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Browsing named entities in Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics.

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India (India) (search for this): book 2, section 1226a
ings not only their existence or non-existence is possible, but also for human beings to deliberate about them; and these are all the things that it rests with us to do or not to do. Hence we do not deliberate about affairs in India, or about how to square the circle; for affairs in India do not rest with us, whereas the objects of choice and things practicable are among things resting with us, and squaring the circle is entirely impracticable (and thus it is India do not rest with us, whereas the objects of choice and things practicable are among things resting with us, and squaring the circle is entirely impracticable (and thus it is clear that purposive choice is not simply opinion either). But purposive choice does not deal with all the practicable things resting with us either. Hence one might also raise the question, why is it exactly that, whereas doctors deliberate about things in their field of science, scholars do not? The reason is that since error occurs in two ways (for we err either in reasoning, or in perception when actually doing the thing), in medicine it is possible
Crete (Greece) (search for this): book 3, section 1229a
nd madmen face things rushing on them, or grasp snakes. Another is the courage caused by hope, which often makes those who have had a stroke of luck endure dangers,and those who are intoxicated—for wine makes men sanguine. Another is due to some irrational emotion, for example love or passion. For if a man is in love he is more daring than cowardly, and endures many dangers, like the manUnknown. who murdered the tyrant at Metapontium and the person in Crete in the storyUnknown; and similarly if a man is under the influence of anger and passion, for passion is a thing that makes him beside himself. Hence wild boars are thought to be brave, though they are not really, for they are so when they are beside themselves, but otherwise they are variable, like daring men. But nevertheless the courage of passion is in the highest degree natural; passion is a thing that does not know defeat, owing to which the young are
Athens (Greece) (search for this): book 3, section 1232b
about few things and those great ones, and not about whatever somebody else thinks. And a great-spirited man would consider more what one virtuous man thinks than what many ordinary people think, as Antiphon after his condemnation said to Agathon when he praised his speech for his defence.A variant reading gives 'as A. said to A. when he insincerely praised his defence.' For Antiphon's indictment as a leader in the revolution of the Four Hundred at Athens see Thuc. 8.68. Agathon is presumably the tragic poet, see Plato's Symposium. The anecdote is not recorded elsewhere. And a feeling thought to be specially characteristic of the great-spirited man is disdain. On the other hand, as to the accepted objects of human interest, honor, life, wealth, he is thought to care nothing about any of them except honor; it would grieve him to be dishonored and ruled by someone unworthy, and his greatest joy is to obtain
Olympia (Greece) (search for this): book 3, section 1233b
the fitting is the suitable, as nothing is fitting that is unsuitable. But it must be fitting in each particular, that is, in suitability to the agent and to the recipient and to the occasion—for example, what is fitting at the wedding of a servant is not what is fitting at that of a favorite; and it is fitting for the agent himself, if it is of an amount or quality suitable to him—for example people thought that the mission that Themistocles conducted to Olympia was not fitting for him, because of his former low station, but would have been for Cimon.The story of Themistocles at the Olympic festival incurring disapproval by vying with Cimon in the splendor of his equipment and entertainments is told by Plut. Them. 5. But he who is casual in regard to the question of suitability is not in any of these classes.Similarly in regard to liberality: a man may be neither liberal nor illiberal.Generally
490 BC (search for this): book 7, section 1235a
\ KOLOIO/N Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1155a 35, where the dialect suggests that it is from a Doric poet (unknown).; “And thief knows thief and wolf his fellow wolf.”'Set a thief to catch a thief.' The origin of the verse is unknown.And the natural philosophers even arrange the whole of nature in a system by assuming as a first principle that like goes to like, owing to which EmpedoclesMystic philosopher, man of science and statesman of Agrigentum, fl. 490 B.C. said that the dog sits on the tiling because it is most like him.Presumably, like in color; true of Greek dogs today. Empedocles does not appear to have gone on to infer protective mimicry.Some people then give this account of a friend; but others say that opposite is dear to opposite, since it is what is loved and desired that is dear to everybody, and the dry does not desire the dry but the wet (whence the sayings—"Earth loveth rain,"Quoted as from<
Agrigentum (Italy) (search for this): book 7, section 1235a
KOLOIO\N POTI\ KOLOIO/N Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1155a 35, where the dialect suggests that it is from a Doric poet (unknown).; “And thief knows thief and wolf his fellow wolf.”'Set a thief to catch a thief.' The origin of the verse is unknown.And the natural philosophers even arrange the whole of nature in a system by assuming as a first principle that like goes to like, owing to which EmpedoclesMystic philosopher, man of science and statesman of Agrigentum, fl. 490 B.C. said that the dog sits on the tiling because it is most like him.Presumably, like in color; true of Greek dogs today. Empedocles does not appear to have gone on to infer protective mimicry.Some people then give this account of a friend; but others say that opposite is dear to opposite, since it is what is loved and desired that is dear to everybody, and the dry does not desire the dry but the wet (whence the sayings—"Earth loveth rain,"Qu<
Ephesos (Turkey) (search for this): book 7, section 1235a
ly variant. One party thinks that the like is friend and the opposite foe— The less is rooted enemy to the more For ever, and begins the day of hate, Eur. Phoen. 539f. E)XQR=AS H(ME/RAS= E)/XQRAS, cf. DOU/LION H)=MAR= DOULEI/A, Paley.and moreover adversaries are separated in locality, whereas friendship seems to bring men together. The other party say that opposites are friends, and HeracleitusThe natural philosopher of Ephesus, fl. end of 6th cent. B.C. rebukes the poet who wrote— Would strife might perish out of heaven and earth, Hom. Il. 18.107 for, he says, there would be no harmony without high and low notes, and no animals without male and female, which are opposites.These, then, are two opinions about friendship, and being so widely separated they are too generali.e. being so absolutely opposite to one another, they are too sweep
Egypt (Egypt) (search for this): book 7, section 1235b
when it dies, as a corpse is useless—but people that have a use for it keep it, as in Egypt. Now all these factorsi.e. likeness, contrariety, utility (Solomon). seem to be somewhat opposed to one another. For like is of no use to like and opposition is farthest removed from likeness, and at the same time opposite is most useless to opposite, since opposite is destructive of opposite. Moreover some think that to gain a friend is easy, but others that it is the rarest thing to recognize a friend, and not possible without misfortune, as everybody wants to be thought a friend of the prosperous; and others maintain that we must not trust even those who stay with us in our misfortunes, because they are deceiving us and pretending, in order that by associating with us when unfortunate they may gain our friendship when we are again prosperous.Accordingly a line of argument must be taken that will best explain to us the
Athens (Greece) (search for this): book 7, section 1236a
friendships: this was among the things said already,ll. 7-17. as we have distinguished three senses of the term friendship—one sort has been defined as based on goodness, another on utility, another on pleasure.Of these the one based on utility is assuredly the friendship of most people; for they love one another because they are useful, and in so far as they are and so, as says the proverb—“Glaucus, an ally is a friend, as long as he our battle fights,A friend in need is a friend indeed. and Athens no longer knows Megara. Fr. Eleg. Adespota 6 (Bergk) On the other hand friendship based on pleasure is the friendship of the young, for they have a sense of what is pleasant; hence young people's friendship easily changes, for since their characters change as they grow up, their taste in pleasure also changes. But the friendship in conformity with goodness is the friendship of the best
Megara (Greece) (search for this): book 7, section 1236a
friendships: this was among the things said already,ll. 7-17. as we have distinguished three senses of the term friendship—one sort has been defined as based on goodness, another on utility, another on pleasure.Of these the one based on utility is assuredly the friendship of most people; for they love one another because they are useful, and in so far as they are and so, as says the proverb—“Glaucus, an ally is a friend, as long as he our battle fights,A friend in need is a friend indeed. and Athens no longer knows Megara. Fr. Eleg. Adespota 6 (Bergk) On the other hand friendship based on pleasure is the friendship of the young, for they have a sense of what is pleasant; hence young people's friendship easily changes, for since their characters change as they grow up, their taste in pleasure also changes. But the friendship in conformity with goodness is the friendship of the best
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