Alfred Roman, The military operations of General Beauregard in the war between the states, 1861 to 1865

‘ [414] of his army’¹—words copied from General Kirby Smith's order of April 21st to his forces—were in striking contrast with his refusal, and his reasons given at the time for refusing,² to send assistance to General Hood, in his hard campaign around Nashville, after the battle of Franklin. Mr. Davis had, no doubt, forgotten the expression of opinion of the War Department (December 4th, 1864) concerning General Kirby Smith: that he had heretofore failed to respond to many calls made on him, and ‘that no plans should be based on his compliance.’³

General Beauregard also bitterly reflected upon General Sherman's long and slow march, from Atlanta to Savannah, from Savannah to Goldsboroa, and from Goldsboroa to Raleigh, a distance of 650 miles, which it had taken him 109 days, or an average of six miles a day, to accomplish. He knew that this had been effected, without material opposition, because of want of forethought on the part of the officers of the War Department, from whom no reinforcements could be obtained, and by reason of whose apathy no concentration could be made at any point, notwithstanding his repeated and urgent appeals. And what added keenness to his regret was the recollection that, had General Hood crossed the Tennessee River at Guntersville when he should have done so, he would have had ample time to destroy the scattered Federal forces in that part of the State, take Nashville, with all the supplies there collected, and march to the Ohio, without encountering serious obstacles. Or possibly he might, after taking Nashville, have crossed the Cumberland Mountains and gone to form a junction with General Lee, so as to strike General Grant before General Sherman could come to his assistance. The success of either movement might have compelled General