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[728] council of war a few hours previous. The rain, which follows the mist of the day before, seems to presage another rise in the waters of the river, which will detain the enemy for one or two days more. With the exception of a slight forward movement on his right to cover Hagerstown at the south-west, he only orders new reconnoissances to be made, the result of which he is waiting for in order to decide what course to pursue. But Lee's outposts, both very strong and extremely active, keep the Federals at a distance of one hundred and fifty or two hundred yards: the latter, blinded by the rain, can only discover such of the enemy's positions as he allows to be seen. Sedgwick, who has made a half-wheel to the left in order to form a connection with the Eleventh corps, posted on the Williamsport road above Hagerstown, perceives a continuous line of intrenchments. Howard and Kilpatrick, on the extreme right, are under the impression that the enemy might be turned on that side, but they make no effort to ascertain definitely, the cavalry not being authorized to advance in the direction of the Conococheague, where it would only have encountered Stuart's troops; while the Eleventh corps merely drives from Hagerstown toward the Clear Spring road a small detachment of Ramseur's brigade of Rodes' division, which is easily repulsed. This inaction, however, astonishes the Federal soldiers, making them uneasy. Meade finally realizes his danger. It may be that a despatch which he received during the evening has opened his eyes. General Kelley telegraphs him at half-past 4 o'clock from Fairview, on the upper Potomac, that Lee, according to reliable information, has at last succeeded in throwing a ponton across. Consequently, at nine o'clock in the evening he finally makes up his mind as to his course. He decides to make a direct attack, thinking, no doubt, that a manoeuvre along the right would require too much time. The four army corps forming his left and centre, each of them with at least one division, are to make a reconnoissance in force at seven o'clock in the morning of the next day, holding themselves ready to march against the weakest point of the enemy's line. In a section of country easy to defend and difficult to penetrate this mode of
Philadelphia, Jos. H. Coates and co., 1883.
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