[35]
10. But I am afraid someone may wonder why I am
now separating the virtues—as if it were possible for
anyone to be just who is not at the same time wise;
for it is agreed upon among all philosophers, and
I myself have often argued, that he who has one
virtue has them all. The explanation of my apparent inconsistency is that the precision of speech we
employ, when abstract truth is critically investigated
in philosophic discussion, is one thing; and that
employed, when we are adapting our language
entirely to popular thinking, is another. And therefore I am speaking here in the popular sense, when
[p. 205]
I call some men brave, others good, and still others
wise; for in dealing with popular conceptions we
must employ familiar words in their common acceptation; and this was the practice of Panaetius likewise.
But let us return to the subject.
M. Tullius Cicero. De Officiis. With An English Translation. Walter Miller. Cambridge. Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass., London, England. 1913.
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