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I think also that this is said by them against common
sense, that Nature herself is indifferent, and yet that it is
good to agree with Nature. For it is not our duty either to
follow the law or be persuaded by argument, unless the
law and argument be good and honest. And this indeed
is the least of their errors. But if, as Chrysippus has
written in his First Book concerning Exhortation, a happy
life consists only in living according to virtue, other things
(as he says) being nothing to us, nor co-operating any ways
towards it, Nature is not only indifferent, but foolish also
and stupid, in inclining us to such things as belong nothing
to us; and we also are fools in thinking felicity to be an
agreeing with Nature, which draws us after such things as
contribute nothing to happiness. For what can be more
agreeable to common sense, than that, as desirable things
are requisite to live commodiously, so natural things are
necessary that we may live according to Nature? Now
these men say not so; but having settled the living according to Nature for their end, do nevertheless hold those
things which are according to Nature to be indifferent.
[p. 376]
Plutarch. Plutarch's Morals. Translated from the Greek by several hands. Corrected and revised by. William W. Goodwin, PH. D. Boston. Little, Brown, and Company. Cambridge. Press Of John Wilson and son. 1874. 4.
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