Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 3

At all events, so Sheridan thought and felt. He was aware that critical and instant movements might be precipitated. Lee might even yet turn on him with the bulk of what remained of the rebel army; he was himself isolated still from Grant. He must have a man who shared his spirit and would carry out his orders, and Warren, whatever his merits, was not this man.

Yet there need be no suspicion of Warren's patriotism or gallantry. He was as desirous of success as Sheridan himself; he lost a horse under him in this battle, and doubtless was thunderstruck when the order came for him to be relieved. His accomplishments no one denied; his abilities under certain contingencies would have been all sufficient. He simply did not possess that daring impetuosity, that splendid enthusiasm, that prompt, impatient, irresistible spirit which in other emergencies is indispensable. He was not a soldier to wring victory out of defeat, to seize upon an instant, to move without regard to flanks or reserves or even the enemy, to forget everything but the order to advance. Grant had found this out before, and supported Sheridan fully on this occasion.

The general-in-chief had three aides-de-camp with Sheridan this day, sending them in succession to communicate his views. Colonel Porter was instructed first to say that the movements of the main army would very much depend upon the result of Sheridan's operations; that Grant would have preferred to send him the Sixth corps, but it was at too great