47. ἀλλὰ παίζειν. The editors suppose that Socrates is here
turning the tables on Prodicus, who it is supposed meant his
criticism seriously, but the tone of the passage seems to imply
that Prodicus is in league with Socrates to make fun of Protagoras, who is represented throughout the whole dialogue as
lacking all sense of humour. It would not be wit, but sheer
buffoonery, in Plato to represent Prodicus as seriously believing
that Simonides had censured Pittacus for having said: ‘It is bad
to be good.’
48. καὶ σοῦ δοκεῖν ἀποπειρᾶσθαι. δοκεῖν is not pleonastic
after οἶμαι but means ‘think fit’—a very idiomatic use, cf. Aesch.
Ag. 16 ὅταν δ᾽ ἀείδειν ἢ μινύρεσθαι δοκῶ. See Class. Rev. III, 148,
where Mr Arthur Sidgwick discusses and illustrates this usage.
Plato. Protagoras. J. Adam & A. M. Adam. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1893.
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