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but too glad to be able to reserve our ammunition for more important work.
Longstreet pointed out to
Lee the enemy's position on the
Round Tops and the danger of withdrawing
Hood and
McLaws from our right flank, which would be necessary if they were to take part in the attack upon the enemy's left centre.
Lee recognized the necessity and substituted six brigades from
Hill's corps.
His report says: —
‘Longstreet was delayed by a force occupying the high rocky hills on the enemy's extreme left, from which his troops could be attacked in reverse as they advanced.
His operations had been embarrassed the day previous from the same cause and he now deemed it necessary to defend his flank and rear by the divisions of Hood and McLaws.
He was, therefore, reenforced by Heth's division and two of Pender's brigades to the command of which Trimble was assigned.’1
Longstreet further objected that the enemy's artillery on the ‘high rocky hills’ would enfilade the lines assaulting the left centre.
Col. Long, of
Lee's staff, in his
Memoirs of Lee, writes:—
‘This objection was answered by Col. Long who said that the guns on Round Top could be suppressed by our batteries.
This point being settled, the attack was ordered and Longstreet was directed to carry it out.’
Longstreet, in his
Manassas to Appomattox, describing the same conversation, gives further detail as follows: —
‘I asked the strength of the column.
He (Lee) stated, 15,000.
Opinion was then expressed that the 15,000 men who could make successful assault over that field had never been arrayed for battle; but he was impatient of listening and tired of talking, and nothing was left but to proceed.’
It seems remarkable that the assumption of
Col. Long so easily passed unchallenged that Confederate guns in open and inferior positions could ‘suppress’ Federal artillery fortified upon commanding ridges.
Our artillery equipment was usually admitted to be inferior to the enemy's in numbers, calibres and quality of ammunition.
Moreover, here, the point selected and the method of the attack would certainly have been chosen for us by the enemy had they had the choice.
Comparatively the