Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 1

‘ [563] roost. They have a force equal to theirs in their front, who outnumber them in artillery. It is not possible to carry the place by assault. Palmer made the attempt to turn it yesterday with Baird's and Cruft's divisions, but was met by an equal force, and in an equally strong position as at Buzzard's roost. After expending nearly all his ammunition, he retired, during the night, to Catoosa platform. Our transportation is poor and limited. We are not able to carry more than sixty rounds per man. Artillery-horses so poor that General Palmer could bring but sixteen pieces. The country is stripped entirely of subsistence and forage. The enemy's cavalry is much superior to ours. Prisoners taken yesterday report that a portion of Cleburne's division¹ . . . . I will wait the developments of this day, and advise you further.’

To this, Grant sent the following reply: ‘It is of the highest importance that the enemy should be held in full belief that an advance into the heart of the South is intended, until the fate of Sherman is fully known. The difficulties of supplies can be overcome by keeping your trains running between Chattanooga and your position. . . .’ Thomas, accordingly, remained in force near Dalton, as long as he could supply himself. On the 29th, Grant reported to Halleck: ‘He is back now to Dalton, where he hopes to be able to haul supplies until the railroad can be completed to him.’ Schofield could not follow Longstreet further than Strawberry plains, because every step took him from