When Perseus heard that Meliboea was beingB.C. 169 attacked by the consul's army at the same time that the fleet was anchored at Iolcus, in order to attack Demetrias from there, he sent a certain Euphranor, one of his officers, with two thousand picked soldiers to Meliboea. Euphranor's orders were that if he dislodged the Romans from Meliboea, he was to enter Demetrias unobserved before the Romans brought their camp up to the city from Iolcus. The besiegers of Meliboea, in great panic when Euphranor suddenly made his appearance on higher ground, abandoned their works and set them afire. So the siege of Meliboea was given up. After freeing one city from siege, Euphranor at once advanced to Demetrias. He entered the walls by night and gave the inhabitants such confidence that they felt sure of their ability not only to defend their walls, but to protect their land from raids. Sallies were made against the scattered ravagers, not without casualties to the enemy. However, the praetor and the king rode around the walls, reconnoitring the situation of the city, in case they could attempt an assault by works or by main force at any point. There was a rumour that Cydas the CretanA substantial account of this and other intrigues is given by Polybius XXIX. 6 (lc). and Antimachus, the commander in Demetrias, were agents in discussing terms of friendship between Eumenes and Perseus. At any rate, the Romans departed from Demetrias. Eumenes sailed to the consul, and after offering congratulations on his successful entrance into Macedonia, left for Pergamum in his own kingdom. The praetor Marcius Figulus sent part of his fleet into winter quarters at Sciathus, and made for Oreüs in Euboea with the rest of his ships, thinking that thisB.C. 169 city was most suitable for the forwarding of supplies to the armies in Macedonia and Thessaly.

The historians give highly different accounts of King Eumenes. If you trust Valerius Antias,As Livy knew, trusting Valerius Antias was a hazardous proceeding. Polybius XXIX. 5 (lb) is less certain about Eumenes' attitude; Valerius perhaps reported the view prevailing in Rome at the time. his account is that although the praetor summoned the king with frequent despatches, he did not even receive naval assistance from him, nor did Eumenes on his way to Asia part on good terms with the consul, being indignant because he was not permitted to encamp in the Roman area; Eumenes, says Valerius, could not even be persuaded to leave behind the Galatian cavalry he had brought with him. His brother Attalus, continues Valerius, not only remained with the consul, but displayed genuine and unwavering good faith and notable exploits in this campaign.

While the war was continuing in Macedonia, envoys from across the Alps from a Gallic chieftain —his name is given as Balanos, but there is no record of his tribe —came to Rome promising aid for the Macedonian campaign. Thanks were expressed by the senate and gifts sent the envoys, a twisted necklace of two pounds of gold and golden bowls of four pounds, a horse with ornamental trappings, and cavalry weapons. After the Gauls, PamphylianThey had apparently been recognized as free friends of Rome after a dispute as to their status under the treaty with Antiochus, XXXVIII. xxxix. 17, and xv. 6. envoys presented in the senate-house a gold crown made of twenty thousand philipsThese coins were worth about twenty silver drachmas, cf. XXXVII. lix. 4 and the note. The gift seems to have been unusually large; the Rhodians gave the same when desperately trying to regain Roman favour, see XLV. xxv. 7; the figure here may be wrong. The philip, by weight a stater or double drachma of the Athenian standard (= 8.6 g.; the theoretical U.S. gold dollar of 1934 = 15r[grains troy = 0.988 g.), was popularized by Philip II after the fall of Olynthus in 348 B.C. He seems to have taken the coin from the Olynthians; it paralleled an earlier issue from Philippi, which began as a colony of Thasos three years before its capture by Philip, and which had an Athenian adviser. Philip continued the coinage of this town. During the second century, the philip was the commonest gold coin of Rome (see XXXIV. lii. 7; XXXVII. lix. 4; XXXIX. v. 15 and vii. 1, and frequent allusions of Plautus' Bacchides, Poenulus, and Trinummus); as a result of Roman trade, philips also made their appearance in central Gaul, and were locally imitated there, in the Rhine-land, and even in Britain. (See Seltman, Greek Coins, pp. 200-202, and R.E. 2196-2198.) and their request was granted that they be permitted to deposit thisB.C. 169 present in the temple of Jupiter, Greatest and Best, and to offer sacrifice on the Capitol; a gracious answer was given to the envoys' request for a renewal of the state of friendship, and a gift of two thousand asses apiece was sent them.

Next, an audience was given to envoys from King Prusias, and shortly thereafter to those from the Rhodians, who made a very different presentation of the same request. Both embassies treated of making terms again with King Perseus. Prusias' attitude was more that of entreaty than demand, for he declared that up to this time he had taken the part of the Romans, and would so continue as long as the war lasted; however, inasmuch as envoys from Perseus had come to him to discuss ending the war with the Romans, he had promised to plead Perseus' cause before the senate; he requested that if they could bring themselves to do so, they would put an end to their wrath, and would accord him, too, their thanks for the restoration of peace. So spoke the king's envoys. The Rhodians haughtily reviewed their services to the Roman people, and claimed for themselves almost the greater part of the victories, especially over King Antiochus; they then added that while peace had existed between the Macedonians and Romans, they had entered upon friendship with King Perseus; this they had broken off against their will and on account of no fault of his toward them, but because it had seemed good to the Romans to draw them into participation in the war. For the third year, they said, they were feeling manyB.C. 169 inconveniences from this war because of the interruption of commerce; their island was poor, and could not be inhabited without the assistance of sea-borne supplies. Since therefore they could no longer endure this privation, they had sent other envoys to Perseus in Macedonia, to inform him that it was the Rhodians' wish that he should arrange a peace with the Romans, and that they had sent a similar announcement to Rome. If either party was responsible for preventing the ending of the war, the Rhodians would deliberate as to what action they ought to take against this party.

I feel sure that even now these statements cannot be read or heard without indignation; from this one can judge what the senate's state of mind was as they listened.For the services of the Rhodians, cf. XLII. xlvi. 6. According to Polybius XXVIII. 16, relations between Rome and Rhodes were entirely cordial this year; in 168 B.C. the consul Marcius suggested to an embassy of the Rhodians that they act as mediators; the only result was to encourage the pro-Macedonians in Rhodes (cf. below, xxxv. 4, where Livy still saddles the Rhodians with the onus in this matter; also XLV. iii. 3, with which cf. Polybius XXIX. 10). Polybius suspects Marcius of planning to have the Rhodians annoy the Romans and so justify Rome's overriding their independence; in view of Marcius' liking for intrigue (XLII. xlvii. 1-4), this is quite probable. In XLV. xxii. 2, Livy suggests that Roman suspicion of Rhodes was something new in 167 B.C.; in XLV. xxv. 6, the freeing of Lycia and Caria seems to have been ordered in that year. Claudius (see below) or some other annalist seems to have misled Livy by anticipating developments. Cassius Dio XX. fr. 66, 2 = Zonaras 9. 22 says that Perseus would have been granted peace but for the tactlessness of the Rhodians. Livy certainly had no suspicion that the Romans might have continued to tolerate Perseus.

Claudius has it that the senate returned no answer, but only had read its decree that the Roman people gave the Carians and Lycians their freedomPrevious friction between these peoples and the Rhodians was noted in XLI. vi. 8-12, cf. the note, and XLII. xiv. 8. Polybius XXX. 5. 12 records a decree freeing the Carians and Lycians in the year 168-7 B.C., probably the time when it was actually passed. and that despatches should be immediately sent to both peoples, on hearing which the chief of the Rhodian embassy, for whose proud language theB.C. 169 senate-house had but a moment before seemed too small, now suffered deflation. Other historians record the following answer:

At the outset of this war the Roman people were informed by no trifling sources that the Rhodians had entered upon secret plots with King Perseus against the Roman state,Cf. XLII. xxvi. 8 for earlier Roman suspicions, which to a large extent resulted from the Rhodians' non-partisanship, based on a preference for a balance of power, cf. XLII. xxx. 5-6. but even had this been doubtful before, the words of the embassy just uttered have made the matter certain. Frequently treachery unmasks itself, even if it is more wary at first. And now the Rhodians pass judgment throughout the world as to peace and war! At the beck and call of the Rhodians will the Romans take up and lay down their arms! Now we are no longer to call upon the gods to witness treaties, but rather the Rhodians! Unless obedience is rendered them, and our armies are removed from Macedonia, the Rhodians will see, will they, what they must do? What the Rhodians will see, they themselves know. But surely the Roman people, after their conquest of Perseus, which they hope will take place any day, will see that they repay a suitable reward for the actions of each state during the war. Nevertheless, a present of two thousand sesterces apiece was sent to the envoys, which they refused.

Thereafter despatches from Quintus Marcius the consul were read, describing his crossing over into Macedonia, by forcing the pass; in Macedonia he had procured supplies in advance of winter from various localities, and in particular had receivedB.C. 169 twenty thousand bushels of wheat and ten thousand of barley from the Epirotes, so that payment for this grain should be arranged with their envoys at Rome. Clothes, said the consul, should be sent to the army from Rome; there was need for about two hundred horses, especially Numidians, and he had no supply of them where he was. A decree of the senate was passed to carry out these requests of the consul. Gaius Sulpicius the praetorHe was the city praetor, cf. XLIII. xv. 3. Under Sulpicius' sponsorship as praetor, Ennius produced his Thyestes (Cicero, Brutus 78), and in his consulship, Terence produced his Andria; for Sulpicius' prediction of an eclipse, see below, xxxvii. 5. let a contract for transporting to Macedonia six thousand togas,For this use of a civilian garment by soldiers, cf. XXII. liv. 2 and the note. thirty thousand tunics, and two hundred horses, and for depositing them where the consul chose. Sulpicius also paid the envoys of the Epirotes the price of the grain, and brought before the senate Onesimus, son of Pytho, a Macedonian noble. He had always been a proponent of peace to the king, and had advised him to adopt frequently, if not regularly, the practice which his father Philip had begun and continued to the last day of his life —namely, that of reading through twice daily the treaty he had made with the Romans. After Onesimus had been unable to discourage the king from war, Onesimus began at first to withdraw on one excuse or another, so as not to be associated with projects of which he disapproved. Finally, when he saw that he was an object of suspicion and that occasionally he was being charged by innuendo with treachery, he deserted to the Romans and made himself very useful to the consul. On being introduced to the senate, he recited these facts, and the senate ordered that he be enrolled in the category of allies, that a residence and entertainment be provided for him, that two hundred acres of theB.C. 169 public land of the Roman people in the district of Tarentum be given him, and that a house be bought for him at Tarentum.For similar rewards, cf. II. xvi. 4-5; XXIII. xlvi. 6-7; XXVI. xxi. 9-13. Gaius Decimius the praetorHe was praetor in charge of aliens, XLIII. xv. 3. was entrusted with the execution of these orders.

The censors conducted the census on the thirteenth of December more strictly than before. Many were deprived of their rank of knights, among them Publius Rutilius who as tribune of the commons had violently assailed the censors; he was also removed from his tribe and disenfranchised.Severity to knights was previously mentioned, XLIII. xvi. 1; either the process was interrupted by the objections there described, or the censors conducted a new review at this later date. Rutilius was now open to their attack, because he had left the tribunate four days before on December 9. As half the revenues of the year had by decree of the senate been assigned by the quaestors to the censors for the construction of public works, Titus Sempronius, out of the funds assigned to him, bought for the state the house of Publius Africanus behind the Old Shops in the direction of the statue of Vortumnus, as well as the butcher's stalls and the shops adjacent, and saw to the construction of the basilica which afterward received the name of Sempronian.Africanus was the father-in-law of the censor. The Old Shops had been built in 209 B.C., cf. XXVII. xi. 16, and were so called to distinguish them from some built in 194 B.C. The bronze statue of the Etruscan god Vortumnus stood in the Vicus Tuscus some distance south-west of the Forum, but visible from it; the statue is mentioned by Cicero, in Verrem II. I. 59, 154, and Propertius V. (IV.) 2. The god, whose name seems to be good Latin, was in charge of turning or exchange, and received a temple in Rome after the overthrow of his home town of Volsinii in 264 B.C. The Basilica Sempronia was later supplanted by the Basilica Julia.

The year was drawing to its close, and because of concern, especially for the war with Macedonia, men were discussing what consuls they should elect for this year, to bring this war at last to an end. A resolution of the senate was therefore passed, that Gnaeus Servilius should come as promptly as possible to hold the elections. The praetorB.C. 169 Sulpicius forwarded the resolution to the consul, and read to the senate a few days later the return despatch from that officer. In this, he set the day for the elections as . . ., and announced his return to the city previous to that time. The consul made haste, and the elections were completed on the day set. There were elected as consuls Lucius Aemilius Paulus for the second time, in the fourteenth year after his first term, and Gaius Licinius Crassus. On the following day, there were elected to the praetorship Gnaeus Baebius Tamphilus, Lucius Anicius Gallus, Gnaeus Octavius, Publius Fonteius Balbus, Marcus Aebutius Helva, and Gaius Papirius Carbo. Concern for the war with Macedonia induced the speeding up of the whole procedure. Therefore it was voted that these magistrates-elect should be allotted their fields of operation immediately, so that when it was known which consul had received Macedonia and which praetor the fleet, the designated men might begin their plans and preparations of the supplies necessary for war and might consult the senate if there was need for consultation on any subject. It was determined to hold the Latin Festival as soon as was possible on religious grounds after the entrance upon office of the magistrates, to avoid any delay to the consul who was to set out for Macedonia. In these decrees, the fields of operation for the consuls were designated as Macedonia and Italy; those for the praetors were, besides the two jurisdictions in the city, the fleet, Spain, Sicily, and Sardinia. Macedonia fell to the lot of the consul Aemilius,It was later assumed, cf. C.I.L. I.2 1, p. 194, elogium XV. and Plutarch, Aemilius x that Paulus was elected as general for Macedonia; this cannot be taken literally, as it would have been the senate which assigned him to a province; unless a judicious falsifying of the allotment process took place, the appointment of Paulus was a bit of the felicitas of the Roman people. Crassus had a respectable record as a soldier, cf. XLII. lviii. 12. Italy toB.C. 169 Licinius. Of the praetors, Gnaeus Baebius received the jurisdiction over citizens, Lucius Anicius was given that over aliens and was placed at the disposal of the senate, Gnaeus Octavius received the fleet, Publius Fonteius Spain, Marcus Aebutius Sicily, and Gaius Papirius Sardinia.

It was at once obvious to everyone that Lucius Aemilius was going to prosecute this war in no sluggish fashion, not only because he was a warlike man, but also because without relaxing by day or night he turned over in his mind nothing but what concerned this war. First of all he requested the senate to send envoys to Macedonia to inspect the armies and the fleet and to report their findings as to what was needed by way of forces on land or sea; moreover, they were to collect information as far as possible about the king's forces and about the terrain under our control and under that of the enemy. They were to investigate the following: whether the Romans were encamped among the mountains or whether all the narrows had been passed and the plains reached; which of the allies were loyal to us, which were wavering and of a loyalty dependent on fortune, and which seemed definitely hostile; how large a supply of provisions had been prepared and whence they could be brought, by a land route or by ships, respectively; what had been achieved on land and sea during this summer. From good information on these points sure decisions might be made for the future, said Aemilius. The senate gave the consulB.C. 169 Gnaeus Servilius the task of choosing three men satisfactory to Lucius Aemilius as envoys to Macedonia. Two days later the envoys set out —Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus, Aulus Licinius Nerva, and Lucius Baebius.

Report was made of two showers of stones near the end of this year, one on Roman land, one on that of Veii. On both occasions a nine-day rite was performed. The priests who died during this year were Publius Quinctilius Varus, the flamen of Mars,He was replaced in the following year by Lucius Postumius Albinus, XLV. xv. 10. and Marcus Claudius Marcellus of the Board of Ten. Gnaeus Octavius replaced the latter. Display being now on the increase, it is recorded that at the games in the arena by the curule aediles Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica and Publius Lentulus, sixty-three leopards and forty bears and elephants participated.

In the consulship of Lucius Aemilius PaulusB.C. 168 and Gaius Licinius, on the fifteenth of March, at the beginning of the new year, the senators were on the qui vive, especially as to what the consul in charge of Macedonia would bring before them about his field of operations. But Paulus said that he had nothing to present until the envoys returned, but that the envoys were now at Brundisium, after having been blown back twice to Dyrrachium on their voyage. As soon as he acquired the information which was the first necessity, he would lay matters before the senate, and this would take place within a very few days. In order to avoid any delay to his settingout, said Paulus, the day for the Latin Festival hadB.C. 168 been set at April twelfthThe date is given below, xxii. 16, as March 31; in either case, it was very early as compared with dates cited elsewhere, e.g., XLI. xvi. 1 (May 5), XLII. xxxv. 3 (June 1). Actually, due to the confusion of the calendar, the festival was held in late January this year, cf. below, xxxvii. 8. ; after the proper performance of the sacrifice, if the senate concurred, he and Gnaeus Octavius would both set out. His colleague Gaius Licinius would take care, in his absence, to get ready and send out what should be made ready and sent to the war; meanwhile, said Paulus, the embassies of foreign nations might be given audience.

First the envoys from King Ptolemy and Queen Cleopatra at Alexandria were announced. Grimy,As part of their costume as suppliants. with untrimmed beard and hair, they entered the senate-house bearing olive-branches, and prostrated themselves; their speech was more pitiable than their array. Antiochus, the king of Syria, who had been a hostage at Rome, under the decent pretext of restoring the elder Ptolemy to his throne, was waging war against the younger brother, who was then in possession of Alexandria.On Antiochus' sojourn at Rome, cf. XLI. xx; a previous stage in Antiochus' encroachment on Egypt was mentioned in XLII. xxix. 5, cf. Polybius XXVII. 19, also XXVIII. 18 f. (16 f.) The elder Ptolemy is Ptolemy VI Philometor; the younger, Euergetes II. Antiochus had won a naval battle at Pelusium and, after leading his forces across the Nile on a hastily-constructed bridge, was overawing Alexandria with his siege and seemed to be on the very point of laying his hands on a very rich kingdom. Complaining of this attack, the envoys begged the senate to come to the rescue of a kingdom and a royal pair who were friends of Roman rule. Such, they argued, were the benefits conferred on Antiochus by the Roman people, and such their influence with all kings and nations that, if they sent envoys to declare to Antiochus that the senate did notB.C. 168 wish war to be made on kings allied to it, Antiochus would at once depart from the walls of Alexandria and would lead his army back into Syria. If they hesitated to do this, shortly Ptolemy and Cleopatra, robbed of their kingdom, would arrive in Rome, somewhat to the shame of the Roman people, because they had offered no aid in the final crisis of their fortunes. The senators, stirred by the entreaties of the Alexandrines, at oncePolybius XXIX. 2 (1) stresses the Roman interest in keeping Antiochus out of Egypt; he does not indicate that the Roman embassy accompanied the Egyptians, and puts more emphasis than does Livy on Roman initiative. sent Gaius Popilius Laenas, Gaius Decimius, and Gaius Hostilius as envoys to bring an end to the war between the kings. They were instructed to approach first Antiochus and then Ptolemy, and to proclaim that if war was not concluded, the party constituting the obstacle would not be considered either a friend or an ally to the Romans.

This embassy left within three days along with the envoys from Alexandria. The mission from Macedonia arrived on the last day of the QuinquatrusThis festival, first mentioned for the year 207 B.C., occurred on March 19-23, see XXVI. xxvii. 1 and the note, also Ovid, Fasti III. 810; C.I.L. I.2 1, p. 312 gives a discussion of the origin of the name (probably because it originally fell on the fifth day, Roman inclusive reckoning, after the Ides), and points out that besides being connected with Minerva, the day had associations with Mars, and seems to have been the time for ceremonial readying of weapons for the campaigning season. amid such eagerness that, had it not been evening, the consuls would have summoned the senate at once. Next day the session was held and the envoys were heard. They reported as follows: The army has been led into Macedonia by trackless passes at a risk disproportionate to the gain. Pieria, which the army has reached, is in the hands of the king; the encampments are so nearly in contact that hardly more than the Elpeüs River separates them. The king does not offer battle, and our forces have not the strength to compel him to do so. Also theB.C. 168 winter is an added obstacle to an active campaign. The soldiers are being supported in idleness and have grain for no more than six days. The Macedonian forces are said to number thirty thousand. If Appius ClaudiusLivy has not mentioned him since XLIII. xxiii. 6; Polybius XXVIII. 13 (11) tells how Appius in the meantime had tried to raise Achaean troops, but had been hindered by Marcius. had sufficient strength in the region of Lychnidus, he could have distracted the king with a second front; as it is, Appius and the force with him are in the greatest danger unless either a full-fledged army is quickly sent him or his present force is extricated. As to the fleet, we heard after we left the camp that some of the sailors have been lost by disease, and some, especially the Sicilians, have gone home, so that the ships lack crews. Those who are there have not received their pay and are insufficiently clothed. Eumenes and his fleet have come and gone for no good reason, as if his ships were drifting before the wind; and there is no good evidence that the spirit of this king is unwavering.The immediate facts reported by Livy, above, x. 12-xiii. 10, and xxviii, do not bear this out; but Eumenes was not above bargaining with Perseus, below, xxiv-xxv (based on Polybius), and some of Livy's sources may have projected back later Roman suspicions, cf. above, xiii. 9. 12-13. Livy usually falls into the attitude, natural enough for his own day, that no one had any business to act contrary to Roman interests; but in the second century, Rome was not the paramount power in the Macedonian-Greek world, and it was not even clear that she proposed at this time to take a permanent interest in the affairs of that region. The envoys reported that Attalus was as gallantly unswerving as Eumenes was entirely undependable.

After hearing the envoys, Lucius Aemilius laid before the senate the question of the conduct of the war. The senate decreed that the consuls and the people should each choose half of the tribunes for eight legions; however, it was voted that no one whoB.C. 168 had not held office should be chosen that year.These provisions for officering the legions provided for reasonably competent officers, while still avoiding the suspicion of favouritism among an office-holding clique which may have caused the use of popular election of tribunes the previous year XLIII. xii. 7. Of the eight legions, two were probably for Gaul (i.e., north Italy), and two were to be Home Guard (urbanae); officers less competent or less congenial to the consuls could be shunted to these legions. The dangers of inbreeding in office-holding at Rome are especially well illustrated by the Jugurthine War; the counter-dangers of politically able commoners elevated to military posts are shown by the careers of Flaminius and Varro in the Second Punic War. Then from among the tribunes Lucius Aemilius was to choose whomever he preferred for the two legions for Macedonia. It was further voted that after the completion of the Latin Festival, the consul Lucius Aemilius and Gnaeus Octavius, the praetor to whom the fleet had been allotted, should depart for their field of operations. To them was added the praetor Lucius Anicius, whose post was the court for aliens; it was voted that he should succeed Appius Claudius in the Illyrian theatre near Lychnidus. Charge over the levy was given to the consul Gaius Licinius. He was instructed to enroll seven thousand Roman citizens and two hundred horsemen and to demand of the allies of the Latin Name seven thousand infantry and four hundred cavalry, and he was to send a despatch to Gnaeus Servilius the commander in the province of Gaul, instructing him to enroll six hundred cavalry. This force Licinius was ordered to send as promptly as possible to his colleague in Macedonia; a limit of two legions was placed on the army on that front, and each legion was to be reinforced till it contained six thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry; the surplus infantry and cavalry were to be distributed as garrisons. Men unfit for military service were to be discharged. An added levy was imposed on the allies of ten thousand infantry and eight hundred cavalry. This force was given to Anicius besides the two legions which he was ordered to transport toB.C. 168 Macedonia, each legion having five thousand two hundred infantry and three hundred cavalry. Moreover, five thousand sailors were enrolled for the fleet. Licinius the consul was ordered to hold his area with two legions, and to add to them ten thousand infantry and six hundred cavalry of the allies.

When the senate had finished its voting, the consul Lucius Aemilius went from the senate-house to a public meeting and made the following speech: I seem to have noticed, fellow-citizens, that greater congratulations were offered me when I was allotted Macedonia as my field of operations than when my election as consul was announced, or on the day when I entered upon office. The reason for this was none other, I believe, than that you regard me as capable of bringing the long-drawn-out war in Macedonia to an end worthy of the high position of the Roman people. The gods too, I hope, approve this fall of the lot and will likewise be at my side in action. So far I can partly prophesy, and partly hope; another matter I dare to assert as sure namely, that I will strive with every effort that the hope you have conceived for me shall not be vain. What is required for the war has been voted by the senate, and since it is determined that I shall set out at once, for which I am not reluctant, the preparations will be made by that excellent man, my colleague Gaius Licinius, as vigorously as if he were going to conduct the campaign. For your part, see to it that you have confidence only in the reports I make to the senate and to you, and beware of nourishing by your credulity the gossip for which no sponsor will appear. For I have noticed that, as is commonly the case, so now especially in this war no one is so scornful ofB.C. 168 rumour that his spirit cannot be weakened. In all the clubs and even —God save us! —at dinner-tables there are experts who lead armies to Macedonia, who know where camp should be pitched, what places should be held with garrisons, when or by what pass Macedonia should be invaded, where granaries should be set up, by what routes on land or sea provisions should be supplied, when we must join battle with the enemy and when it is better to remain inactive. Not only do they decide what should be done, but when anything is done contrary to their opinion, they accuse the consul as if he were in the dock. Such behaviour is a great obstacle to the men in the field. For not everyone is as unwavering and as steadfast of spirit against hostile gossip as was Quintus Fabius, who preferred to have his independence of command lessened by popular folly rather than to neglect the best interests of the state for the sake of acclaim. I am not, fellow-citizens, one who believes that no advice may be given to leaders; nay rather I judge him to be not a sage, but haughty, who conducts everything according to his own opinion alone. What therefore is my conclusion? Generals should receive advice, in the first place from the experts who are both specially skilled in military matters and have learned from experience; secondly, from those who are on the scene of action, who see the terrain, the enemy, the fitness of the occasion, who are sharers in the danger, as it were aboard the same vessel. Thus, if there is anyone who is confident that he can advise me as to the best advantage of the state in this campaign which I am about to conduct, let him not refuse his services to the state, but come with me into Macedonia. I willB.C. 168 furnish him with his sea-passage, with a horse, a tent, and even travel-funds. If anyone is reluctant to do this and prefers the leisure of the city to the hardships of campaigning, let him not steer the ship from on shore. The city itself provides enough subjects for conversation; let him confine his garrulity to these; and let him be aware that I shall be satisfied with the advice originating in camp.Polybius XXIX. 1 (la) also mentions Paulus' attack on the armchair generals, which President Roosevelt used effectively (New York Times, Mar. 18, 1942, p. 10). In sec. 2, cf. the note on the text, it is possible that there was a reference to Paulus' reluctance to assume the consulship in this year, a reluctance to which Plutarch, Aemilius x f., refers both as a fact and as an item in Paulus' speech.

After this address and the due completion of the sacrifice at the Latin Festival, which was held on March 31The date had been set for two weeks later, according to xix. 4 above; it seems unlikely that the date, once announced, could have been advanced, and there is probably a confusion in the text between Ides and Kalends either here or above. on the Alban Mount, both the consul and the praetor Gnaeus Octavius immediately set out for Macedonia. History records that the consul was escorted by an unusually great throng of persons paying their respects to him, and that men prophesied with almost sure expectation that the Macedonian war would come to an end, and that the return of the consul would be prompt and in great triumph.

While these events were occurring in Italy, Perseus decided that since he had discovered that the Romans had entered the pass and that the final crisis of the war impended, he must no longer postpone the project which he could not bring himself to complete because expenditure of money was required-namely, gaining the adherence of Gentius, king of Illyria. Inasmuch as Perseus had agreed through his envoy HippiasNot named by Livy in his description of an earlier stage of the negotiations in XLIII. xx. In the present passage, Livy is following Polybius XXIX. 3-4. on a payment of three hundred talents of silver, on condition of an exchangeB.C. 168 of hostages, he sent Pantauchus, one of his most trusty friends, to complete the agreement. At Meteon in the region of Labeatis, Pantauchus met the Illyrian king; there he received the king's oath and his hostages. Gentius too sent an envoy named Olympio to require the oath and the hostages of Perseus.' Others were sent with him to receive the money; and, at Pantauchus' suggestion, Parmenio and Morcus were named as envoys to go with the Macedonians to Rhodes. To them instructions were given to set out for Rhodes only after the oath, the hostages, and the money had been received; it was thought that by the prestige of two kings at once the Rhodians could be induced to war with the Romans, and that once the kings were joined by the state to which belonged a unique reputation for sea-power, no hope on land or sea would be left the Romans.

On the arrival of the Illyrians, Perseus left his camp at the Elpeüs River with all his cavalry and met them at Dium. There the terms agreed upon were executed in the presence of the surrounding column of cavalry, whom the king wished to be present at the ratification of the alliance with Gentius, thinking that it would somewhat raise their spirits. The hostages were also given and received in the sight of all, those who were to receive the money were sent to the royal treasury at Pella and those who were to accompany the Illyrian envoys to Rhodes were ordered to take ship at Thessalonica. MetrodorusA Rhodian, agent of the pro-Macedonian party. was at that port, a recent arrival from Rhodes, who stated, on the authority of Dinon and Polyaratus, the heads of the state,They were heads of the pro-Macedonian party, but Livy may exaggerate their official position. that the Rhodians were ready forB.C. 168 war. Metrodorus was assigned as the leader of the combined embassy with the Illyrians.

At the same time, identical messages, suggested by the state of affairs, were sent both to Eumenes and to Antiochus, as follows: by nature a free state and a king were things hostile to each other; the Roman people attacked kings one by one, and —an unjust state of affairs —assailed kings with the help of kings; Perseus' father had been overcome with the aid of Attalus; with Eumenes helping, and to a certain extent Perseus' father Philip as well, Antiochus had been assailedOn Attalus, see above, XXIX. xii. 14 and XXXI. xiv; for Eumenes, XXXV. xiii; XXXVI. xliv; XXXVII. xli; for Philip, XXXVII. vii. ; now both Eumenes and Prusias were in arms against Perseus; if the kingdom of Macedonia were out of the way, next would come Asia Minor, which the Romans had already made their own to some extent under pretext of freeing communities, and after Asia Minor, Syria. Already Prusias was being given a position above Eumenes, already Antiochus, though victorious, was being barred from Egypt, his prize of war. Perseus bade each king, on considering these facts, to take such steps that either he might force the Romans to make peace with Perseus, or if Rome persevered in an unjust war might regard the Romans as the common enemy of all kings.

The message to Antiochus was open; to Eumenes the envoy was sent under guise of ransoming prisoners, but in fact certain more secret matters were under discussion, which for the time being embarrassed Eumenes, who was already an object of hatred and suspicion to the Romans, with false and more serious charges; for he was already regarded as a traitor and almost an enemy, while the two kings with grasping hands vied with each other in guile and greed.Polybius XXIX. 7-8 (Id) calls Eumenes most unscrupulous and Perseus most miserly, and says that Eumenes was unable by his lack of scruple to get the best of Perseus' stinginess. There was a Cretan, Cydas, one of Eumenes' henchmen. He had held conversations, first at Amphipolis with a certain Chimarus, a fellow-countryman who was serving in Perseus' army, then later at Demetrias, beneath the very walls of the city, once with a certain Menecrates and again with Antimachus, both of whom were officers of the king.For the negotiations at Demetrias, see above, xiii. 9, where Antimachus only is mentioned on the Macedonian side. Herophon also, who was then sent by Perseus, had similarly undertaken two previous missions to Eumenes. These conversations were secret, and the missions caused bad rumours, but there was no knowledge of what had been discussed or upon what the kings had agreed. The actual state of affairs, however, was as follows.

Eumenes did not want a victory for Perseus, nor did he intend to assist him in winning one by military means, not so much because of the mutual hostility of their fathers, as because of the hatred engendered between himself and Perseus.Livy is in this chapter expanding the account of Polybius XXIX. 7-8 (Id). The jealousy of kings is such that Eumenes would not have viewed with calmness the attainment by Perseus of such great strength and prestige as awaited him if he defeated the Romans. Eumenes also perceived that from the very outset of the war Perseus had nurtured the hope of peace in every wayLivy now states what his presentation of facts showed before-that Perseus did not want the war, and stood on the defensive from the first, see Vol. XII. 396 and 460, notes 1, Roman suspicions and propaganda notwithstanding; the latter have influenced Livy extensively in his commentary on events. and as time went on had come more and more, as the threatB.C. 168 came closer, to treat and think of nothing else. Since the war was dragging on longer than the Romans had hoped, they too, their commanders, and their senate would not be averse, so Eumenes thought, to ending so disturbing and difficult a war. Having ascertained this willingness on either side, Eumenes was eager to put on sale his good offices in an effort to negotiate the peace which he thought might even come about automatically through the weariness of the stronger and the fears of the weaker side. Therefore Eumenes tried to negotiate for a reward, now for not aiding the Romans' military effort on land or sea, now for securing peace with the Romans; for his abstention from war, his price was a thousand talents,Polybius says five hundred. for negotiating peace, fifteen hundred. He showed himself always ready not only to pledge his word to either course of action, but even to give hostages.

Perseus was very ready to undertake the attempt under pressure of fear, and as to the acceptance of hostages the discussion proceeded without delay, and it was agreed that, when accepted, the hostages should be sent to Crete. When the subject of money came up, there Perseus hesitated, and said that especially for the first alternative the payment of money was dishonourable and base for kings of so high a reputation, not only for the giver, but even more for the recipient; for the hope of peace with the Romans, he would not refuse an expenditure, but he would pay on the completion of the enterprise, and meanwhile would deposit the funds in the temple on Samothrace. Since this island was in Perseus' realm, Eumenes saw that it made no difference whether the money was there or at Pella; heB.C. 168 attempted to secure some sort of down payment. And so having tried vainly to overreach each other, the kings got themselves nothing but a bad reputation.

This was not the only failure incurred by Perseus because of miserliness, when by payment of money he could either through Eumenes' efforts have secured peace. which he should have bought even at the price of part of his kingdom, or had he been deceived, he could have exposed his enemy with the booty on him and aroused just hostility toward him on the part of the Romans. But a previous parallel case was that of the alliance with King Gentius, ready for the taking; and at this same time Perseus lost through miserliness the tremendous assistance of the Gauls who were scattered through the region of Illyria.These people may have been much the same as the Bastarnae of XL. v. 10 and lvii, cf. also XLI. xix. 3-11. The name of the leader, Clondicus, is the same here and in XL. lviii. 8, which makes it sound like a title rather than a proper name. In Polybius XXV. 6 (XXVI. 9), there is a reference to the Bastarnae joining Perseus and the Gauls (Paton's interpretation),which has led some scholars to think that Polybius was referring to the Bastarnae as Gauls (Galatai) here. Properly, the Bastarnae were Germans rather than Gauls, as was recognized soon after Livy's time, cf. Strabo VII. 306, Pliny, N.H. IV. 81, Tacitus, Germania 46. The location of the Bastarnae was to the north-east of the location here suggested for these Gauls, but cf. below, xxvii. 3. There were on their way ten thousand cavalry and an equal number of infantry who matched their pace to that of the horses, and in turn seized the riderless horses of fallen cavalrymen for further fighting. These men had been pledged a cash payment of ten gold pieces per cavalryman, five per infantryman, and a thousand for their leader. When they approached, Perseus went to meet them from his camp at the Elpeüs with half of his forces and began to give orders throughout the villages and cities near the road to bring out provisions so that there would be plenty of grain, wine, and animals. He himself brought horses, breast-ornaments, and capesB.C. 168 as presents for the chief men, and a small amount of gold to distribute among a few, supposing that the rank and file could be led along by expectations. He reached the city of Almana and pitched camp on the banks of the Axius River. The force of Gauls halted near Desudaba in Maedica,Probably on the mid-Strymon. waiting for their promised pay. Thither Perseus sent Antigonus, one of the wearers of the purple, to order the rank and file of the Gauls to shift camp to Bylazora (this is a place in Paeonia) and the leaders to come in a body to him. The Gauls were seventy-five miles from the Axius River and the king's camp. Antigonus carried this message to them and added an account of the abundance of all supplies prepared through the thoughtfulness of the king, through which they would travel, and of the gifts of garments, silver, and horses with which the king proposed to greet their leaders on their arrival. The Gauls replied that they would certainly find out about these matters from personal observation, but they asked about what had been promised for immediate delivery —whether he had brought with him the gold which was to be distributed among the individual horsemen and footmen. When they received no reply on this point, Clondicus, their chieftain, declared: Go back then and report to the king that the Gauls will not move a step farther unless they receive the gold and hostages.

When this message was reported to the king, he summoned his council, but when it became clear what everyone would advise, the king, a trustier guardian of his cash than of his kingdom, began to discourse on the treachery and savagery of the Gauls, which had been demonstrated long since by disasters to many people; it was dangerous, he said, to receiveB.C. 168 such large numbers into Macedonia, for fear that they would find the Gauls more deadly as allies than the Romans were as enemies; a force of five thousand cavalry was sufficient, for these they could use for military purposes and would not themselves be overawed by their numbers.

It was obvious to everyone that he was troubled about the pay and nothing else; but as no one dared to give him the advice he asked for, Antigonus was sent back to announce that the king could use the services of five thousand cavalry only, and would not keep the rest of the host. When the barbarians heard this, there was an indignant outcry from the remainder that they had been to no purpose lured away from their homes. Clondicus again asked whether he would pay what had been agreed upon to these five thousand; and when he saw that to this, too, a devious reply was being concocted, the Gauls returned to the Danube, without injury to the messenger who had tricked them (a fate he had hardly hoped could befall him), but plundering that part of Thrace which adjoined their route. This force of Gauls, even had the king remained inactive at the Elpeüs before the Romans, could if brought into Thessaly through the pass of Perrhaebia have not only stripped the fields by their ravages, so that the Romans could have looked for no provisions from there, but could even have stormed cities as long as Perseus held the Romans at the Elpeüs, in order to prevent their rescuing the cities of their allies. The Romans would have had to consider their own plight, since they could neither remain if Thessaly, the army's source of supplies, were lost, nor could they advance while the camp of the Macedonians lay before them.B.C. 168 By losing this added strength, Perseus weakened to no small degree the morale of the Macedonians, who had been depending on this source of hope.

The same miserliness caused a rift with Gentius. For when Perseus had counted out three hundred talents for the envoys sent by Gentius to Pella, he permitted them to affix their seal to the money; then he sent ten talents to Pantauchus and ordered this paid at once to the king. His own people were transporting the rest of the money marked with the seal of the Illyrians, and he ordered them to convey it by short stages, and then when the Macedonian frontier was reached, to halt there and wait for messengers from him. After Gentius had received a scant portion of the money, he was continually spurred on by Pantauchus to assail the Romans with an act of hostility, and so he threw into prison Marcus Perpenna and Lucius Petilius, the ambassadors who happened to reach him at this time.See below xxxii. 2. On hearing of this Perseus thought that Gentius had committed himself to fight the Romans in any case, and sent a recall to the one conveying the money, as if his only concern was to save as much booty as possible for the Romans after his own defeat.

Herophon also returned from the court of Eumenes, the secret negotiations being still unrevealed. The Macedonians spread the word that discussion about prisoners had taken place, and Eumenes, to avoid suspicion, informed the consul to this same effect.

After the disappointment of Herophon's return from the court of Eumenes, Perseus sent Antenor and Callippus, his naval commanders, with forty scout-ships —there were five cuttersCf. XXXV. xxvi. 1, Polybius XVI. 2. 9 and XVIII (XVII) 1. 1, lumps these pristes with the lembi as light fighting vessels. Livy, quoting from the latter passage of Polybius, translates pristis by beaked ship, XXXII. xxxii. 9. added toB.C. 168 this number —to Tenedos, in order to protect from that base the ships scattered through the Cyclades islands on their way to Macedonia with grain. The ships were launched at Cassandrea, and after crossing first to the harbours under Mount Athos and thence on a calm sea to Tenedos, they sent away unharmed and even with kind addresses some undecked Rhodian ships which were at the port with Eudamus their commander. Then Antenor discovered that on the other side of the island fifty of their freight ships were blockaded by warships of Eumenes, under command of Damius, which were stationed at the mouth of the harbour. Antenor promptly sailed around and by threat caused the enemy ships to retreat; the freight ships were sent to Macedonia under convoy of ten scout-ships, which were instructed to return to Tenedos after seeing them safe. On the ninth day thereafter they returned to the fleet, which was now anchored at Sigeum. Thence they crossed to Subota, an island lying between Elaea and Chios. On the day after the arrival of the fleet at Subota, thirty-five of the ships called horse-transports, setting out from Elaea with Galatian cavalry and their mounts, were making for Phanae, a cape of Chios, from which they could cross to Macedonia. They were being sent to Attalus by Eumenes. When a signal reached Antenor from a lookout post that these ships were at sea, he started from Subota and met them between the cape of Erythrae and Chios, where the strait is narrowest. Eumenes' officers least ofB.C. 168 all suspected that a Macedonian fleet was at large in that sea; now they thought them to be Romans, now Attalus, or some men sent back by Attalus from the Roman camp and on their way to Pergamum. But when the shape of the approaching scout-ships was unmistakable and the rapid motion of the oars and the pointing of the prows head-on revealed that enemies were approaching, then panic fell upon them. Since there was no hope of resistance, both because of the unwieldly type of vessel and because the Galatians could hardly withstand an undisturbed voyage, some of them, who were nearer to the mainland, swam ashore at Erythrae and some set sail for Chios, ran their ships aground, and abandoning their horses fled in rout to the city. But as the scoutships put troops ashore nearer the city at a more convenient landing-place, the Macedonians overtook the Galatians and cut them down, partly as they fled along the road and partly when they were shut out of the city gates. For the Chians had closed their gates, not knowing who were fleeing or who pursuing.The move by Eumenes to add to Attalus' force indicates that Livy's charges of treachery against Eumenes were none too well founded. The exact course of the action described is not clear from the account in Livy's usual impressionistic manner; but the Macedonian ships seem to have let the transports pass Subota, wherever that was, and then pursued, overtaking them between Phanae, the cape and harbour at the south end of Chios (cf. above, XXXVI. xliii. 11 and Strabo XIV. 1. 35) and Chios city. The Chians were allies of Rome. About eight hundred of the Galatians were killed and two hundred taken alive; some of the horses were destroyed in the sea as the ships were wrecked, some were hamstrung on shore by the Macedonians. Antenor ordered twenty horses of exceptional beauty, along with the prisoners, to be taken to Thessalonica by the same ten scout-ships he had sent before, which he ordered to return as soon as possible to the fleet; he said he would await them at Phanae.B.C. 168 For about three days the fleet anchored before the city. Then they moved on to Phanae, and setting sail on the unexpectedly early arrival of the ten scout-ships, crossed the Aegean Sea to Delos.

While these events were taking place, the Roman envoys,To Alexandria, cf. xix. 13. Gaius Popilius, Gaius Decimius, and Gaius Hostilius, set out from Chalcis in three five-banked ships and on arriving at Delos found there forty Macedonian scout-ships and five five-bankers of King Eumenes. The holiness of the temple and the island kept them all from harm. And so the Roman, the Macedonian, and Eumenes' sailors mingled in the temple under the truce provided by the sacredness of the place. Whenever signals came from the lookouts that any freight-ships were passing out at sea, Antenor, Perseus' officer, would himself pursue with some ships, while others of his ships were distributed among the Cyclades, and either sank or plundered every ship not sailing for Macedonia. Popilius would come to the rescue with what ships he had either of his own or Eumenes'; but the Macedonians would evade him by sailing at night mostly in groups of two or three ships.

At about this same time, the envoys from Macedonia and Illyria arrived together at Rhodes, and weight was lent their words not only by the arrival of the scoutships roaming all around the Cyclades and the Aegean Sea, but also by the very fact of the combination between the kings Perseus and Gentius, and the rumour of the arrival of the Gauls in great numbers both of infantry and cavalry. Since, then, the boldness of Dinon and Polyaratus, who sided with Perseus, was on the increase, not only was a cordialB.C. 168 response given to the kings, but the flat statement was made that the Rhodians would by their influence bring an end to the war, and that therefore the kings themselves should make up their minds calmly to accept peace.Livy is following Polybius XXIX. 11 (5). Polybius says that the loss of Eumenes' cavalry impressed the Rhodians, but does not mention the Gauls from the North; he does not make the Rhodians sound as cock-sure as does Livy.

By now spring was beginningIt was late April by the then Roman calendar, but actually early February, see below, xxxvii. 5-9. and the new commanders arrived in the field, the consul Aemilius in Macedonia, Octavius with the fleet at Oreüs, and in the region of Illyria, Anicius, whose task was the campaign against Gentius.The characterization of Gentius is based on Polybius XXIX. 13 (5). This king, the son of Pleuratus, king of the Illyrians, and Eurydice, had two brothers, Plator, a full brother, and Caravantius, born of the same mother. The latter Gentius suspected less because of the obscurity of his father, but the king killed Plator and two friends of his, Ettritus and Epicadus, energetic men, for the greater security of his reign. The rumour was that he envied his brother his betrothal to Etuta, daughter of Monunius the chieftain of the Dardani, since by this marriage Plator would secure the support of the Dardani; and Gentius made this really very probable by marrying the girl after the murder of Plator. Once the fear of his brother was removed, Gentius began to be oppressive to his people, and the violence innate in his character was inflamed by overuse of wine. However, when he had been stirred up to fight the Romans, as has been related above, he collected all his forces at Lissus. These were fifteen thousand men. From there he sent his brother with a thousand infantry and fifty cavalry to subdue theB.C. 168 tribe of the Cavii either by force or threats, while he himself advanced from Lissus five miles to the city of Bassania. The inhabitants were allied to the Romans; and so when overtures were made by messengers sent ahead of Gentius, they preferred to stand siege rather than to surrender. As Caravantius arrived among the Cavii, the town of Durnium received him hospitably; Caravandis, another city, shut him out; and while he was ravaging their territory far and wide, a few scattered soldiers were killed by the rallying farmers. By now Appius Claudius too had added auxiliaries of the Bullini and the citizens of Apollonia and Dyrrachium to the army he had with him, and had set out from winter quarters to a camp by the Genusus River, since he had heard of the treaty between Perseus and Gentius and was incensed by the mistreatment of the molested envoys, so that he was bent on campaigning against Gentius. About this time Anicius the praetor heard at Apollonia of affairs in the region of Illyria, and sending ahead orders to Appius to wait for him at the Genusus, he himself arrived in camp in three days. He added to the auxiliaries he had two thousand infantry and two hundred cavalry of the young men of the Parthini —Epicadus commanded the infantry, Algalsus the cavalry —and made ready to march into the region of Illyria, especially in order to relieve the siege of Bassania. His urgency was restrained by a rumour of scout-ships ravaging the coast. There were eighty of these ships, sent by Gentius at the suggestion of Pantauchus to plunder the territory of Dyrrachium and Apollonia. Then aB.C. 168 fleet at . . .Appian, Illyrian Wars ii. 9 says that Anicius captured some of Gentius' scout-ships and then engaged him in battle on land, defeated him, and shut him up in a fortress. . . . they surrendered.

Thereafter the cities of the region did the same, the turn of their thoughts being assisted by the mildness and justice of the Roman praetor. Next he arrived at Scodra, the centre of resistance not only because Gentius had appropriated it as the citadel for his whole kingdom, but also because it is the best-fortified town of the Labeate tribe, and is hard to approach. Two rivers surround it, the Clausal flowing by on the side of the city which faces eastward, the Barbanna on the west side, flowing from the Labeate Lake. (These two streams after joining fall into the Oriundes RiverThis river is elsewhere called the Drilon (modern Drin); in 1858, after a period during which the Drilon emptied to the south, and the Barbanna followed its own course to the sea, the Drin, in flood, resumed the course reported by Livy, and was maintaining it, except for some water following the southern channel, about 1940 (see the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1944, s. v. Albania). which rises on Mount Scordus, is swelled by many other streams, and falls into the Adriatic Sea. Mount Scordus, by far the highest of that region, overlooks Dardania to the eastward, Macedonia to the south, and the Illyrian region to the west.) Although the town was fortified by its surroundings and the whole nation of the Illyrians, as well as their, king, was defending it, nevertheless the Roman praetor decided that since his first moves had met with success, good fortune in the campaign as a whole would follow these beginnings, and that a fast-moving threat would be efficacious; so he advanced to the wall with his army in formation. If well-placed forces had shut the gates and defended the walls and gate-towers, they would have routed the Romans from the wall andB.C. 168 made their attempt worthless; as it was, they sallied from the gate and on level ground joined battle with more spirit than they maintained. For they were routed and huddled in flight, while over two hundred fell in the very mouth of the gate, and they brought in with them such panic that Gentius at once sent representatives named Teuticus and Bellus, leading men of the nation, to the praetor to ask for a truce so that the king might deliberate over his situation. When he was given three days for this purpose, he boarded a ship, since the Roman camp was about half a mile from the city, and sailed up the Barbanna River to Lake Labeate, as if seeking a secluded spot for taking council; actually, as became evident, he was stirred by an unfounded hope that his brother CaravantiusPossibly he had gone to a different region from that mentioned in the preceding chapter, and was among friends. would arrive with many thousands of soldiers gathered in the region to which he had been sent. After the talk about this had evaporated, on the third day he brought the same ship downstream to Scodra. First sending messengers to secure an opportunity for addressing the praetor and on being given the opportunity, he came into camp. At the outset of his speech he began by blaming his own stupidity, and at the end gave himself up to entreaties and a flood of tears, and falling at the praetor's knees, put himself into his hands. Immediately he was bidden to take heart, and after being invited to dinner, returned to his own people in the city. On that day he was banqueted with marks of distinction by the praetor, and then put under the guard of Gaius Cassius, tribune of the soldiers, after having received a mere ten talents, hardly the fee ofB.C. 168 a gladiator, though he was a king dealing with a king, to induce him to sink to such misfortune.

On taking over Scodra, Anicius' very first order was that the ambassadors Petilius and Perpenna should be searched out and brought to him. When they had been restored to a properly dignified state, he immediately sent Perpenna to arrest the friends and relatives of the king. Perpenna set out for Meteon, the city of the Labeate tribe, and brought to camp at Scodra Etleva,We cannot determine whether this is another queen, or whether the name Etuta in xxx. 4 refers to the same woman. the queen, with her two children, Scerdilaedus and Pleuratus, and Caravantius the king's brother. After completing the Illyrian campaign within thirty days, Anicius sent Perpenna to Rome as messenger of this victory, and a few days later sent on King Gentius himself with his mother, wife, children, and brother, as well as other leading Illyrians. This campaign was unique in that its conclusion was reported at Rome before its beginning.

During the time that this was going on, Perseus also was in great fear because of the arrival not only of Aemilius the new consul, who he heard had come on the scene bringing dire threats, but also of Octavius the praetor. The king was feeling equally keenly the threat from the Roman fleet and the danger to the coastal area. At Thessalonica, Eumenes and Athenagoras were in command with a small garrison of two thousand light infantry.Cf, XLII. li. 4 and the note. To that place Perseus sent the officer Androcles also, under orders to encamp right by the dockyards. To Aenea a thousand cavalry under Creon of Antigonea were sent to protect the coastal area, in order to come at once toB.C. 168 the aid of the country folk at any point on the shore where they heard that enemy ships had put in. Five thousand Macedonians were sent to garrison Pythoüs and Petra,These places guarded a pass north of Mount Olympus by which the position at the Elpeüs might have been taken in the rear. the commanders being Histiaeus, Theogenes, and Midon. When these forces had left, Perseus set himself to fortifying the bank of the Elpeüs, because its dry bed could be crossed. In order that his entire force might be free for this operation, women gathered from the near-by cities brought foodstuffs into camp; the soldiers, under orders, from the woods near by generously . . .Further preparations of Perseus and the arrival of Paulus at the Roman camp were described in this gap.

... to gather, and finally he ordered the water-carriers to follow him to the sea, which was less than three-tenths of a mile away, and to dig wells on the beach, some here, some there, at slight intervals. The immense height of the mountains,Plutarch, Aemilius xiv. 1, says that the green woods on the slopes indicated abundant ground-water. especially inasmuch as they produced no visible rivers, gave him the hope that underneath were hidden streams, the veins of which trickled through to the sea and mingled with the salt water. Hardly had the uppermost sand been penetrated when jets of water spurted out, at first muddy and slight, but then proceeding to pour out, as if by a miracle, with clear and copious water. This success too gave the commander no little glory and power of leadership with the soldiers. Then when the soldiers were ordered to put their weapons in condition, the consul with the tribunes and ranking centurions went forward to reconnoitre the crossings, in order to find out where the way down was easy for men under arms and whereB.C. 168 on the farther bank there was the least unfavourable way up. After gathering sufficient information on these points, he introduced other changes, too; in the first place, he saw to it that everything in the column should take place in good order and without confusion at the beck and call of the commander; when orders were given to the whole army at once and not all were within hearing, he said, some, after receiving an unclear order, made additions of their own and did more than was bidden, while others did less; hence discordant outcries arose everywhere and the enemy found out what was afoot sooner than one's own men. Therefore the consul decided that the tribune of the soldiers should first give an order privately to the chief centurion of the legion, and he and his subordinates in rank should then each tell to the next in rankCenturions ranked according to their place in the formation of the legion, cf. e.g. XLII. xxxiv. 5-8. what was to be done, whether the order was to be passed from the head of the column to the rear, or from the last to the first. The consul also made the innovation of forbidding sentries to carry a shieldPlutarch, Aemilius xiii. 5, says a spear. on post; for he said that a sentry is not going into combat to use his weapons, but is to keep on guard so that when he perceives the approach of the enemy, he may retire and rouse the others to arms. Men set the shield before them and stand there, helmet on head; then when they are tired, they lean on the spear, rest the head on the shield-rim, and stand there drowsing, so that with their shining armour they can be detected by the enemy from afar, while they themselves do not see ahead at all. The consul also changed the practice of the outposts. All were used to spending the entire day under arms, cavalry with their horses bridled; when this took place on summer days under an unremitting -andB.C. 168 burning sun, after so many hours of heat and weariness the tired men and horses were often attacked by fresh enemy troops and superior numbers thrown into confusion by even a few. So he gave orders that men on duty in the morning should be relieved at noon by a different afternoon detail; in this way a fresh enemy could never attack tired men.

After he had announced to an assembly of the soldiers the decision to adopt these measures, the consul added a speech in the vein of his address in Rome:

There should be a single general in an army who foresees and plans what should be done, sometimes by himself, sometimes with the advisers he calls into council. Those who are not called into council should not air their own views publicly or privately. A soldier should concern himself with the following: his body, to keep it as strong and as nimble as possible; the good condition of his weapons; and the readiness of his food-supply for unexpected orders. For the rest, he should realize that the immortal gods and his general are taking care of him. In an army in which the soldiers deliberate and the general is led about by the gossip of the rank and file, conditions are utterly unsound. For my part, I shall do the duty of a general —that is, see to it that you have an opportunity for successful action. You ought not to ask what is going to happen, but when the signal is given, then do your duty as soldiers.

After these instructions, he dismissed the assembly, while throughout the army even the veterans admitted that they, like raw recruits, had for the first time learned how military matters should be handled. Not only did they show by such remarks with howB.C. 168 much approval they had heard the words of the consul, but there was also an immediate response in action. Soon you could have seen no one idle in the whole camp; some were sharpening swords, others were polishing helmets and cheek-pieces, still others shields and coats of mail; some were fitting their armour to their bodies and trying the nimbleness of their bodies under arms, others were brandishing spears, others fencing with their swords and inspecting the pointThe Romans relied chiefly on the thrust, cf. Vegetius I. 12. ; so that anyone could easily see that as soon as an opportunity of joining battle with the enemy had been given, they would put an end to the war either by a glorious victory or by a death that would go down in history.

When Perseus, too, noticed that on the arrival of the consul and the beginning of spring everything in the enemy camp was full of noise and bustle as if the war were just beginning, that the camp had been shifted from Phila to the bank opposite the Macedonians, and the hostile commander was now going about to view Perseus' defences, no doubt because he was reconnoitring a passage, now .. .According to Plutarch, Aemilius xv, a period of startling inactivity on both sides ensued. The words with which the text resumes may conclude an account of how the news of Gentius' defeat arrived in the two camps. . of the Romans was.

This affair raised the spirits of the Romans. It also brought no little panic to the Macedonians and their king. At first he tried to hide the report of the event in secret, by sending men to forbid Pantauchus, who was coming from there, to approach the camp. But now some boys were seen by their relatives being led along with the Illyrian hostages and the more carefully the various details wereB.C. 168 concealed, the more easily they leaked out through the garrulity of the king's servants.

About the same time envoys from Rhodes came into camp with the same message about peace which had aroused great wrath in the senators at Rome. They received a much less favourable audience from the council in the camp. So while some advised that the envoys be thrown into chains, others that they be driven headlong out of camp without an answer, the consul announced that he would make a reply a fortnight later. Meanwhile, to make it clear how much influence the Rhodian peace-makers had succeeded in exerting, he began to hold consultations as to the plan of campaign. Some, especially the younger, wished to force a way through the bank of the Elpeüs and the fortifications; a solid formation, they said, attacking in single column would be irresistible to the Macedonians, who had the previous year been driven out of so many forts,This is contrary to the picture given by Livy above, chs. iv-vii, and seems to be inserted to show that the speakers estimated the situation incorrectly. rather higher and better fortified and held with strong garrisons. Others advised that Octavius with his fleet should make for Thessalonica and by ravaging the coastal area create a diversion of the king's forces, so that on the appearance of another attack in his rear the king would be pulled about to guard the inner part of his kingdom and be compelled to open a crossing somewhere over the Elpeüs. The consul himself regarded the riverbank as impregnable by nature and by fortification and, besides the fact that artillery had been placed everywhere, he had heard that the enemy employed missile weapons better and with more deadly aim.B.C. 168 The whole thought of the Roman commander inclined in a different direction; and dismissing his council, he summoned the Perrhaebian merchants Coenus and Menophilus, men already known to him for loyalty and wisdom, and secretly inquired what the passes into Perrhaebia were like. When they said that the terrain was not difficult, but was blocked by the king's guard-forces,Plutarch, Aemilius xv and xvi. 1, says that the passes were not guarded at this time, but that Perseus sent a force after hearing that Romans, under Nasica, were on the march to Pythium. Plutarch cites Polybius and Nasica himself for the story of the dislodging of the Macedonians. the consul conceived the hope that the guards could be dislodged if he attacked suddenly by night with a strong force and surprised them; for, he argued, javelins, arrows, and other missiles are useless in the dark when the target cannot be sighted at a distance; the sword is the weapon used at close quarters in a confused throng, and with that weapon the Roman soldier would win. Planning to use the abovementioned merchants as guides, the consul summoned the praetor Octavius, explained his plans, and ordered him to sail for Heracleum with the fleet and have ten days' cooked rations for a thousand men. For his own part, he sent Publius Scipio Nasica and his own son Quintus Fabius MaximusAs explained by Plutarch, Aemilius xv, this was the elder of Aemilius' sons by his first wife; the younger became Scipio Africanus the Younger, cf. below, xliv. 1-2. After divorcing his wife, remarrying, and having two more sons(for whom see below, XLV. xl. 7), Aemilius gave the older pair in adoption. Fabius was about eighteen at this time; his adoption had taken place about ten years before. with five thousand picked menPlutarch, following Nasica and correcting Polybius, lists three thousand Italians (special troops —e)kto\s ta/cews =extraordinarii?), five thousand of the left wing (= sinistra ala, i.e. cavalry?), 120 cavalry, and 200 mixed Thracians and Cretans. to Heracleum, in order to feign an embarkation for the purpose of the plan mentioned in the council, namely, of ravaging the coastal area of inner Macedonia. Scipio and Fabius were privately informed that food was ready for them at the fleet,B.C. 168 so that they would not be delayed. Next, the guides were instructed to arrange the stages of the journey so that they could attack Pythoüs in the fourth watch of the third day. Next day at dawn the consul himself, in order to keep the king from investigating the other projects, joined battle with the enemy's outposts in the middle of the river-bed. The fight was conducted with light-armed troops on both sides. It was impossible to fight with heavier troops in so rough a stream-bed. The slope of either bank to the bottom was about three hundred paces; between the banks, a space of a little over a mile lay open where the torrent had hollowed it out in varying degrees from place to place. There the fight took place in sight of the watchers from the walls of both camps, the king on one side, the consul and his legions on the other. The king's light troops fought better at long range with missiles; at close quarters the Romans were steadier, and better protected by either the cavalry targe or the Ligurian rectangular shield.This is based on Polybius XXIX. 14. 4; the Ligurian shield was long and light, according to Diodorus V. 39. 7. About noon the consul ordered the recall to be sounded for his men. So that day the fight was broken off with no small losses to both sides. At sunrise the next day an even sharper fight took place, since their spirits had been roused by the combat. But the Romans received a great many wounds not only from those with whom the fight had been joined, but much more from the large numbers posted on the towers with all sorts of missile weapons and stones. As they came nearer to the enemy's bank, the shots from the engines reached even the rear ranks. After far more severe losses that day, the consul recalled his men somewhat later. On the third day, he desisted from battle and went down toB.C. 168 the lower side of the camp as if he were going to attempt the crossing through the spur of the fortifications which ran down to the sea. What was before Perseus' eyes ...Judging from Plutarch, Aemilius xvi, the lost four sheets told of the success of Nasica in clearing the pass, Perseus' fright and retreat, and his subsequent resolve to make a stand at Pydna; also of the joining of Nasica with Paulus and the overtaking of the Macedonians.

The season was that immediately following the turn of midsummerSee below, xxxvii. 5-8 and note 1; by the then calendar, it was Sept. 3. ; the time of day was approaching noon; the journey had been made through much dust and an ever-hotter sun. Weariness and thirst now began to make themselves felt, and since it was presently obvious that midday would intensify the blazing heat, the consul decided not to expose men so weakened to a fresh and unwearied enemy; but such zeal was in their hearts for fighting at all costs that the consul needed as much skill to out manoeuvre his own men as the enemy. Since all were not yet in formation, he urged on the tribunes of the soldiers to hasten the deployment; he himself went about the ranks and was engaged in rousing the spirits of the men to battle by exhortation. At this they first kept eagerly calling for the signal; then, in proportion as the heat increased their countenances were less lively and their cries slacker, and some stood lolling on their shields and leaning on their spears. Then the consul proceeded openly to give the order to the ranking centurions to layout the front of the camp and place the baggage.Which was placed next the wall of the camp. When the soldiers perceived that this was being done, some rejoiced openly that he had not compelled men wearied by the toil of marching to fight a battle in scorching heat. Surrounding the general were his staff and the foreign commanders, among whom wasB.C. 168 Attalus, all showing approval as long as they believed the consul was going to fight (for he had not revealed his doubts even to them); then at the sudden change of plan they were all silent except Nasica, who alone dared to advise the consul not to loose his grasp on an enemy who had baffled previous generals by avoiding an encounter. Nasica feared that if the enemy departed by night, he would have to be pursued with the greatest toil and risk into the interior of Macedonia, and that the summer would be wasted, as under previous leaders,As far as Livy's account goes, this applies only to Marcius, above, vi-x. in roaming about the bypaths and passes of the Macedonian mountains; for his own part he strongly urged attack while the consul had the enemy in open country, so as not to lose the opportunity for victory which had been offered. The consul, nothing offended by the outspoken warning from so famous a young man, replied:

I too have had the spirit which you now have, Nasica, and you will come to have the spirit I now have. From many vicissitudes of war I have learned when to fight and when to refuse battle. There is not time to instruct you while you are standing-to for battle as to the reasons why it is better to be inactive today. You shall ask for my reasoning at another time; now you will be satisfied to take the word of an experienced general.

The young man held his tongue, thinking that no doubt the consul saw some obstacles to battle which he himself did not envisage.

After Paulus saw that the camp had been laid out and the baggage placed, he quietly withdrew the rear formation first from behind the battle-line, next the chief formation, while the forwardB.C. 168 formation stood its ground at the front of the battle-line, in case the enemy should make a move; last of all he withdrew the forward formation, taking the soldiers of one maniple at a time, starting with the right wing. In this way, while the cavalry and the light-armed troops faced the enemy from in front of the battle-line, the infantry were withdrawn without confusion, and the cavalry were not called away from their posts until the facade of the rampart and the ditch facing the enemy had been completed. Although the king would have been prepared to fight that day without reluctance, he was satisfied to let it be seen that the delay was due to the enemy, and he too withdrew his forces into camp.

After the fortification of the camp was complete, Gaius Sulpicius Gallus,He is mentioned by Cicero, De Senectute xiv. 49 as a geometer and astronomer. For his praetorship, see XLIII. ii. 5. Pliny, Nat. Hist. II. xii. 53, Frontinus I. xii. 8, and Zonaras 9. 23 speak of a prediction by Sulpicius; Justinus 33. 1. 7, Cicero, De Republica I. xv. 23, Valerius Maximus 8. 11. 1, and Plutarch, Aemilius xvii say that the explanation followed the eclipse. A fragment of Polybius XXIX. 16 (6) states that the eclipse was interpreted as portending the fall of a king; therefore it cheered the Romans and discouraged the Macedonians, see below, sec. 9. Modern reckoning sets the date of the eclipse as June 21, which would mean that the calendar was at least 70 days ahead of time, cf. p. 87, Appendix. tribune of the soldiers with the second legion, who had been praetor the year before, summoned the soldiers to an assembly, by permission of the consul, and announced that no one should regard it as a bad omen when on the following night an eclipse of the moon would take place from the second to the fourth hour of the night. Since this occurred in the regular order of nature at certain times, said Sulpicius, it could be calculated ahead of time and foretold. Therefore just as they were not surprised —inasmuch as both the risings and the settings of the sun and moon are well understood —when they saw the moon shining now full, now during its wane with a narrow arc, no more ought they to count it a prodigy that the moon is darkened whenever it is hidden in the shadow of the earth.B.C. 168 On the night preceding the 4th of September, when the moon was eclipsed at the predicted hour, the Roman soldiers regarded the wisdom of Gallus as almost divine; the Macedonians took it as a dire portent, foretelling the downfall of the kingdom and the nation, and no soothsayer shook their conviction. There was uproar and wailing in the Macedonian camp until the moon emerged to shine as usual.

On the following day, so great was the eagerness of both armies for battle that some of their followers blamed both the king and the consul for separating without a fight. The king had a rejoinder ready at hand: not only that the enemy had taken the lead in openly declining battle and leading his men back to camp, but that he had posted his forces in a position to which the phalanx could not be advanced, since even slightly unfavourable terrain makes a phalanx useless. As for the consul, besides his seeming loss of an opportunity for battle on the previous day and his giving the enemy a chance of withdrawing by night if they wished, he seemed on this day too to be wasting time on the pretext of offering sacrifice, although he should have given the signal at dawn and gone out to battle.Plutarch, Aemilius xvii. 6, says that the consul's sacrifice to Heracles obtained good omens only with the twenty-first victim; also that the consul waited till the afternoon so that the sun would not be in the eyes of his troops. At the third hour, after due completion of the sacrifice, he at last called a council, and in doing so seemed to some to be expending in talk and untimely advisement the time needed for carrying out action. In reply to such talk the consul delivered the following speech:

"That excellent young man, Publius Nasica, alone among all those who favoured fightingB.C. 168 yesterday disclosed his opinion to me; he too kept silent later, so that he may have seemed to have exchanged his view for mine. Certain others thought it better to criticize their general behind his back rather than to advise him openly. Both to you, Publius Nasica, and to any others who less openly shared your opinion, I shall not hesitate to give an accounting for having postponed the battle. For I am so far from regretting our inactivity yesterday that I believe I saved the army by so planning. That none of you may believe me to hold this opinion groundlessly, come let each, if he please, review with me how many factors weighed for the enemy and against us. First of all, of their great superiority in numbers I am sure that you were all previously aware, and that you took notice of it on seeing the battle-line drawn up yesterday. Out of this small force of ours, one-fourth of the men were left to guard the baggage; and you know that the guarding of the packs is not put in the hands of the most cowardly. But suppose we had been united: can we possibly consider it a small advantage that we shall go out, with the good help of the gods,For similar expressions of precautionary piety, see VI. xxiii. 10, VII. xxxii. 17, XXI. xxi. 6. from this camp in which we have spent last night, to do battle either today or at latest tomorrow if we so determine? Does it make no difference whether you bid a soldier take up arms and lead him into battle when he is wearied neither by the toil of a journey nor by construction on that day, when he is rested and refreshed in his own tent, when he is full of strength and vigorous in body and in spirit? Or whether he is wearied by a long march and tired by his load,B.C. 168 dripping with sweat, his throat dry with thirst, his mouth and eyes full of dust, with the midday sun beating down upon him? Will you pit him against an enemy fresh and rested, who brings into battle a strength unsapped by previous exertion? Who, by the gods' good faith, when he is thus matched, sluggish though he be and unwarlike, will not overcome the bravest fighter?

"What of the fact that the enemy had drawn up their line completely at leisure, had made ready their spirits, were standing each at his post in the ranks, while we at that time had to incur the hasty turmoil of drawing up our line and had to enter battle in disorder? Oh yes, you say, we should have had a battle-line undeployed and disorderly; but our camp was fortified, our water-supply found, the way to it secured by placing guards, and reconnaissance made all around. Or did our men have nothing but the bare ground on which to fight . . .? Your ancestors regarded a fortified camp as a haven against all the mischances of an army, whence they might go out to fight, and whither they might find shelter from the storm of battle. Therefore when they had walled in their camp with fortifications, they used also to strengthen it with a powerful garrison, because one who had been stripped of his camp, even though he had won the battle, would be considered the loser. Camp is the shelter of the conqueror, the refuge of the conquered. How many armies meeting with none too favourable fortune in battle, after being driven within their rampart, have in their own good time, sometimes after only a moment, sallied forth and routed the victorious enemy? This abode is a second home for the soldier, its rampart takes the place ofB.C. 168 city walls and his own tent is the soldier's dwelling and hearthside. Should we have fought like nomads with no abode, so that, whether conquered or conquerors, we might return —where?

"To this statement of the difficulties and hindrances to battle, here is the rejoinder: what if the enemy had departed during the interval of last night? How much toil would we have had to expend in the renewed pursuit far into the utmost end of Macedonia? For my part I am sure that he would never have remained here or led his forces out into battle-line had he decided to retreat from here. For how much easier it would have been to depart while we were at a distance than now when we are on his neck and he cannot trick us by leaving either by night or day? What more can we wish than to attack our enemy in open country from the rear of his retreating and dispersed column after he has left his fortifications, instead of attacking, as we have attempted to do, his camp protected by the lofty bank of a river, and barricaded as well with a rampart and plenty of towers?

These were my reasons for postponing battle from yesterday to today. For I too prefer to fight; and therefore since the way to the enemy was barred by the Elpeüs River, I have opened a new road by expelling the enemy's guards from a different pass, and I will not turn back till I have fought to a finish.

After this speech silence ensued, partly because men had changed over to his opinion, partly because they shrank from offending him to no purpose in a matter which was in any case a lost opportunity and could not be brought back. Nor even on that day did either the consul or the kingB.C. 168 care to fight, the king because he would have had to attack men no longer weary from travel as on the previous day, nor in turmoil as they marshalled their line of battle and hardly in formation, the consul because neither wood nor fodder had been collected in the new camp and a large number of soldiers had gone out of camp to seek them from the near-by countryside. Without either general wishing it, Fortune, which is stronger than human planning, brought on the battle. There was a stream of no great size nearer the camp of the enemy, from which both the Macedonians and the Romans were drawing water after posting guards on either bank in order to accomplish this mission safely. There were two cohorts on the Roman side, a Marrucinian and a Paelignian, and two troops of Samnite cavalry under the command of the staff-officer Marcus Sergius Silus; another fixed outpost was stationed before the camp under the staff-officer Gaius Cluvius, composed of three cohorts, from Firmum, the Vestini, and Cremona respectively, and two troops of cavalry from Placentia and Aesernia.The Marrucini, Paeligni, Samnites, and Vestini were Italian allies of the Romans; Firmum, Cremona, Placentia, and Aesernia were colonies with Latin rights. While there was quiet at the river, since neither side took the offensive, about the ninth hour a baggage-animal shied from the hands of his grooms and escaped toward the other bank.Plutarch credits Aemilius with ordering a horse to be let loose, in order to bring on the battle. While three soldiers were chasing him through the water, which was about knee-deep, two Thracians dragged the animal from mid-stream to their bank; the Romans pursued them, killed one, recaptured the animal, and retired to their post.B.C. 168 There was a guard of eight hundred Thracians on the Macedonian bank. At first a few of these, angry at the killing of their fellow-countryman before their eyes, crossed the river in pursuit of the killers, then more went, and finally the whole force, and with the guard . .Two leaves of the MS. are missing at this point. Judging from Plutarch, these pages contained a description of the advance of the armies from camp, their battle-order, skirmishing by the light-armed troops in which the Macedonians had the advantage, the charge of the Paelignians against some Macedonian light infantry and their collision with the phalanx (cf. below, sec. 9), and perhaps the impression made on Aemilius by the phalanx, an impression which he was careful not to show at the time.

... led... the battle. The men were stirred by the prestige of his office, the fame of the man, and above all by his age, for though he was over sixty he kept assuming functions of men in their prime in undergoing an outstanding amount of toil and danger. The legion filled the space between the light infantry and the phalanxes and broke the enemy line. In the rear were the light infantry; the consul faced a unit with metal shields —these were called the Bronze Shields. Lucius Albinus the ex-consul was ordered to lead the second legion against the White Shield phalanxPlutarch speaks of this unit as having gilded armour. ; this was the centre of the hostile line. On the right wing, where the battle had begun near the river, the consul brought up the elephants and the squadrons of the allies; and from this point the flight of the Macedonians first began. For, as frequently men's new inventions appear strong when described, but in actual trial, when there is need for action rather than a description of how they will act, these inventions disappear without achieving any result, so in this battle the anti-elephant corps was a mere name without practical effect.Zonaras 9. 22 (p. 269) says that these were infantry with sharp spikes projecting from their helmets and shields, and also cavalry, both forces having been drilled to fight elephants; dummy elephants were used to accustom the horses to them. The words of Livy at the beginning of sec. 4 seem to be a direct quotation from Polybius XXIX. 17. 2 (12). The chargeB.C. 168 of the elephants was followed up by the allies of the Latin Name, who routed the left wing. In the centre the charge of the second legion scattered the phalanx. No reason for the victory was more obvious than the fact that there were many scattered engagements which first threw into confusion and then disrupted the wavering phalanx. The power of this formation when closed up and bristling with spears extended is irresistible; but if by attacks at several points you compel them to swing their spears about, unwieldy because of their length and weight, they become tangled in a haphazard mass; and if indeed some sort of uproar is heard on a flank or from the rear, they are involved in utter confusion. Such was the case on this occasion, when the phalanx was compelled to meet the Romans who were attacking in groups, while the Macedonian line was broken at many points. The Romans for their part kept infiltrating their units wherever gaps presented themselves. If they had attacked frontally in solid line against an orderly phalanx, as happened to the Paelignians who at the beginning of the battle recklessly met the light infantry, the Romans would have spitted themselves on the spears and would not have withstood the solid line.A variant account of the battle is given by Frontinus II. iii. 20, who says that Paulus arranged his line in wedges, and tried to draw out the Macedonians by attacking with skirmishers (velites); when this failed, Paulus retreated, to induce the Macedonians to break formation; when this also failed, the Roman cavalry from the left wing were ordered to charge along the front of the phalanx and break off the spear-points with their shields; when this manoeuvre succeeded, the Macedonians broke and fled. Livy seems to have a far preferable account.

However, while the infantry were being slaughtered all over the field, except for those who cast away their weapons and fled, the cavalry on the other hand retired from the fight almost unscathed.B.C. 168 The king himself was the leader in the flight. Directly from Pydna he set out for Pella with the Sacred Squadrons of cavalry; immediately Cotys and the Odrysan cavalry followed them. The other Macedonian squadrons also continued to retreat in orderly formation because the line of the infantry in between kept the victors busy with slaughter and caused them to forget the pursuit of the cavalry. For a long time the phalanx was cut to pieces from the front, from the flanks, and from the rear. Finally those who slipped through the hands of the Romans fled weaponless to the sea, and some even entered the water and raising their hands to the men on board ship humbly begged for life. When they saw small boats gathering from all around the fleet, they thought that these were coming to pick them up, to take them prisoner rather than to kill them, and so they advanced farther into the water, some even swimming. But when they were mercilessly cut down from the boats, those who could made for shore again by swimming and ran into a more dreadful form of destruction; for the elephants, guided by their mahouts to the shore, trampled and crushed the men coming out of the water.