Designs of the enemy.
It is every day becoming more apparent that the
Yankee despotism, despairing of conquering us by means of pitched battles, in which they have rarely ever failed to be worsted, have changed their plans, and now hope to wear us out by starvation and the force of their superior numbers.
They have, with a want of faith which it is scandalous even to think of, taken every opportunity to violate the cartel solemnly established by duly authorized commissioners, under the hope of forcing us to abrogate it; and, finding that object unattainable, they have abrogated it themselves.
They will exchange no more prisoners, hoping that the vast number left on our hands will assist them more effectually where they are, by consuming our provisions, than they could hope them to do in the field of battle.
They can afford to spare them, they think, because their places will be supplied from
Ireland and
Germany, while the
Confederate prisoners whom they detain cannot be replaced from our smaller population.
This is an ingenious calculation — such a calculation as a people naturally cowardly and more disposed to effect their objects by trickery than by strength would be likely to resort to. The remedy is to feed
their prisoners on the smallest possible allowance consistent with the bare preservation of life — to take as few hereafter as possible, and to instil into our troops the duty of never surrendering as long as there remains the least possible hope of opening a passage by the sword or the bayonet.
The indecisive character of the battles which we have heretofore fought greatly assists the enemy in carrying out his schemes.
We have been almost always victorious, yet we have never in a single instance derived any benefit from our victories, and in all of them we have lost a vast number of men. We have not the least doubt that in his three battles, in
Kentucky,
Tennessee, and
Georgia,
General Bragg lost as many men as the victorious party lost in the three battles of
Marengo,
Austerlitz, and
Jena, each of which struck down an Empire.
Yet
General Bragg, although victorious in all his battles, not only gained nothing, but lost ground.
It is difficult to understand of what use such victories can be to us, when the results have been such.
A defeat could hardly have produced a catastrophe more unfavorable to us. The enemy is vastly more numerous than we. He knows that in every battle we fight we lose large numbers of men, although we may be victorious, and that we find it difficult to replace them.
He knows, too, that although he may lose two to one, he can more easily replace those two than we can replace that one.
Thus he hopes finally to wear us out by the mere force of numbers, as the Russians did the Poles in the revolution of 1831.
The Poles defeated them in every battle; but in every battle the Poles lost men, which their scanty numbers did not enable them to replace, and thus in the end they were exhausted by their own success.
There is but one way to prevent the recurrence of such a misfortune here, and that is to push our victories when we gain them and to gather some fruit from them.
In general, we have been contented with merely gaining the victory.
We never think of pushing it to its legitimate conclusion.
We vote it imprudent to follow up an enemy who is flying for life.
It is very prudent, however, to let him get to a place of safety, where he can recruit at his leisure.
Then he comes out, and it is very prudent to fight another desperate battle, in which we lose four times as many men as we should have lost had we followed him while he was disorganized by defeat.
We do not profess to understand the sense of such tactics.
Not being military, of course it is not to be expected that we should; but we can see that if they be pursued much further we shall begin to want recruits very badly.
