As it has been requested that a roster of the different organizations of the Confederate army be given, I will endeavor to give as completed record of the Black Eagle Company of Cumberland county, Va., as I can now remember, after an interval of thirty-eight years. This company was mustered into the service at Richmond, April 23rd, 1861, and was known afterwards as Company E. Eighteenth regiment, Virginia Volunteers, and had the following list of officers, non-commissioned officers and privates:

Harrison, Carter H., first captain, promoted major, Eleventh Virginia Regiment; killed at Bull Run, Va., 18th July, 1861.

Harrison, Randolph, second captain; promoted colonel in Wise's Legion; lost his leg near Petersburg, Va., April, 1865; dead.

Shields, Dr. Thomas P., third captain; wounded at Gaines' Mill, Va., 27th June, 1862; promoted surgeon.

Leitch, Thomas M., second lieutenant; exempted from service 1862.

Cocke, Edmund R., fourth captain; wounded at Gettysburg, Pa., 1863.

Weymouth, John E,, first lieutenant; wounded at Gettysburg, Pa., 1863; dead.

Austin, Cornelius, second lieutenant; killed at Gettysburg, Pa., 1863.

Cocke, William F., third lieutenant; killed at Gettysburg, Pa., 1863.

Dobbs, Henry J., color sergeant; promoted lieutenant; wounded at Frazer's Farm, Va., 1st July, 1862.

Died, on October 15, 1909, at Millwood, near Farmville, Va., Major Andrew Reid Venable, Jr., formerly Adjutant and Inspector-General of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, in his seventy-seventh year.

This fell sergeant, Death, is strict in his arrest, as Shakespeare tells us, and thus has been struck from the rolls of survivors of that glorious army the name of one of the noblest gentlemen and most daring soldiers who ever periled life for hearth and home and country.

But it is only from the roll of survivors that his name has been stricken, for on the deathless roll itself, his name shall blaze so long as freemen shall revere those stern and warlike virtues that make men strong to meet with unshaken front the very stroke of fate.

Born of an ancient and honorable race, distinguished from Colonial days for inflexible integrity, high courage and keen intellectual gifts—nourished in the most heroic traditions of the Commonwealth—he proved himself in every relation of life—as husband, father, kinsman and comrade—worthy of the noble stock from which he sprung.

His life before the war (the war to us beyond all other wars it must ever be), was uneventful—just the life of the average young Virginian of good family, straining at the leash and eager to get beyond the somnolent life of prosaic surroundings.

It may be told in few words, for his real life lay within the four years of war. He was born at the Vineyard (one of the old Venable estates), in Prince Edward county, on December 2, 1832, son of Samuel Woodson and Jane Reid Venable—was graduated from Hampden—Sidney College before he was twenty, in the class of 1852—disdained to settle down as a small planter, and so went West to seek his fortunes, speedily deciding on St. Louis as his new home. There, owing to his industry, quick intelligence and spirit of enterprise, his business success was almost instant. What is far more to the purpose, it was there that he met socially two people who were to play the chief part in his life—Miss Stevens, a niece of Governor Stevens, of Maryland, a lady destined within a few years to become his wife under the most romantic circumstances—while he was an escaped prisoner in the enemy's country—and Lieutenant J. E. B. Stuart, U. S. A., who, though but twenty-two, had just proved his warlike mettle in the campaign against the fierce Apaches, as a young officer of the famous old Rifles, and who, now transferred to the First Cavalry, had been assigned duty at Jefferson Barracks, St. Louis.

An intimate friendship sprung up at once between Venable and the brilliant young officer, for they were both enthusiastic Virginians, both far from home and both in the very May-morn of their youth.

Little did either then dream that, within ten years, one should become a great cavalry leader, dazzling a world with deeds, and the other ride by his bridle-rein as his most trusted staff officer. But Stuart soon went his way to fight the Sioux and the Cheyennes, receiving in the campaign against the latter a grievous wound in the desperate action at Soloman's Fork, Kan., while Venable, with characteristic tenacity, stuck to his business enterprises with such effect, that, within a few years, he had accumulated what was then reckoned a handsome competence.

But party spirit was running high through all the land and nowhere, North or South, were sectional animosities so intense and bitter as in St. Louis. The Southern element, as it was called, dominated society, but the bulk of the population, the plain people (in large measure Germans), sided with the Abolitionists and Free-Soilers.

Young Venable, who had been bred up in the strict States' Rights school, and who, through temperament, contemned everything savoring of compromise or expediency, threw himself with all the passion of his ardent nature into the struggle that had even then begun between Secessionists and Union men for control of Missouri in the impending conflict. Then burst the storm of war, and Venable, without a moment's hesitation, threw up his prosperous business (though he well knew that it meant the sacrifice of everything he had accumulated), and sped to his mother State, where he at once enlisted as a private soldier in the Third Battery of Richmond Howitzers, then under orders to join the Army of the Peninsula. He was at this time, as the writer of these lines remembers (for we were in the same gun-detachment), a singularly handsome man, genial, yet dignified, blessed with a keen sense of humor, fond of a good story, but instantly austere at any hint or irreverence touching religious matters, always cheery when hardships had to be endured, and speedily became known to officers and men as one of the most resolute and daring soldiers in the command. The Third Battery of Howitzers saw, perhaps, more actual fighting than any other artillery company in the Army of the Peninsula, and Venable, born trooper though he was, was always proud and glad, during the years after the war, to meet in reunion his old artillery comrades, with whom, as simple cannoneer he had received his first baptism of fire.

He took part with his battery in all the actions and minor affairs of that army in ‘61, and of the Army of Northern Virginia until the summer of 1862, when he was made Captain and Commissary of the First Regiment of Virginia Artillery, commanded by the gallant and accomplished Colonel John Thompson Brown (former Captain of the Second Battery of Howitzers) who at the very beginning of the Campaign of '64 fell in action at The Wilderness, mourned by an army.

This position Venable held until the spring of ‘63.

Commissaries and Quartermasters, with few exceptions, never went into action. Indeed, for them to do so, was contrary to explicit and very proper orders. So, too, of Surgeons. But Venable could no more keep out of a fight than Stuart's Chief Surgeon, Talcott Eliason, of whom Stuart says in his rollicking fashion (in his official report of the Gettysburg Campaign): Surgeon Eliason, though without a superior in his profession, would, from his conduct on the field, excel as a Colonel of Cavalry.

The Commissary of the First Virginia Artillery had a way of suddenly turning up in the very thick of things to ask his

Colonel some utterly idle and irrelevant question about rations for the men, and the Colonel tried to look severe and the battery commanders winked at each other and at Venable, when the latter said, And now, sir, if I could carry any orders for you, as I see your Adjutant has gone.

Thus it was that Stuart, who, on Jackson's fall on the evening of May 2nd, at Chancellorsville, had been put in command of Jackson's Corps, met Venable in the very thickest of the battle of the 3rd day. Venable had come up to ask his Colonel whether he didn't think a bean ration would be good for the men.

He never proposed that momentous question to his Regimental Commander.

Stuart, who handled Jackson's Corps on that day with superb skill, came suddenly in the woods upon the conscientious Commissary. They had never seen each other since the old St. Louis days, but the recognition was instant. Stuart, who had sent off every staff officer with urgent, and almost inspired, orders, grasped his hand, and said, Venable, I've sent off my last man. You must take this order to the left. There is no one else. I assume all responsibility. Certainly, sir, replied Venable, saluting, and most delighted, and away he sped through the woods reverberating with the fierce, wild cries of the victorious Confederates, driving the enemy from their last stubborn stand. All through that glorious day (the tactical masterpiece of the nineteenth century, as was Leuthen of the eighteenth), Venable carried Stuart's orders, and when night fell, as they lay by the camp fire, told a kindred spirit how he chafed at being in a bomb-proof.

I shall ask that for your services to-day, said Stuart, you be assigned my staff.

For Stuart to ask (after his own brilliant work), was to have, and so Venable, within a few days, was assigned to the Headquarter Staff of the Cavalry, with the rank of Major, and announced in General Orders as Assistant Adjutant and Inspector-General of the Corps.

From that time until his capture at the battle of Hatcher's Run (or Burgess's Mill), in the autumn of 1864 (Oct. 27th), the story of Venable's career is the story of that splendid body of horse, whose deeds gave Stuart his imperishable renown.

It was an open secret at Cavalry Headquarters, that of all the splendid and capable staff officers there—Heros Von Borcke (of the Madgeburg Dragoons) and Henry McClellan and young The. Garnett—Venable was closest to Stuart. Whenever most perlious service was to the fore, Venable was selected for that service, and wherever the Headquarter guidon of Lee's horse blazed in the van of trampling squadrons, there always was Andrew Venable, riding bit to bit, by the bridle-rein of the gay and debonnair Rupert of the South.

It is sad, in a way, to his surviving comrades, that the story of his brilliant career will never be told. But it is no worse in this case than in that of Willy Pegram, or Jim Breathed, or Beckham, or Jimmy Thompson, or Victor Girardey, and many, many others, whose names were household words as stubborn fighters, in an army of stubborn fighters, who are yet unknown to-day to the people for whose liberties they yielded up their lives.

Still, one may be allowed to cite one or two instances in that career—if only for his children's sake—to evidence how absolute was his Chief's confidence in the readiness of resource and cool daring of this favorite staff officer in desperate and critical events.

In the Gettysburg Campaign, when Stuart had lost touch with Lee's columns (because of his daring raid towards the Susquehanna), and had finally recognized the imperious necessity of communicating with the commanding general, Venable was the officer chosen to make his way through the hostile country, swarming with the enemy, and carry to Lee the first direct message from his Chief of Cavalry.

The perilous ride was successfully accomplished, and Lee's official report tells us that on the evening of July 1st, Venable reported to him the exact whereabouts of his cavalry.

Stuart himself, in his official report of the campaign (dated August 20th, 1863), says: The untiring energy, force of character and devotion to duty of Major Andrew R. Venable, Inspector-General, and of Lieutenant G. M. Ryal, C. S. Army, Provost Marshal, deserves my special gratitude and praise.

As we shall see later on, Venable and Ryal were again to have special mention together for signal service, after their brilliant chief had fallen in battle.

In October, 1863, three months after Gettysburg, Lee, ever ready to strike and confident in the aggressive morale of his veterans of confirmed hardiness, began a movement around the right flank of Meade's army (then lying in Culpeper), with a view to forcing his late anatagonist again to battle. This is known to old soldiers as the Bristoe Campaign.

The duty assigned Stuart was to guard Lee's right and screen the movement from the enemy's powerful and skillfully-handled horse. It was a most difficult and delicate service, and Lee's instructions prove beyond question how entirely his Chief of Cavalry retained his great commander's complete confidence. Stuart, chafing under half-muttered cavillings, and eager to have a chance to sweep away every cloud of adverse criticism, showed up at his best from start to finish. In the saddle day and night, he handled his small cavalry force against the preponderating squadrons of the enemy with a happy blending of prudence and audacity that friend and foe alike (among trained soldiers) applauded with generous accord.

But his wise audacity (which, if unsuccessful, would have been termed foolish rashness) had at one point what is known as a very close call. The story is familiar to the old troopers of his command and is too long to detail here. Suffice it to say, that he discovered a movement of the enemy's infantry that neither he nor Lee had suspected. As usual, he selected Venable to carry the news to the commanding general, instructing him to ride by way of Auburn, which Lomax, with his brigade of horse, was supposed to hold. Venable sped upon his mission, and rode confidently into Auburn, only to ride out as fast as he could put spur to horse under a tempest of bullets, for Lomax had just been driven from the place and Kilpatrick's troopers held all the roads. But the trusted staff officer, with more than one touch-and-go escape, made a wide detour, knowing every foot of the country even in the darkness, and safely delivered the message to Lee.

In those heroic days, compliments did not fly thick and fast, as in the great Spanish War, and to be mentioned in dispatches meant a good deal. Of this daring ride, Stuart says simply, in his official report: Major Andrew R. Venable, Jr., A. A. and Inspector-General, deserves special mention for his conduct in evading the enemy near Auburn and reaching the Commanding General with important dispatches on the night of October 13th.

To this generation, those few words may not mean much. To Andrew Venable's surviving comrades, they are pregnant with martial meaning.

But the hero of Gettysburg had no desire to try conclusions with his fierce and wary adversary, and slipped away from the crucial test, counting its avoidance a clever manoeuvre. What a complete answer to latter-day military sciolists, who blame Meade for not pursuing Lee after Gettysburg, blatantly assuming the demoralization of that veteran soldiery that had stormed Cemetery Hill.

The story of Venable's services during the winter of ‘63-64, when Stuart, despite his being compelled to scatter his command because of lack of forage, was yet continually beating up the enemy's quarters (as his Cavalier prototype was wont to express it), must be sought in official dispatches.

Then, in the spring of ‘64, began the greatest of Lee's campaigns—a grim wrestle of eleven months, with the guns going night and day—in which the Confederate commander, from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor, put hors-de-combat more men than he had taken into the campaign, and again, from Cold Harbor to Five Forks, put hors-de-combat as great a number as had been left him for the defense of Petersburg and Richmond.

Grant crossed the Rapidan on May 4th, and on May 5th. Stuart in person conducted Lee's advance (A. P. Hill's Corps) to strike the enemy on the Plank Road. It is no exaggeration, but only severest truth to say that from that moment, the Commander of the Cavalry Corps, night and day in the saddle, with only a few hours' sleep during the twenty-four, never lost aggressive contact with the enemy's infantry and cavalry, until the fatal May 11th, at Yellow Tavern, when he fell mortally wounded from a random pistol-shot fired by a retreating Federal trooper.

The story of that desperate fight, so tragic in the cruel disparity of numbers, has been too often told to need repetition here. As they lifted Stuart, stricken with his mortal hurt, into the ambulance, he saw some disorganized troopers retreating to the rear. Raising himself up, the old light of battle shining in his eyes, his voice rang out in imperious tones: Go back! go back! Do your duty as I've done mine. I'd rather die than be whipped. And once again the little handful turned and stayed the tide of thundering onset.

Venable tenderly bore his chief from the field to Richmond, and then, like a true soldier, galloped back at once to the front. He had looked his last on the face of the man of whom to his dying day he could never speak save with deep emotion.

But, as the brilliant cavalry leader lay a-dying, he did not forget this loyal friend and comrade, knit to him by so many ties of joyous camaraderie and common danger.

As was natural, Stuart was passionately fond of horses, was always superbly mounted, and rode like a Centaur. Of all his horses, his gallant gray was his favorite, and, just before he breathed out his dauntless soul, after directing that his personal effects shouldd be sent to his wife, turning to his faithful Adjutant-General, Henry McClellan, whispered, Take the bay and let Venable have my gray.

He then added, I am going fast: God's will be done, and so the bugles sang Lights Out to the wearied trooper, and he fell on heroic sleep.

It may not be impertinent to set down here that the writer of these lines was sittting on his horse at Spotsylvania C. H., close to Lee, when the telegram was handed the latter announcing Stuart's fall at Yellow Tavern. Lee's simple words on reading the telegram constitute, to our mind, Stuart's noblest epitaph and should have been graved upon the pedestal of his statue: Gentlemen, he said (evidently greatly moved), we have very bad news. General Stuart has been mortally wounded. He paused for a few moments, and then exclaimed impressively: He never brought me a piece of false information. Think of it!— from the commander of a veteran army, touching his Chief of Cavtlry—the eyes and ears of that army!

After Stuart's death, Venable was for a brief time assigned staff-duty with the Major-General W. H. A. Lee, but in August was reassigned to the Headquarters of the Cavalry Corps, with his old duties as Inspector-General, on the staff of General Wade Hampton.

Time would fail to deal in detail with the active part he bore in the constant cavalry engagements of those stirring August and September days.

But one signal service may, at least, be touched upon.

On September 14th (1864), Hampton, having ascertained through his scouts the exact location of the great corral for the supply cattle of the Army of the Potomac, determined to make a bold raid in Grant's rear, and, if possible, to lift (in Hieland phrase) the fat beeves there congregated, of which the Federals always had plenty, while at this time the chief food of the hungry Confederate was but half a ration of hard tack and rancid pork. For many months, indeed, Lee's veterans, like the English just before Agincourt, had been shrewdly out of beef, but Hampton knew that (as the Constable of France allowed of his adversaries on the eve of that historic day) give them great meals of beef, and iron and steel, they will eat like wolves and fight like devils.

To penetrate so far to the enemy's rear seemed to many of the boldest a rash undertaking, but the actual cutting out of this immense herd (by official count, two thousand four hundred and eighty-six) was brilliantly accomplished under the very noses of the astounded Federals, and then came the most critical part of the expedition. To round up and bring off such a number of cattle demanded the readiest shrewdness, coolest courage and wariest management. The enemy, after their first overwhelming amazement, recovered their wits; telegraph wires were kept hot from City Point to Grant's front, and very speedily Hampton was so hard pressed by both cavalry and infantry that a less resolute fighter would have abandoned his booty and thought only of escape. But Hampton knew Lee's great need of proper food for the men, and at all times was an officer of prompt resource and most stubborn courage. He placed Venable and Ryal in charge of the escort that was to drive the cattle, and turned about himself to hold the swarming enemy in check, until the cattle might be herded across the Nottoway to some point of safety. 'Twas a great feat, accomplished with consummate skill and judgment, and who of us can ever forget the great shout that went up from the gaunt veterans in the trenches, to whom it meant returning health and vigor and renewed strength to fight on for the cause that grew even closer to their hearts.

In his official report, Hampton says (September 27th, 1864): Major Venable, of my staff, was ordered to superintend this movement of the cattle, and, with Major Ryal, Provost Marshal, who had been very efficient in conducting it up to this time, to place them quickly across the Nottoway River at Freeman's Ford. These officers discharged their duty admirably, and the successful manner in which the cattle were brought off is due very much to their zeal and enterprise.

On October 27th, in the great action at Hatcher's Run, in which Grant received another lesson that we still could sting, and sting sharply, Venable, while carrying an important message from gallant Jimmy Deering (one of Lee's Boy Brigadiers) to Hampton, in making his way through the heavily wooded country, rode headlong into the enemy's pickets and was promptly captured. He was at once carried before the officer commanding that part of the picket line, who, very improperly, threatened him with direful bodily harm when Venable flatly refused to answer a single one of his questions. He would not even tell him to whose command he belonged. The officer became more irate, and more insistent that he should tell him at once the position and number of troops engaged and other like information. Venable, who never set his life at a pin's fee in any matter involving soldiery honor, and who could be, on occasion, as scornful as he was fearless, blazed out upon the Federal commander with such scathing words as the latter probably never forgot. In his official report of the part borne by his command in this battle, Brigadier-General Thos. V. Eagan, U. S. V. (on whose line he was captured) has but little to say of the incident, but that little speaks volumes to those who knew Venable, and who can read between the lines: Here my skirmishers captured Major Venable, formerly Inspectoreral of Stuart's Cavalry, and now Adjutant-General (it is thought, [sic]), of Hampton's Division. He would give no information That officer little knew the adamant he was up against!

The romantic story of Venable's adventures after his capture and confinement in the Old Capitol Prison, in Washington, his dare-devil escape by leaping through the window of the car that was carrying him to Fort Delaware, as the train slowed up in the dusk of evening near Philadelphia—his successful concealment, through the active help of Southern Sympathizers in that rabid and envenomed City of Brotherly Love (old St. Louis friends of Stuart's were these sympathizers), who not only secreted the young Virginian at great personal risk, but pressed upon him unlimited money for emergencies—his cool assumption of the role of an oil-land promoter—his frequent trips to the Pennsylvania oil-fields to pick up hints, for better playing the part—his writing his fiancee, Miss Stevens (who had come on to Baltimore with her aunt, to avoid the persecution in St. Louis of Rebel sympathizers), begging her to make a few rapid preparations for marriage, following up the letter (characteristically) with a telegram, Come with your aunt at once their marriage by the Rev. Dr. W. S. Plummer in his study, who had been his father's classmate at college, and who was then living in Philadelphia—his wife's departure within a few days Southward for Baltimore, while he fared Westward to the oil-fields—his making his way gradually, through help of the underground, to Hagerstown, Maryland—his dash, one stormy night, on a fleet horse to an unguarded point on the Potomac—the perilous swim across—and so back to freedom, and Old Virginia—all this, as wild as any chapter in Stevenson or Dumas, must be told at another time and in another place. A comrade heard him recount the story soon after his return, and begged him to write it down then, and he half-promised to do so, but, as so often happens, never did.

Just after the disastrous Retreat, which culminated in the Surrender at Appomattox C. H., Mrs. Venable got permission from the Federal authorities to come to Virginia, and after many inevitable hardships reached her husband's home in Prince Edward. The whole of that section had been ravaged by the enemy, and desolation reigned supreme. He had now a wife to care for, besides others dependent on him, and, without any idle repining at the malice of fortune, at once went to work with a will.

Of his life after the war there is small need to speak. It was the same as that of the great majority of his old comrades.

Enough to say, that he illustrated in every task he essayed that pithy dictum of a great English thinker that the reward of one duty is the power to fulfil another.

His wife now fortunately came into her property, and he himself again accumulated a comfortable competence, which within a few years was lost through misplaced confidence in others. Once more with no repining, he began the battle of life, this time as a simple farmer, and thenceforth devoted himself in chief measure to advancing agricultural interests throughout the Commonwealth, being for years prominently identified with the revived State Fair and active in the management of other kindred organizations.

A simple farmer he indeed continued to the end outwardly, but in his heart of heart (as Hamlet hath it), he always remained a soldier.

He was never reconstructed and disdained to pretend that he was. He was not glad that the war ended as it did, and was not slow to express his virile scorn for those who thus bowed down in the House of Rimmon.

For the past two or three years, his health had been steadily failing, but the spirit of the man was invincible, and he never for a moment abated his activities, so that when the blow fell at last, his death proved a great shock to family, kinsmen and friends.

On October 15th, after a few days' illness, he passed quietly away at Millwood, surrendering his pure soul unto his Captain, Christ.

He lived in a great time and bore himself through all the stress and storm of it in a manner worthy of his historic lineage.

After the war there were long years in which he was tried as by fire, but he ever proved all gold. And he has left to wife and children, to kinsmen and comrades, as a precious legacy, the fragrant memory of his tenderness and purity, his generosity and integrity, his nice sense of honor and chivalric courage, and of all those stern and gentle virtues that we unconsciously associate with the loftiest type of the high-bred gentleman and dauntless soldier.

In contemplating this heroic life, thus rounded, at the last, with the sleep which He giveth His beloved, we, who miss him and hold him in our hearts, rising above our own selfish sorrow, can surely say of him, as Milton says of Sampson:

I have frequently been asked by friends and members of my family to write something of my experiences during the great Civil War.

The pressure of a busy professional life has left me little in the way of leisure to gratify this request, and I have always felt that personal experiences were difficult to recall, and at best interested but few people.

I have not been unmindful, too, of Max Muller's caution that he doubted whether any historian would accept a statement made thirty years after the event, without independent confirmation. In writing his autobiography, he says, All that I can vouch for is, that I read my memory as I should read the leaves of an old manuscript, from which many letters, nay whole words and lines have vanished, and when I am often driven to decipher as a palimpsest what the original uncial writing may have been, I am the first to confess there may be flaws in my memory, there may be before my eyes that magic azure which surrounds the distant past, but I compromise that there shall be no invention, no Dichtung, instead of Wahrich, but always as far as in me lies, truth.

An occasional visit to the battlefields of Gettysburg in these latter years has served to revive my interest in the scenes, some of which I witnessed nearly fifty years ago.

I have been led to read again some of the discussions which were so rife after the war as to the causes of General Lee's failure. These again caused me to review the whole campaign in the light of the official reports and correspondence which have since been published, and the result of these investigations in connection with the facts of which I was personally cognizant are embodied in the following pages.

Popular interest in the battle of Gettysburg has suffered no abatement from the lapse of time. In popular imagination the shouts of the contending hosts, and the echoes of musketry and artillery still resound through the valleys and linger upon the opposing heights. While the battle is not accounted as sanguinary as Sharpsburg, and not as picturesque in its setting as Fredericksburg, and while there was no brilliant coup de main like that of Jackson's at Chancellorsville, yet, as marking the turning point in the fortunes of the war, and repelling the tide of Southern invasion, it is by common consent regarded as the most momentous of all the struggles waged between the army of the Potomac and the army of Northern Virginia.

To the military student of the campaign, the tactical movements on either side, the manner in which the troops were brought into action, the nature of the ground, the strength of the several positions, and how each of them bore on the final result, furnish on a large scale rich material for the study of the art of war. Notwithstanding the volumes which have been devoted to the subject, no writer has yet appeared, able to paint the picture in all its fullness, tracing with bold sweep the general outlines, and deftly filling in its multitudinous details.

Historical truth evolves itself slowly. In the diary of the Hon. Gideon Wells, Secretary of the Navy, now being published, he records that Mr. Lincoln was extremely dejected at Lee's escape after the battle, and much displeased that Meade did not press Lee vigorously. The average Northerner, however, while he failed, as did Mr. Lincoln, to realize how close the Union army had been to defeat, was quite willing when success was assured to forget the panic which swept the country ahead of Lee's invading army when it made its swift march to the Susquehanna, and was too elated over the result to care to go much into the inquiry how it all came about. This feeling to some extent, affected the subsequent investigation before a Committee of Congress upon the conduct of the war. Everyone could afford to be generous when there was so much cause for mutual congratulation.

In the South it was different; the increasing exigencies of the Confederate government and its narrowing resources, left it no time during the remainder of its existence, to institute inquiries into the cause of Lee's failure, and at the conclusion of hostilities, the people were too much engaged in their efforts to repair the waste of war, to think of the past and its mistakes. Still, with the army of Northern Virginia and among its officers and men, from the day their faces were turned again to the Potomac, the causes of the failure have been a theme of repeated, and sometimes angry, discussion.

When the magnanimity of General Lee prompted him, at the end of the third day, to assume the responsibility for the disaster, it allayed for the time any disposition to fix the responsibility elsewhere, and so long as he lived, his influence was felt in restraining heated discussions, which he discouraged as productive of no good, and the effect of which would be to alienate from each other those who had been comrades in arms.

The subject, however, was of such a nature, its discussion could not be finally suppressed. The Gettysburg failure touched too keenly the pride of the army and the reputation of General Lee, to permit silence on the part of his followers when it was believed by many that the responsibility rested upon other shoulders than his own. As time passed the discussion widened, and it became more and more apparent that General Lee's broad and generous mantle had covered the shortcomings of more than one of his lieutenants. One of the contemporary criticisms was directed against General Stuart, the cavalry leader, who was charged with having not only committed a fatal blunder, but with violating his instructions in detaching himself from the army when the Potomac was crossed, and failing to furnish the Commander-in-Chief with the information which it was essential for him to possess. Stuart's brilliant service afterwards, and his death in battle disarmed any disposition to emphasize whatever error he may have committed; but it remained for some of the general staff afterwards to point out and lay stress upon this feature of the campaign. This view was endorsed by General Longstreet, to whom Stuart was reporting immediately before the passage of the Potomac. Colonel John S. Mosby in his book recently published, entitled, Stuart's Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign, and in his letters to the press, has undertaken to refute these charges, and to show that Stuart not only acted within his instructions, but that his detour between Hooker's army and the city of Washington, was justified by the result, and that had he been with Lee on the march he could have rendered no special service, and his presence at Gettysburg would have been practically useless.

The most serious controversy, however, growing out of the campaign has been over the conduct of General Longstreet on the second and third days of the battle, and his alleged tardiness and failure to co-operate cordially with the Commander-in-Chief. In his book From Manassas to Appomattox, and in various publications given to the press, General Longstreet has vigorously defended himself, and adopting the old Roman method has sought to carry the war into Africa, and made counter charges, sometimes with an exhibition of temper which his best friends must regret.

Now, that nearly all the chief actors in the memorable struggle have passed away, certainly those whose feelings were most enlisted in the controversies growing out of it, it is not inopportune to attempt in a dispassionate way a brief historical sketch of the campaign, tracing the movements of the two armies from the time they left the neighborhood of Fredericksburg, Va., noting the objects had in view by the Confederate leaders, and pointing out the causes of General Lee's failure at Gettysburg.

Mr. Davis in his work entitled The Rise and Fall of the Confederacy, has put himself on record, that the main purpose of the movement across the Potomac, was to free Virginia from the presence of the enemy. If (he says) beyond the Potomac, some opportunity should be offered so as to enable us to defeat the army on which our foe most relied, the measure of our success would be full; but if the movement only resulted in freeing Virginia from the presence of the hostile army, it was more than could be fairly expected from awaiting the attack which was clearly indicated.

General Lee's own view of the situation is set forth in a confidential letter, written by him to Mr. Seddon, the Confederate Secretary of War, on June 8, 1863, in which he points out that nothing could be gained by his army remaining quiet on the defensive, which it would have to do unless reinforced, that it was difficult to take the aggressive with so large an army in his front, intrenched behind a river where it could not be advantageously attacked, and that unless it can be drawn out in a position to be assailed, it will take its own time to prepare and strengthen itself to renew its advance upon Richmond, and force this army back within the intrenchments of that city. At the date of this letter General Longstreet, with two divisions of his corps, was absent from the army, having been detached after the battle of Fredericksburg and sent to the south side of the James to cooperate in the capture of Suffolk. Mr. Davis says that in anticipation of General Hooker's advance in May, instructions were sent to General Longstreet to hasten his return to the army with his two divisions, and notwithstanding the instructions I were repeated with urgent insistence, has movements were so delayed that though the battle of Chancellorsville did not occur until many days after he was expected to join, his force was absent when it occurred.

Some explanation of this apparent reluctance on Longstreet's part may possibly be gathered from his account of an interview between himself and Mr. Seddon on his way back to the army, published by the General in his own defence in 1878 in the Philadelphia Times, and republished in the Southern Historical Society Papers, vol. 5, page 35. At that interview, when the situation of the Western armies was being discussed, General Longstreet says he unfolded a plan of his own, which was to concentrate the Western forces under Joe Johnston, against Rosencranz at Tullahoma, and add his two divisions, which would enable Johnston to crush Rosencrans; after which they could turn their faces North, and with this splendid army march through Tennessee and Kentucky and threaten the invasion of Ohio. In the march through those States, he thought the army would meet no organized obstruction, and supplies would be plentiful. Mr. Seddon, he says, did not accede to his views, not, he thought from any want of confidence in them, but from the difficulty of weakening Lee.

The General adds that he was so thoroughly impressed with the practicability of his plan, that when he reached General Lee he laid it before him with a certain confidence justified by their close personal and official relations. He failed to convince General Lee, mainly, he says, because if adopted it would force Lee to divide his army: He says General Lee then asked him if he did not think an invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania would accomplish the same results, to which he replied he did not see that it would, and the movement would be too hazarous, and the campaign in thoroughly Union States would require more time and greater preparation than one through Tennessee and Kentucky. The account proceeds, I soon discovered that he (Lee) had determined he would make some forward movement, and I finally assented that the Pennsylvania campaign might be brought to a successful issue if he could make it offensive in strategy, but defensive in tactics. This point was urged with great persistency, &c. These interviews, as reported by General Longstreet himself, are referred to because they reflect at the very outset his mental attitude, and indicate an unwillingness to enter upon the Maryland-Pennsylvania campaign before it began. They also reveal an aggressive attitude on the part of Longstreet towards Lee, which was unsuspected until this announcement.

After the battle of Chancellorsville, the two armies lay confronting each other on the banks of the Rappahannock: General Hooker's correspondence at that time shows that notwithstanding his recent disastrous repulse, he was meditating another advance, and this seems to have been General Lee's expectation.

Hooker, however, was handicapped by instructions from Washington. The administration seemed unwilling to commit itself to the hazard of another forward move, and when Hooker inquired of headquarters whether it would be within the spirit of his instructions to throw his Army South of the river, it met with that well known response from Mr. Lincoln, I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river, like an ox, jumped half over a fence, and likely to be torn by dogs, front and rear, without a fair chance to go one way, or kick the other. Animated by the views contained in the letter to Mr. Seddon, and assured of the return of Longstreet's two divisions, General Lee took the initiative, and on the 3d of June, just a month after the battle of Chancellorsville, the movement began. McLaws' divisions of Longstreet's corps, which had remained with the army, was quietly withdrawn from the front at Fredericksburg, and put on the march to Culpeper Court House, where Hood's division, marching from Hanover Junction, joined it. On the following day Ewell's corps was set in motion for the same point, proceeding by a circuitous route through Spotsylvania Court House and Verdierville, to escape observation, and crossing the Rapidan about twenty miles above its junction with the Rappahannock. The third corps under A. P. Hill, with extended front, was left to face the enemy. These movements were conducted with the utmost secrecy, but their magnitude prevented them from entirely escaping the observation of the enemy.

Hooker's balloons were on the lookout during the day time, and deserters and spies brought him information that changes were in progress, but their object and meaning remained a riddle, and he received little or no assistance from the cavalry towards its solution. On June 4th he telegraphed Mr. Stanton, Secretary of War, that it was reported several of the enemy's camps had moved during the night previous, and on the 5th he sent word to Meade, the enemy appeared to have moved the greater part of its forces from the front.

In a letter to Mr. Lincoln on the same date, after stating what he thought would be the probable direction of the enemy, he added, After giving the subject my best reflection, I am of opinion it is my duty to pitch into his rear, although in doing so, the head of his column may reach Warrenton before I return. Will it be within the spirit of my instructions to do so. It would appear from this, that General Hooker's confidence in himself had either been destroyed, or he was in the anomalous position of being in command of a large army without the power of directing its movements. Hooker, however, was not entirely suppressed by the reply from Washington.

On the 6th inst., General Sedgwick, with part of his corps, crossed the river on pontoons, below Fredericksburg, and made a demonstration on Hill's right, occupying the highway which led to Bowling Green in Hill's rear, but the movement did not appear to excite serious apprehension with the Confederates, although Hooker, South of Fredericksburg, was nearer Richmond than Lee at Culpeper, and although Hill was without a supporting musket nearer than Longstreet and Ewell, thirty miles away. On Sedgwick's advice Hooker withdrew his force to the north side of the river.

In separating his army so widely, General Lee doubtless counted upon the concealment which he had practiced in the movements of the troops. The cavalry did admirable work in acting as a screen. He had a right to reckon, too, upon the forbearance of his opponent. He felt assured that Hooker would never venture, or would not be permitted to uncover Washington, and while he had put the bulk of his army farther from Richmond than where Hooker's army lay, he was not without rail communication to the capital. About the same time Hooker planned a more important expedition to the right. In a letter to Halleck of June 6th, he expressed his determiniation to break up the rebel force of cavalry in Culpeper, saying he meant to send for this purpose all his cavalry, stiffened by about three thousand infantry, and Pleasanton, the Chief of Cavalry, was directed to disperse and destroy the rebel forces in the vicinity of Culpeper, and destroy its trains and supplies, after which he would be free to move as he thought proper, the instructions added, It is believed the enemy has no infantry.

General Stuart had now under his command five brigades of cavalry, and that arm of the service was greater in numbers and in better condition than it had ever been before, or ever was afterwards.

On the 7th of June Stuart arranged for a grand review of his cavalry by General Lee, who was greatly pleased at their appearance, and on the following day, in writing a private letter to his family, he says, I reviewed the cavalry in this section yesterday. It was a splendid sight. The men and horses looked well. They had recuperated since last fall. Stuart was in all his glory, &c.

At daylight on the morning of the 9th, under Pleasanton's directions, Buford with a division of cavalry crossed the Rappahannock at Beverly Ford, while Gregg with two divisions and the infantry crossed the stream about seven miles below at Kelly's Ford, the objective point of both columns being Brandy Station, about six miles north of Culpeper Court House, towards which the roads from the two fords converged. The south bank of the stream at the upper ford was picketed by a single company of cavalry, Jones' brigade being encamped about a mile and a half in rear, with a battalion of horse artillery parked in front of the brigade and between it and the river. Buford's advance overwhelmed the small force at the river, and came near running over and capturing the guns in rear before the horses could be harnessed and the pieces put in position. A few moments hesitation enabled the gunners with the prompt assistance of the cavalry, to check the first onset until better positions could be gained, and fresh supports arrived. After a stubborn and exciting struggle, Buford was checked and driven back. Gregg, meanwhile, crossing at the lower ford, and meeting little opposition, advanced rapidly to Brandy Station, and Stuart, whose camp was at Fleetwood, a half mile distant, found himself with the enemy in his rear and front at the same time. The situation was enough to dismay anyone with a heart less stout than Stuart's, but he proved himself equal to the occasion. Leaving a brigade to hold Buford in check, he quickly gathered his remaining forces, and threw himself upon Gregg with the strength of a giant. The most sanguinary cavalry battle of the war ensued, and Gregg was finally forced to withdraw, and he and Buford re-crossed the river during the afternoon, without having made the discovery that Longstreet's and Ewell's forces were in the vicinity.

In his official report of that date, Pleasanton states that a train of cars was run up to Brandy Station, filled with infantry, who opened on his men, and on the following day he reports having learned from contrabands that five or six divisions of infantry were near Culpeper and Orange Court House, but the Confederate infantry were kept concealed, and it proved unnecessary for them to participate in the engagement.

General Hooker seems to have been possessed of the idea about this time, that a cavalry raid on a large scale was projected on the Confederate side. In a letter to Lincoln of the 10th inst., he suggests the probability of a heavy column of infantry being sent by the Confederates to accompany the cavalry on the proposed raid, in which case there would be nothing left to prevent a rapid advance on Richmond, and he concludes with the inquiry, If it would not promote the true interests of the cause for me to advance to Richmond at once? This proposal, like the previous one, met with no favor from Mr. Lincoln, and under the circumstances, it is not surprising.

Hooker was ignorant of the true situation of Lee's army, and so were Lincoln and Halleck. In a letter to General Dix, of the 12th instant, Hooker says, All of Lee's army, so far as I know, is extended along the immediate bank of the Rappahannock from Hamilton's Crossing to Culpeper. A. P. Hill's corps is on his right, below Fredericksburg; Ewell's corps joins his left, reaching to the Rapidan and beyond that river is Longstreet's corps.

At the date of that letter, Ewell was crossing the Blue Ridge, more than two days march from Culpeper, and Longstreet in a direct line was thirty miles or more from Hill.

Any disposition felt by Hooker to advance, does not seem to have been seconded by his corps commanders.

General Sedgwick had given it as his opinion, that it was not safe to mass troops south of the river below Fredericksburg, and General Sykes expressed himself as opposed to any movement across the river with his forces at Banks' and United States Fords. Baffled and perplexed, and weighed down by his instructions from Washington, Hooker informed Halleck on the 13th, that he was about to transfer the operations of the army from the line of the Aquia to the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, and as daylight dawned on the morning of the 14th, the last division of the Army of the Potomac could be seen filing over Staffords Heights on its way to Aquia.

A. P. Hill had been instructed that when the enemy evacuated his position, he should, if he deemed it practicable, cross the river and attack his rear, but this he did not see fit to attempt, and setting out at once on the march, he reached Culpeper in the evening of the 16th, from whence he proceeded to cross the Blue Ridge at Chester Gap, reaching Shepherdstown on the 23d, and relieving the division of Ewell's left there to watch Harper's Ferry.

The first point in General Lee's game of strategy was now won. He had succeeded in drawing out his adversary from behind his intrenched works, to a position where he could be assailed on equal terms, and this without a hostile shot, except on the part of the cavalry. But this was not the only success. On the day before Hill moved, Ewell had Milroy surrounded at Winchester, and on the 14th he captured the place with about four thousand prisoners, and all the artillery, Milroy escaping with a fragment of his force to Harper's Ferry.

What must have been Hooker's surprise at receiving on that date, a telegram from the President, Do you consider it possible that fifteen thousand of Ewell's men can now be at Winchester? Later in the day Mr. Lincoln sent another message from Washington: So far as we can make out here, the enemy have Milroy surrounded at Winchester, and Tyler at Martinsburg: If they could hold out a few days, could you help them? If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg, and the tail of it on the Plank Road between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere, could you not break him? But it was now too late, the opportunity had gone. Had there been wise counsel at Washington, the forces at Winchester and the garrison at Harper's Ferry would have been withdrawn to the defenses of Washington, and the safety of that place assured, Hooker should have been allowed to strike Hill and advance on Richmond.

As the duty of protecting the Confederate capital was entrusted to General Lee, much solicitude was excited about this time by the reports of a Federal expedition threatening Richmond, by way of the Peninsula, which caused him to write to Mr. Davis, on the 15th, I hesitate to draw the whole of A. P. Hill's corps to me; two of Pickett's brigades are at Hanover Junction and Richmond, so that I am quite weak. On the 19th, writing from Milwood, he says the difficulty of procuring supplies retards, and renders more uncertain our future movements. To draw Hooker still further away from his base, however, and to embarrass him as to the Confederate movements, Longstreet was pushed forward from Culpeper, along the east base of the Blue Ridge, through Fauquier and Loudoun counties, with instructions to occupy Ashby's and Snickers' Gaps, which he continued to do to the 20th, when he withdrew and camped on the left bank of the Shenandoah. When Longstreet began his move from Culpeper, Stuart with his cavalry was directed to cover his right flank, and guard the passes through the Bull Run Mountains, a range which runs parallel to and east of the Blue Ridge. In the meantime Ewell crossed the Potomac on the 15th, with two of his divisions and proceeded to Hagerstown, Maryland, while Jenkins's brigade of cavalry was sent to Chambersburg, to scour the country and gather in supplies.

These movements of the Confederates greatly mystified Hooker; it was of the greatest consequence to him to know whether they portended simply a reconnaissance and cavalry raid, or whether they were the prelude to another invasion. He could not afford to follow Ewell, and throw his army across the river, leaving Washington exposed from the South side, and Lee's whereabouts, and whether he might not be sending reinforcements to the Western army remained a great perplexity.

On the other hand, General Lee expresses himself in doubt, when Hooker swung his right wing towards the waters of the Upper Potomac, whether his purpose was to occupy Harper's Ferry, or whether he meditated crossing the mountains and pushing into the valley.

While it was part of Lee's plan to get Hooker out of Virginia, he had no wish to hurry him at this juncture. On the 19th he wrote to Ewell, Longstreet's corps has been operating with a view to embarrass the enemy as to our movements, so as to detain his forces east of the Mountains, until A. P. Hill could get up to your support; should the enemy force a passage, you would be separated, which it is the object of Longstreet to prevent if possible. * * * I very much regret that you have not the benefit of your whole corps, for with that north of the Potomac, should we be able to detain Hooker's army from following you, you would be able to accomplish as much unmolested, as the whole army could perform with General Hooker in its front. Not knowing what force there is at Harper's Ferry, or could be collected to oppose your progress, I cannot give you definite instructions, especially as the movements of General Hooker's army are not yet ascertained.

Hooker now had his army posted to cover all the approaches to Washington from the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, his right resting about Fairfax Station, and his left at Warrenton, about thirty-five miles distant. Such being the position of the two armies, a most important duty was devolved on the respective cavalry leaders. On the one side, General Pleasanton's task was to penetrate the Confederate lines, and ascertain the situation; on the other side, General Stuart's duty was to keep down the curtain, which had heretofore kept Lee's force concealed.

Pleasanton had declared, He would make the enemy show his hand, if he had any in this part of the country. He dispatched Gregg with a division to Aldie, at the mouth of a pass in the Bull Run Mountains, and a stiff fight occurred on the 17th of June. Stuart's forces were somewhat scattered over the large area covered by them, and the engagement was fought on his side chiefly by Fitz Lee's brigade. Captures were made by both sides, and the losses by each were severe. On the 19th, the fight was renewed at Middleburg, to which point Pleasanton had dispatched another force, taking Stuart in rear. A division of infantry reinforced Pleasanton, and Longstreet sent back a division to Snicker's Gap to assist Stuart, who was finally compelled to retire beyond Upperville. The fighting lasted several days. Pleasanton in his reports, claims to have penetrated several of the gaps in the Blue Ridge, but admits he met there no bodies of infantry, and the extent of the information imparted to Hooker was that the enemy's infantry was west of the Blue Ridge.

On the 23rd, General Lee wrote to Mr. Davis, The attempts to penetrate the mountains have been successfully repelled by General Stuart with the cavalry. General Stuart, last night, was within a few miles of Aldie, to which point the enemy had retired.

The campaign had now reached a stage when the part which Stuart was to play was second only in importance to that of the Commanding General. To an army operating in the field, an efficient cavalry force is its most important auxiliary; moving in the enemy's country it is doubly so.

It was now to be seen whether Stuart would make good the confidence of his commander, and the hopes of his friends.

He was now in the full flush of youth and early manhood, being scarcely thirty years of age. He was a splendid horseman and possessed a superb vitality. His courage was conspicuous, and the appearance of his black plume always in the thickest of the fight, made him the idol of his troopers. To him, if to anyone, would the words apply:

Did he violate instructions upon which the safety and welfare of the army depended? The answer to the latter question must be determined from the records, and to these we will briefly refer.

On June 20th, General Lee's headquarters were at Berryville, on the road from Snicker's Gap to Winchester. On the 22d, the first and third corps being within reach, he addressed a letter to General Ewell, telling him if he was ready to move, to do so. The letter advised Ewell that his best course would be toward the Susquehanna, taking the routes by Emmittsburg, Chambersburg, and McConnellsburg, and that the trains, if possible, should be kept on the centre route, and the cavalry should be used in gathering supplies, obtaining information and protecting his flanks. It will depend (said General Lee), upon the quantity of supplies obtained in that country, whether the rest of the army can follow. There may be enough for your command, but none for the others. Every exertion should, therefore, be made to locate and secure them. Beef we can drive with is, but bread we cannot carry, and must secure it in the country. The letter farther added that his progress and direction should depend upon the development of circumstances; If Harrisburg comes within your means, capture it. A. P. Hill, the letter announced, had arrived the day before in the vicinity of Berryville, and would be moved on immediately: that Longstreet had withdrawn from the Blue Ridge, and that on the day before the enemy had pressed the cavalry so hard that McLaws' division had to be sent back to hold Ashby's Gap.

Later on the same day, at 3:30 P. M., Lee sent Ewell the following letter:

I have just received your letter of this morning from opposite Shepherdstown. Mine of today, authorizing you to move toward the Susquehanna, I hope has reached you ere this. After dispatching my letter, learning that the enemy had not renewed his attempts of yesterday, to break through the Blue Ridge, I directed General R. H. Anderson's division to commence its march towards Shepherdstown. It will rest there tomorrow. I also directed General Stuart, should the enemy have so far retired from his front to permit of the departure of a portion of the cavalry, to march with three brigades across the Potomac, and place himself on your right, and in communication with you, keep you advised of the movements of the enemy and assist in collecting supplies for the army. I have not heard from him since. I also directed General Imboden, if opportunity, offered, to cross the Potomac and perform the same offices on your left, &c. * * *

The letter to Stuart, written the same day, is as follows:

General: I have just received your note of 7:45 this morning to General Longstreet. I judge the efforts of the enemy yesterday were to arrest our progress, and ascertain our whereabouts. Perhaps he is satisfied. Do you know where he is, and what he is doing? I fear he will steal a march on us, and get across the Potomac before we are aware. If you find that he is moving northward, and that two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge and take care of your rear, you can move with the other three into Maryland, and take position on General Ewell's right; place yourself in communication with him, guard his flank, keep him informed of the enemy's movements, and collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army. One column of General Ewell's army will probably move toward the Susquehanna by the Emmittsburg route; another by Chambersburg. Accounts from him last night state there was no enemy west of Frederick, &c.

It is quite plain from this letter, that Stuart's taking his three brigades into Maryland and putting himself on Ewell's right, was, in case he found the enemy moving northward, and that the two remaining brigades could guard the Blue Ridge and take care of the rear; and it would also appear that the instructions contemplated that if such a move were made, Stuart would be able immediately to put himself in touch with Ewell, and be able to assist him in collecting supplies. This letter was sent by General Lee to Stuart, through Longstreet, as acknowledged by the latter in his letter of the same date, at 7:30 P. M., addressed to General Lee, in which he says: Yours of 4 o'clock this afternoon is received. I have forwarded your letter to General Stuart, with the suggestion that he pass by the enemy's rear, if he thinks that he may get through. In forwarding Lee's letter, General Longstreet also addressed a letter to Stuart, dated Millwood, June 22, 1863, 7 P. M., saying: General Lee has enclosed to me this letter for you, to be forwarded to you, provided you can be spared from my front, and provided I think you can move across the Potomac without disclosing our plans. He speaks of your leaving, via Hopewell Gap, and passing by the rear of the enemy. If you can get through by that route, I think that you will be less likely to indicate what our plans are, than if you should cross by passing to our rear. I forward the letter of instructions with these suggestions. Please advise me of the condition of affairs, before you leave, and order General Hampton, whom I suppose you will leave here in command, to report to me at Millwood, either by letter or in person, as may be most agreeable to him. I think that your passage of the Potomac, by our rear at the present moment, will in a measure, disclose our plans. You had better not leave us, therefore, unless you can take the proposed route in rear of the enemy. As the letter from Lee to Stuart said nothing about moving by Hopewell Gap, which is a gap in the Bull Run Mountains, any allusion to that Gap must have been contained in a letter from Lee to Longstreet, enclosing him the letter to be forwarded to Stuart; and if such a letter exists, the official records do not disclose it.

It must be borne in mind, that at this time Longstreet was at Millwood, in the valley, west of the Shenandoah, with his columns headed north toward the Potomac. General Lee was in the neighborhood of Berryville, a little north of Millwood, while Stuart was holding the gaps in the Blue Ridge. It was possible for Stuart to have withdrawn three brigades and pass between Longstreet and the enemy towards the Potomac, and this seems to be what Longstreet meant when he speaks of passing by our rear. At the time the instructions were given, it may have been regarded feasible to cross the river east of the Blue Ridge. The proposed route in rear of the enemy would necessarily require a detour, and lead Stuart to the river at a much lower point. It appears most extraordinary that the proposed route in rear of the enemy should not be alluded to in the direct instructions given by Lee to Stuart, but come indirectly through Longstreet. At any rate, the suggestions made by Longstreet, fell in with Stuart's temper, and he proceeded to act upon them, notwithstanding General Longstreet, in the article already referred to, says: As I was leaving the Blue Ridge, I instructed General Stuart to follow me, and to cross the Potomac at Shepherdstown, while I crossed at Williamsport, ten miles above. In reply to those instructions, General Stuart informed me that he had discretionary powers; whereupon I withdrew.

The correspondence between Lee and Stuart is not complete without adding an extract from a letter, dated 23d June, in which General Lee says:

* * * If General Hooker's army remains inactive, you can leave two brigades to watch him, and withdraw with the three others, but should he appear to be moving northward, I think you had better withdraw this side of the mountain tomorrow night, cross at Shepherdstown the next day, and move over to Fredericktown. You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their wing without hindrance, doing them all the damage you can, and cross the river east of the mountains. In either case, after crossing the river, you must move on and feel the right of Ewell's troops, * * * but I think the sooner you cross into Maryland after tomorrow, the better.

In view of these letters, it seems reasonably plain that while General Lee's first purpose, communicated to Stuart the same day he gave orders to Ewell to move, was to have Stuart join Ewell at once, if the move could be made, that purpose was modified by the letter of the following day, leaving the crossing at Shepherdstown or east of the mountains to his own judgment, with the injunction that in either case, he should move on and feel the right of Ewell's troops. In giving Stuart this discretion, General Lee did not anticipate, nor did Stuart foresee that in availing of it, he might be put completely out of touch with Ewell. Colonel John S. Mosby, in his book, Stuart's Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign, makes himself largely responsible for Stuart's decision as to choice of routes. He says that after the affair at Middleburg, he penetrated the enemy's lines, and found the different army corps widely separated, no corps being nearer than ten miles to any other: That he reported their location to Stuart, and that it would be an easy matter for a column of cavalry to pass between them, and at the same time strike a damaging blow at the wagon trains with which all the roads were filled, and suggested to him to cross the Bull Run Mountains and pass through the middle of Hooker's army into Maryland. Mosby was a great favorite with Stuart, and had frequently supplied him with valuable information. No one knew the country so thoroughly as he did, and his opinions were entitled to great weight. He supported his suggestions with arguments that appealed to Stuart. He pointed out that the Bull Run Mountains could be passed in the morning, and the Potomac crossed early in the evening, and communication be severed between Pleasanton and Hooker, and that if the former's cavalry were sent in pursuit, it could never overtake them, and that the best way to preserve Lee's communications was to assail Hooker's, &c.

According to Colonel Mosby, Stuart told him that Lee was anxious to know if Hooker's army was moving to cross the Potomac, which he volunteered to find out. That he did so, and found no signs of movement. That Hooker seemed to be waiting for Lee; that this information was given to Stuart on the morning of the 24th, who was to forward it to Lee. Stuart and Mosby then arranged that the latter should again cross the Bull Run Mountains, and meet Stuart the next day at a designated point, where Mosby would guide the advance as it moved on through Hooker's army to Seneca Ford.

The idea, no matter by whom suggested, of passing through Hooker's army or by his rear, and interposing between him and Washington, doubtless possessed great fascination for Stuart. It suited his daring spirit and love of adventure. The prize held out in the way of spoils had its attractions, for if the cavairy on either side had a weakness, it was for intercepting and capturing wagon trains. Probably Stuart was not unmindful of the fame and success he had achieved by his successful ride round McClellan in 1862, and regarded this as offering opportunities for even a more brilliant adventure. If he drew in advance any parallel between the two, he failed in the present instance, to reckon on the fact that its whole success was dependent upon his ability at a critical moment, to unite with a distant and independent force.

Stuart's movement began during the night of the 24th, but the meeting at the appointed place between Stuart and Mosby never took place. Stuart found Hooker's army in motion and Hancock's corps in possession of Thoroughfare Gap, and across his path to Haymarket. He could not resist throwing a few shells at Hancock's passing columns, but the road being blocked, and finding himself unable to pursue his course west of Centreville, he determined to make a wide detour, which carried him around the enemy's rear to Fairfax Station, which the enemy had just left, moving westward to Leesburg. In consequence the Potomac was not reached until the evening of the 27th, when it was crossed during the night, under many difficulties. If everything else had gone smoothly with Stuart, this delay was fatal, and threw his plans out of gear.

Hooker's army, after concentrating about Leesburg, began the passage of the Potomac on pontoons at Edwards' Ferry, about twelve miles east of and below Harper's Ferry, on the 25th, and the movement was completed on the 26th. In the meantime Hill crossed the river at Shepherdstown on the 24th, and Longstreet at the same time at Williamsport. The two columns united at Hagerstown, and proceeded thence to the neighborhood of Chambersburg, which was reached on the 27th, where a rest was made of two days. The two cavalry brigades of Robertson and Jones followed, and instructions were sent to Imboden, commanding a cavalry force, to move from Hancock and join the army.

When Stuart crossed the river, he learned that Hooker was at Poolesville, Maryland, and his army in motion for Frederick. Had he paused when he reached the river and turning back, moved up by the south bank and crossed at Shepherdstown, he would have had no more miles to travel following Lee in reaching Gettysburg than he passed over in the route he took, and with the road free of obstacles, could have accomplished it in less time. But his choice of routes in the first instance, however unhappy it proved to be, cannot be said to have been a violation of his instructions. In his official report of the compaign, made on the 20th of August, 1863, he says, that after the affair at Aldie, He began to look for some other point at which to aim an effective blow, and he submitted to the Commanding General, the plan of leaving a brigade in his front, and passing through some gap in the Bull Run Mountains, attain the enemy's rear, passing between his main body and Washington, and cross into Maryland, joining our army north of the Potomac. The Commanding General wrote me authorizing this move, if I deemed it practicable, and also what instructions should be given to the officer in command of the two brigades left in front of the enemy. He also notified me that one column should move via Gettysburg and the other via Carlisle, towards the Susquehanna, and directed me after crossing, to proceed with all dispatch to join the right (Early), of the army, &c. The report of which this is an extract, is written with unusual care, and apparently to meet some of the criticisms, which even at that time were levelled at Stuart. It was addressed to General Lee's Chief of Staff, and its accuracy does not appear to have been challenged by any endorsement on the report.

In the official reports of the campaign by General Lee, dated July 31st, 1863, and prior to the date of Stuart's, he says: * * *

General Stuart was left to guard the passes of the mountains and observe the movements of the enemy, whom he was instructed to harass and impede as much as possible, should he attempt to cross the Potomac. In that event General Stuart was directed to move into Maryland, crossing the Potomac east or west of the Blue Ridge, as in his judgment should be best, and take position on the right of our column, as it advanced, &c.

In a subsequent, more elaborate report on the 20th of January, 1864, substantially the same language is repeated, with this addition, * * * Upon the suggestion of the former officer (Stuart) that he could damage the enemy and delay his passage of the river by getting in his rear, he was authorized to do so, and it was left to his discretion, whether to enter Maryland east or west of the Blue Ridge; but he was instructed to lose no time in placing his command on the right of our column as soon as he should perceive the enemy moving northward. * * * It was expected as soon as the Federal army should cross the Potomac, General Stuart would give notice of its movements, and nothing having been heard from him since our entrance into Maryland, it was inferred that the enemy had not yet left Virginia. The accuracy of this last report has been questioned by some of General Stuart's friends and partisans, and it has been suggested that not being written by the hand of General Lee himself, it does not properly reflect what he intended to say.

There can be no doubt of the fact, that there was prevalent at the time in the army, a deep sense of disappointment over Stuart's absence during all the march into Pennsylvania, and a disposition to hold him strictly to account. It is equally true that General Lee was greatly disturbed, and keenly felt his absence, so that we are disposed to accept the language of the report, notwithstanding the fact that Stuart must be acquitted of any violation of the letter of his instructions.

At a small dinner party, composed of ex-Confederates, some years after the War, at which Col. Charles Marshall was present, the discussion turned upon the Gettysburg campaign, and those present were not a little startled, by Col. Marshall's declaring, that he had tried to have General Stuart court-martialled. Who? everyone exclaimed, not Jeb Stuart. Yes, Jeb Stuart, he said, and proceeded to make the following statement, which I reduced to writing the next day, and is in nearly these words:

It was my habit and duty to prepare General Lee's reports, that is, a skeleton draft, which I would submit to him to modify or reject, and to this end, all the official reports, from those of corps commanders down to infantry captains, were referred to me. It was often necessary to reconcile conflicting reports, and to do this, I would send for the officers, point out in their presence the discrepancies, and require them to be so modified as to substantially agree. I never could get a report from Stuart after the Gettysburg campaign. I sent for it repeatedly. Finally General Lee said he must have it, and I went to see Stuart. He gave me a first-rate dinner, the best he had, but no report. He promised it however by a certain day, and it came. I then concluded my report for General Lee. In doing so I dealt with Stuart in the plainest language, in fact, I had told him before, I thought he ought to be shot.

General Lee was unwilling, however, to adopt my draft. I had explicitly charged him with disobedience of orders, and laid the full responsibility at his door.