Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, Book 25
Frank Gardener Moore, Professor Emeritus in Columbia University, Ed.

20. The siege of Capua was resumed with intensity by the consuls, and all that was needed for the purpose was being brought together and made ready. [2] Casilinum was the depot for grain. At the mouth of the Volturnus, where there is now a city, a stronghold was fortified, and there and at Puteoli,¹ which Fabius Maximus had previously fortified, a garrison was placed, that the sea in that neighbourhood and the river might be in their power. [3] To these two strongholds by the sea the grain which had been sent recently from Sardinia and that which the praetor Marcus Junius had purchased in Etruria was transported from Ostia, so that the army might have a supply through the winter. [4] But in addition to the disaster incurred in Lucania, the army of [p. 421]slavevolunteers also, which had served with the utmost² loyalty while Gracchus lived, abandoned its standards, as if discharged by the death of the general.

Hannibal did not wish that Capua should be neglected nor his allies abandoned in such a crisis. [5] But in view of a success due to the rashness of one Roman general he was eager for an opportunity to surprise a second general and army. [6] Apulian legates were informing him that the praetor Gnaeus Fulvius had at first been very active while besieging some Apulian cities which had revolted to Hannibal; but that later, owing to unmerited success, both he himself and his soldiers, who were loaded with booty, had gone to such lengths in licence and indifference that there was no military discipline. [7] Hannibal, who frequently at other times, and particularly within a few days, had discovered what an army is under an incompetent general, moved his camp into Apulia.