Rebellion Record: a Diary of American Events: Documents and Narratives, Volume 6.
Frank Moore, Ed.

[232] miles beyond Charleston, and marched to Mitchell's Cross-Roads, twelve miles from the mouth of the Coldwater, where we found that Gen. Hovey had sent forward to that point about one thousand two hundred infantry, with four field-pieces. I had scarcely arrived at Mitchell's Cross-Roads, when word came into camp that two companies of infantry, sent out by Col. Spicely on the Panola road as a picket, were fighting, and in danger of being cut off. Without an instant's waiting. I threw my force forward--Captain Walker, of the First Indiana, with his little howitzers in front, and Major Birge, of the Ninth Illinois cavalry, immediately following. As soon as we came in sight of the enemy, Capt. Walker and Major Birgebrought their guns into position, and a few well-directed shots sent the enemy flying. The enemy was posted on the north side of the Yockna, a deep stream about one hundred and twenty-five feet wide, crossed by a ferry. I immediately threw a portion of Capt. Walker's command across the stream, who pursued them lively for a few miles, until further pursuit was useless. This force was part of Stark's cavalry. Being now entirely out of rations, I sent in to the mouth of the Coldwater, where the supply train was, for two days rations, to be sent out during the night, intending to in early next morning, and endeavor to reach Coffeeville. My men had their horses saddled up, and in readiness at daylight, but no rations came. Owing to the breaking-down of wagons, they did not come up so that the rations could be distributed before two o'clock P. M. This day, (Tuesday, Dec. 2,) it rained incessantly all day. Owing to the want of rations, not being able to march on Coffeeville, and knowing that the enemy were in considerable force at Panola, on the Tallahatchie, fourteen miles from my camp, where they had fortified to defend the crossing, and also at Belmont, seven miles further up the river, I concluded that I would go up there and reconnoitre, and, if possible, drive these forces away, so as to leave no force in my rear when I should move toward Coffeeville the following day. I left camp about two P. M., and rode rapidly to Panola. About one and a half miles before reaching the town, we came upon their camp, (apparently a very large one,) but we found nobody to receive us, they having fled the night before. I sent Major Birge with the Ninth Illinois cavalry forward, who took possession of the town, and captured a few prisoners. We also ascertained from negroes who had been at work on the fortifications at Belmont, that they abandoned their works there, and fled in great precipitation when they heard of our approach. After occupying Panola we returned, same night. to our camp near Mitchell's Cross-Roads. I did not disturb the railroad at Panola, or burn any bridges, having rendered it useless to the rebels, and knowing we should want to use it very shortly. The next morning early I took up my line of march for Coffeeville via Oakland. I ordered Col. Spicely, who was in command of the advanced infantry and artillery force, to throw forward for my support as far as Oakland six hundred infantry, and two field-pieces, which he did, under the command of Lieut.-Col. Torrence, Iowa Thirtieth infantry. The roads were very heavy, and the march was tedious. As we approached Oakland, information was, that there was no enemy there, and had been none since Sunday night, but about one mile before reaching town, the advance-guard from the First Indiana came in sight of two or three rebel pickets. Each party fired, and the pickets fled, hotly pursued.

The road here was narrow, and the ground on both sides covered with a dense growth of small saplings, with a fence on each side. The advance immediately formed in line, so far as the nature of the ground would admit. They found the rebels dismounted, and drawn up in line in large force in a most advantageous position. The advance stood their ground manfully, and delivered their fire with great coolness and precision. After delivering their fire, the enemy charged upon them in great force, and the ground being such as to render it impossible for them to re-form, they were compelled to fall back about two hundred yards, to an opening where I was able to deploy to the right and left of the road. Supposing that this force was the large cavalry force that occupied Oakland on Sunday night, I felt impelled to move with much caution, and beat up the woods as I proceeded. This occupied some little time, we in the mean-time having got our howitzers in position and shelled the woods in all directions where an enemy seemed probable. Advancing with our lines extended, we entered the town just in time to get sight of the enemy. Col. Stephens, commanding the Second brigade, having deployed on the left, was first to enter the town, and as soon as he came in sight of the enemy, charged upon them, and drove them with great rapidity through the town and down the road to Coffeeville. We captured a number of prisoners, horses, and arms, and five thousand rounds of Minie ball-cartridges; and we found, at different houses in town, about a dozen so badly wounded that they could not be taken away — among them Captain Griffin of the First Texas Legion, whose arm was shattered by a pistol-ball. Some of their wounded were fatally so. I have to report no loss of men during the engagement, but about ten were wounded, only one of whom seriously so. The First Indiana lost eight or ten horses, which were killed during the engagement, and my body-guard had six horses killed, and Lieut. Myers, commanding the body-guard, had his horse shot under him, and a bullet shot through his coat. I regret to have to report that, during the confusion that ensued when the enemy charged on the head of our column, and before the First Indiana could get their guns in position, one of them, which had been too far advanced to the front, was captured and borne of<*> by the enemy. This is the only event of the expedition that I have cause to regret; and yet, knowing as I did, from personal observation, the determined character of the first onset of the enemy, I do not regard the event as surprising, or one for which the company to which the gun belonged as censurable. The conduct of Captain