J. E. Sandys, Select Private Orations of Demosthenes

ὧν μὴ εἶναι δίκας Infin. in relative clause influenced by λέγοντος. ‘Among other cases in which an action cannot be maintained, those especially in which a discharge and release have been given or received.’

εἰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The sense is, ‘If it is just that, when once a case has been tried, it should not be tried again, even although the defeated litigant might fairly plead that the court had been imposed upon, a fortiori there is no ground for re-opening the question when a man has judged his own case and has palpably decided against himself by giving and receiving a discharge.’

μηκέτ᾽ ἐξεῖναι δικάζεσθαι Or. 38 § 16 ἅπαξ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τὰς δίκας. 20 Lept. § 147 οἱ νόμοι δ᾽ οὐκ ἐῶσι δὶς πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν οὔτε δίκας οὔτ᾽ εὐθυνας οὔτε διαδικασίαν οὔτ᾽ ἄλλο τοιοῦτ᾽ οὐδὲν εἶναι.

ἐξηπατήθητε Or. 37 § 20 περὶ ὧν ἔγνω τὸ δικαστήριον, ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὡς ἐξαπατηθὲν τοῦτ᾽ ἐποίησε ...ἃ δ᾽ αὐτὸς ἐπείσθη καὶ ἀφῆκεν, οὐκ ἔνι δήπουθεν εἰπεῖν οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸν αἰτιάσασθαι ὡς οὐ δικαίως ταῦτ᾽ ἐποίησεν.

αὑτοῦ...καταγνοὺς The two subsequent participles are subordinate in construction to καταγνούς. ‘He who has clearly condemned (given a verdict against) himself by both granting and getting a release and discharge.’ Madvig, Gr. Synt. § 176, d.

ἀφεὶς καὶ ἀπαλλάξας It is clear the words do not mean the same thing, for below we have γέγονεν ἀμφότερα: καὶ γὰρ ἀφῆκε καὶ ἀπήλλαξε. Similarly 37 § 1 and 38 § 1 after ἀφεὶς καὶ ἀπαλλάξας we have γεγενημένων ἀμφοτέρων, and in 37 § 19 after ὧν ἂν ἀφῇ καὶ ἀπαλλάξῃ τις we have ἀμφότερ᾽ ἐστὶ πεπραγμένα.

ἀφιέναι is very frequently used of the lender, or the landlord, who, on settlement of his claims, releases the borrower or the tenant from all further liability (§§ 10, 15, 16, 17, 24; 45 §§ 5, 40). Similarly of a ward releasing his guardian from all further claims, in 38 §§ 3, 4, 6, 18, 27; and of a creditor forgiving a debt, 53 §§ 8, 13. Cf. 56 §§ 26, 28, 29.

ἀπαλλάττειν often refers to the debtor or tenant getting quit of his creditor or landlord by discharging or compromising the debt (34 § 22 τοὺς δανείσαντας ἀπήλλαξεν, 49 § 17; 53 § 11; 33 § 9; 24 § 37; Andoc. 1 § 122; Lysias 29 § 1 and Isaeus Or. 5 Dicaeog. § 28 ἀπαλλάττειν τοὺς χρήστας). Settling a cross account between lessor and lessee (e.g. Apoll. and Phormion) would involve a double release and quittance on either side. Cf. 33 § 12 τῶν συναλλαγμάτων ἀφεῖμεν καὶ ἀπηλλάξαμεν ἀλλήλους ὥστε μήτε τούτῳ πρὸς ἐμὲ μήτ᾽ ἐμοὶ πρὸς τοῦτον πρᾶγμ᾽ εἶναι μηδέν, and § 3 ὅσα μὲν ἐμοὶ καὶ τούτῳ ἐγένετο συμβόλαια, πάντων ἀπαλλαγῆς καὶ ἀφέσεως γενομένης.

The present passage is the subject of the following article in Harpocration. ἀφεὶς καὶ ἀπαλλάξας: τὸ μὲν ἀφεὶς ὅταν ἀπολύσῃ τίς τινα τῶν ἐγκλημάτων ὧν ἐνεκάλει αὐτῷ, τὸ δὲ ἀπαλλάξας, ὅταν πείσῃ τὸν ἐγκαλοῦντα ἀποστῆναι καὶ μηκέτι ἐγκαλεῖν (recte): Δημοσθένης ἐν τῇ ὑπὲρ Φορμίωνος παραγραφῇ. (With ἀπαλλάξας, ὅταν πείσῃ κ.τ.λ., cf. Or. 37 § 20 ἂ δ᾽ αὐτὸς ἐπείσθη καὶ ἀφῆκεν.) ἔστι δὲ καὶ οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἀφίησι μέν τις αὐτῶν μόνον ὧν ἂν ἐγκαλῇ, ἀπαλλάττει δὲ, ὅταν μηδὲ ἄλλον τινὰ λόγον ύπολίπηται ἑαυτῷ πρὸς τὸν ἐγκαλούμενον. Δημοσθένης ἐν τῇ ὑπὲρ Φορμίωνος παραγραφῇ “ἵν᾽ ἀραλλαγή τις αὐτῷ γένηται ραπ<*> ὑμῶν κυπία” (§ 2). Cf. Or. 37 §§ 1, 16, 19; Or. 38 §§ 1, 5; Or. 33 § 3. In Bekker's Anecdota pp. 202, 469 we find the same explanation as that which is given in the first part of Harpocration's article.

In Shilleto's copy of Kennedy's translation I find a manuscript note in which, after quoting the explanation given in Bekker's Anecdota, he adds: “This is a clear statement and exactly in accordance with the meaning of the words: ἀφίημι, ‘I let go, one whom I have a hold of’; ἀπαλλάττω, ‘I get rid of one who has a hold of me.’ So I ἀφίημι a man on whom I have a claim by my condoning the debt, by receiving payment, postponing it, &c.; I ἀπαλλάττω a man who has a claim on me, by his condoning the debt, by my paying it, by my putting off the payment-day. So he who ἀφίὴσιν, ἀπαλλάττεται [passive]; he who ἀπαλλάττει, ἀφίεται [passive]. I cannot conceive anything plainer.” But owing to the twofold use of ἀπαλλάττειν, both of setting free and getting rid of another, the question is not really quite as simple as this would make it appear. Thus in Isocr. Trapez. § 26, after ἀφειμἐνος and ἀφεῖσθαι τῶν ἐγκλημάτων have been used in §§ 23, 25 of one who is ‘released from all claims,’ the same person is described as ἀπηλλαγμένος τῶν ἐγκλημάτων, which is possibly a middle use, ‘having got himself quit of all claims.’—The distinction drawn in Platner's Process I 146, is that ἀφιέναι regards the release from an existing obligation mainly from the point of view of the person granting the release, whereas ἀπαλλάττειν implies a twofold transaction and an agreement on the part of both the persons concerned.— Kennedy, on p. 230 of his translation of Dem. Pant., approves of Pabst's supposition that ‘the two Greek verbs have no distinct meanings’; and similarly Mr Paley held that ‘although a shade of difference might be traced, and perhaps originally existed between them, they had practically become synonyms.’ Reasons have been given above for dissenting from this view.