to several souls was necessary in order that the investigation might be directed to political activity.

mhde/: “without.” th\n au)lhtikh/n: Socrates so chooses his examples that he passes from species to species in an ascend ing scale, and at the same time gradually approaches nearer to rhetoric. Playing the flute passed for the lowest species of music. Cf. the boyish words of Alcibiades in Plut. 2 au)lei/twsan *qhbai/wn pai=des: ou) ga\r i)/sasi diale/gesqai. In Athens it was left mostly to such as made a business of it. Female flute-players were accustomed to appear at banquets. The instrument was probably more like a clarionet than a flute.

diw/kein, fronti/zein: these infinitives, while in sense epexegetic to toiau/th ei)=nai, are syntactically dependent on dokei=. See on 487 c.

h( e)n toi=s a)gw=sin: Plato considers as a species of flattery only that kind of cithara-playing which was practised in the musical contests at the public festivals. On the other hand, he recognizes a variety of this music which may be helpful to the proper cultivation of the soul of the individual who practises it, and indeed may elevate his moral feeling. This he himself recommends in iii. 399 d f. Cithara-playing was a part of the education of all young Athenians.

h( tw=n xorw=n didaskali/a: didaskali/a denotes the drill of the chorus for orchestral exhibition as well as for singing. It was the business of the poet. Hdt. i. 23 says of Arion e)o/nta kiqarw|do\n tw=n to/te e)o/ntwn ou)deno\s deu/teron kai\ diqu/rambon prw=ton a)nqrw/pwn tw=n h(mei=s i)/dmen poih/santa/ te kai\ o)noma/santa kai\ dida/canta e)n *kori/nqw|. What is to be understood here by choruses is explained by the addition h( diqura/mbwn poi/hsis. It is not all choric lyric which is condemned, but only that part of it which from its connexion with the Dionysus cult had found entrance into Athens and had there been much fostered by the state, which entrusted both native and foreign musicians with the arrangement and production of the dithyramb at the Dionysiac festivals, where contests （a)gw=nes) took place in it. The founder of dithyrambic melic was the just-named Arion of Methymne (B.C. 600), who resided at the court of Periander of Corinth. He was said to have introduced the strophic arrangement, and the so-called cyclic chorus (consisting of fifty members), which was thus named because the chorus was arranged in a circle around the altar. The second period of the dithyramb begins with the settling in Athens of Lasus of Hermione, a contemporary of the Pisistratidae and a teacher of Pindar. But it soon degenerated in Athens by excessive over-refinement and fantastic cultivation, until it received a new impulse towards the end of the Peloponnesian war by the more artistic cultivation of the dramatic and musical elements by Philoxenus of Cythera.

*kinhsi/as: a very popular dithyrambic poet about the middle of the Peloponnesian war, who deserves a great deal of censure for having helped to debase dithyrambic poetry. He tried to produce a striking effect by fantastic, misty, and often immoral subjects, combined with a pompous diction, excess of imagery, and shallow figures of speech. And he succeeded in a way, for he was ridiculed by the comic poets Strattis (who composed a comedy upon him), Plato Comicus, and also Aristophanes in the and the , as a sinner against art and taste,—one of those who are called in 333 kukli/wn xorw=n a)|smatoka/mptai. Of his father Meles we know less; he was certainly less important than Cinesias, though he also is ridiculed by the comic poets.

tw=n qeatw=n: just as in English the general designation for the people who fill the theatre is ‘audience,’ whether the performance be an opera or a drama, so the Greeks used qeatai/, “the spectators,” as a general designation for the crowds who thronged the Dionysiac theatre, no matter what sort of a performance was given. So, just below (20), we find h)ni/a ga\r a)/|dwn tou\s qeata/s.

ou)xi\ h(/ te kiqarw|dikh/: this conclusion we must suppose to be permitted because at the moment Callicles can cite no example to the contrary. kiqaristikh/ (above, 501 e) and kiqarw|dikh/, which are properly distinct (cf. kiqa/risis and kiqarw|di/a 533 b), are here interchanged in ac cordance with colloquial usage. To fix the meaning of kiqa/risis, the adj. yilh/ was added. 669 e.

h( semnh/: viewed in the light of the result which Socrates deduces, this word as well as qaumasth/ may be considered ironic. But tragedy was regularly designated semnh/, “venerated,” as being the most noble presentation of poetry before the public mind, both from its sage maxims and from the moral effect which was ascribed to it. Socrates' actual view of poetry is well stated in 22 b, c e)/gnwn ou)=n kai\ peri\ tw=n poihtw=n tou=to, o(/ti ou) sofi/a| poioi=en a(\ poioi=en, a)lla\ fu/sei tini\ kai\ e)nqousia/zontes w(/sper oi( qeoma/nteis kai\ oi( xrhsmw|doi/.

e)f' w(=| e)spou/dake: the order of the whole sentence is involved; ti/ de\ dh/ (e)stin e)kei=no) e)f' w(=| e)spou/daken. After giving the general question, Socrates follows it by a disjunctive special one. The repetition of the art. h( is illustrated by Stallbaum from 213 e th\n tou/tou tauthni\ th\n qaumasth\n kefalh/n. It is not common. For the construction e)pi/ tini, cf. 183 a e)kei=noi ma/lista tw=n *(ellh/nwn spouda/zousin e)pi\ toi=s toiou/tois, Xen. i. 3. 11 spouda/zein . . . e)f' oi(=s ou)d) a)\n maino/menos spouda/seien. We find peri/ ti in 64 d fai/netai/ soi filoso/fou a)ndro\s ei)=nai e)spoudake/nai peri\ ta\s h(dona/s. For the pf. equiv. to a pres., cf. the passage from just quoted.

25 f.

po/tero/n e)stin . . . w(/s soi dokei=: the more usual idiom would require po/teron dokei= soi ei)=nai.

27 ff.

e)a\n me/n, ei) de/: this variation in the employment of the cond. particles has come to be a rule; i.e. the negative of an e)a\n me/n clause is introduced by ei) de/. If the condition is particular, we find ei) with the fut. indic.; if generic, ei) with the pres. indic., which latter is frequently omitted. In the earlier usage the custom was to give the favorable condition first; hence ei) de\ mh/ comes to have an unpleasant or unfavorable connotation, as here. Cf. also 481 b. The omission of me/n after e)a/n is probably due to its employment with h(du/. On the repetition of me/n and de/ with both clauses, see on 512 a.

a)hde\s kai\ w)fe/limon: the connexion of these two words with kai/ seems somewhat strange, when one considers both the relation of the ideas themselves and the fact that they are preceded by h(du\ me\n . . . ponhro\n de/. The design is probably to emphasize the co-existence of the two ideas, and not their distinctness. There is no contradiction to a)hde/s in the following e)a/n te xai/rwsin kte(.; it refers to the manner in which the spectators will receive his words, concerning which the poet has no reason to trouble himself, provided what he says is correct.—On the omission of o)/n, see GMT. 902; H. 984 a.

le/cei kai\ a)/|setai: viz. in the dialogue and choruses.

perie/loito: Socrates conceives the difference between prose and poetry to lie simply in the dress, which in the case of poetry surrounds the thought as the shell does the kernel, and is only so far of value.

me/los: i.e. the musical element, the melody, which is especially prominent in lyric productions.

r(uqmo/n: i.e. the regular movement, at the basis of which lies the me/tron, syllable and verse measure.

gi/gnontai: prove to be.

dhmhgori/a: here employed without any unpleasant connotation. It might seem somewhat strange that Callicles so readily admits that dhmhgori/a is r(htorikh/,—an admission on which the whole deduction rests. The reason may be that these wordartists were very prone to extol the universality of their art, without regard to consequences. See Socrates' conversation with Gorgias (especially ch. XI.).

oi(=on . . . gunaikw=n: one is certainly justified in assuming according to this passage that women were admitted to the tragedies; whether they also had the right to attend the comedies remains doubtful. The admission of slaves to the theatre was always restricted.

ei)=en: marks the conclusion of one part of the argument, viz. the premises from which the conclusion is to be drawn. Its employment here, however, also draws especial emphasis to the fact that these premises are definitely settled.

e)n tai=s po/lesin: in the political sense of the word. Cf. Soph. 737 po/lis ga\r ou)k e)/sq' h(/tis a)ndro/s e)sq) e(no/s.

tou\s tw=n e)leuqe/rwn: is ironic. They consider themselves to be free men, although they are really, even according to the true opinion of Callicles (cf. 489 c above), slaves. Cf. Dem. iii. 30 to\ me\n pro/teron strateu/esqai tolmw=n au)to\s o( dh=mos despo/ths tw=n politeuome/nwn h)=n kai\ ku/rios au)to\s a(pa/ntwn tw=n a)gaqw=n,—nu=n de\ tou)nanti/on ku/rioi me\n oi( politeuo/menoi tw=n a)gaqw=n kai\ dia\ tou/twn a(/panta pra/ttetai, u(mei=s d' o( dh=mos e)n u(phre/tou kai\ prosqh/khs me/rei gege/nhsqe.

h)\ kai\ ou(=toi kte(.: testimony to the correctness, of this statement is found in the very numerous references and complaints found in the orators, notably Demosthenes. Of course, Plato meant by to\ be/ltiston something a little different from the orators. Cf. Isoc. de Pace § 5 kai\ ga/r toi pepoih/kate tou\s r(h/toras mele- ta=n kai\ filosofei=n ou) ta\ me/llonta th=| po/lei sunoi/sein, a)ll' o(/pws a)re/skontas u(mi=n lo/gous e)rou=sin. The apparent pleonasm arising from the recurrence of the same idea in but slightly varied form is artistic in showing that this thought lay uppermost in the speaker's mind.

w(/sper paisi/: reminds of 464 d.

ou)k a(plou=n: the word has its fundamental meaning. The question requires a double answer. 188 c a(plou=n to/ g' e)mo\n peri\ lo/gwn e)sti/n, ei) de\ bou/lei, ou)x a(plou=n, a)lla\ diplou=n. kai\ ga\r a)\n do/caimi/ tw| filo/logos ei)=nai kai\ au)= miso/logos. Cf. also 468 c a(plw=s ou(/tws.

ei) ga\r kai/: kai/ does not belong to tou=to, but to ei). Socrates expresses himself as satisfied with the division made by Callicles, but recognizes even under this condition at least the possibility of a good, commendable rhetoric.

ei)/te h(di/w ei)/te a)hde/stera: Demosthenes, who in many speeches combats the pro\s h(donh/n and pro\s xa/rin dhmhgorei=n, says in iii. 18, in harmony with Plato's teaching, a)lla\ dei= ta\ be/ltista a)nti\ tw=n h(de/wn, a)\n mh\ sunamfo/tera e)ch=|, lamba/nein.

toiou=ton ei)pei=n: speak of as such.

21 f.

ti/ ou)xi\ . . . e)/frasas: in passionate questions ti/ ou) is usually construed with the aorist. The question marks impatience that a thing which is future is not past. The idea is usually modal, “why will you not?” 86 d ei)/ tis u(mw=n eu)porw/teros e)mou= ti/ ou)k a)pekri/nato. Different in 468 c.

ai)ti/an e)/xousin: a r(h=ma me/son (vox media). Originally “to bear the blame,” it was gradually worn down until it became merely a circumlocution for le/gesqai, as 169 a w(=n dh\ su\ pe/ri ai)ti/an e)/xeis diafe/rein, or iv. 435 e oi( de\ kai\ e)/xousi tau/thn th\n ai)ti/an (sc. qumoeidei=s ei)=nai). Usually, however, it retains its bad sense, e.g. Apol. 38 c o)/noma e(/cete kai\ ai)ti/an—w(s *swkra/th a)pekto/nate.

ou)k oi)=da ti/s e)stin: when ti/s instead of the more regular o(/stis is used after a neg., it should be conceived rather as a direct question. See on 447 d.

*qemistokle/a kte(.: it is noteworthy that Callicles passes over Aristides, whom Socrates mentions later with respect, and whom also Demosthenes in iii. 21 speaks of among the statesmen who were still honored down to his time. But Callicles was probably hardly able to appreciate the uprightness and unselfishness of Aristides, which was displayed so prominently in the formation of the Delian League.

a)kou/eis: Greek, like the Eng., often uses the pres. of the verbs of perception where the pf. would be more exact. See GMT. 28; H. 827.

30 f.

*perikle/a toutoni\ to\n newsti\ teteleuthko/ta: we must guard against drawing the conclusion from this passage that this dialogue was intended to be understood as held soon after Pericles' death. See Introd. § 18. For newsti/ simply means “lately” as compared with the other statesmen mentioned, and the interval between that and the date of the dialogue may still have been a great one. Cf. Hdt. vi. 40. See also on 523 b. The same is true of the Lat. nuper, as we see from Cic. de Nat. Deor. ii. 50. 126 Quid ea, quae nuper, id est paucis ante seculis, medicorum ingeniis reperta sunt.

ou(= a)kh/koas: sc. le/gontos. A possible reference to 455 e.

ei) e)/stin ge kte(.: “yes, if, etc.” The answer is so closely connected with the preceding question that there is no need of supplying an apod. In the second member, ei) de\ mh\ kte(., for which we must supply a pred. from the first, instead of the expected criticism of the men mentioned we have a question based on the principle just proved.

tou=to: viz. to\ . . . a)popimpla/nai. As a pred. supply a)reth\ a)lhqh/s e)stin. We should expect after a)ll' o(/per . . . o(mologei=n some expression corresponding to to\ . . . a)popimpla/nai, instead of which we find o(/ti kte(., due to o(mologei=n, with which we must again supply a)reth\ a)lhqh/s e)stin to govern a)potelei=n.

34 f.

e)n tw=| u(ste/rw| lo/gw|: refers to 499 e. tou=to de/ continues the recapitulation, and refers to 500 a. Instead of te/xnhn tina/, which we should expect, we find by an anacoluthon the nom. as if w(mologh/qh preceded. On the neglect of the assimilation in tou=to, see Kr. 61, 7, 4.

ou)k e)/xw: Callicles does not understand the standard of judgment, to the exposition of which Socrates now turns.

ou(twsi\ a)tre/ma: quietly, just as we are. ou(/tws is frequently used by itself to denote “under the conditions or circumstances in which we are at present,” and often with an adverb when it is to be translated separately. Sometimes it follows the adverb, and sometimes it has itself an explanatory addition, as 351 c a(plw=s ou(/tw, w(s su\ e)rwta=|s. Cf. 460 e, 464 b, 468 c, 478 a, 494 d.

4 f.

a)poblfpwn pro/s ti: with a view to something, which must, in contrast with ei)kh=|, be a definite object, as is afterwards more clearly shown. See on 474 d.

5 ff.

oi( a)/lloi . . . prosfe/rei: a case of part. apposition. See G. 137, N. 2; H. 624 d. Cf. 450 d. The thought with prosfe/rei is of the single articles out of which the object is to be made.

dhmiourgoi/: see on 452 a.

o(/pws a)\n . . . sxh=|: a general rel. sentence, giving the opposite to ei)kh=|, “that it may acquire for itself some form.” The second aor. of e)/xein is the only second aor. which seems to have an ingressive force. See Gildersleeve's note to Morris' Thuc. i. 12. 3.

ei)=dos: i.e. the outward appearance which an object displays, its figure and form, an image of which the artist of course carries in his mind and gazes upon with the eye of fancy.

8 f.

ei) bou/lei i)dei=n: with such conversational expressions we should refrain from supplying any definite apod., as doubtless none was felt. The force of this phrase approaches that of a mild imv., sko/pei, after which the objective clause follows naturally with w(s. The subject e(/kastos distributes the tou\s zwgra/fous which has been appropriated as the obj. of i)dei=n.

susth/shtai: is applicable to the form as a whole, because it is only by the harmony of its several parts (to\ e(/teron tw=| e(te/rw| a(rmo/tsein) that it exists. 269 c to\ d' e(/kasta . . . le/gein te kai\ to\ o(/lon suni/stasqai.

kekosmhme/non: this word, as well as ko/smos below (19), has, of course, no reference to any external adornment, but only to an endowment with such qualities as are requisite for the a)reth/ of the whole. See on e below.

14 f.

oi(/ te dh\ a)/lloi dhmiourgoi/: would require properly some such pred. as kosmou=sin e(/kastos to\ e(autou= e)/rgon. But the general thought is here, as often, to be completed by a kind of zeugma from the special one to which the discussion hurries.

ou(\s nundh\ e)le/gomen: sc. in 500 e, which in turn refers to 464 b ff.—The body serves in general as an analogy for the soul.

e)/stw: the imv. indicates only a tentative concession, which Callicles reserves the privilege of recalling if he chooses. The same feeling is felt in a)na/gkh sunomologei=n below.

kai\ mh\n kte(.: is to be completed with necessary changes from the preceding question of Socrates (ta/cews a)/ra kte(.). By kai\ mh/n (and indeed) we pass to the more important part of the argument. Here also the general ideas ta/cis and ko/smos receive special limitations.

29 f.

tw=| gignome/nw|: belongs to u)/noma/ e)stin, while e)n tw=| sw/mati, in looser relation to the whole, denotes the range to which the question extends.

i)/sws le/geis: in the answer of Callicles shows that, while indeed according to his feelings he would regard such a relation as false and impossible, his reason compels him to admit its truth.

e)ggignome/nw|: the use of the compound verb here, in place of the simple one in the other member of the comparison, is probably due to its close connexion with e)n th=| yuxh=|.

ti/ de\ ou)k au)to\s le/geis: on the meaning of the interr. form, see on 503 b. The question is of the nature of an evasion of the answer, which Callicles pushes upon Socrates to escape responsibility. Cf. 470 b.

fa/qi: see on 475 e.

ei) de\ mh/: see on 502 b.

e)/legxe: with this and e)pi/trepe (yield) the neuter object (“what I say”) is understood. In a similar way e)pitre/pein is used absolutely, 35 b and elsewhere.

a)reth/: used at first in the general sense of “proper function or condition,” so that it can afterwards appear in its moral force without thereby the standard of judgment being changed.

42 f.

no/mimo/n te kai\ no/mos: sc. o)/noma ei)=nai. Both expressions are found elsewhere associated in order to express the idea as fully and completely as possible, e.g. Crito 53 c. Here there is the more reason to add no/mos because Callicles had previously used this word in the passage where he first gave expression to his scorn of right and law (ch. XXXVIII. ff.). The corresponding disposition is also elsewhere called ko/smios. Cf. the passage in ta/s te eu)nomoume/nas po/leis kai\ tw=n a)ndrw=n tou\s kosmiwta/tous. Apropos is 114 e kosmh/sas th\n yuxh\n ou)k a)llotri/w| a)lla\ tw=| e(auth=s ko/smw| swfrosu/nh| te kai\ dikaiosu/nh| kai\ a)ndrei/a| kai\ e)leuqeri/a| kai\ a)lhqei/a|.

tau=ta: with free reference to what precedes and without assimilation to the predicate, denotes the qualities expressed by no/mimoi and ko/smioi.

e)/stw: see on a above.

pro\s tau=ta ble/pwn: in the choice of words Socrates goes back to what was said in 503 e.

prosoi/sei kte(.: cf. above, 503 e. Although it is by the lo/goi especially that the soul will be shaped, yet other influences may be brought to bear, just as the orator or statesman (a good specimen of such an orator was Demosthenes) has power to cause gifts to be made to the people—as, for example, the qewriko/n, the dikastiko/n, the stratiwtiko/n, and the bouleutiko/n, and the division of booty, public spectacles, etc.—and also to be taken away from them, for example, by taxes (ei)sforai/) or the abolition of the gifts mentioned.—The connexion forbids us to think of any rougher kind of deprivation, which seemed to Polus (466 c) so enviable a privilege of power.

au)tou=: poss. gen., to be closely connected with toi=s poli/tais (“his fellow-citizens”).

o(\ mh\ o)nh/sei: the generic idea causes the negative mh/.

tou)nanti/on: is certainly adverbial, and to be attached to e)/latton (o)nh/sei). The sense of this difficult passage seems to be something like this: “What advantage is there in giving to a sick man anything which cannot profit him, more or less”; literally, “sometimes more, or on the contrary, at least rightly considered, less.”

22 f.

u(giai/nonta . . . polla/: is added to make the contrast stronger.

23 f.

w(s e)/pos ei)pei=n: see on 450 b.

a)no/htos kte(.: see in the discussion with Polus the remark at 477 b, where the ponhri/a of the soul is described in the same way.

a)no/sios: Plato prefers to use only two endings with this adj., which usually, especially in later Greek, has three. The common collocation, as in the present passage, with several other adjs. of only two endings, may perhaps explain his usage.

ou(/tw . . . a)/meinon: sc. than if it were differently dealt with. Cf. 468 b.

w(/sper su\ nundh\ w)/|ou: refers naturally to the second member, for which a predicate is to be supplied from the first. Socrates has in mind 491 e ff. The contradiction between this admission and the statement made at the first (nundh/), Callicles seeks, in his accustomed manner, to evade.

41 f.

au)to\s tou=to pa/sxwn: Calli

cles has given in the investigation also a practical example of that a)kolasi/a which he had defended in theory. For him the investigation is only a trial of wits. In ou(=tos a)nh\r kte(. we may have a reminiscence of the expression used by Callicles of Socrates in 489 b.

katalu/omen: this idiomatic use of the pres. instead of the fut. of a course of action to be immediately taken is also idiomatic in Latin and English. See Kr. 53, 1, 9. In a somewhat similar manner the pres. is used of the immediate consequence by Dem. de Falsa Leg. 32 ei) de/ fhsin ou(=tos, deica/tw kai\ parasxe/sqw, ka)gw\ katabai/nw. Cf. 513 c.

au)to\s gnw/sei: refuses to answer. “You will have to decide that.”

ou)de\ tou\s mu/qous: to say nothing of a lo/gos which is directed to a definite object. The proverb, which Socrates quotes, seems to rest upon a religious feeling, in accordance with which myths had to be completely narrated in order not to draw upon the narrator the anger of the deity. 66 d to\ meta\ tau=q' h(mi=n ou)de\n loipo\n plh\n w(/sper kefalh\n a)podou=nai toi=s ei)rhme/nois, 301 e to\n kolofw=na e)pitiqe/nai.—

qe/mis: “right acc. to sacred law.”

perii/h|: the change from the pl. (tou\s mu/qous) to the sing. is explained by the freedom of conversation. 319 d tou/tois ou)dei\s tou=to e)piplh/ttei w(/sper toi=s pro/teron, o(/ti ou)damo/qen maqw\n . . . sumbouleu/ein e)pixeirei=.

w(s bi/aios ei)=: cf. 491 e w(s h(du\s ei)=.—

bi/aios: usually in contrast with pei/qein, e.g. Polit. 304 d ei)/te dia\ peiqou=s ei)/te dia/ tinos bi/as is applied here by Callicles to Socrates' persistent argument; cf. 35 d ei) pei/qoimi u(ma=s kai\ tw=| dei=sqai biazoi/mhn.

ti/s ou)=n kte(.: since the question assumes the necessity that some one take the role of respondent, a causal clause follows.

4 f.

mh\ . . . katalei/pwpen: for let us no longer leave, etc.

au)to\s de\ kte(.: the question has a tone of reproof. au)to/s is opposed to a)/llw| dialego/menos. The requirements of the question can be fulfilled in two ways,—either in continuous discourse, as 464 b-466 a, or in the form of a dialogue, which Socrates employs later (ch. LXII.).

to\ tou= *)epixa/rmou: Epicharmus was a native of Cos, but early went to Sicily (Megara) and devoted himself there to the study of medicine and philosophy, especially the Pythagorean and Empedoclean. But his claim to fame rests on his comedies. He stands at the head of the Sicilian comic poets, being noted for the ethical nature of his poetry. It was full of sententious sayings, and thereby aroused Plato's interest to the highest degree. He flourished during the Persian war, under the government of Gelo. The verse here cited reads, according to Athenaeus: ta\ pro\ tou= du/) a)/ndres e)/legon ei(=s e)gw\n a)poxre/w (i.e. a)poxra/w, Socrates means that he is himself assuming a burden which according to the nature of the matter requires two. The answer is in construction connected with the question of Callicles in order to disclose for the others' consideration the doubtful side, as it were, of such a demand. With this the following a)ta/r (however) agrees.

filoni/kws e)/xein: see on 457 d. Socrates wishes to direct ambition only to proper objects.

ti/ yeu=dos: yeu=dos is frequently found opposed to a)lhqe/s. 34 e ei)/te ou)=n a)lhqe\s, ei)/te ou)=n yeu=dos, 272 a e)a/n te yeu=dos e)a/n te a)lhqe\s h)=|. The article with a)lhqe/s is due to its position. We should also have in like manner to\ yeu=dos, did it precede ti/ e)stin. Cron thinks it denotes that truth is single, while error has many forms.

14 f.

e)a\n... lang=greek>dokw=, xrh\ kte(.: is an anticipatory cond. sentence, xrh/ with the inf. having the force of an imv. Cf. e)pilamba/nou in b below.

o(mologei=n e)mautw=|: Socrates is about to combine the two roles of questioner and respondent, and hence will have to assent to his own statements.

15 f.

a)ntilamba/nesqai: with the gen., means to “break in upon a discourse for the purpose of contesting a point,” as in i. 336 b kai\ o( *qrasu/maxos polla/kis kai\ dialegome/nwn h(mw=n metacu\ w(/rma a)ntilamba/nesqai tou= lo/gou. On the other hand e)pilamba/nesqai, used below in b, means simply “to arrest the discussion.” See on 469 c.

a)\n ti\ fai/nhtai kte(.: the emphasis is on the indefinite, as in 472 a.

a)ll' e)moi\ kte(.: on the assumption by Gorgias of the role of mediator, and the justice of his claim to speak in the name of all, see Introd. § 13 fin. Cf. 497 b. His request to proceed is a part of the artistic machinery of the dialogue, in that it affords an opportunity for a general summary of what has been already learned in the discussion, which was necessary in order to proceed intelligently.

ou) . . . tw: a rather unusual ‘tmesis,’ of which another example is found in 72 d ou) me/ntoi w(s bou/lomai/ ge/ pw kate/xw to\ e)rwtw/menon.

bou/lomai ga\r kte(.: with these words Gorgias expresses his approbation of Callicles' opinion that a respondent is not necessary. The chestnuts are good,—but just as good without the intervention of the cat. Hence ga/r to give a reason for the continuance of the discussion, kai\ au)to/s to show his agreement with Callicles, and au)tou= to exclude the idea of co-operation. The following kai\ au)to/s in the answer of Socrates corresponds to the similar expression of Gorgias.

26 f.

*)amfi/onos: Socrates answers with a pleasant allusion to 485 e. He will really assume the character of Amphion, which had been imputed to him, and as Amphion had in the plays of Euripides defended his calling, so will he prove that the claim of philosophy to be followed as a calling in life is a just and weighty one.

a)pe/dwka: the indic. is due to assimilation with the preceding indic. with a)/n of the unfulfilled condition.

28 f.

a)ll' ou)=n . . . e)pilamba/nou: see on 496 d and a above.

31 f.

eu)erge/ths a)nagegra/yei: this phrase is found in Hdt. viii. 85, and was doubtless technical, the fut. pf. expressing like the legal pf. the finality and fixity of the action. It was quite common for Greek states to confer the title of eu)erge/ths on citizens or strangers, especially foreign statesmen or princes, for services rendered them. The decree conferring the honor was engraved on stone and preserved. In 36 d Socrates claims the title for himself. The greatest benefit consists, according to 458 a, in freeing a man from error.

w)= a)gaqe/: a friendly manner of address, which frequently, however, has an ironical coloring, or a tone of condescension, depreciation, or correction. So in Lat., o bone, cf. Hor. ii. 3. 31; or bone vir in comedy.

w(s e)gw\ kai\ *kalliklh=s w(mologh/samen: sc. in 495 c ff. Cf. especially 500 d.

paragenome/nou, paro/ntos: the words may have been designedly chosen with reference to the nature of the ideas h(du/ and a)gaqo/n, the former being only a condition, the latter an actuality.

h(du\ de/ e)stin kte(.: on the h(du/, cf. what Callicles has himself remarked in 494 a, b, above, and especially 53 c a)=ra peri\ h(donh=s ou)k a)khko/amen, w(s a)ei\ ge/nesi/s e)stin, ou)si/a d' ou)k e)/sti to\ para/pan h(donh=s. On the a)gaqo/n, cf. above 468 b e(/nek' a)/ra tou= a)gaqou= a(/panta poiou=sin oi( poiou=ntes and 54 c ou)kou=n h(donh/ ge, ei)/per ge/nesi/s e)stin, e(/neka/ tinos ou)si/as e)c a)na/gkhs gi/gnoit' a)/n—*to/ ge mh\n ou(= e(/neka to\ e(/neka/ tou gigno/menon a)ei\ gi/gnoit) a)/n, e)n th=| tou= a)gaqou= moi/ra| e)kei=no/ e)sti. This distinction, however, even if intended, is not preserved, as can be seen from the following (8) a)reth=s tinos paragenome/nhs. See on 497 e.

a)reth/: the subst. to denote the form in which the Good manifests itself in persons and things. According to its real nature the Good re mains one and the same, but its manifestation (the a)reth/) assumes various names according to circumstances.

tw)| ei)kh=|: on the use of the art. with adverbs, see Kr. 50, 5, 10. The dat. is in the same construction as those following.

12 f.

ta/cei kai\ o)rqo/thti kai\ te/xnh|: the two latter words simply complete the first. We might translate them as adjs. The addition of ka/llista seems to admit the possibility of a kind of a)reth/ being brought about by other means than ta/cei kte(.

o( e(ka/stou oi)kei=os: the nature of each thing conditions the peculiarity of its ko/smos. Hence this may receive different names, according to the conditions.

22 f.

su/ . . . di/daske: Socrates turns now again to Callicles and tries to draw him into the conversation, be cause the argument has now been brought just to the point where Callicles broke it off before.

le/ge: go on with your exposition. This answer is a refusal to cooperate and at the same time a neg. answer to ei) e)/xeis.

25 ff. The idea of swfrosu/nh is defined in the most general way by the expression ta\ prosh/konta pra/ttein. We attain to the idea of righteousness and piety by restricting the prosh/konta to definite domains, according to the personages (men and gods) towards whom we have duties to perform. We attain to the idea of bravery by distinguishing between especial divisions of the idea pra/ttein. Accordingly, we have on the one side diw/kein kai\ feu/gein, on the other u(pome/nonta karterei=n.

h(dona\s kai\ lu/pas: added by Socrates in his enumeration because it is just in these spheres that swfrosu/nh is usually exercised. The point at which bravery necessarily coincides with it comes out in this way most emphatically. The exhibition of bravery under such conditions is also discussed in ch. xviii.

39 f.

a)gaqo\n . . . tele/ws: ‘the perfection of goodness.’ Cope. All the virtues combined make the a)gaqo\n a)/ndra. Wisdom is omitted, probably because Socrates has in mind only the earlier discussion, and besides he is taking for the moment the popular point of view; hence the collocation of o(/sion with di/kaion, as in Besides, as Socrates' view was that all evil-acting springs from ignorance, the fact that a man wàs di/kaios, a)ndrei=os, and o(/sios would presuppose the possession of wisdom.

to\n d' eu)= pra/ttonta kte(.: not in the sense “he who is fortunate,” so often found, but in the sense of the clause eu)= kai\ kalw=s pra/ttein a(\ a)\n pra/tth| preceding; otherwise it would be equivalent to maka/rion kai\ eu)dai/mona, and the syllogism would gain nothing. Plato therefore conceives eu)= pra/ttein a(\ a)\n pra/tth| the necessary basis for maka/rion ei)=nai, and the latter as the natural result of the former. Hence there is no case of a fallacia secundum dictionem (by the use of homonyms or a)mfiboli/a), but the conclusion o( a)ko/lastos a)/qlios is correctly and legitimately obtained by a combination of the second statement with the first and without any fallacious or sophistical reasoning.

1 f.

kai/ fhmi tau=ta: the repetition of tau=ta causes these principles to appear especially weighty.

2 f.

to\n boulo/menon . . . diwkte/on: the verbal is equivalent here to dei= with the inf. The regular case for the agent is the dat.; the acc. is rare. See H. 991 a, and cf. 480 e. The position of w(s e)/oiken, which belongs to the whole clause, is noteworthy.

w(s e)/xei podw=n: i.e. to the full extent of his power, a phrase whose origin can be readily seen. Cf. Hdt. vi. 116 ou(=toi me\n dh\ perie/pleon *sou/nion. *)aqhnai=oi de\ w(s podw=n ei)=xon ta/xista e)boh/qeon e)s to\ a)/stu kai\ e)/fqhsan a)piko/menoi pri\n h)\ tou\s barba/rous h(/kein, and Thuc. ii. 90. 4 *peloponnh/sioi . . . e)/pleon w(s ei)=xe ta/xous e(/kastos e)pi\ tou\s *)aqhnai/ous. On the use of the gen. with such adverbs as w(s, a)/rista, and i(kanw=s, and e)/xein, see G. 168, 3; H. 757 a.

paraskeuaste/on: in a middle sense, as is frequently the case with verbals, but only when used impersonally.

h)\ i)diw/ths h)\ po/lis: disjunctive apposition to a)/llos tis tw=n oi)kei/wn. Contrasted with po/lis, i)diw/ths denotes the individual; with a)/rxwn, the common man who holds no office; with dhmiourgo/s and similar words, one who is not versed in a certain thing.—

e)piqete/on di/khn: Socrates deduces from the principles proven exactly the conclusions which, in his argument with Polus, had so offended Callicles. Cf. 480, 481.

9 f.

pa/nta ta\ au(tou=: “all the powers of the body and soul.” Cf. the passage quoted below (10), and 46 b ta\ e)ma/. The construction of kai\ pa/nta kte(. shows another example of the common Greek idiom of following a rel. by a demonstrative. See on 452 d.

ei)s tou=to: takes up again ou(=tos o( sko/pos for the purpose of recapitulating in its correlative clause, o(/pws kte(., the substance of what has been explained; ou(/tw again reiterates in one word the whole previous participial clause, and connects it with pra/ttein, which has the same construction as zh=n. The positive directions summarized in ou(/tw are still further fixed (after Plato's habit) by the following negative direction in the epexegetical participial clause ou)k e)piqumi/as e)w=nta . . . plhrou=n. After plhrou=n we find the parenthetical criticism a)nh/nuton kako/n, while the life of the man who attempts what is deprecated in the participial clause, is characterized very emphatically by the appositional tag which completes this rambling, intensely conversational sentence.

suntei/nonta: the image is that of drawing the bow and aiming, to the employment of which, sko/pos has led the way. We find in ix. 591 c the same image in a similar connexion, o(/ ge nou=n e)/xwn pa/nta ta\ au(tou= ei)s tou=to cuntei/nas bi/wsetai.

a)nh/nuton kako/n: “an evil to which there is no end.” The striving to satisfy the desires is also called an a)nh/nuton e)/rgon in 84 a, and compared with the web of Penelope, which was begun every day anew. On the apposition, see G. 137, 3; H. 626.

13 f.

lh|stou bi/on zw=nta: for the appositional partic. see Kr. 56, 15, 3.

a)du/natos: in an active sense.

koinwni/a: in passing, Socrates shows that the only foundation for an all-embracing view of the world is found in correct moral principle. Both in nature and in the universe the harmony of the parts with each other and with the whole is essential for existence. The state, and, proceeding further, the moral condition of the individual soul, should therefore be modelled on the principle of general order which pervades the world.

oi( sofoi/: those especially meant are the Pythagoreans, to whose views Plato had had recourse before. Cf. 493 a. Pythagoras is said first to have applied to the world the name ko/smos. He was followed by Empedocles with his scientific system, according to which there are two principles in the world,—love, filo/ths (storgh/, *)afrodi/th, a(rmoni/h), and hate, nei=kos. The former is the cause of association and union, the latter of separation and disunion. Cf. Emped. 94, Karst. *)/allote me\n filo/thti sunerxo/men' ei)s e(\n a(/panta, | *)/allote d' au)= di/x) e(/kasta foreu/mena nei/keos e)/xqei.

sune/xein: the subj. of the inf. is th\n koinwni/an, as is shown by the art. as well as the connexion. Cf. 242 e to\ o)\n . . . e)/xqra| kai\ fili/a| sune/xetai. The omission of the art. in enumerations is common. See on 450 d.

dikaio/thta: an unusual word for justice, formed like kosmio/ths and i)so/ths. It was probably chosen here on account of the assonance. Similarly 331 b tau)to/n e)sti dikaio/ths o(sio/thti. Xenophon also uses the word.

kai\ tau=ta: the regular Greek expression for “and that too.” See H. 612 a.

22 f.

h( gewmetrikh/: adds a limitation to the i)so/ths, that absolute equality, which is impossible in any government. i)so/ths alone is purely arithmetical equality (a = b); i)so/ths gewmetrikh/ is ratio or proportion (a:b::c:d). Plato distinguishes between two kinds of i)so/ths in vi. 757 b, the one th\n me/trw| i)/shn kai\ staqmw=| kai\ a)riqmw=|, the arithmetical; the second, th\n a)lhqesta/thn kai\ a)ri/sthn i)so/thta, the geometric, which is not comprehensible by every man, and which is dependent upon the judgment and decision of the gods. Of this he says (ib.): tw=| me\n mei/zoni plei/w, tw=| d' e)la/ttoni smikro/tera ne/mei, me/tria didou=sa pro\s th\n au)tw=n fu/sin e(kate/rw|, kai\ dh\ kai\ tima\s mei/zosi me\n pro\s a)reth\n a)ei\ mei/zous, toi=s de\ tou)nanti/on e)/xousin a)reth=s te kai\ paidei/as to\ pre/pon e(kate/rois a)pone/mei kata\ lo/gon. On this i)so/ths, which is here opposed to pleoneci/a, is founded the administration of justice in the state (ib. to\ politiko\n tou=t' au)to\ to\ di/kaion). Aris totle also ( v. 6, 7, Bekk.) refers to\ e)n dianomh=| di/kaion back to a)nalogi/a, i.e. to i)so/ths lo/gwn, and adds, kalou=si de\ th\n toiau/thn a)nalogi/an gewmetrikh\n oi( maqhmatikoi/. Isocrates expresses himself to the same effect in (vii.) 20 ff., where he says of Solon and Cleisthenes, me/giston au)toi=s suneba/leto pro\s to\ kalw=s oi)kei=n th\n po/lin, o(/ti duoi=n i)soth/toin nomizome/nain ei)=nai, kai\ th=s me\n tau)to\n a(/pasin a)ponemou/shs, th=s de\ to\ prosh=kon e(ka/stois, ou)k h)gno/oun th\n xrhsimwte/ran kte(. Thompson also quotes Plut. 719 b, according to which Lycurgus ‘expelled from Lacedaemon arithmetical equality, holding it to be democratic and levelling in principle, and introduced the geometric, as better suited to a temperate oligarchy and monarchy.’

gewmetri/as ga\r a)melei=s: Plato considered mathematics as a necessary preliminary to philosophy. Hence the well-known mhdei\s a)gewme/trhtos ei)si/tw mou th\n ste/ghn upon his house.

ei)=en: see on 466 c. Cf. 472 d, 480 a.

h)\ e)celegkte/os dh\ kte(.: the alternative appears as the obvious and necessary result of what precedes. The meaning and construction are similar to 482 b (w(s ou) kte(.). See on 467 a.

oi( a)/qlioi a)/qlioi: if the emendation is correct, we have an example of chiasmus, as in 498 d.

ti/ ta\ sumbai/nonta: the sing. ti/ inquires for the general result, which may include various details. See Kr. 61, 8, 2.

a(\ *pw=lon ai)sxu/nh| kte(.: with this Socrates avoids the accusation that he may have defended those principles only for the sake of confuting his adversary. They are seen now to be quite necessarily bound together with a moral view of life. Note the difference in the tenses, sugxwrei=n (equiv. to sunexw/rei) and below (37) o(mologh=sai (equiv. to w(molo/ghse).

LXIV.

w(s ou)x oi(=o/s t' ei)mi\ kte(.: this objection Callicles had only brought forward as a possibility, not as an actual fact (486 a, b). Socrates treats it as the latter, but even thus it does not misrepresent Callicles' sentiments.

5 f.

w(/sper oi( a)/timoi: see on 486 c. As the reading stands, tou= e)qe/lontos must be considered as a variant for e)pi\ tw=| boulome/nw|. In spite of Plato's fondness for poikili/a, it is hardly likely that he would use bou/lesqai and qe/lein as identical in meaning.

6 f.

to\ neaniko\n dh\ tou=to: in appo

sition to the whole clause, but more especially to the words which follow. See on 447 a. For the meaning, see on 482 c.

o(/stis: viz. e)sti/n. The omission of the verb in the dependent question is very uncommon.

e)/ti: almost equivalent to e)/ti pleona/kis.

te/mnesqai to\ sw=ma: may be a delicate allusion to 473 c (e)kte/mnhtai) as to\ balla/ntion and kle/ptein to 486 c (u(po\ de\ tw=n e)xqrw=n perisula=sqai pa=san th\n ou)si/an), but it is more probable, owing to its common association with balla/ntion, that te/mnesqai is used generally like the Lat. secari. In view of Socrates' poverty, this savors of humor.

balla/ntion: a leathern purse for carrying money, which was fastened to the girdle. The ballantioto/moi (cut-purses) were men who made a business of slipping off such purses in the market-places and the baths, and against whom it was difficult to protect one's self. This sentence is also a commentary on the mischiev

ous results of the principle defended by Callicles, which was sure to introduce the most outrageous kinds of a)diki/a. Apropos of this, cf. also the view of Thrasymachus in i. 344, especially b kai\ ga\r i(ero/suloi kai\ a)ndrapodistai\ kte(., oi( kata\ me/rh a)dikou=ntes tw=n toiou/twn kakourghma/twn kalou=ntai: e)peida\n de/ tis pro\s roi=s tw=n politw=n xrh/masi kai\ au)tou\s a)ndrapodisa/menos doulw/shtai, a)nti\ tou/twn tw=n ai)sxrw=n o)noma/twn eu)dai/mones kai\ maka/rioi ke/klhntai.

20 f.

kai\ ei) a)groiko/tero/n ti ei)pei=n: see on 462 e. The kai\ ei) shows that the word used is correct, though harsh. See crit. note on 503 a. The definite indic. is used in order to excuse the unusual comparison of arguments to iron and steel fetters. The simile is well chosen, and is a good retort on Callicles, who in 484 a had characterized the laws and moral rules as bonds which the true man must break through (diarrh/cas).

ou(twsi/: “as matters stand,” i.e. so far as these principles have been tested. They may be attacked with new arguments, in which case new defences would have to be made.—

ei) mh\ lu/seis: the stern minatory conditional form. See on 502 b.

neanikw/teros: i.e. who is more powerful and courageous, just as Callicles surpassed Polus, and Polus Gorgias.

o( au)to\s lo/gos: cf. 506 a ou)de\ ga\r e)/gwge ei)dw\s le/gw a(\ le/gw.

25 f.

w(=n . . . e)ntetu/xhka: on this unusual kind of attraction, see G. 153, 2; H. 996 a. We miss a mention of the persons with w(/sper nu=n.

26 f.

mh\ ou): after a negatived leading verb, the negative of the inf. is generally made by mh\ ou). See Madv. § 211; GMT. 815.

au)= ti/qhmi: sc. as against the opposing opinions of all others. This statement now, taken as a basis (ei) de\ ou(/tws e)/xei) leads to a conclusion which is given in the form of a question. ti/qhmi is frequently used of the laying down of a principle or assumption. ii. 361 b toiou=ton qe/ntes to\n di/kaion, 191 c.

29 f.

tou/tou mei=zon megi/stou o)/ntos: notice the comparison of the superlative.

a)lla/: introduces a more definite and detailed statement of a thought involved in the previous question.

tau/thn ei)=nai th\n ai)sxi/sthn kte(.: a noteworthy instance of the employment of a very common construction, which is as old as Homer (Kr. Di. 55, 3, 8). Logically we should expect tau/thn th\n boh/qeian mh\ du/nasqai bohqei=n ai)/sxiston ei)=nai. But boh/qeian, being uppermost in the speaker's mind, is made the subject, instead of cognate accusative, drawing also the predicate after it (see on 449

b, c). In this way mh\ du/nasqai bohqei=n is characterized as a species, and the most shameful species, of boh/qeia, which was pretty exactly Plato's opinion of the assistance which the orators were in the habit of rendering to themselves and their friends before a court. This assimilation is extended to the following clauses, deute/ran etc., for the sake of consistency.

e)f' e(/kasta: viz. kaka/, which are conceived as the enemy to be fought. Instead of ai)sxu/nh we should have expected ai)sxu/nhn.

ou)k a)/llws: it is remarkable that after his utterances in 505 d Callicles allows himself to be again drawn into the discussion. *(ekw\n a)e/konti/ ge qumw=|; For that the answer slips from him unconsciously, instead of being a willing admission, seems to follow from e)/stw soi tou=to (510 a), where his earlier disposition again becomes plain.

tou= a)dikei=n kte(.: in apposition to the duoi=n.

a)mfote/ras: the following investigation takes up each of the two cases separately.

du/namin h)\ bou/lhsin: what has been determined in 466 d regarding du/nasqai and bou/lesqai still holds good, but is expanded in what follows.

a)dikh/setai: the fut. middle as a passive occurs more commonly with pure verbs. See Kr. 39, 11; H. 496.

dh=lon dh\ kte(.: the form of the answer shows very willing agreement, which applies, however, only to this particular point.

ti/ de\ dh\ tou= kte(.: cf. 78 d ti/ de\ tw=n pollw=n kalw=n, oi(=on a)nqrw/pwn h)\ i(/ppwn . . .; a)=ra kata\ tau)ta\ e)/xei kte(. It is not necessary to supply peri/ or some other word; when put thus freely at the beginning of the sentence, the genitive is held up to view and the case lost sight of. See Rid. § 27. The acc. also is occasionally thus ‘freely’ used. Cf. Lyc. 28 kai\ tau=ta e)mou= qewrh/sate, w(s dikai/an th\n e)ce/tasin poioume/nou peri\ tou/twn.

du/namin kai\ te/xnhn . . . ma/qh| kai\ a)skh/sh|: an example of chiasmus. Knowledge is preserved and strengthened by practice.

w(s . . . a)dikh/sei: the causal use of w(s is not common. See Kr. 65, 8; H. 925.

au)ta/: for the neut. pl. referring to two preceding fem. sings. see Kr. 58, 3, 5; H. 630, 633.

13 f.

ti/ ou)k . . . a)pekri/nw: see on 503 b.

boulo/menon: for the usual e(ko/nta, in order not to diminish the contrast between du/namis and bou/lhsis. Besides, it has just been shown to Polus that he who does wrong does only what seems to him good, not what he wishes, because the wish is always for the good.

a)dikh/somen: according to (the amended) Dawes' canon o(/pws in object clauses cannot be construed with the first aor. subjv. either act. or middle. See GMT. 363, 364.

e(tai=ron: the common word to express party affiliation (hence also e(tairei=ai, “clubs”), as in 21 a u(mw=n tw=| plh/qei e(tai=ros.

o(ra=s kte(.: expression of joy that Socrates, with whom Callicles has had so often to agree unwillingly and under protest, now speaks quite to his liking. This view is the one thought of his life. Cf. 475 a.

sko/pei... lang=greek>e)a/n soi dokw= kte(.: for the construction with sko/pei see H. 1016 c, and on 452 c. Cf. above in a. ‘What is worth noticing upon this usage is that e)a/n gives a different shade of meaning from the more usual ei). The question submitted is represented by it as a perfectly open one; whereas ei) would limit the speaker's foregone conclusion, and give a certain appearance of positiveness. e)a/n is therefore chosen for the sake of expressing more perfect courtesy, in contexts such as this, which relate to the conduct of a dialogue.’ Rid. § 64.

e(/kastos e(ka/stw|: does not de note an unlimited reciprocality, but a restricted one, as is shown by the following o( o(moi=os tw=| o(moi/w|.

o(/nper . . . le/gousin: which the wise men of old mean when they say (le/gousin). The following proverb occurs very early, i.e. in Homer r 218 w(s ai)ei\ to\n o(moi=on a)/gei qeo\s w(s to\n o(moi=on. Plato often employs it, e.g. Prot. 337 d to\ ga\r o(moi=on tw=| o(moi/w| fu/sei suggene/s e)stin, 195 b o( ga\r palaio\s lo/gos eu)= e)/xei, w(s o(moi=on o(moi/w| a)ei\ pela/zei, 214 b to\ o(moi=on tw=| o(moi/w| a)na/gkh a)ei\ fi/lon ei)=nai. Of kindred import is the well-known verse h(=lic h(/lika te/rpe, ge/rwn de/ te te/rpe ge/ronta, alluded to in 240 c.

o(/pou tu/ranno/s kte(.: ‘where a savage and illiterate ruler is lord and master.’ Cope. In what follows, tou/tou refers to tu/rannos, tou/tw| through au)to/n to the ti\s.

ou)d' a)\n ou(/tws: is to be completed according to the previous remark of Socrates.

a)/cios lo/gou fi/los: pred. after lei/petai. According to the nature of the case none other could come under consideration as lasting friends of the tyrant, even if they should show themselves friendly for a time.

tau)ta\ ye/gein kai\ e)painei=n: like toi=s au)toi=s xai/rein kai\ a)/xqesqai is the external sign of a similarity of disposition and friendliness. See on 473 a.

u(pokei=sqai: in the elsewhere not uncommon meaning, “to be subject to.” Its use here is to emphasize the degradation in the eyes of a free man. Cf. also 53 e u(perxo/menos dh\ biw/sei pa/ntas a)nqrw/pous kai\ douleu/wn.

xai/rwn a)dikh/sei: the partic. denotes the result of the verb. “He will have no reason to rejoice,” i.e. he will not injure him with impunity. Cf. Soph. 363 a)ll' ou)/ ti xai/rwn di/s ge phmona\s e)rei=s.

ei) a)/ra tis: the case which Socrates here assumes in illustration serves not only to enliven the discourse, but also to show (as opposed to the objections of ch. XL.) how unworthy and debased an object would have to be set before educators if the possession of power in the state is to be the leading aim of mankind.— Noteworthy is the use of the direct question after the introductory protasis, and furthermore the omission of some apodosis corresponding to the protasis, like gnoi/h a)\n o(/ti, in place of which we find w(s e)/oiken. Kr. gives other similar examples in 65, 5, 14. Similar cases occur in Latin.

e)n tau/th| th=| po/lei: see on 468 e. The position is noteworthy.

mhdei/s me a)dikoi/h : mh/ was the negative of the wish, underlying the question, and is thus retained. It is therefore not necessary, with GMT. 292, 2, to suppose an idea of prevention to be involved. (prevent any one from doing, GMT.) me wrong?

diapepra/cetai: the fut. pf. is employed to express finality or fixedness. Cope translates, “he will establish for himself a lasting immunity from,” etc. See on 469 d.

e)pi\ to\ oi(/w| te ei)=nai: this is considered by Callicles and Polus as an end to be desired.—On the change of case, oi(/w| and a)dikou=nta, see on 492 b.

kai\ du/namin: the way to become powerful, says Socrates above, is to imitate the despo/ths. Hence kai\ du/namin is the power (to\ me/ga du/nasqai) obtained by this mi/mhsis (o(/pws o(/ti ma/lista o(moi=os e)/stai).

o(/ph| stre/feis: the last conclu sion of Socrates is not agreeable to Callicles, who therefore declares it an arbitrary perversion of the argument. The stre/fein a)/nw ka/tw (see on 481 e), the twisting this way and that of words and ideas so that their sense was reversed, was an important department of Eristic.

e)a\n bou/lhtai: the use of bou/lesqai again shows that the detailed explanation by Socrates of the difference between bou/lesqai and dokei=n (ch. XXIII. f.) was in vain. Hence Socrates himself ceases to regard it in his answer.

ei) mh\ kwfo/s g' ei)mi/: “otherwise I would have to be deaf.” 349 e ka/lliston . . . ei) mh\ mai/nomai/ ge.

polla/kis: 486 b, 466 c, et al.

a)poktenei= me\n kte(.: cf. Plut. 20 o( me\n ou)=n *)=agis e)pi\ th\n stralla/lhn poreuo/menos, w(s ei)=de/ tina tw=n u(phretw=n dakru/onta kai\ peripaqou=nta, “pau=sai/ me” ei)=pen, “w)= a)/nqrwpe, klai/wn. kai\ ga\r ou(/tws parano/mws kai\ a)di/kws a)pollu/menos krei/ttwn ei)mi\ tw=n a)nairou/ntwn.”

kai\ to\ a)ganakthto/n : kai\ is climactic and the art. emphatic. “So far from this circumstance mitigating the outrage, is it not just the revolting part of it,” i.e. especially revolting? Callicles puts himself in the place of the one who suffers the wrong, but with a feeling quite the reverse to that of Agis, quoted in the preceding note. In a similar manner Apollodorus says in [Xen.] 28 *)alla\ tou=to e)/gwge, w)= *sw/krates, xalepw/tata fe/rw o(/ti o(rw= se a)di/- kws a)poqnh/|skonta. to\n de\ le/getai katayh/santa au)tou= th\n kefalh\n ei)pei=n, *su\ de/, w)= fi/ltate *)apollo/dwre, ma=llon a)\n e)bou/lou me o(ra=n dikai/ws a)poqnh/| skonta;

w(s o( lo/gos shmai/nei: assumes that the statement has already been proved by the course of the argument. Cf. 527 c.

52 f.

dei=n . . . zh=n: against such an over-valuation of life Socrates declares himself also in 28, 29; 48 b.

th\n r(htorikh/n: the position is very emphatic. For examples of the rel. clause preceding the antecedent, see Kr. 51, 11.

sumbouleu/wn: connected in construction with the last words of Socrates, as is frequently the case in answers. Cf. 451 d o)rqw=s ge le/gwn su/, 473 b a)lhqh= ge oi)o/menos i)/sws. See Kr. 56, 8, 7.

toiou=ton: has its correlative in ou(=, which, like other relative adverbs, often stands for a prepositional phrase, as here equiv. to e)n w(=|. Frequently we find ti\ added to toiou=ton. The sense of toiou=ton is made clear by the context.

ta\ sw/mata kai\ ta\ xrh/mata: probably this phrase was a common one, and we must therefore not press a contrast between ta\ sw/mata and ta\s yuxa/s, which latter refers especially to their lives. Thompson supposes, with some probability, that sw/mata refers to the other members of the passenger's family, who may be conceived as belonging to him. Perhaps “goods and chattels” may be as good a rendering as any.

prosestalme/nh: “retired,” i.e. unpretending. Still stronger is sunestalme/nos, as i.e. in Isoc. 230 a)ph/|ei fronimw/teros gegenhme/nos kai\ sunestalme/nhn e)/xwn th\n dia/noian (“with a feeling of humility”).

e)sxhmatisme/nh: cf. 268 a w(s a)gnoei= tau=ta a(\ pro\s tou\s a)/llous w(s ei)dw=s e)sxhma/tistai (“which he has pretended to know”).

th=| dikanikh=|: used by Socrates instead of th=| r(htorikh=| because this species of the art affords the most room for comparison.

du/) o)bolou/s: i.e. about six cents. The price was accordingly very low, if, as is shown by what follows, the fare from Egypt or Pontus (a dangerous voyage besides) for a whole family, including baggage, was only two drachmae, or about thirty-five cents.

e)pra/cato: ‘gnomic’ or ‘empiric’ aorist.

au)to/n: the regular designation for the master of the house, who is frequently opposed to the rest of the family as here. See on 447 c. The order of enumeration is noteworthy as showing the low estimation in which the women were held. The pl. may be due to assimilation to pai=das, as we say “wife and child,” or it may be collective, “women folks.”

para\ th\n qa/lattan: also effective in the portrayal of the seaman's unpretending nature.

e)n metri/w| sxh/mati: with unassuming carriage, has nothing to do with the dress, but merely with the deportment (cf. above, prosestalme/nh). Perhaps there is a slight hit at Gorgias' pompous manner. See Introd. § 5 end

19 f.

logi/zesqai ... e)pi/statai: naturally not meant in full earnest, and not without some color of irony. The change of tense in w)fe/lhke and e)/blaye is probably due merely to the frequency of the form.

20 f.

ou(/stinas wfe/lhke kte(.: reminds us of Matt. xviii. 6, where of those who offend it is said: sumfe/rei au)tw=| i(/na ... katapontisqh=| e)n tw=| pela/gei th=s qala/sshs.

h)\ oi(\ a<*>ne/bhsan: it is a Greek peculiarity to compare different states by employing the gen. of the reflexive. Here a clause takes its place.

logi/zetai o(/ti ou)k: the force of the neg. extends over the whole sentence, which is developed antithet ically. Since both leading clauses are hypothetical, we have a double employment of me/n and de/. The first member of the antithesis is given first only for the sake of the contrast; we should use a subordinate clause in English, and lay the most stress on the second member, and, too, on its conclusion. 28 e e)gw\ ou)=n deina\ a)\n ei)/hn ei)rgasme/nos, ei) o(/te me/n me oi( a)/rxontes e)/tatton, ou(\s u(mei=s ei(/lesqe a)/rxein mou, to/te me\n ou(= e)kei=noi e)/tatton e)/menon—tou= de\ qeou= ta/ttontos, w(s e)gw\ w)|h/qhn te kai\ u(pe/labon, filosofou=nta/ me dei=n zh=n—e)nt<*>u=qa de\ fobhqei\s h)\ qa/naton h)\ a)/llo o(tiou=n pra=gma li/poimi th\n ta/cin. See on 502 b and 499 d.

a)/qlios o(/ti ou)k a)pe/qanen: some such idea as this frequently occurs in Plato; for example, in the and 47 d, e e)a\n diole/swmen (sc. to\ sw=ma) a)=ra biwto\n h(mi=n e)sti diefqarme/nou au)tou=; *ou)damw=s. Socrates makes there a similar estimate of the relationship of soul to body.

LXVIII.

no/mos: usage, custom. Cf. ta\ nomizo/mena.

mhxanopoio/n: Socrates has in mind the constructors of great machines which were used in the defence of beleaguered cities, and of which the second Punic war offers a celebrated example. The military engineer saves at the same time the lives of many men,—the orator only one life at a time.

mh\ (ou)x)

o(/ti: see on 450 e.

e)la/ttw du/natai sw/|zein: this use of the neut. acc. is extended from the cognate. 30 c e)me\ mei/zw bla/yete. On the pl., cf. the adverbial use of the neut. pl. by Thucydides. ‘A chance is represented as the sum of so many contingencies; a quantity as the sum of so many smaller units.’ Rid. § 43.

mh/ soi dokei=: the answer assumed in the following kai/toi would run as above: ma\ *di/) ou)k e)/moige. For the interrogative mh/, see G. 282, 2.—

kata\ ... ei)=nai: to be comparable to, i.e. worthy to be put upon the same plane with. 17 b o(mologoi/hn a)\n e)/gwge ou) kata\ tou/tous ei)=nai r(h/twr.

to\ pra=gma: “his business.”—

katax w/seien: would cover under a mass, i.e. of arrows, like obruere. Cf. Hdt. vii. 225 e)n tou/tw| sfe/as tw=| xw/rw| a)lecome/nous . . . kate/xwsan oi( ba/rbaroi ba/llontes. The use of this word brings up the image of war and the hurling machines of the mhxanopoioi/, whose weapons, however, in this case are to be lo/goi instead of li/qoi.

le/gwn: the omission of an object clause is accounted for by the addition of parakalw=n, which at the same time extends and defines le/gwn. The use of dei=n is rather strange; it would go better with le/gwn. Perhaps there is a mixture of two constructions. For the matter, cf. 486 c.

w(s kte(.: see on 509 e.

9 f.

i(kano\s ga\r au)tw=| o( lo/gos: for his case is strong enough.

a)pokale/sais: call slightingly Cf. Soph. 726 to\n tou= mane/ntos ka)pibouleutou= stratou= cu/naimon a)pokalou=ntes. The displacement of the first ou)/te from its normal position is common enough.

e)c w(=n: stands either for e)k tou/twn e)c w(=n (“for the reasons for which you praise your art”) or e)k tou/twn a(\ (“from that which you say in praise of your art”), more likely the latter. See H. 996 a.

belti/wn kai\ e)k beltio/nwn: such combinations are common. 246 a qew=n me\n ou)=n i(/ppoi te kai\ h(ni/oxoi au)toi/ te a)gaqoi\ kai\ e)c a)gaqw=n, Lys. 18 dou=lon kai\ e)k dou/lwn o)/nta, Soph. 384 pro\s tou= kaki/stou ka)k kakw=n *)odusse/ws, 874 eu)genh\s ga\r h( fu/sis ka)c eu)genw=n, Paul ad Phil. iii. 5 *(ebrai=os e)c *(ebrai/wn.—In this passage, moreover, we see in its worst colors the opposition between the theory championed by Callicles and his actual practices. The former is a kind of sophistical latitudinarianism; the latter, the narrow-mindedness of Greek tradition.

mh\ e)/stin: the regular accentuation of e)sti after mh/ and tou=to.

o)/nta: constr. with the understood subject of sw/|zein.

o(poi=o/s tis e)/tuxen: “without regard to moral qualities.”

22 f.

mh\ ga\r tou=to me\n, to\ zh=n kte(.: the change from the subjv. to the indic. e)sti/ may be due to forgetfulness on the part of the speaker, who, after giving the keynote to the sentence with the mh\ ga/r at the beginning, shifts to the independent, straightforward indic. construction. If the e)sti/ is to be construed rigidly with mh/, understanding again o(/ra, then we must consider that Socrates rejected the subjv., which may refer either to the present or the future, for the indic., which leaves no ambiguity as to its time sphere. That Socrates is aware of the grammatically uncertain structure of his sentence is shown by the tou=q' o(/ra below. But see Goodwin's view, GMT. 269.

23 f.

to/n ge w(s a)lhqw=s a)/ndra: has reference to the lengthy exposition of Callicles in ch. XXXVIII. ff., especially 485 c, d, where the activity of Socrates is characterized as unmanly. Wherein true manliness consists, Socrates shows in his defence, ch. XVI. f. and XXIX.

e)ate/on: cf. 484 c e)a/sas filosofi/an. For the construction, see on 507 c.

24 f.

e)pitre/yanta . . . tw=| qew=|: this feeling of submission to God's decrees Socrates preserved even to his death. 41 d ou)k e)/stin a)ndri\ a)gaqw=| kako\n ou)de\n ou)/te zw=nti ou)/te teleuth/santi, ou)de\ a)melei=tai u(po\ qew=n ta\ tou/tou pra/gmata: ou)de\ ta\ e)ma\ nu=n a)po\ tou= au)toma/tou ge/gonen, a)lla/ moi dh=lo/n e)sti tou=to o(/ti h)/dh teqna/nai kai\ a)phlla/xqai pragma/twn be/ltion h)=n moi.

peri\ tou/twn: for emphasis, instead of the simple acc. tau=ta. But see Rid. § 106.

tai=s gunaici/n: because these hold more firmly to what is old and time-honored, both in dialect (cf. 418 c ai( gunai=kes ma/lista th\n a)rxai/an fwnh\n sw/|zousi, Cic. de Or. iii. 12. 45) and in belief. This same old belief is expressed by Hector Z 488, moi=ran (i.e. th\n ei(marme/nhn) d' ou)/ tina/ fhmi pefugme/non e)/mmenai a)ndrw=n. It is ridiculed as an old wives' tale by the Epicurean Velleius in Cic. de Nat. i. 20. 55 as follows: Hinc vobis exstitit primum illa fatalis necessitas quam ei(marme/nhn dicitis, ut, quidquid accidat, id ex aeterna veritate causarumque continuatione fluxisse dicatis. Quanti autem haec philosophia aestimanda est cui tamquam aniculis et iis quidem indoctis, fato fieri videantur omnia? By the words e)pitre/yanta kte(., Socrates declares in a delicate way that this belief of the women harmonizes with the principles of true manliness better than the view of the highly cultured Callicles.

ou)d' a)\n ei(=s : ou)dei/s is separated for the sake of emphasis. See G. 77, 1, 2; H. 290 a.

to\ e)pi\ tou/tw|: see on 452 c. e)pi/ denotes the immediate succession.

me/lloi: is optative by assimilation to the potential a)\n bioi/h.

kai\ nu=n de\ a)/ra: introduces the application to Callicles and his relation to the Athenian state. In sense the clause depends on skepte/on above, but loosely.

tou=q' o(/ra: returns to the beginning, since the sense has become somewhat obscured by the intervening additions. The use of soi\ kai\ e)moi/ resumes the previous unemphatic se\, inasmuch as each one wishes to obtain the others' acceptance of his own view of life.

ta\s *qettali/das: the Thessalian women were very skilful in sorcery and poisoning. They stood in close relation to the night-goddess Hecate; hence people ascribed to them the power to draw the moon from the heavens. Strepsiades says in Ar. 749 gunai=ka farmaki/d' ei) pria/menos *qettalh\n | kaqe/loimi nu/ktwr th\n selh/nhn kte(. Cf. Hor. 5. 45 quae sidera excantata voce Thessala | lunamque caelo deripit. For this, however, the goddess exacted punishment, for Suidas says ai( th\n selh/nhn kaqairou=sai *qettali/des le/gontai tw=n o)fqa/lmwn kai\ tw=n pai/dwn (v. l. podw=n) steri/skesqai. ei)/rhtai e)pi\ tw=n e(autoi=s ta\ kaka\ e)pispwme/nwn h( paroimi/a. Cf. also Plin. XXX. I. 2 (6). Aristophanes' designation of them under the name farmaki/s, while it implies that their art consisted in the manipulation of drugs, does not limit us to that view, because Herodotus, vii. 114, uses the verb farmakeu/ein in speaking of the sacrifice of white horses by the Magi to the river Strymon.

33 f.

su\n toi=s filta/tois: at the risk of our dearest interests. For the asyn deton, see on 450 b.

ta\ fi/ltata: denotes the soul and its a)reth/, as in 314 a o(/ra, w)= maka/rie, mh\ peri\ toi=s filta/tois kubeu/h|s kai\ kinduneu/h|s. In ai(/resis lies a play on kaqairei=n.

o(ntinou=n a)nqrw/pwn: recalls the promises made for rhetoric by Gorgias.

mimhth/n: imitation is not to be thought of, for immoral action with a correct moral feeling is impossible. Hence the similarity must be original (au)tofuw=s).

fili/an tw=| dh/mw|: substantives involving action, either physical or mental, sometimes take the construction of their corresponding adjs. or verbs. Cf. 522 d boh/qeia e(autw=|, 30 a th\n tw=| qew=| u(phresi/an. H. 765 a.

kai\ nai\ ma\ *di/a tw=| *purila/mpous: see on 481 d.

politiko\s ei)=nai: since these words would be understood if not present, the special insertion of them can only serve to emphasize the identity of wish and result.

tw=| au(tw=n ga\r h)/qei legome/nwn: as an illustration of the sentiment, cf. Dem. iii. 19 a)ll' oi)=mai me/ga toi=s toiou/tois u(pa/rxei (“comes to the aid of”) lo/gois h( par' e(ka/stou bou/lhsis.

w)= fi/lh kefalh/: a humorously pathetic mode of address, borrowed from the Homeric usage (*q 281 et al.). Cf. also Soph. 950 w)= fi/ltaton gunaiko\s *)ioka/sths ka/ra etc. Our use of the word ‘heart’ in tender address is analogous. Cf. Shaks. Love's Labor Lost, v. 3: ‘Good heart, what grace hast thou thus to reprove?’ etc.

to\ tw=n pollw=n pa/qos: namely that they listen gladly only to that which harmonizes with their opinions, and are very loath to offer on the altar of more perfect knowledge the views they have come to cherish; hence they remain unde cided, as Meno says, 95 c o(/per oi( polloi\ pe/ponqa: tote\ me/n moi dokou=si, tote\ de\ ou)/. The candor of Callicles here as compared with his earlier obstinacy is quite remarkable. For the asyndeton, see on 450 b.

i)/sws: this addition shows that the fulfilment of the condition is still very doubtful. Cf. Socrates' remarks on the necessity of time to convince, in 19 a, 37 a, b, quoted on 455 a.

d' ou)=n: but then, emphasizes, in contrast to the uncertain hope just expressed, what must happen in any case. Cf. Apol. 17 a. The Latin equivalent is certe. Socrates has in mind at the moment ch. LV. f., where, however, reference was made to the conversation with Gorgias and Polus in ch. XIX. f.

e(/kaston: subject to qerapeu/ein.

8 f.

pro\s h(donh\n o(milei=n: epexegetic to mi/an (sc. paraskeuh/n). mh\ kataxarizo/menon limits o(milei=n which belongs also to pro\s to\ be/ltiston, and requires the supplying of an indefinite subject. See on 512 d o)/nta.

kataxarizo/menon: used in 35 c with the acc. (ta\ di/kaia). diama/xesqai frequently takes peri/ tinos. See also on 502 b, 503 a.

ei) boulei: added by Callicles here, as ei)/ soi h(/dion in 514 a, i(/na soi xari/swmai 516 b, to avoid responsibility. It is almost parenthetical.

h( . . . e(te/ra: there is no need of an explanatory appositional clause corresponding to h( pro\s h(donh/n, since the inference from d is sufficient. The lacking verb (tugxa/nei ou)=sa) on account of the parallelism must be taken from the preceding words of Socrates. o(/pws . . . tou=to is added to correspond to a)gennh\s . . . kolakei/a, thus, “is directed to that end, viz.” etc. The connexion is a loose one.

qerapeu/ein: the addition of the inf. here is an afterthought, after the object which in sense belongs to it has been already proleptically connected with the preceding verb. 52 c e)piqumi/a se . . . a)/llwn no/mwn e)/laben ei)de/nai. See Kr. 61, 6, 8; Rid. § 180.

20 f.

w(s . . . poiou=ntas: connected (as a correlative) epexegetically with ou(/tws. 59 a sxedo/n ti ou(/tw diekei/meqa, o(te\ me\n gelw=ntes, e)ni/ote de\ dakru/ontes. The position of the ou(/tws, which in sense is to be construed with qerapeu/ein, is due to the form of the sentence. The partics. agree in case with the unexpressed subj. of qerapeu/ein, viz. h(ma=s.

e)a\n mh\ kte(.: explains a)/neu dh\ tou/tou.—

dia/noia: i.e. the inner activity of the soul itself, its reasoning, thinking; hence it is often used for the mode of thought, the disposition, and even for the soul itself.

ei) ou)=n parekalou=men kte(.: by a series of analogies Socrates tries to show that the profession of statecraft implies various preliminary qualifications, and that the incipient statesman ought to be subjected to an examination as to his education and previous habits, instead of following the Athenian practice. 319 d e)peida\n de/ ti peri\ tw=n th=s po/lews dioikh/sews de/h| bouleu/sasqai, sumbouleu/ei au)toi=s a)nista/menos peri\ tou/twn o(moi/ws me\n te/ktwn, o(moi/ws de\ xalkeu\s skutoto/mos, e)/mporos nau/klhros, plou/sios pe/nhs, gennai=os a)gennh/s, kai\ tou/tois ou)dei\s e)piplh/ttei o(/ti ou)damo/qen maqw\n ou)de\ o)/ntos didaska/lou ou)deno\s au)tw=|, e)/peita sumbouleu/ein e)pixeirei=, Xen. iv. 2. 1-7.

dhmosi/a| pra/contes: almost equivalent to dhmosieu/ontes. —

tw=n pragma/twn: must be considered as part. gen. after dhmosi/a| pra/contes, and is not to be construed with the following clause, with Cron.

h)\ teixw=n h)\ newri/wn h)\ i(erw=n: these are themselves the greatest public works, but the addition of me/gista serves to emphasize the importance of the matter and the responsibility of the person.

po/teron: the second member of the double question is found in the h)\ ou)/ which follows the repeated e)/dei a)/n below.

e)/dei a)/n: instead of e)/dei, shows that the whole condition is purely fictitious and unreal. The simple e)/dei would have drawn attention only to the inf. GMT. 423.

deu/teron au)= to/de: to be com

pleted from the preceding po/teron kte(.

i)di/a| dia\ h(mw=n: would lead us to expect as a contrast koinh=| meta\ tw=n didaska/lwn. But koinh=| is omitted as self-evident, while i)di/a| gives a certain definiteness to dia\ h(mw=n.

diakeime/nwn (viz. h(mw=n): is used absolutely; nou=n e)xo/ntwn is to be connected with h)=n as above, 500 a panto\s a)ndro/s.

ou(/tw de/: correlative with ou(/tw me/n. See on 512 a.

a)no/hton h)=n a)/n: cf. below, e katage/laston a)\n h)=n and a)no/hton a)\n ei)=nai.

LXX.

ou)kou=n ou(/tw pa/nta: these words would seem to indicate the conclusion of the induction and the transition to its application to the question under discussion. Meanwhile, however, Socrates cites another example which is still closer to his idea. Hence ta/ te a)/lla kai/, which at the same time sums up and emphasizes.

ka)/n: is to be resolved into kai\ a)/n, the kai/ being correlative with te/, and not going with ei) in the sense “even.” For the repetition of the a)/n, two lines below, see 465 c, d, and on 475 e.

dhmosieu/ein: the general word to denote the public practice of any profession or business which is for the benefit of the community. See on 452 a dhmiourgo/s. In the case of physicians, are included not merely those who are in the service of the government, but also private practitioners. See on 455 b.

w(s . . . o)/ntes: expresses in a different form what is found above, a, in the phrase e)pi\ ta\ oi)kodomika/, viz. the department of activity to which attention is drawn.

fe/re kte(.: change to direct quotation occurs frequently as here, without the employment of a definite verb of saying.

de/: often employed in lively questions which are closely connected with the words of another. So here. Socrates offers himself to the state as a physician, but in what state of health is his own body? Cf. Xen. ii. I. 26 (in the myth of Prodicus, after *kaki/a had praised her gifts) kai\ o( *(hraklh=s a)kou/sas tau=ta, *)=w gu/nai, e)/fh, o)/noma de/ soi ti/ e)sti;

h)\ dou=los h)\ e)leu/qeros: cf. 502 d and 515 a. The distinction between slaves and freemen, which was always present to the mind of a Greek, is emphasized here because it was common for slaves to be treated by less skilled physicians, who might themselves be slaves, as we learn from iv. 720 c a)=r' ou)=n kai\ cunnoei=s o(/ti dou/lwn kai\ e)leuqe/rwn o)/ntwn tw=n kamno/ntwn e)n tai=s po/lesi tou\s me\n dou/lous sxedo/n ti oi( dou=loi ta\ polla\ i)atreu/ousi. Cf. Herm. iv.^{3} § 38.

a)nqrw/pous: from the particular to the general, which also includes the particular. We should say “people” in the same way. It is remarkable, however, how quickly Socrates returns to the first person in the next clause. One must have in mind an individual before he can give particulars.

o(/pws e)tu/xomen poih=sai: is the contrast to katorqw=sai. When one is beginning in a profession much is necessarily, from inexperience, done at a risk, and may or may not suc ceed. For the phrase o(/pws e)tu/xomen, cf. 521 c, 45 d to\ so\n me/ros, o(/ti a)\n tu/xwsi, tou=to pra/cousi, “the success of your sons is left as far as you are concerned to the caprice of chance.” 353 b o(/ti a)\n tu/xwsi, tou=to le/gousi, qui quidquid in buccam venit dicunt. The usual inference is unfavorable. The partic. is to be supplied from the following verb.

ei) tw=| pi/qw| th\n keramei/an: the proverb denotes, “to begin with the large instead of with the small.” 187 a ei) ga\r nu=n, prw=ton a)/rcesqe paideu/ein, skopei=n xrh\ mh\ ou)k e)n tw=| *kari\ u(mi=n o( ki/ndunos kinduneu/htai, a)ll' e)n toi=s u(e/si te kai\ e)n toi=s tw=n fi/lwn paisi/, kai\ a)texnw=s to\ lego/menon kata\ th\n paroimi/an u(mi=n sumbai/nh| e)n pi/qw| h( keramei/a gignome/nh. A proverb from the potter's art was natural among the Athenians, where the art flourished (*kerameiko/s).

w)= be/ltiste a)ndrw=n: a pathetic address. See on 513 c.

a)/rti a)/rxei: on the age of Callicles at the time of this dialogue, see Introd. § 15.—On the matter, cf. 36 c e)pixeirw=n e(/kaston u(mw=n pei/qein mh\ pro/teron mh/te tw=n e(autou= mhdeno\s e)pimelei=sqai, pri\n e(autou= e)pimelhqei/h, o(/pws w(s be/ltistos kai\ fronimw/tatos e)/soito, mh/te tw=n th=s po/lews, pri\n au)th=s th=s po/lews.

fe/re kte(.: see on 514 d.

23 f.

a)/diko/s te kte(.: various kinds of ponhri/a, as contrasted with the corresponding virtues. Cf. 491 e ff.

ei)/per kte(.: Socrates' opinion can be readily perceived. Between these repeated questions we must assume short pauses. On the possessive pronoun followed by the gen., see H. 691; G. 137, N. 1.

filo/nikos ei)=: the accusation is a confession of weakness, having much the same force as Crito's answer ( 54 d) a)ll' , w)= *sw/krates, ou)k e)/xw le/gein. See on 457 d.

e)n h(mi=n: cf. e)n toi=s poli/tais, e)n tw=| dh/mw|. In spite of the addition of dei=n, no subject for politeu/esqai is expressed. But we should not feel the ellipsis in English, and often make such without noticing it.

h(mi=n: seems to be a kind of ethical dat. See G. 184, 3, N. 6; H. 770. Cope translates the clause, ‘whether we shall find you concerning yourself about anything else,’ etc.

u(pe\r sou=: cf. 22 e w(/ste me e)mauto\n a)nerwta=n u(pe\r tou= xrhsmou=, so that I asked myself in the name of the oracle.

poli=tai: the idea of this word (as also of politeu/esqai) approaches so near that of “statesmen” that it is frequently used in that sense; i.e. in the speech of Diodotus against Cleon (Thuc. iii. 42. 5) xrh\ to\n a)gaqo\n poli/thn mh\ e)kfobou=nta tou\s a)nterou=ntas a)ll' a)po\ tou= i)/sou fai/nesqai a)/meinon le/gonta. Cf. below, e. Above we find politiko\s a)nh/r and also a)nh/r simply, used in the same sense; cf. 517 a.

e)poi/ei: sc. in the course of his activity as a statesman.

a)nti\ xeiro/nwn: the brachylogy is here harder than in the case where the relation is reversed; e.g. Polit. 308 a a)nt' e)leuqe/rwn geno/menoi dou=loi. We might have expected e)k.

h)/rxeto le/gein: here denotes not so much Pericles' first appearance before the people as the first period of his political life. This began even before the death of Ephi altes, who, owing to the machinations of his enemies, was murdered shortly after the banishment of Cimon (460 B.C.). The height of Pericles' power was reached after the death of Cimon and the banishment of Thucydides, son of Melesias (443 B.C.).— On the construction of a)/rxesqai, see on 488 a.

ta\ teleutai=a e)/legen: Socrates is referring again, not so much to Pericles' last oratorical efforts, but to the last period of his political activity, which fell within the first years of the Peloponnesian war. On the result of his last speech (430 B.C.) Thucydides (ii. 65) remarks: *toiau=ta o( *periklh=s le/gwn e)peira=to tou=s *)aqhnai/ous th=s te e)p' au)to\n o)rgh=s paralu/ein kai\ a)po\ tw=n paro/ntwn deinw=n a)pa/gein th\n gnw/mhn. oi( de\ dhmosi/a| me\n toi=s lo/gois a)nepei/qonto . . . ou) me/ntoi pro/tero/n ge oi( cu/mpantes e)pau/santo e)n o)rgh=| e)/xontes au)to\n pri\n e)zhmi/wsan xrh/masin. —On the neut. pl., see on 512 b and Kr. 46, 3, 2.

a)na/gkh|: is adverbial dat. corresponding to the adverb i)/sws.

ti/ ou)=n dh/: see on 453 b and 497 d. The reply of Socrates shows that he intends Callicles himself to draw the necessary inference from what he proceeds to bring forward.

a)rgou\s kte(.: this accusation is based upon a suspicion that Pericles, in order to bring about certain desirable measures in the government, employed bribery disguised under the names of misqo\s stratiwtiko/s, dikastiko/s, e)kklhsiastiko/s, and qewriko/s, of which, however, only the first two can be ascribed to Pericles. On this dole the Athenian citizens could live in a poor way at the expense of the state, and they lost perhaps some of that energy which was characteristic of them in earlier times.

deilou/s: the Athenians became timid, as a natural consequence of their inactivity, in that they (much later however) withdrew from personal war service, and depended on mercenaries exclusively.

la/lous: to activity in the real service of the state, principally of course in the assembly, was soon joined a desire to seek entertainment in public. For here their curiosity, a natural failing, was nourished by continual gossip and talk. This was the case in the time of Demosthenes ( i. 10), of Paul ( xvii. 18), and is the case at the present day. See on 461 e.

filargu/rous: the desire to obtain money from the public treasury became continually stronger and more universal, and wrought great damage to the government. At the time of Demosthenes the continuance of the qewriko/n was especially injurious, because the means for military purposes were thereby greatly curtailed. Plato's criticism of Pericles was always unfavorable, which, however, is not to be wondered at, since his youth fell during the years of Athenian depression, which the oligarchy ascribed to the mistakes of the great democratical leader.—

misqofori/an: on the growth and effects of this policy at Athens and elsewhere, see Grote, Hist. xi. 281 (c. lxxxvii.).

tw=n ta\ w)=ta kateago/twn: the Laconian imitators (lakwni/zontes, lakwnomanou=ntes) in Athens were thus named from having their ears often broken in the pugmh/ by the straps with which the hands were covered (see Herm. iv.^{3} § 37, p. 347). They formed a party, hostile to the democracy, which saw in Lacedaemon the model of a noble state, and looked to her for help. They practised Lacedaemonian severity in all external matters; hence they wore mustaches, short mantles, etc., and practised gymnastics very diligently. To harden the body, they even engaged in boxing, which was forbidden in Sparta. They became naturally, therefore, butts for ridicule. 342 b.—By this remark Callicles here accuses Socrates of partisanship.

e)peidh\ de\ kaloi\ ka)gaqoi/: with bitter irony. If they were really good, the righteousness of the judgment of Pericles would have been recognized; but if this judgment was unrighteous, then Pericles did not make them good.

u(p' au)tou= : gi/gnomai, as passive of poiw=, requires u(po/ for the agent.

35 f.

kloph\n au)tou= kte(.: in the second year of the Peloponnesian war, when Pericles returned from an expedition against the Spartan coast, the slumbering discontent of the people, caused by the devastation of Attica by the Spartans and the ravages of the plague in Athens, broke out against him in the form of an accusation as a result of which he was fined a sum of money, the amount of which (15, 50, 80 talents) is not certain. Thuc. ii. 59; 65. See on 515 d. That the ostensible charge was embezzlement of the public funds is supported by this passage alone, but that various rumors were current of his dishonesty can be gathered from the story of Alcibiades' advice to him in Plut. vii. *periklei= de\ boulo/menos e)ntuxei=n e)pi\ qu/ras h)=lqen au)tou=. puqo/menos de\ mh\ sxola/zein, a)lla\ skopei=n kaq' e(auto/n, o(/pws a)podw/sei lo/gon *)aqhnai/ois, a)piw\n o( *)alkibia/dhs: “ei)=ta” e)/fh “be/ltion ou)k h)=n skopei=n au)to/n, o(/pws ou)k a)podw/sei lo/gon *)aqhnai/ois;”

ei) paralabw/n: not designed as an epexegesis to toiou=tos w)/n, which merely gives the general idea which runs through all the preceding thought, but added to give those details to the simile which seem to be requisite.

paralabw/n: receiving for training. See on 483 e. —The position of the words lakti/zontas, kuri/ttontas, and da/knontas is probably merely a chance one.

a)pe/deice: the word means “to show or prove as the result of a process,” often in mathematical reasoning; here as the result of training. Cf. below c a)pe/fhnen. Hence also the expression a)podeiknu/nai tina\ strathgo/n. See on 484 b.

i(/na soi xari/swmai: see on 513 e. The reply of Socrates is full of irony.

a)pokrina/menos: for the tense, see on 491 c.

e)/dei: without a)/n. See on 514 a.

a)nti\ a)dikwte/rwn: see on 515 d.

oi(/ ge di/kaioi h(/meroi w(s e)/fh *(/omhros: there is no such direct as

sertion in any passage of Homer, but the same sense is seen in z 120, i 175 h)= r() oi(/ g' u(bristai/ te kai\ a)/grioi ou)de\ di/kaioi. Here, moreover, the leading thought is the utter exclusion of any idea of dikaiosu/nh from the a)/grioi.

o(\n h(/kist' a)/n e)bou/lonto: cf. 25 d e)/stin ou)=n o(/stis bou/letai u(po\ tw=n cuno/ntwn bla/ptesqai ma=llon h)\ w)felei=sqai. For o(/n, see on 453 e. The ellipsis is to be supplied from what precedes.

ou) . . . fh/|s: see on 450 d.

e)cwstra/kisan au)to/n: Cimon was a supporter of the Lacedaemonian league, and also caused the Athenians to send aid to the Spartans in the third Messenian war. But when the Athenians were dismissed in so humiliating a manner at Ithome, his opponent, Pericles, turning to account the indignation of the people, succeeded in effecting his banishment in B.C. 461. The term of banishment by ostracism was limited by law to ten years. But Cimon was recalled about B.C. 457, also at the instance of Pericles. Since ostracism (Herm. i. § 130) was properly not a punishment, Socrates, in the words i(/na au)tou= de/ka e)/th mh\ a)kou/seian, is merely making a point against the influence of Cimon in the state. Themistocles was banished in B.C. 471, and went to Argos. Here he was accused by the Spartans of participation in the treason of Pausanias, or mhdismo/s, and to escape investigations fled to the Persian king, a step which was followed by the confiscation of his magnificent property at Athens.

prosezhmi/wsan: and in addi-

tion they punished, etc. 20 a sfi/sin cunei=nai xrh/mata dido/ntas kai\ xa/rin proseide/nai.—

to\n e)n *maraqw=ni: this short adverbial expression seems to have been used simply as a distinguishing epithet, and it is not likely that the Greeks supplied or felt any ellipsis such as is suggested by Cron, viz. to\n e)n *maraqw=ni (*maraqw=ni alone) parataca/menon (maxesa/menon) or nikh/santa. The epithet is the more emphatic as the victors at Marathon (*maraqwnoma/xai Ar. 986) were unusually revered by posterity. In consequence of the unfortunate expe dition against Paros, Miltiades was, on the prosecution of Xanthippus, declared guilty of a)pa/thsis tou= dh/mou, and fined fifty talents. According to Hdt. vi. 136, his adversary demanded the penalty of death, which was averted by the intercession of friends.

ei) mh\ dia/: “if it had not been for.” The prytanis probably exerted his influence before the division, though this whole story seems to be much overdrawn.

40 f.

ei) h)=san . . . e)/pasxon: opposition to generic present. Cf. 471

a. Goodwin (GMT. 410) considers this as a case of real opposition to the past.

ou)/koun kte(.: the neg. contained in ou)/koun (Kr. 69, 51, 2) applies not to the second member alone, but to the two members together; the coexistence of the two clauses is denied. This form sharply emphasizes the self-contradiction which is fundamental in Callicles' view.—The results of the whole argument are now summed up as briefly as possible.

su\ de\ kte(.: with w(molo/geis

must be supplied the participial clause of the preceding sentence. From this also we must take a verb of saying to govern a tina/s also to be supplied from ou)de/na of the clause tw=n . . . e)/mprosqen.

e)c i)/sou: has almost the force of an adj. See Kr. 43, 4, 5; H. 798 f.

ou) ga\r e)ce/peson: we find additions, such as e)k th=s patri/dos, a)rxh=s, turanni/dos, and the like; also do/chs, ou)di/as (e)k tw=n e)o/ntwn, Hdt. iii. 14). The verb e)kpi/ptein serves thus as a passive to e)kba/llein, though the image is that of a chariot driver who is thrown out. Cf. the English phrase ‘fall through,’ as applied to a design or project.

ou)/te th| kolakikh|: sc. with which they might have saved themselves, according to Callicles' view (511 c, 486 b), but which Pericles despised.

<*>lla\ me/ntoi . . . mh/ pote: “But yet, the men of the present day are at least far from being able to,” etc.

o(\s (o(/stis)

bou/lei: used like the Lat. quivis, by a looseness of construction. 43 d triw=n ou)=n u)/ntwn h(mi=n w(=ntinwn bou/lei, 432 a o(/stis bou/lei a)/llos a)riqmo/s. Rid. § 189.

4 f.

w(/s ge diako/nous ei)=nai: as far, that is, as their being servants of the city is concerned. See Madv. § 151, GMT. 781, for examples. The distinction here drawn rests also, as is quickly shown, on what has been demonstrated in ch. XIX. ff. But it is more extensive.

metabiba/zein: “to give another direction to.” See on 493 a. This verb and e)pitre/pein are resumed by ou)de\n tou/twn, and depend on die/feron. A similar passage (without the intervening acc.) is 328 a a)lla\ ka)\n ei) o)li/gon e)/sti tis o(/stis diafe/rei h(mw=n probiba/sai ei)s a)reth/n, a)gaphto/n.

e)pitre/pein: we must supply a dat. from the preceding acc. See on 460 d. The verb has a slightly different sense in 504 c.

tou/twn: note the variety in the use of the pronouns; tou/twn is the same as tw=n nu=n above, and hence e)kei=noi is required to take the place of tou/tous above.

nau=s kte(.: cf. 455 d.

ei)=nai: equiv to o)ti h)=san.

ei)s to au)to\ perifero/menoi: similar in form, but not in meaning, to the English phrase “argument in a circle,” i.e. a coming back again to the point of departure. v. 456 b h(/komen ei)s ta\ pro/tera perifero/menoi.

a)llh/lwn: is to be connected, as a kind of subjective or possessive gen., with the following indirect question. See H. 733; Kr. 47, 10, 8. “Each other's language.”

ditth\ kte(.: notice the position of the ti\s, which belongs to ditth/, “a kind of doubled.” See on 491 c.

h( me\n e(te/ra: the second member of the correlation is divided into two parts of which the first is indicated by o(/ti e)/stin tis kte(. (below, e), and the other by th\n de\ . . . despoi/nas ei)=nai tou/twn (518 a).

h(=| . . . ei)=nai: the shift from the regular indir. disc. indic. to an inf. is not uncommon. x. 616 b e)/fh a)fiknei=sqai tetartai/ous o(/qen kaqora=n a)/nwqen kte(. Rid. § 281; GMT. 755.

21 f.

a)/ll' w(=n e)/rxetai kte(.: anything else, that the body comes to want.

poristiko\n ei)=nai kte(.: in what follows, three varieties are distin guished. The ka/phlos is the small dealer, hawker or shopkeeper, who deals properly with products of the land (among which are included wines in 518 b); the e)/mporos is the regular merchant and wholesale dealer. 313 c. The dhmiourgo/s is the one who prepares from the raw material the various articles demanded by the needs of the body.

skutodeyo/n: is unusual for bur- sode/yhs (tanner).

o)/nta toiou=ton: includes under one expression all the divisions and subdivisions of the por<*>stiko\n ei)=nai, but owing to the introduction of qaumasto/n e)stin the construction is changed and the partic. takes the place of the inf. What Socrates wishes to explain is that one who attends to the needs of the body, even though he may understand nothing of either gymnastics or medicine, may very easily himself become possessed of the idea that he is the genuine conserver of the body, as well as inspire the same belief in others.

panti\ tw=| mh\ ei)do/ti: added as a restrictive explanation to the preceding toi=s a)/llois, which is far too general a statement for Socrates.

28 f.

para\ tau/tas a(pa/sas: see on ta\s a)/llas kte(. below, 518 a.

douloprepei=s: plays on 485 b and similar expressions in the earlier conversation with Callicles, i.e. 485 d. The attributes of rhetoric and philosophy are just reversed.

ta\s a)/llas te/xnas: “arts ordinarily designated as such.”

*qeari/wn: and the followingnamed persons are sometimes mentioned by later authors, *mi/qaikos for example, among those whom Athenaeus xii. 12 cites as authors of works on cookery (ta\ o)yartutika/). The title of his work can be surmised from this passage. That the art of cookery, especially in rich and proud Syracuse, was early developed, Plato testifies in iii. 404 d *surakosi/an tra/pezan kai\ *sikelikh\n poikili/an <*>)/you. Cf. Hor. iii. I. 18 Siculae dapes. The a)rtoko/pos is at the same time a cake-baker. The a)/rtos made from wheat meal was a festival dainty, as is to be judged from Athenaeus iv. 14 *so/lwn de\ toi=s e)n prutanei/w| sitoume/nois ma=zan pare/xein keleu/ei, a)/rton de\ tai=s e(ortai=s prosparatiqe/nai. Sarambus probably had a wine-shop.

LXXIV.

i)/sws a)\n ou)=n h)gana/kteis: as Callicles really did when Socrates proved to him that he understood nothing at all of statecraft.

o(/ti: see on 521 b.

paraskeuasta\s a)nqrw/pous: the addition of a)nqrw/pous (“fellows”) is contemptuous.

kalo\n ka)gaqo\n: is used by Plato regularly of persons. Schanz, ii. 2 proll. 1, has collected only sixteen cases where it is not so used. Three such examples are found in the Gorgias, viz. 514 a, 526 a, in addition to the present passage.

peri\ au)tw=n: refers according to sense to gumnastikh=s, but is made general in view of b above.

4 f.

a)\n ou(/tw tu/xwsin: see on 514 e. Here, “if they so chance,” i.e. perhaps.

6 f.

prosapolou=sin . . . sa/rkas: Demosthenes expresses the same idea by a somewhat different simile in i. 15 w(/sper oi( daneizo/menoi r(a|di/ws e)pi\ toi=s mega/lois to/kois mikro\n eu)porh/santes xro/non u(/steron kai\ tw=n a)rxai/wn a)pe/sthsan. Also with the following a)ll' oi(\ a)\n au)toi=s tu/xwsin paro/ntes cf. Dem. i. 16 e)gw\ de\ ou)k a)gnow= me\n, w)= a)/ndres *)aqhnai=oi, tou=q' o(/ti polla/kis u(mei=s ou) tou\s ai)ti/ous, a)lla\ tou\s u(sta/tous peri\ tw=n pragma/twn ei)po/ntas e)n o)rgh=| poiei=sqe a)/n ti mh\ kata\ gnw/mhn e)kbh=|, ii. 34 o(rw= ga\r w(s ta\ polla\ e)ni/ous ou)k ei)s tou\s ai)ti/ous, a)ll' ei)s tou\s u(po\ xei=ra ma/lista th\n o)rgh\n a)fie/ntas.

oi( d' au)=: the construction is loose, but the context prevents ambiguity.

10 f.

h(/kh| fe/rousa: gives a picture,—“it is actually at hand, bringing disease with it,”—for the more prosaic “has brought about disease.” See on 491 c.

tou/tous: is defined by the following th\n po/lin. With kai/ fasi the subject changes, so that au)tou/s refers to the same as oi(/, while tou/tous furnishes the subject for kai/ fasi.

oi)dei= kai\ u(/poulo/s e)sti: the first term denotes an external swelling or bloated condition, which may, however, for the time have all the appearance of health; the latter, the internal and hence invisible seat of disease.

fo/rwn: duties and imposts which the Athenians imposed upon other states, but expended only for their own interests.

kai\ toiou/twn fluariw=n: with a side hit at 490 c and a more definite reference to 455 e. Cf. Dem. iii. 29, quoted on 490 c.

22 f.

tou\s to/te paro/ntas kte(.: again the same thought as in d above.

sou= . . . e)pilh/yontai: contains an allusion to 486 a. For the partitive gen., see H. 738 a, and on 469 c.

kai\ tou= e)mou= e(tai/rou *)alkibia/dou: on the value of this prophecy of Socrates for determining the date of this discussion, see Introd. § 19. For the reader, the life of Alcibiades will serve as a most convincing proof of the soundness of Socrates' statements.

o(rw), a)kou/w: Socrates desires to emphasize that in the past as well as the present the same thing has been repeating itself.

a)ganaktou/ntwn: depends upon ai)sqa/nomai with the omission of au)tw=n. The pl. is due to the plural idea, and to the a)ndrw=n. The statement holds good for all, though the action affects the individual only.

a)/ra: postpositive, as in 355 b w(s de\ tau=ta geloi=a/ e)sti kata/dhlon e)/stai e)a\n mh\ polloi=s o)no/masi xrw/meqa a)/ra. Here it serves to characterize the assumption as a result that follows of itself.

ou)d' a)\n ei(=s: see on 512 e.

o(/soi kte(.: loose connexion. The same case, “as well in regard to those who, etc. . . . as, etc.”

prospoiou=ntai: Socrates is thinking of the task which each class assumes, viz. to make the subject of their treatment better, to endow him with virtue. The pretended statesman promises this result to the whole body of citizens; the sophist, to the individual. Cf. Isocr. xiii. 5 f.

sfa)s au)tou/s: themselves indeed, with more emphasis than the simple sfa=s, which is more usual as the indir. reflexive. Cf. 520 b.

kai/: but little different from kai/ toi (and yet) in rejoinders, espepecially to statements made by the speaker. 29 b kai\ tou=to pw=s ou)k a)maqi/a e)sti/n; Dem. vi. 16 ka|i\ ti/s a)\n tau=ta pisteu/seien;

a)nqrw/pous a)gaqou\s kte(.: sc. as one must assume, according to the statement of the sophists. The addition of e)caireqe/ntas a)diki/an . . . a)dikei=n tou/tw| (just here lies the a)diki/a) o(\ ou)k e)/xousin serves to bring out very strongly the want of consistency in the theory.

sxo/ntas: after they had gotten. See on 503 e. 19 a, Soph. 1256 mo/lis ga\r e)/sxon nu=n e)leu/qeron sto/ma.

w(s a)lhqw=s dhmhgorei=n: here denotes the delivery of a long, connected discourse as opposed to dialectic investigation. It is also a reply to Callicles' accusation in 482 c w(s a)lhqw=s dhmhgo/ros w)/n.

LXXV.

e)/oika/ ge (sc. oi(=o/s t' ei)=nai kte(.): is a partial assent to the assertion implied in Callicles' question, “You would doubtless be quite capable,” etc.—The following clause with gou=n seems to be urged in proof, but it is really more of a complaint.

suxnou\s . . . tw=n lo/gwn: cf. 465 e suxno\n lo/gon a)pote/taka. The part. gen. emphasizes the distinctness of the arguments.—For the agreement of the adjective in gender and number with. the subst., cf. Xen. iii. 2. 2 pollh\n th=s xw/ras, iv. 5. 4 tw=n a)/rtwn tou\s h(mi/seis.