[333d]
At first Protagoras appeared to be coy, alleging that the argument was too disconcerting: however he consented at length to make answer. Well now, I said, begin at the beginning, and tell me, do you consider people to be temperate when they are unjust?Let us suppose so, he said.And by being temperate you mean being sensible?Yes.And being sensible is being well-advised in their injustice?Let us grant it, he said.Does this mean, I asked, if they fare well by their injustice, or if they fare ill?If they fare well.Now do you say there are things that are good?I do.Then, I asked, are those things good which are profitable to men?
This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.
An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.

