Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America. Vol. 4.
Henry Coppee , LL.D., Ed.

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[492] They would have to be prepared to turn back if they encountered too great a resistance, or, the contrary being the case, to push as far as Shreveport, to retrace their steps immediately after having destroyed that place, the arsenals, depots, and the gunboats under its shelter. This plan presented grave difficulties: the Confederates had above the Alexandria falls two armored vessels which could not fail to disperse the Federal flotilla should the latter not be protected by some of Porter's ironclads, and they had erected around Shreveport fortifications which it would have been difficult to reduce without attempting a regular siege by the fleet and the army at the same time. A light expedition would therefore run great risks of failing before .Shreveport, the only military post whose destruction it was worth while to undertake. On the other hand, it would be necessary to proceed methodically, as had been done in the case of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Mississippi. If that of the Arkansas had been so easily wrested by Steele from the Confederates, the reason was that the upper part had been for a long time threatened by Blunt, and that the latter thus outflanked Holmes' defences at Little Rock. The same was not the case in regard to Red River. The Confederates on this river were flanked by Texas, and this offered them both a means of retreat and a base of operations. It would therefore be expedient to occupy successively the most important points on Red River—Fort de Russy, Alexandria, and Grand Écore; also to proceed in company with Porter's fleet, if it could ascend the river; if not, then establish along its course, while advancing, batteries which would protect the light boats laden with provisions against any offensive attack on the part of the Southern ironclads. It would also be necessary to carry on a regular siege against Shreveport, and during that time to put in working order the railroad from De Soto to Monroe, and complete for a length of fifty miles that from Monroe to Shreveport. This work could be accomplished in three months: at this cost the Federals would be sure to have a direct line of one hundred and twenty-five miles connecting them with the Mississippi at all seasons, without having to concern themselves about the navigation, so long, so dangerous, and so uncertain, of Red River. They could concentrate their forces in front of Shreveport, capture the place, and establish