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[450] and even entered the enemy's breastworks at one or two points; but they soon wavered and fell back in confusion and great slaughter. Notwithstanding the disastrous upshot of this assault, the experience of which had taught the troops that the work assigned them was really hopeless,1 a second charge was ordered an hour after the failure of the first. The repulse of this was even more complete than that of the former effort; and the loss in the two attacks was between five and six thousand, while it is doubtful whether the enemy lost as many hundreds. Among the killed was Brigadier-General Rice of the Fifth Corps, distinguished for his in trepid bearing on many fields. On the left of Warren an assault by part of the Sixth Corps met with more success. Upton's brigade, in a vigorous charge, carried the enemy's first line of intrenchments, capturing nine hundred prisoners and several guns. But as this operation was unsupported the advantage could not be maintained, and after nightfall Upton withdrew, leaving the captured guns behind.2 In these operations before the lines of Spottsylvania, General Grant had carried out with much fidelity, but very indifferent success, his own principle of hammering continuously. Better results, however, at length rewarded his persevering efforts under sounder combinations. Thus far the attacks had been mainly directed against Lee's left. It was now resolved to make a sudden sally against
1 This conclusion the men had really formed, and this was precisely one of those cases in which the troops, thus viewing the task given them to do, showed a nervous wavering and a behavior very unlike that which was common with them. ‘Ward's brigade,’ says General Hancock, ‘retired in disorder, until rallied by my own staff and that of General Birney.’ ‘Birney's men,’ writes a staff-officer, ‘in fact became scared and ran back a quarter of a mile behind some old breastworks.’ It is only those who know little of the motives which influence troops that would mistake such conduct for pusillanimity.
2 General Meade attributes the failure of this operation to the fact that Up ton was not supported, as had been designed he should be, by Mott's division of the Second Corps on his left.—Report of the Rapidan Campaign.
1866.
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