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[280] term of service was expiring. General John Pope was fully occupied in North Missouri with nearly all my disposable force, which was required to hold in check rebellion in that quarter. For the defense of Cairo B. M. Prentiss had 8 regiments, but 6 were three-months men, at the end of their term, unpaid, and unwilling to reenlist. At Springfield General Lyon had about 6000 men, unpaid and badly fed, and in need of clothing. In this condition he was in hourly expectation of being attacked by the enemy, who was advancing in three times his nominal strength. This was the situation to be met at the outset. The arms and equipments for 23,000 men which I had gathered at New York I now found had been diverted from my department and sent to Virginia. I had no money and the Government no credit; but the chief difficulty was the want of arms. There was no want of men. The loyal population of the North-western States flocked to the Union standard; the German population with a noble unanimity. Having these conditions to face, on the 26th of July I telegraphed my needs to Montgomery Blair, whom I had known intimately. In reply he telegraphed, “I find it impossible to get any attention to Missouri or Western matters from the authorities here. You will have to do the best you can and take all needful responsibility to defend and protect the people over whom you are specially set.” Two days afterward Secretary Seward telegraphed to ask what disposition I had made of the arms I had purchased in Europe, asking for an invoice. I telegraphed him that I needed to use these arms for my department, that I had absolutely no arms, and that the situation of the State was critical. On the 30th I sent to the President, as had been arranged, an unofficial letter setting forth the condition of my command. I informed him that the treasurer of the United States at St. Louis had $300,000 entirely unappropriated, but had refused my request for $100,000 to be delivered to my paymaster-general. I said to him that there were three courses open to me: “First, to let the enemy possess himself of some of the strongest points in the State and threaten St. Louis, which is insurrectionary; second, to force a loan from the secession banks here; third, to use the money belonging to the Government which is in the treasury. . . . This morning I will order the treasurer to deliver the money in his possession to General Andrews and will send a force to the treasury to take the money, and will direct such payments as the exigency requires. I will hazard everything for the defense of the department you have confided to me, and I trust to you for support.” To the propositions of this letter the President gave the tacit approval of not replying, and I acted upon it. I had no time to lose. The situation of Lyon at Springfield was critical, and the small disintegrating garrison at Cairo was hourly exposed to assault by an overpowering force. Among the various points threatened, Cairo was the key to the success of my operations. The waterways and the district around Cairo were of first importance. Upon the possession of this district depended the descent and control of the Mississippi Valley by the Union armies, or the inroad by the Confederate forces into the loyal States.
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