previous next
‘ [356] cities, and preparations should be made for this contingency.’1 The only difference between the two generals was, that General Lee saw the necessity of concentration too late, and failed to act upon it; whereas Beauregard saw it much earlier, and would have tried to carry it to a successful conclusion, had the power been given him to execute his plans. That General Grant himself dreaded the effects of such ‘folly’—i. e., the concentration proposed and the demand for reinforcements by General Beauregard —is conclusively shown by the following quotation from General Badeau's book: ‘At this time again Grant saw reason to apprehend a movement of Lee before Richmond or Petersburg, either to screen the withdrawal of the rebel army, or to distract attention from operations elsewhere.’2 And General Grant is reported to have said, on the 25th of February: ‘Deserters from the rebel lines, north of the James, say it is reported among them that Hill's corps has left, or is leaving, to join Beauregard.’3 That, late as it was, the course proposed by General Beauregard was the true strategic measure to adopt, is shown by the apprehension of the enemy. And General Badeau again quotes, as follows, General Grant's words to General Meade, on the 3d of March:‘For the present, it is better for us to hold the enemy where he is than to force him South. * * * To drive the enemy from Richmond now would endanger the success of these columns’4—meaning Sherman's and Schofield's.

And what was General Beauregard attempting to compass, with a view to a successful conclusion of the war? That the end had been nearly reached by both contending parties was evident at the time, and has been set forth, with startling certainty, by researches among the Federal archives. The desire for peace was eager all over the North; and any decisive victory or series of victories, on our part, would not only have disheartened our adversaries, by re-opening before them a vista of long and protracted struggles, with levies of men now become most exacting, but would have reanimated the whole South, and brought back thousands of absentees to our ranks. Under such circumstances,

1 General Lee's communication, of February 19th, 1865, to General Breckinridge, Secretary of War, in Appendix.

2 ‘Military History of Ulysses S. Grant,’ vol. III., p. 394.

3 Ibid., vol. III., p. 395.

4 Ibid., vol. III., p. 405.

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.

An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.

hide Places (automatically extracted)

View a map of the most frequently mentioned places in this document.

Download Pleiades ancient places geospacial dataset for this text.

hide People (automatically extracted)
Sort people alphabetically, as they appear on the page, by frequency
Click on a person to search for him/her in this document.
Ulysses S. Grant (5)
G. T. Beauregard (5)
R. E. Lee (3)
Badeau (2)
W. T. Sherman (1)
C. J. M. Schofield (1)
Meade (1)
D. H. Hill (1)
John C. Breckinridge (1)
hide Dates (automatically extracted)
Sort dates alphabetically, as they appear on the page, by frequency
Click on a date to search for it in this document.
February 19th, 1865 AD (1)
March 3rd (1)
February 25th (1)
hide Display Preferences
Greek Display:
Arabic Display:
View by Default:
Browse Bar: