Benjamnin F. Butler, Butler's Book: Autobiography and Personal Reminiscences of Major-General Benjamin Butler

[636] An attack was made in the night of the 19th of April, by the rebel ram. Flusser was killed by the recoil of a shell from a gun fired by his own hands; the Southfield was sunk; the Miami partially disabled and the rest of our fleet driven out of the Roanoke; the rebel gunboats commanded the town, and Plymouth, after a brave defence, was captured with some sixteen hundred men and considerable provisions.

By direction of the lieutenant-general, I ordered Washington, N. C., to be evacuated, and the troops sent to join the force preparing for the campaign. It will thus be seen that my opinion, given to the War Department upon taking command of this department, that Plymouth and Washington were worse than useless to us, was unhappily verified.

On the 9th of April, General Grant wrote to General Meade a letter¹ in which he set out his whole plan of campaign, which shows how fully at that time the plan of my operations became a fixed fact, and further, how fully it was determined that General Grant should strike the left flank of Lee and turn that so as to drive him into Richmond, which he afterwards did. But Grant was repulsed at the Battle of the Wilderness, so that it became necessary for him to march by his left flank and come down to co-operate with me against Lee, as he afterwards did, at City Point, Bermuda Hundred, and Petersburg.

In consultation with Gen. Wm. F. Smith, as to the movements of the enemy in North Carolina, the subject of my proposed army co-operation with the Army of the Potomac, by moving it to that State, was discussed with General Grant at his visit. Smith very much favored it, saying our army should be called the “Army of Cape Fear River.” I learned afterwards from General Smith that General Grant had considerably favored such co-operative movement before he came to Fortress Monroe, and that Smith himself was quite impressed with it, as, among other things, it would be a means of relieving our forces in North Carolina from their impending danger. Meanwhile, orders came to the quartermaster to prepare transportation for two and a half millions of rations to North Carolina. With this fact in view, knowing that General Smith had strongly advised a movement into North Carolina instead of up the James, and fearing lest the lieutenant-general,