Where very far from hence, deep under ground,Having therefore said in his Third Book of Nature, that it is more expedient for a fool to live than not, though he should never attain to wisdom, he adds these words: ‘For such are the good things of men, that even evil things do in a manner precede other things that are in the middle place; not that these things themselves really precede, but reason, with which we should choose rather to live, though we were to be fools.’ Therefore also, [p. 384] though we were to be unjust, wicked, hated of the Gods, and unhappy; for none of these things are absent from those that live foolishly. Is it then convenient rather to live miserably than not to live miserably, and better to be hurt than not hurt, to be unjust than not unjust, to break the laws than not to break them? That is, is it convenient to do things that are not convenient, and a duty to live even against duty? Yes indeed, for it is worse to want sense and reason than to be a fool. What then ails them, that they will not confess that to be evil which is worse than evil? Why do they say that folly alone is to be avoided, if it is not less but rather more convenient to shun that disposition which is not capable of folly?
Lies a vast gulf.
1
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But the corollary which Chrysippus himself has
given for a conclusion to his doctrines seems to free us
from the trouble of saying any thing more about it. For
there being, says he, in Nature some things good, some
things bad, and some things between them both, which we
call indifferent; there is no man but would rather have
the good than the indifferent, and the indifferent than the
bad. And of this we call the Gods to witness, begging of
them by our prayers principally the possession of good
things, and if that may not be, deliverance from evil; not
desiring that which is neither good nor bad instead of
good, but willing to have it instead of evil. But this man,
changing Nature and inverting its order, removes the
middle out of its own place into the last, and brings back
the last into the middle,—not unlike to those tyrants who
give the first place to the wicked,—and he gives us a law,
first to seek the good, and secondly the evil, and lastly to
judge that worst which is neither good nor evil; as if any
one should place infernal things next to celestial, thrusting
the earth and earthly things into Tartarus,
1 Il. VIII. 14.
Plutarch. Plutarch's Morals. Translated from the Greek by several hands. Corrected and revised by. William W. Goodwin, PH. D. Boston. Little, Brown, and Company. Cambridge. Press Of John Wilson and son. 1874. 4.
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