hide Sorting

You can sort these results in two ways:

By entity
Chronological order for dates, alphabetical order for places and people.
By position (current method)
As the entities appear in the document.

You are currently sorting in ascending order. Sort in descending order.

hide Most Frequent Entities

The entities that appear most frequently in this document are shown below.

Entity Max. Freq Min. Freq
Massachusetts (Massachusetts, United States) 386 0 Browse Search
William H. Seward 168 0 Browse Search
Daniel Webster 145 1 Browse Search
Abraham Lincoln 132 2 Browse Search
Europe 130 0 Browse Search
John Brown 126 0 Browse Search
France (France) 110 0 Browse Search
William Lloyd Garrison 110 0 Browse Search
Louis Napoleon 96 0 Browse Search
New England (United States) 92 0 Browse Search
View all entities in this document...

Browsing named entities in a specific section of Wendell Phillips, Theodore C. Pease, Speeches, Lectures and Letters of Wendell Phillips: Volume 1. Search the whole document.

Found 636 total hits in 106 results.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Cushing (search for this): chapter 9
the act of 1850. This is another technical evasion, but not as good even as the first; because, in the Sims case, (7 Cushing, 285,) which Mr. Loring cites, Judge Shaw holds the act of 1850 constitutional, because it is so precisely like the act was not a fugitive slave, and so not within the Fugitive Slave Law provisions. Our own Supreme Court has decided (see 7 Cushing, 298) that a slave on board a national vessel with his master, by express permission of the Navy Secretary, who had been Gentlemen, as every reader would, and would have a right to conclude, that this sentence, quoted from the 319th page of Cushing's Reports, is part of a decision of our Supreme Court. Not at all, Gentlemen; it is only a note to a decision, written, stand together on the sidewalk. In his decision in the Burns case, Mr. Loring refers to the Sims case, above cited, (7 Cushing, 285,) as the unanimous opinion of the judges of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, and then quotes this same sentence
Parsons (search for this): chapter 9
fully aware of its importance. We know as well as our fellow-citizens the unspeakable value of a high-minded, enlightened, humane, independent, and just judge; one whom neither fear, favor, affection, nor hope of reward can turn from his course. It is because we are so fully impressed with this, that we appear before you Taking our history as a whole, we are proud of the Bench of Massachusetts. You have given no higher title than that of a Massachusetts Judge to Sewall, to Sedgwick, to Parsons. Take it away, then, from one who volunteers, hastens, to execute a statute which the law as well as the humanity of the nineteenth century regards as infamous and an outrage. We come before you, not to attack the Bench, but to strengthen it, by securing it the only support it can have under a government like ours,--the confidence of the people. You cannot legislate judges into the confidence of the people. You cannot preach them into it; confidence must be earned. To make the name of
William Brent (search for this): chapter 9
ring knew, or was bound to know, since such has been the constant practice in all slave cases, here and elsewhere. The first duty of a just judge was to tell the man, truly and plainly, what he was arrested for,--see that his friends had free access to him, and fix some future day to commence his trial, leaving time sufficient to consult and prepare a defence. This is what the statutes of every civilized state ordain, in cases where even ten dollars are in dispute. The first word that William Brent, the witness, was allowed to speak on the stand in such circumstances was the death-knell to any claim Mr. Loring might have to be thought a humane man, a good lawyer, or a just judge. A statute which the whole civilized world regards as the most infamous on record is executed by men who claim to be lawyers, judges, and Christians, with a violence and haste which doubles its mischief. These slave commissioners, while constantly prating of the painful duty their allegiance to law entail
Kent (search for this): chapter 9
me Court of the United States), John Phillips of Boston (Judge of the Common Pleas Court of Massachusetts, and President of the Senate), Martin of Dorchester, Cummings of Salem (Judge of the Common Pleas), Levi Lincoln of Worcester (afterwards Judge of our Supreme Court and Governor of the Commonwealth), Andrews of Newburyport, Holmes of Rochester, Hills of Pittsfield, Austin of Charlestown (High Sheriff of Middlesex County), Leland of Roxbury (afterwards Judge of Probate for Norfolk County), Kent of West Springfield, Shaw of Boston (present Chief Justice of the Commonwealth), Marston of Barnstable, Austin of Boston (since Attorney-General of the Commonwealth), and Bartlett of Medford, --a committee highly respectable for the ability and position of its members. Permit me to read a section of their Report (p. 136):-- By the first article of the Constitution, any judge may be removed from his office by the Governor, with the advice of the Council, upon the address of a bare majori
Hayes (search for this): chapter 9
ing contends that he was bound to issue the warrant, holding as he did the office of Commissioner! Who obliged him to hold the office? Could he not have resigned, as many — young Kane of Philadelphia, and others-did, when first the infamous act made it possible that he should be insulted by an application for such a warrant? There was a time when all of us would have deemed such an application an insult to Edward G. Loring. Could he not have resigned when the application was made, as Captain Hayes of our police did, when called on to aid in doing the very act which Mr. Loring had brought like a plague on the city? Could he not have declined to issue the warrant or take part in the case, as B. F. Hallett was reported to have done in the case of William and Ellen Crafts? But whether he could or not matters not to you, Gentlemen. Massachusetts has a right to say what sort of men she will have on her bench. She does not complain if vile men will catch slaves. She only claims th
Constitutional History (search for this): chapter 9
e bene placito, as the phrase is. This, of course, made the judges entirely the creatures of the king. To prevent this, and secure the independence of the judges, after the English Revolution of 1689, it was fixed by the Act of Settlement, as it is called, that the king should not have the power to remove judges, but that they should hold their offices during good behavior. They were still, however, removable by the king, on address from both Houses of Parliament. Hallam, in his Constitutional History, states very tersely the exact state of the English law, and it is precisely the law of this Commonwealth also, in these words: No judge can be dismissed from office except in consequence of a conviction for some offence, or the address of both Houses of Parliament, which is tantamount to an act of Legislature. (Const. Hist., Am. edit., p. 597.) To come now to our Commonwealth. There are, as I just intimated, two ways of removing a judge known to the Constitution: one is, by imp
Robert Morris (search for this): chapter 9
her learned counsel, who sits by my side (Charles M. Ellis, Esq.), heard that such a scene was enacting, and hurried to the court-house. I heard of it in the street. Mr. Theodore Parker was notified, and we went to the court-room. We found Robert Morris, Esq., already there. Mr. Morris, a member of the bar, had attempted to speak to Burns,--the policemen forbade him. The melancholy farce had proceeded for about half an hour. In two hours more, so far as any one could then see, the judgmentMr. Morris, a member of the bar, had attempted to speak to Burns,--the policemen forbade him. The melancholy farce had proceeded for about half an hour. In two hours more, so far as any one could then see, the judgment would have been given, the certificate signed, the victim beyond our reach. There sat the Judge of Probate, clothed with the ermine of Massachusetts; before him cowered the helpless object of cruel legislation, -the crushed victim of an inhuman system. Mr. Dana had moved the court before to defer the trial; but the Commissioner proceeded to examine the witness. After a short time, Mr. Dana rose, (he had no right to rise, technically speaking,--he rose as a citizen merely, not as counsel,) an
Ingraham (search for this): chapter 9
ine of lies and close confinement always found in slave cases, Mr. Loring's first duty, after his court was open, was to adjourn it for three days, at least, taking measures that Burns should meantime see friends and counsel, to consult on his defence. All Mr. Loring's friends can say for him is, that he was only acting as all other slave commissioners act, and that no harm was done, since the Abolitionists came in, and secured Burns a trial! As if the infamous slave-prisons of Curtis and Ingraham were precedents for any court to follow! As if any man was proved fit to be a judge by alleging that strangers prevented his doing all the mischief he intended! The case was adjourned to Saturday. Where do we next meet this specimen of Massachusetts humanity and judicial decorum? It was necessary some one should see Burns to arrange for his having counsel. The United States Marshal refused us admission to the cell. On Friday I went to Mr. Loring at Cambridge, where he was Law Le
Rufus Choate (search for this): chapter 9
f the bench, and abuse your power, if you exercise it in any case but a clear violation of law. This is a practical annihilation of the power. This claim loses sight of the very nature and intent of the power, which is well stated by Mr. Austin, when he says that a judge who has lost the confidence of the community ought to be removed, though you can prove no specific charges against him,--though he may have violated no law, written or unwritten. Or, in words said to have been used by Mr. Rufus Choate in a recent case, A judicial officer may be removed if found intellectually incapable, or if he has been left to commit some great enormity, so as to show himself morally deranged. This unlimited power, then, Gentlemen, is one that you undoubtedly possess. It is one that the people deliberately planned and intended that you should possess. It is one which the nature of the government makes it necessary you should possess, and that, on fitting occasion, you should have the courage
Dean Swift (search for this): chapter 9
d all the safeguards and checks of a judicial examination. The hapless victim, too ignorant at the best to know his own rights or how to defend them, was then stunned by the overwhelming blow,--by the arrest, and the sight of the horrible pit into which he was to be plunged. Over his prostrate body this Massachusetts judge of the fatherless and widow opens his court, and begins to hold the mockery of a trial! If you continue him in office, you should appoint some one,--some flapper, as Dean Swift says,--some humane man, to wait upon his court, and for the honor of the State remind him when it will be but decent to remember justice and mercy, for he is not fit to go alone. Do you ask us what course Mr. Loring should have adopted? We answer, the same course that any merely decent judge would adopt in such a case. Here was a man arrested some twelve hours before on a false pretence, and kept shut up from all his friends. All this Mr. Loring knew, or was bound to know, since such
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11