‘In order to guard against disaster the infantry was to be preceded by artillery, and the movement postponed until later in the evening, so that, if compelled to retire, it would be under the cover of night. Owing to unexpected delays the movement could not be gotten ready until late in the evening. The first gun had hardly moved forward from the wood 100 yards when the enemy's artillery reopened, and so completely swept our front as to satisfy me that the proposed movement should be abandoned.’A. P. Hill's division, which bore the brunt of the fighting on the 13th, out of 11,000, lost 2122 men. Early's, which came to his support, lost 932 out of 7500. The other divisions lost less than 200 each, principally from the heavy artillery fire which the enemy threw into the woods. Meade's division, out of 5000, lost 1853, and Gibbon lost 1267. So the casualties of the two
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now the only activity until near sundown, which occurred about 4.45.
Burnside, at 1 P. M., had sent orders to Franklin to attack with the 6th corps on the right of Gibbon, and at 2 P. M. had repeated the order urgently and explicitly.
But about this time Meade and Gibbon were driven back, and pursued, and put so completely out of action that fresh divisions had to replace them.
When his left had been made secure, Franklin thought it too late to organize a fresh attack.
Jackson had noted within the Federal lines movements of troops and artillery with which they were preparing themselves to resist further attack.
He had misinterpreted them, and supposed them to be preparations for a renewed assault.
His appetite for battle had not been satisfied, and seeing the heavy force at the enemy's disposal, he could not believe that they would be content with an affair of only two or three divisions.
He accordingly waited to receive the expected assault, and finally, when it did not materialize, he determined to take the offensive himself.
Apparently, he did not yet fully appreciate that the enemy's position was practically a citadel.
But he fortunately discovered it in time.
While his assault was being prepared, he had indulged in some preliminary cannonading, which had put the enemy fully on the alert.
In his official report, he writes: —
1907.
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