Oliver Otis Howard, Autobiography of Oliver Otis Howard, major general , United States army : volume 1

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[352] off of his entire cavalry force. But for that there is little doubt that, humanly speaking, Lee would have been defeated. Stoneman would have curtained our movements, occupied the attention of Stuart, guarded our right flank, and let General Hooker and his corps commanders know what maneuvers of Lee were in progress before the wilderness and its deceptive wilds had been reached. But at the outset we were divorced from this potential helpmate. Pleasonton's brigade, which was left to Iooker, was too small to subdivide, so that we were usually left to skirmishers, scouts, and reconnoissance from the infantry arm to ascertain what the enemy was about. From this one mistake arose a dozen others, which contributed to our final discomfiture.

The orders of April 27th made the left wing to consist of the First, Third, and Sixth Corps, Sedgwick to command.

According to instructions, Reynolds took his command (the First Corps) to the lower place, near Pollock's Mills Creek. The Sixth Corps undertook Franklin's old crossing just below the mouth of the Deep Run. With some little delay and after overcoming the enemy's pickets, Wadsworth's division of Reynolds's corps was firmly established on the other shore, and the remainder of that corps held at hand.

The Sixth Corps was equally successful, and Brooks's division, aided by a battery, held a stone bridgehead below Fredericksburg and kept the way open for his corps. The preliminaries to all this work --Hunt planting the helpful artillery and Benham bringing up his bridges, and the concentration of the troops — were thoroughly provided for and executed with secrecy and dispatch; yet General Lee's watchful