17. φέρε δή. From here to l. 24 Socrates tries to prove that a
thing can have but one ἐναντίον. This is true only if we confine
ἐναντίον to the meaning of ‘contradictorily opposite’ throughout, e.g. if we are always content merely to assert that the
ἐναντίον of καλόν is μὴ καλόν: as soon as we say that its ἐναντίον
is αἰσχρόν we have given to the thing two opposites (one of them
multiform)—since μὴ καλόν is not αἰσχρόν but may be anything
in the whole world except καλόν. This part of the argument is
therefore also vitiated by neglecting the difference between
contrary and contradictory terms.
Plato. Protagoras. J. Adam & A. M. Adam. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1893.
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